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 Abstract 
 
The thesis is conducted on the international experiment in the 
transfer of the state-owned enterprises to the private sector (privatization), 
concentrating on the legal aspects of the process. The Sudanese 
experiment has been assessed in comparison with the international 
models. 
To illustrate the international experience, the researcher has 
exploited a considerable number of the relevant international legal 
references of privatization and the publications of the World Bank. 
Locally, the researcher has relied upon the information presented to him 
by the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, the Department of 
Legal Affairs of the Central Bank of Sudan, and the annual reports of the 
two committees concerned with the privatization operations in the Sudan, 
precisely the Higher and Technical Committees for Disposition of Public 
Enterprises. The two Committees presented a large number of the 
significant privatization contracts to the researcher. Furthermore, a 
considerable number of the privatized enterprises personnel have been 
interviewed.  
In the light of the international experiment, any government 
interested to implement a privatization program should prepare a 
privatization strategy which determines the economic objectives of the 
program as well as the legal formulas of the privatization contracts. The 
privatization strategy should also determine and ultimately abolish the 
valid legislations which may hinder the program. For example, a 
legislation which grants a monopolistic situation for the enterprise to be 
privatized should be abolished, for instance; whereas any legislation 
which encourages competition has to be activated and encouraged. 
Among the significant results of the study is the detection of the 
widening of the concept of privatization to include other types of 
privatization manifested in lease and management contracts, beside the 
sales contracts to which it used to be confined. There is also an 
international tendency towards the adoption of the contracts which avoid 
the state the full transfer of the state-owned enterprises. The Sudanese 
government, for instance, has extensively activated sale contracts which 
has restricted the opportunities for further future control over the 
privatized enterprises.  
The execution of privatization program may clash with the 
constitutional articles which restrict the transfer of state-owned 
enterprises to private sector. This is obviously prevalent in the countries 
of communist/socialist history prior to economic liberalization. These 
xiii 
 
articles should be amended before the commencement of any 
privatization operation as this may lead to legal obstacles which may 
ultimately eradicate the program. 
Concerning the institutional framework of privatization, some 
governments have assigned the execution of the program to the 
administrative personnel of the enterprises to be privatized, while others 
preferred to delegate neutral committees for the supervision of the 
proceedings. The Sudanese government has adopted the latter choice to 
guarantee neutrality and transparency of action. 
Some countries relied upon the existing public sector management 
legislations in administering the privatization programs, whereas others 
enacted detached legislations for the execution of the programs. The 
study has, however, recommended the use of the public sector 
management legislations if they clearly decide the right to take decisions 
with respect to the enterprise to be privatized. In the case of absence of 
legislation or ambiguity, the government has to enact detached legislation 
to organize and supervise the activities. According to the study results, 
the Sudanese government has succeeded in the enactment of a detached 
legislation to organize the process of the privatization. 
Due to the typical big size of the infrastructure sectors, 
governments all over the world have adopted the “Unbundling” technique 
which means the division of the sector to be privatized into smaller 
segments so as to facilitate the contribution of the private sector by 
lowering the costs. On the other hand, it enables the government to 
control the sectors maintaining the ownership of the strategic segments in 
particular. The Sudanese government used this technique in many 
privatization operations. 
Privatization activities usually lead to loss of employment. 
Therefore, in countries where social security nets are weak, or due to 
failure to secure the funds necessitated by the compensational procedure, 
the research recommends the method of “Generous Severance Payment”. 
This method has been adopted by many countries because it secures the 
financing required and evades the problems created by the delay of 
monthly payments of pensions. Use can be made of proceeds of 
privatization. Because of the practicability of this method, the World 
Bank has contributed to the financing of this method in many countries 
across the world. Due to some crisis between the Sudanese government 
and the international community, the Sudanese government has not 
benefited from these facilities.  
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  ﻣﺴﺘﺨﻠﺺ
ﻳﺘﻨﺎول هﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ ﺗﺤﻮﻳﻞ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ اﻷﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﻘﻄﺎع 
 ﺑﻴﻦ  اﻟﺒﺤﺚ وﻳﻘﺎرن ، ﻣﻊ اﻟﺘﺮآﻴﺰ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺠﻮاﻧﺐ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﻌﻤﻠﻴﺔ)noitazitavirP(اﻟﺨﺎص 
 . ﺑﻬﺬا اﻟﺼﺪد اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ واﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ
ﻲ ﻋﺪد ﻣﻘﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺮاﺟﻊ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﺮﺻﺪ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﻌﺎﻟﻤﻴﺔ ﻓﻘﺪ ﻟﺠﺄ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ إﻟ
اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ، آﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ إﻃﻠﻊ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻣﻨﺸﻮرات اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻨﺎول 
ﻟﺪراﺳﺔ وﺗﺤﻠﻴﻞ اﻟﺘﺠﺮﺑﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ ﻓﻘﺪ إﻋﺘﻤﺪ . اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻮاﺣﻲ اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ واﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ 
رة اﻟﻤﺎﻟﻴﺔ واﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎد اﻟﻮﻃﻨﻲ ، وآﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺣﺼﻞ ﻋﻠﻴﻬﺎ ﻣﻦ وزا
آﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ وﻓﺮأﻋﻀﺎء اﻟﻠﺠﻨﺘﻴﻦ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ واﻟﻔﻨﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﺮف . داﺋﺮة اﻟﺸﺆون اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﻤﺮآﺰي 
ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻖ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت وإﺣﺼﺎءات ﻓﻲ ﻏﺎﻳﺔ اﻷهﻤﻴﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺎﺣﺚ وذﻟﻚ ﺑﻤﺪﻩ ﺑﺠﻤﻴﻊ اﻟﺘﻘﺎرﻳﺮ 
ﻟﺨﺼﺼﺔ ﻣﻨﺬ ﺑﺪاﻳﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﻴﻖ اﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻓﻲ  وﺑﻌﺪد آﺒﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻋﻘﻮد ا اﻟﺴﻨﻮﻳﺔ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ
آﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻘﺪ إﻋﺘﻤﺪ اﻟﺒﺎﺣﺚ . اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻓﻲ أواﺋﻞ ﺗﺴﻌﻴﻨﺎت اﻟﻘﺮن اﻟﻤﺎﺿﻲ وﺣﺘﻲ ﺗﺎرﻳﺦ إآﻤﺎل اﻟﺒﺤﺚ 
  .   ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻠﻘﺎءات اﻟﻤﺒﺎﺷﺮة ﻣﻊ إدارات اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻤﺖ ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺘﻬﺎ
 ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﻗﺒﻞ اﻟﺪﺧﻮل ﻓﻲ إﻧﻔﺎذوﻟﻲ أﻧﻪ إﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ  ﻓﻘﺪ  اﻟﺪولربﺎﺗﺠﻟﻲ إ ﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮﺑ
. ﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ أن ﺗﻌﺪ إﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ  ﻟﻠﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ اﻟ اﻟﺪﺧﻮل ﻓﻲ ﺗﻨﻮيﻟﻠﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻻ ﺑﺪ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ 
هﺪاف اﻹﻗﺘﺼﺎدﻳﺔ ﻟﻠﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ، وﺗﺤﺪد ﺗﺤﺪد اﻷإﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ هﻲ اﻟﺨﻄﺔ اﻟﺸﺎﻣﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ 
آﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ إﻟﻐﺎؤﻩ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت ﻗﺎﺋﻤﺔ ﻗﺪ ﺗﻌﻴﻖ إﻧﺴﻴﺎب اﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ، وﻣﺎ ﻳﺠﺐ إﺻﺪارﻩ ﻣﻦ 
 ﻓﺈن اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﻔﻞ أوﺿﺎﻋًﺎ إﺣﺘﻜﺎرﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺳﺒﻴﻞ اﻟﻤﺜﺎل.  ﺗﻴّﺴﺮ إﻧﺴﻴﺎب اﻟﺒﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت
ﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺸﺠﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ اﻟﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت اأﻣﺎ  واﺟﺒًﺎ ، ﻟﻠﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺮاد ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺘﻬﺎ  ﻳﺼﺒﺢ إﻟﻐﺎؤهﺎ أﻣﺮًا
  .أﻣﺮًا ﻣﻬﻤﺎﻳﺼﺒﺢ  إﺻﺪارهﺎ أو ﺗﻔﻌﻴﻠﻬﺎ ﻓﺈن
اﻟﺘﺼﺮﻓﺎت اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ آﺎﻹﻳﺠﺎر ﻳﺒﺮز اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أن ﻣﻔﻬﻮم اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻳﺘﺴﻊ ﻟﻴﺸﻤﻞ ﻋﺪدًا ﻣﻦ 
ﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻲ أﻧﻪ وﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ وﻗﺪ  . ﻓﻘﻂ وﻋﻘﻮد اﻻدارة ، وﻻ ﻳﻘﺘﺼﺮﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﻌﻘﻮد اﻟﻨﺎﻗﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ
ﺗﺠﻬﺖ ﻟﻠﻌﻘﻮد ﻏﻴﺮ اﻟﻨﺎﻗﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﻤﻠﻜﻴﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎﺗﻬﺎ ، ﻓﻘﺪ ﻣﺎﻟﺖ إن ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﺪول ﻗﺪ ﻣﻦ أ
 ﻣﻦ اﻟﺴﻴﻄﺮة ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ إﻟﻲ ﻋﻘﻮد اﻟﺒﻴﻊ اﻟﻨﻬﺎﺋﻲ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﻔﻘﺪهﺎ أي ﻧﻮع
  .ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻘﺒﻞ
م إﻧﻔﺎذ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻓﻲ دوﻟﺔ ﻣﺎ ﺑﺒﻌﺾ ﻣﻮاد اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻤﻨﻊ ﺻﺮاﺣﺔ ﻗﺪ ﻳﺼﻄﺪ
ﺖ  وﻳﺤﺪث ذﻟﻚ ﻏﺎﻟﺒﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ آﺎﻧ،ﻟﻲ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﺨﺎصإﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻮآﺔ ﻟﻠﺪوﻟﺔ ﺑﻴﻊ اﻟﻤ
ﻞ ات اﻟﻤﻌﻘﺪة اﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﺘﻄﻠﺒﻬﺎ ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻋﻠﻲ ﺿﻮء اﻻﺟﺮاء. ﻬﺎ ﺷﺘﺮاآﻴﺔ ﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﺤﺮﻳﺮ إﻗﺘﺼﺎداﺗإﺷﻴﻮﻋﻴﺔ أو 
 اﻟﺪﺧﻮل ﻓﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺘﺼﺮف  ﻓﻘﺪ ﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻲ وﺟﻮب ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻮاد ﻗﺒﻞﻣﻮاد اﻟﺪﺳﺘﻮر 
اﻟﻤﺴﺘﺜﻤﺮﻳﻦ ﻓﻲ ن اﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻗﺒﻞ ﺗﻌﺪﻳﻞ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻮاد ﻗﺪ ﻳﺆدي اﻟﻲ إﺷﻜﺎﻻت ﻗﺎﻧﻮﻧﻴﺔ ﺑﻴﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ وأذﻟﻚ 
 إﻟﻲ أﻧﻪ وﺑﺎﻟﺮﻏﻢ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ.  ﻗﺪ ﺗﻨﺴﻒ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ آﻜﻞاﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ
 ﻗﺪ ﺗﺒﻨﺖ أﻳﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺎت ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ ، ﻣﻦ ﺿﻤﻨﻬﺎ اﻷﻳﺪﻳﻮﻟﻮﺟﻴﺔ  ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدانأن اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻗﺒﺔ
اﻷﺷﺘﺮاآﻴﺔ ، ﻓﻘﺪ ﺧﻠﺖ اﻟﺪﺳﺎﺗﻴﺮ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻣﻦ  اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﻈﺮ إﻧﺘﻘﺎل ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم 
  .ﻟﻠﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﺨﺎص
اﻟﺬي و( krowemarF lanoitutitsnI ) ﻟﻠﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﺎﻻﻃﺎر اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﻲ ﻓﻲ
ﺚ اﻟﻲ  ﺗﻨﻔﻴﺬ ﺑﺮﻧﺎﻣﺞ اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ، ﻓﻘﺪ ﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺎت وواﺟﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﺸﺎرآﻴﻦ ﻓﻲﻣﺴﺆﻟﻴﺗﺤﺪﻳﺪ ﻳﺘﻮﻟﻲ 
ﺔ  ﻗﺪ إﺧﺘﺎرت أن ﺗﺘﻮﻟﻲ  إدارات اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺮاد ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺘﻬﺎ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼأن ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺪول
ن ﺗﺘﻮﻟﻲ ﻟﺠﻨﺔ ﻣﺤﺎﻳﺪة اﻻﺷﺮاف ﻋﻠﻲ ﺟﻤﻴﻊ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت أ رأي اﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻵﺧﺮﺑﻨﻔﺴﻬﺎ ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ 
 ، وﻗﺪ ﻓﻖ وذﻟﻚ ﻟﺪواﻋﻲ اﻟﺤﻴﺎد واﻟﺸﻔﺎﻓﻴﺔﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻲ ان اﻟﺨﻴﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ هﻮ اﻷو .اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ
 ﺑﺘﺸﻜﻴﻠﻬﺎ ﻟﻠﺠﻨﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻴﺎ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻖ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺘﺘﻮﻟﻲ اﺗﺒﻌﺖ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان اﻟﺨﻴﺎر اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ
   . اﻹﺷﺮاف ﻋﻠﻲ آﻞ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺒﻼد
 vx
 
 دارةﺈﺨﺼﺔ ﻋﻠﻲ ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎﺗﻬﺎ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺑﻟﺨﺼإﻋﺘﻤﺪت ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﺪول ﻓﻲ إﻧﻔﺎذ ﺑﺮاﻣﺞ ا
ﻟﻲ إﺻﺪار ﺗﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎت ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ ﻹﻧﻔﺎذ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﺒﺮاﻣﺞ  اﻷﺧﺮإ، ﺑﻴﻨﻤﺎ اﺗﺠﻪ اﻟﺒﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎمﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت
اذا اﻟﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻌﺎم ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎت ﺈدارة ﺑ  اﻟﻤﺘﻌﻠﻘﺔ ﺘﺸﺮﻳﻌﺎتﻪ ﻳﻤﻜﻦ اﻹﻋﺘﻤﺎد ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻲ أﻧ. 
 إﺻﺪار وإﻧﻔﺎذ اﻟﻘﺮار ﺑﺎﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻲ  واﺿﺤﺔ ﻓﻴﻤﺎ ﻳﺘﻌﻠﻖ ﺑﻤﻦ ﻟﻪ ﺣﻖﻣﻮادآﺎﻧﺖ ﺗﺤﺘﻮي ﻋﻠﻲ 
ﻳﺘﻮﺟﺐ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ إﺻﺪار ﺄﻧﻪ  أو ﻏﻤﻮﺿﻬﺎ ﻓﻤﻮادﺎﻟﺔ ﻏﻴﺎب ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟاﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻬﺪﻓﺔ ، أﻣﺎ ﻓﻲ ﺣ
 اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أن اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ ﻗﺪ أﺻﺎﺑﺖ ﺒﺮزﻳ.  ﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ  ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻞﻗﺎﻧﻮن
ﺮاﻓﻖ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﺔ ﻟﺴﻨﺔ ﻗﺎﻧﻮن اﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤ)ﺑﺈﺻﺪار ﻗﺎﻧﻮن ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻞ ﻟﺘﻨﻈﻴﻢ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ 
  (.0991
ﻓﻘﺪ أﺑﺮز ( srotceS erutcurtsarfnI)ﻘﻄﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﻨﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ ﻟ اﻟﻜﺒﻴﺮ ﺤﺠﻢاﻟ ﺑﺎﻟﻨﻈﺮ إﻟﻲ 
ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻘﻄﺎﻋﺎت ﻷﻏﺮاض ( gnildnubnU)اﻟﺒﺤﺚ أن ﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﺪول ﻗﺪ ﻟﺠﺄت إﻟﻲ ﺗﻔﺘﻴﺖ 
ﻳﺤﻤﻞ ( stnemgeS) اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ، وﻳﻘﺼﺪ ﺑﺎﻟﺘﻔﺘﻴﺖ ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟﻤﺮﻓﻖ اﻟﻤﺮاد ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺘﻪ ﻟﻌﺪة أﻗﺴﺎم
 ﻋﺒﺮ  اﻟﺨﺎص ﻓﻲ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﺮاﻓﻖﻞ ﻣﻨﻬﺎ ﺷﺨﺼﻴﺔ إﻋﺘﺒﺎرﻳﺔ ﻣﻨﻔﺼﻠﺔ وذﻟﻚ ﻟﺘﻴﺴﻴﺮ دﺧﻮل اﻟﻘﻄﺎعآ
ﺧﺮي ﻓﺎن هﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ  ﻳﻤﻜّـﻦ اﻟﺪوﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ أﻣﻦ ﻧﺎﺣﻴﺔ .  ﺗﻘﺴﻴﻢ اﻟﻤﺒﻠﻎ اﻟﻜﻠﻲ ﻟﻠﻘﻄﺎع اﻟﻤﺮاد ﺧﺼﺨﺼﺘﻪ
و ﻣﻠﻜﻴﺘﻬﺎ أدارﺗﻬﺎ إ ﺗﺤﺖ اﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻲ اﻷﻗﺴﺎم ﻏﻴﺮ اﻹﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ واﻹﺣﺘﻔﺎظ ﺑﺎﻷﻗﺴﺎم اﻹﺳﺘﺮاﺗﻴﺠﻴﺔ
  .، وﻗﺪ إﺳﺘﻌﻤﻠﺖ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﺴﻮداﻧﻴﺔ هﺬا اﻟﺘﻘﺴﻴﻢ ﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﺑﻌﺾ ﻗﻄﺎﻋﺎت اﻟﺒﻨﻲ اﻟﺘﺤﺘﻴﺔ 
 ﺆﺳﺴﺎت ﻋﺪد اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺗﺘﺴﺒﺐ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺎت اﻟﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺨﻔﻴﺾﻋﺎدًة ﻣﺎ 
  ﺷﺒﻜﺎت ﻓﻴﻬﺎﻢ ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ و ﺑﺨﺎﺻﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺪول اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻜﻮنﻔﺎﻗاﻟﻤﺨﺼﺨﺼﺔ ﻣﻤﺎ ﻳﺆدي ﻟﺘ
ﺧﺮ أو ﺗﻌﺠﺰ ﻋﻦ اﻹﻳﻔﺎء ﺑﺤﻘﻮق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻔﺼﻮﻟﻴﻦ ﺑﺎﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﺗﺘﺎ اﻟﻀﻤﺎن اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﺿﻌﻴﻔﺔ
  ﻟﻠﺘﺴﻮﻳﺔ أهﻢ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ إﺗﺒﻌﺘﻬﺎ اﻟﻜﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺪول أﺣﺪيﻟﻲ أنإاﻟﺒﺤﺚ  ﺧﻠﺺ .اﻟﻤﻄﻠﻮﺑﺔ 
هﻲ ﻋﻤﻠﻴﺔ اﻟﺪﻓﻊ اﻟﺴﺨﻲ ﻻﻧﻬﺎء اﻟﺴﺮﻳﻌﺔ واﻟﻨﺎﺟﺰة ﻟﺤﻘﻮق اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻔﺼﻮﻟﻴﻦ 
 اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﺗﺴّﻮي ﺣﻘﻮق اﻟﻤﻔﺼﻮل ﺑﻤﻮﺟﺐ هﺬﻩ .  )tnemyaP ecnareveS suoreneG(اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ
ﻳﺘﻢ ﺗﻤﻮﻳﻞ ﺗﻠﻚ  ﻋﺎدة . ة واﺣﺪةﺮ وﻟﻤ(ﻣﺮﺗﺐ ﺛﻼﺛﺔ إﻟﻲ ﺧﻤﺴﺔ أﻋﻮام )ﺪﻓﻊ ﻟﻪ ﻣﺒﻠﻐﺎ آﺒﻴﺮا ﻧﺴﺒﻴﺎﺑﺄن ُﻳ
ﻧﺴﺒﺔ ﻟﻤﺰاﻳﺎ ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻄﺮﻳﻘﺔ ﻓﻘﺪ . اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ آﺎن ﻳﻌﻤﻞ ﺑﻬﺎ  اﻟﺘﺼﺮف ﻓﻲﻣﻦ ﻋﺎﺋﺪات اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ 
ﻓﻲ ﻇﻞ ﺿﻌﻒ ﺷﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻀﻤﺎن . ﻟﺪول ﻓﻲ آﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ اﺔﻤﻠﻴﺗﻤﻮﻳﻞ هﺬﻩ اﻟﻌﻓﻲ  اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ﺳﺎهﻢ
اﻹﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﻲ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮدان ﻓﻘﺪ ﺧﻠﺺ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ إﻟﻲ أن ﻋﺪم إﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل ﺗﻠﻚ اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻟﺠﺔ ، وﺑﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﻋﺪم 
 إﻟﻲ ﺗﻔﺎﻗﻢ ﻣﺸﺎآﻞ اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﻴﻦ اﻟﻤﻔﺼﻮﻟﻴﻦ ﻓﻲ آﺜﻴﺮ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺪ أدياﻹﺳﺘﻔﺎدة ﻣﻦ ﻣﺴﺎهﻤﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺪوﻟﻲ ،
  .اﻟﻤﺆﺳﺴﺎت اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺼﺔ
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Introductory Chapter 
  
  
 Privatization has become one of the most important legal and 
economical subjects in most of countries of the world. The pioneer 
privatization program was launched in one of the free economies states 
(England). This program resulted in the famous dispute between the 
government and labour unions for many reasons. An important reason is 
that the privatized sectors were historically functioned by the public 
sector, such as coal mining. After the spread of privatization programs 
world wide, wide opposition against privatization of public sectors has 
emerged. Opinions of opponents and devotees vary, of course, from one 
country to another and from one ideology to another. Devotees of 
privatization normally ignore the historical necessities for the intervention 
of the state in the economic life as producer and trader. On the other 
hand, opponents of privatization normally ignore the new changes in the 
international economy and ideologies. Therefore, in this introductory 
chapter we will discuss the different opinions of devotees and opponents,  
the historical background of privatization, and the different definitions of 
privatization. All these points will be discussed with concentration on the 
situation in Sudan. Lastly, the structure of this thesis will be 
demonstrated.   
(i)Privatization: Devotees and Opponents: 
Over the last three decades, an increased number of countries have 
embarked on programs to privatize their public enterprises, reserving the 
earlier strategy of public enterprises as the engine of economic 
development. Developing countries formerly created SOEs for many 
reasons: to balance or replace the weak investment of private sectors, 
produce higher investment ratios and extract a capital for investment in 
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the economy, transfer technology to strategic sectors, generate 
employment, and  make goods available at lower costs. Although many 
SOEs have been productive and profitable, large number have been 
economically inefficient, incurring heavy financial losses, and absorbing 
disproportionate shares of domestic credit.1 
 The reasons for the decline of the role of SOEs in countries’ 
activities vary from one country to another. One reason, however, stands 
out: SOEs have generally posted disappointed performance.2They 
managed to survive through tariff protection against competing investors, 
preferences in public procurement, exclusive rights, preferential access to 
credit (often by state-owned banks), government guarantees, tax 
exemptions, and public subsidies. They often serve political objectives or 
purposes; consequently, they suffer frequent intervention by politicians 
and bureaucrats. Almost everywhere, the burden of SOEs on state 
finances has become untenable.3 
 Several studies compared the performance of public and private 
enterprises, but the results vary. Some conclude that an enterprise’s 
efficiency is determined not so much by its public or private character as 
by the regularity structure and the degree of competition under which it 
operates. Others find that the private ownership in itself leads to great 
productivity.4  
 Many devotees of privatization concentrate their criticisms on the 
disadvantages of the intervention of government in the market as a trader 
on the ground that it resulted in:  
                                                 
1 -  Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary Shirley, Privatization, the Lessons of Experience p. 2, 1st ed. 
1992, World Bank Publications, Washington, D.C. 
2- Muir and Saba, Privatization in Developing Countries p.12, 1st ed., World Bank Publications, 
Washington DC.  
3- Pierre Guislain, the Privatization Challenge; a strategic , legal, and institutional Analysis of 
International Experience p.7, 4th  ed. 2001, World Bank Publications, Washington, D.C. 
4- Our humble view, writers who consider privatization as the only solution for achieving great 
productivity regard less the good performance of SOE are either motivated by the current global wave 
of privatization or by ideological view points.  
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1- Absence of administrative monitoring and suitable sanctions, 
spread of corruption, and bureaucracy which wastes the time of the 
consumers. 
2- Lack of quality levels in the services and production because of the 
absence of competition.  
3- Absence of good performance-incentives because of non-
accommodation between wages and life needs. 
4- Political intervention in the management of SOE often leads to the 
ignorance of the known economic measurements. 
5-  Ignorance of the real demand of the market that the monopolistic 
position enables the governmental producers to impose their 
production without considering quality levels. 
6-  Ignorance of technological modernization and updating on the 
pretext of creating new jobs for humans. 
7- Lack of capacity of the national economy to compete globally.5  
   
Devotees, normally, build their evidences of privatization 
advantages on that:   
    1- Trend of privatization was initially launched as a result for the 
well documented poor performance and failure of SOEs. They also 
mention the development of economic efficiency after privatization 
in many countries.6   
   2- Private sector usually exploits resources better than the public   
sector, and provides products and services at cheaper prices. 
                                                 
5 - Mohsin Ahmed Elkhodiri, The Privatization, p.7, 1st ed. 1994, Egyptian Anglo Library, Cairo.  
6 - Maximo Torero and Andres Vesalgo (Ch), Performance of State-Owned Enterprises; Lessons from 
Latin America p. 21, 1st ed. 1996, Stanford University Press and World Bank. 
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   3- Private sector employs efficient managers without political 
intervention.7                                                  
   4-  Private sector usually depends on advanced administration systems    
that help in reaching the economic objectives by the cheapest costs.8 
   5-  Private sector uses precise monitoring systems; a thing which results 
in good performance. 
   6-  Supervision in private sectors is exercised by their owners who are 
more kean than state’s officials.       
   7-  Maximization of the role of the private sector in economic life 
avoids the state many sorts of subsidy and minimizes the heavy 
burden on the public budget. 
  8- Transformation of the public sector into private one provides a real 
opportunity for people to own   SOEs.9 For example, after a decision 
issued by the British Government to privatize the company in April 
1990, more than 350 bus drivers, managers and maintenance 
labourers in Chesterfield Public Company for Transportation took 
the decision to purchase the company. The price was 2.45 million 
pounds. Purchase operation was financed by paying %15 (215 
thousand pounds) of the capital of the company from their personal 
savings. The rest, %85, was financed by the Employee Benefit Trust 
(EBT), by a loan from the Unity Trust Bank. This operation was 
considered one of the most successful operations for the transfer of 
the ownership of a public sector company to its labours and 
managers.10 
                                                 
7 - Ahmed Maher, Manager’s Guide to Privatization p. 3, 2ed ed.2003, University Home publications, 
Cairo.   
8 - Id p. 31. 
9 - This is a one of different methods of privatization of the governmental companies known as 
Employee Share Ownership Plans (ESOP). By this method, the employees of the company can own all 
or the majority of the company’s shares. Then, the employees (the new owners) are free to select the 
ideal methods to administrate the company.   
10 - Gordon, J., Employee Stock Ownership in Economic Transitions p.123, 2ed ed. 1998, Clarendon 
Press. 
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 9-   Transfer of SOEs to private sector provides large sources of money 
for the state to finance developmental programs.   
10-  Under the New Global System liberty of trade transfer of capital and 
free movement of products between countries impose the idea of 
privatization.11  
 
On the other hand, opponents criticize privatization depending on 
many evidences. For example, they claim that:    
1- Lack of the historical experience of the private sector, especially in 
the developing countries, is the basic cause for the state to build 
monopolies.12 
2- In the strategic investment fields like military industries and 
petroleum production, involvement of private sector constitutes a 
stark breach of the sovereignty of the state, especially if the 
investor is a foreigner.13 
3- The state has an essential role to administrate, control, and own all 
public utilities. Also, it has a separate character and its properties, 
by their nature, are public monopolies. 
4- Academia, politicians, and media have recently attacked 
privatization, voicing concerns about its records, the sources of the 
gains, and its impact on social welfare and on the poor.14 
                                                 
11 - Michael E. Porter, the Competitive Advantage of Nations p. 114, 2ed ed. 1998, the Free Press- New 
York.  
12 - Shokri Rajab Elashmawi, Privatization; Employees’ Share Ownership Plans, Concepts-
International and Arabic Experiences p. 81, 1st ed. 2007,University Home Press, Cairo. 
13 - This can be argued by that the state can impose the Golden Share in any privatization operation. 
The Golden Share enables the government to remain its control over the privatized enterprise, attend 
the general meetings, vote, and appoint representatives in the board of directors. By this share the state 
is entitled, in some events, to refuse any decision. Abstractly, the Golden Share is the eye of the state in 
the privatized company or enterprise.  
14 - Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez (Ch), Privatization in Latin America; Myths and Reality p. 1, 
1st ed. 2005, Stanford University Press. 
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5- The negative reaction of privatization has reflected in opinion polls 
and in some governments’ reluctance to further their privatization 
programs.15 
          
In Sudan, in the absence of published opinions of experts (devotees 
or opponents), the followings are the justifications of the government for 
the current privatization program:16 
1- Lack in productivity of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
2- Non-accommodation of productivity with real costs of production. 
3- Lack of public administration systems. 
4- Lack of foreign finance sources.  
5-  Contradiction between public sector regulations which weakens 
the role of the Ministry of Finance in supervising and monitoring 
the public wealth.17 
6-  Weak performance of managers of SOEs.   
7- Weakness of public sector contribution in supporting public 
treasury ( the contribution of public sector is only %3 from the 
public income). 
8- The continual deficit in repaying the foreign loans of SOEs.  
9- The constant deficit of SOEs budgets reached the limit of non-
fulfilling their normal obligations like wages, instalments of 
pensions and insurance, and taxations. 
(ii) Historical Background: 
 The current wave of privatization in Sudan and in many countries 
followed the earlier period of nationalizations. Nationalizations and 
intervention of governments in trade and services almost touched every 
                                                 
15 - Shokri Rajab Elashmawi supra 12, p.82. 
16- Sources: the Annual Reports of the Technical Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprises 
(TCDPE).  
17 - Our humble opinion; this justification does not reflect good reason for privatization as it reflects the 
lack of the ministry of finance to spread its supervision on the public money.  
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area of economic activity in the majority of countries. (United States is 
among the few countries that were not affected by this trend).18 
 
(1) Spread of SOEs, Nationalizations and Public Sector: 
 A state-owned enterprise is: (a) a government owned productive 
organization that (b) is expected to earn a significant portion of its 
revenue from the sale of the goods or services it produces, (c) possesses 
an accounting system separate from any government agency that controls 
or supervises it, and (d) a distinct legal entity.19 
 There were many elements that helped in the spread of SOEs and 
governmental monopolies in different eras. The past era of the European 
colonization in, almost, all Africa and great part of Asia and Latin 
America assisted such spread. The new European governance found that 
the financial capacity of the citizens of these countries is weak and their 
experience is poor; they cannot contribute in the development of their 
countries. Therefore, the colonization facilitated the establishment of 
SOEs and contribution of foreign capital. Thereafter, independence 
movement in Asia, later in Africa, fostered growing nationalizations by 
the new national governments as new states required to regain control of 
their productive assets from the foreign enterprises. In the 1960s and 
1970s, on the tomorrow of their independence most African countries, 
including many of the socialist or Marxist-Leninist (such as Angola, 
Benin, Congo and Tanzania), undertook large nationalization programs.20  
 In Central and Eastern Europe, nationalizations were imposed 
under the Soviet influence through and after the Second World War. 
During the same period many Latin American countries decided to base 
                                                 
18 -  Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p.3 
19- Mary Shirley, Managing State- Owned Enterprises p.2, 1983, World Bank Publications, Washington 
D.C.  
20 - Pierre Guislain, Supra3 p.6  
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their development strategy in state-owned enterprises. In Argentina, for 
example, the government nationalized the telephone company in 1946, 
and about the same time acquired six railway companies owned by 
British, French and Argentinean investors.21 
 The Second World War also contributed in the spread of great 
wave towards nationalization, even in Western Europe, to reform many 
economies destroyed by the war. For example, In France, during and after 
the war; nationalizations took place in practically every area of the 
French economy. Armaments, aviation, railways, coal mining, air 
transport, electricity, gas, banks and insurance companies were 
nationalized.22 
 In Egypt, July Revolution took the power in 1952. In 1956, a 
decision to nationalize As-Sways Channel Company was issued by the 
Revolution Command Council.23 A few years later, the revolution strictly 
adopted the socialist ideology; therefore, large movement towards 
nationalization began in 1961 when the government enacted the law No. 
117.24The first section of this law provided for the nationalization of 
some private companies. Also, the same section provided for 
nationalization of all banks and insurance companies and other 
companies mentioned in the schedule of the law; thereafter, the state 
enacted many other laws to add vast number of private companies to the 
schedule of this law. By Law No. 72- 1963, all the private companies and 
big private enterprises were nationalized (more than 200 companies and 
                                                 
21 - Id p.6 
22 - These nationalizations were applied according to many laws such as 4th August Law, which 
contained list of enterprises for privatization. Such law determined the methods of compensations of 
the former owners of these enterprises. This law provided that the compensations will be paid as 
installments. Another law was; December 2ed 1945 (Nationalization of Bank of France). A third, was 
May 17th Law to nationalize the coal mining.   
23 - This nationalization immediately resulted inThe Triqual Assault by France, Britain and Israel 
against Egypt.  
24 - This law provided that: the nationalized company may remain as its shape before the 
nationalization as a company with shares. The new difference is that company’s shares will be 
transferred to the state property. 
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enterprises).25 The Law No: 32- 1966 organized the future shapes of the 
nationalized companies; it provided that any nationalized enterprise may 
establish a company limited by shares regardless that it was not a 
company at the time of its nationalization.26   
 Results of nationalization in Egypt have been much debated by 
lawyers and economists. The results vary, of course, from one writer to 
another according to his political or ideological background. Leftists, 
socialists, communists and some neutralists are still now supporting the 
past nationalizations depending on different evidence. They appreciate 
the good economic position of the Egyptian citizen at the era of 
nationalizations. They are considering the subsidy presented by the state 
to the poor peoples. On the other hand they ignore the recent global 
changes in trade, technology, and ideologies. 
 Opponents for the former nationalizations in Egypt are still now 
mentioning that the former nationalizations were imposed and practised 
just from the ideological view points of socialist extremists. They claim 
that nationalizations were prejudicially imposed without respecting the 
rights of the original owners. They also criticized the performance of the 
nationalized enterprises with comparison to their performance before the 
nationalization. They ignore the political and economic circumstances 
wherein such private enterprises, properties, and companies were 
nationalized. 
 
(2) Spread of Public Sector and Nationalization in Sudan: 
In Sudan, there were two elements that constituted the themes of the 
current wave of privatization. One is the big number of SOEs which were 
                                                 
25 - Ahmed Mohriz, Legal Institutional Framework of Privatization p.7, 2003 ed., Dar- Almaafrif 
Establishment, Alexandria, Egypt.  
26 - S. 10 of the 1966 law in Egypt. The advantageous development in this law appeared from that the 
former law of 1961 provided that any nationalized enterprise shall remain as its shape before 
nationalization. 
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established through the different eras of the governance. Another is the 
big number of private enterprises, companies, and properties which were 
nationalized in 1970-73 at the beginnings of May Revolution. 
 
(a) Spread of State-Owned Enterprises:  
 Sudanese governments, since the colonization era, have adopted 
the idea of establishing productive public sector units like Jazeera 
Agricultural Scheme (established by a special Act in 1927), which 
became one of the pillars of Sudanese economy. The success of ‘Jazeera’ 
Scheme encouraged Sudanese governments to establish other productive 
units to achieve additive value to the national income. Creation of jobs 
was also an important goal for establishing governmental productive 
units. Sugar factories, tanneries, transportation corporations and many 
other types of SOEs were established. They contributed actively in the 
national income by a proportion reached %50 from the national income 
sometimes.27         
 A good example for public economic units in the banking sector in 
Sudan is the Real Estate Bank which was established in 1966 by the ‘Real 
Estate Bank Act 1966’.The bank was established to exercise many social 
and economic activities like giving a loan for any Sudanese person 
owning a land (by lease or free holding) to build new buildings or to 
rehabilitate old buildings on such a land. Another objective of the bank is 
to finance researches and studies to reduce building costs for peoples of 
limited incomes, and to use the local materials in the buildings whenever 
it is possible.28   
  Another example in banking public sector is the Sudanese Saving 
Bank. This bank was established under the Sudanese Saving Bank Act 
                                                 
27 - The annual report of The Technical Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprises (TCDPE) 
2005. 
28 - S. 15 (d), Real Estate Bank Act 1966. 
 11
1974. The main features of the bank and its activities are shown in some 
sections of the Act, for example: (a) The bank shall be a body corporate 
with perpetual succession and common seal. It may enter into contracts 
and may sue and be sued under its own name.29(b) The headquarter shall 
be in Wad-Madani, and the bank may establish branches or agencies in 
such places as it deems necessary for the achievement of business.30(c) 
Objectives of the bank are to develop thrift consciousness, encourage 
savings, and collect and invest savings in fields of economic and social 
development.  At its beginnings and a few years later, the bank did well 
to achieve its objectives. Recently, the bank is exercising ordinary 
banking activities regardless the social and developmental objectives for 
which the bank was established. 
 The River Transportation Corporation was established in 1973 by 
specific Act. Such type of services was not easy to be exercised by the 
private sector at that time. The main objective of this corporation is to 
achieve and develop efficient system for transporting passengers, 
baggage, goods, post and animals by river transportation on good 
technical and economic bases.31   
 In July 1975 Sudan Airlines Act was enacted. Some features of the 
Act are the followings: (a) the corporation is a body corporate with 
perpetual succession and seal. It can sue or be sued under its own name 
and its headquarter shall be in Khartoum.32(b) Objectives of the 
corporation are to achieve and develop an efficient system for air 
transportation, and to transport passengers, baggage, goods and post on 
good commercial and technical bases.33 
                                                 
29 - S. 3 (1) of the Sudanese Saving Bank Act 1974. 
30 - S. 3 (2) of the Sudanese Saving Bank Act 1974.  
31 - S. 7(1) a, b, c, River Transportation Corporation Act 1973. 
32 - S. 4 (1) of the Sudan Airlines Corporation Act 1975. 
33 - S. 6 (1) a, b, c, d, e, f and g of Sudan Airlines Corporation Act 1975.  
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In Sudan the list of state-owned enterprises includes many activities 
which are not suitable to be owned by the state. The list included 
hotels34and retailing shops for consumer goods and clothes.35 State 
ownership of intensive capital industries36may be suitable in a country 
like Sudan. For example, military industries enterprises are suitable to be 
owned and traded by the state in Sudan, since it may be categorized as 
intensive capital productions and, at the same time, strategic ones. 
 Finally, we will mention some of the important productive units 
which were owned by the state until the beginnings of the current wave of 
privatization in Sudan: 
-    Atbara Cement Factory was established in 1947 as a private 
company under the name of Atbara Portland Cement Factory; thereafter, 
the government nationalized the factory in 1970.37  
- Public Corporation for Printing and Publication (The 
Governmental Press): established in 1924 under name of Macore Kodale. 
Later, the owner involved in partnership with Sudan Government in 
1954.38    
-  Mechanical Transport Utility was established in 1942. Its main 
objective was to repair governmental cars and army tanks.39 
  
(b) Nationalization:  
 As we have previously mentioned May Regime at its beginnings 
adopted socialism as an economic ideology. Also there was a marked 
tendency in the Command Council of May Revolution to create a strong 
relation between the socialism and Arab-nationalism. The two ideologies 
                                                 
34 - Like Sudan Hotel, Grand Hotel and Friendship Palace Hotel. 
35 - Like Aljazeera Company for Trading and Services. 
36 - Such as Atbara Cement Factory, Rabak Cement Factory and all the Sugar Factories. 
37 - (TCDPE) Annual Report 2005 p.25. 
38 - (TCDPE) Annual Report 2005 p.32. 
39 - (TCDPE) Annual Report 2005 p. 33. 
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motivated the regime to nationalize private companies and properties 
with clear imitation of the methods in which the nationalizations in Egypt 
were exercised. The nationalized Companies, banks and other properties 
constituted a good subject for the current privatization operations. 
In 25-5-1970, The Banks Nationalization Law was enacted. The 
introduction reads: 
‘This Act may be cited as the; Banks Nationalization Act- 1970 and shall come into 
force on the date of the signature of the Command Council of the Revolution” 
 
 S.1 of the Act reads: 
S.1/ ‘1- as on the date of the commencement of this Act, the banks  specified 
hereunder situated in The Democratic Republic of Sudan shall be nationalized, their 
ownership shall vest in the State and shall have their names altered as mentioned 
against each of them 
(a) Barclays Bank D.O.O. it shall be called ‘The State Bank for Foreign Trade’. 
(b) National and Grindlays Bank, it shall be called ‘Omdurman National Bank’. 
(c) Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, it shall be called ‘Juba Commercial Bank’ 
(d) Arab Bank, it shall be called ‘Red Sea Commercial Bank’. 
(e) Bank Misr, it shall be called ‘Peoples Co-Operative Bank’. 
 (f) Elnilein Bank, it shall bear the same name. 
(g) Sudan Commercial Bank, it shall bear the same name.’ 
‘S.1/2- All nationalized banks shall continue to function with the provision of this Act, 
and this Act shall be deemed to have amended any other law to the extent of the 
inconsistency between this Act and the provisions of such other law.’ 
  
S.3 of the same Act provided for the transforming of the 
nationalized banks into share capital companies. It reads: 
‘S.3-1: All banks nationalized under the provisions of this Act shall be converted into 
share companies. The board of directors of the Bank of Sudan shall by a decision 
make their memoranda of association and all their shares shall be owned by the Bank 
of Sudan. 
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S.3-2: the Bank of Sudan shall be deemed a competent Administrative authority to 
control and supervise the nationalized Banks. The board of directors of the Bank of 
Sudan shall exercise the powers of the general meeting as regards these banks.’ 
 
Then, the Act appointed committees for fixing the net-values of the 
nationalized banks. S.4 reads: 
‘S.4-1: the net value due to nationalized banks shall be fixed by committees 
constituted of three members each. The President of the Revolutionary Command 
shall constitute such committees and determine their duties by a decision made by 
him. 
 S.4-2: Every committee shall make its decisions within a period not exceeding six 
months from the date of its constitution, and shall communicate such decisions to the 
interested party.  
S.4-3: The interested may appeal against the decision of the Committee within one 
month of the receipt of such decision to the authority appointed by the President of 
the Revolutionary Command Council. The competent authority shall give its decision 
in the appeal within three months from the date of appeal and its decision shall be 
final.’ 
  
 The Nationalization Act put severe sections about the 
compensations of the former owners of the nationalized banks (long 
period of compensation payment mentioned in s.4 of the Act). After the 
abandon of socialism, the regime faced great pressure from the former 
owners of the nationalized banks and their states. Therefore, some 
features of reasonable compensations appeared. An amendment was 
issued in 1973. Such amendment provided that: The state may, if the 
public interest so requires, make an agreement to pay compensations to 
the former owners in a shorter time than it was provided in 1970th Act.40 
 In 1970 the Companies Nationalization Act was enacted. S.2 (1) of 
such Act reads: 
                                                 
40 - S. 2 of the Banks Nationalization Act as amended in 1973. 
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‘As from the date of the coming into force of this Act, the companies specified 
hereunder and situated in the Democratic Republic of Sudan shall be nationalized, 
their ownership shall vest in the state and their names shall be altered as stated 
against each one of them:- 
 (a) The Gellately Hankey and Co. (Sudan) group of Companies shall be called ‘May 
Commercial Corporation for Workers 
 (b) Imperial chemical Industries (Sudan) ltd shall be called: ‘The National Chemical 
Company. 
(c)The Sudan Mercantile Group of Companies and Mitchell Cotts Group of 
Companies: and the two groups shall be merged in the State Corporation for Foreign 
Trade.’ 
 
  The above companies were nationalized on 25/5/1970, and then  
followed by long list of other companies in July of the same year. For 
example, Sudan Portland for Cement, Blue Nile for Packing ltd., Bata 
(Sudan), Sifrian and Co., Trading Cotton Co., Port Sudan Co. for Trading 
and Cottons, and Red Sea Shipping Co.41 
 From the interpretation of the Companies Nationalization Act 1970 
it appears that the motives or purposes of nationalization were of 
ideological nature. The introduction of the interpretation stated:  
‘‘The foreign companies played a very dangerous role in the economic life of 
the state; they are devices for the colonization to assist the foreign interference in our 
economic and political life. The role of these companies extended to help the enemies 
of Sudan to destroy the social and economical life of Sudanese peoples. Therefore, for 
all these reasons, the state does not find any way to resist these activities, except by 
taking the decision to nationalize these  groups of companies and vest their property 
on the state.’’   
  
                                                 
41 - The list included: the National Company for Currency Machineries, Automobile Co. ltd., the 
Foreign Part of the Tractors Company, Gattan Trading Co., Sayers & Cooley Co., National Co. for 
Trade and Cotton, Khartoum Co. for Cotton, Ray Ivan and Co.ltd,. The list is very long, and the 
methods of nationalization were varied from direct nationalization to nationalization and a 
amalgamation after nationalization with other nationalized companies. Abstractly, all the big 
companies were nationalized, especially those of foreign owners or participants.      
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Again, some features of mitigating the severe nationalizations wave 
appeared in the few years following the abandon of socialism. Rational 
and equitable compensations for the former owners of the nationalized 
companies were decided by President Numairi. It is to be noted that the 
reluctance from the severe nationalizations had not been exercised by 
reversing the ownership to the former owners; but by paying better 
compensations. These compensations were granted only to the owners of 
Sudanese origins. Owners of foreign origins were not compensated 
despite the fact that most of them were holding the Sudanese nationality, 
a thing which constituted prejudicial discriminative treatment between 
citizens of one nationality.42For example, the Republican Decision No.34 
1976 in s. (1), about the compensation for Kikos Johoaneadis (Elgadarif 
Crops Sieves Co.), stated that Mr. Ahmed Abdullah Salih and Mr. Salih 
Babikir (former shareholders in the nationalized company) shall be 
compensated well and equitably for their shares on the basis of their real 
value at the time of issuing this decision. In the same decision, s. (3) 
provided that the compensation for shares of Mr. Kikos Johoaneadis (a 
shareholder in the same company) shall remain as they were estimated in 
1970.43Few years later, as a result for the nationalizations, the regime 
failed to attract foreign investors, a thing which resulted in a great 
inflation of Sudanese currency. It is a common notion that ‘capital is 
coward’. A country practicing nationalization should not anticipate 
foreign investment to come into its boundaries.   
 
 
                                                 
42 - Such as Sifrian, Sirkees Azmirilian, and many others who were borne in the Sudan and contributed 
actively in vesting modern methods of trade in Sudan. They established agencies, factories, shipping 
companies and exporting businesses. It seems that May Regime treated the nationalized persons 
according to their origins, colours, or otherwise.  
43 - A same bad treatment was excersised in the Republican Decision for the compensation of Murad 
Sons Co. ltd. 
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(3) Movement Towards Privatization: 
Government initiatives in the area of privatization of SOEs and 
assets have increased substantially in the last three decades. Many 
governments have effectively privatized SOEs. An even larger number 
have announced privatization programs but are only at the earliest stages 
of implementing them in any substantial way. In at least 100 countries 
across all the continents, privatization is an inherent part of efforts to 
rationalize the SOEs as a whole.44 
 
Europe: 
In Western Europe, the pioneer experience of privatization was 
launched in the United Kingdom by one of the greatest Prime ministers, 
Mrs. Margret Thatcher. In 1979, Mrs. Thatcher took a decision to 
privatize a number of the most important sectors. The greatest one is the 
coal mining sector. After the issuance of the decision, Mrs. Thatcher was 
involved in the famous dispute with the labourers’ unions that the 
activities of such sector had, and for many centuries, been operated as a 
state monopoly. Lastly, Mrs. Thatcher beat labours unions and imposed 
further privatizations in other activities and services such as gas, 
electricity and airlines. For this reason Mrs. Thatcher has been nicknamed 
the “Iron Woman”.   
In Germany, after the re-union with the former East Germany in 
1990, the Germany’s Privatization Agency (Treuhand) was established. 
In a few years the Treuhand succeeded to privatize more than 8.000 of 
former East Germany’s SOEs, and was hoping to assist other 
governments’ privatization programs on a consulting basis.45 If we noted 
that the former East Germany was one of the strongest communist 
regimes, it will be fair to look to the performance of the Treuhand as a 
                                                 
44 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3, p.6. 
45 - Van De Walle, Planning for Privatization p.178, 1st ed. 1998, John Wiley & Sons, New York. 
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successful one. The mission of the Treuhand was not to privatize the 
SOEs only in West Germany, but to privatize SOEs in all Germany after 
the union. It was required to treat with two different types of SOEs. The 
first are the SOEs of the former West Germany. SOEs in West Germany, 
before the union, were working in a liberal state, where the rule of the law 
is well respected and both government and labourers knew their rights 
and duties without false slogans. The second are the SOEs of the former 
East Germany, where the voice of labourers was very high, and their 
domination over SOEs was very strong.     
 In France, despite the fact that the legislature did not enact any Act 
for privatization until 1986 (the date of the first Privatization Act), the 
necessaries of the business sectors and the economic activities compelled 
the government to undertake some sorts of combinations with the private 
sector in some governmental economical units. Moreover, the 
government transferred some of the assets of these units to the private 
sector. Despite the fact that the government was keen to make good 
mechanisms for monitoring the combined units, these mechanisms did 
not depend on any legal bases46. There was no Act or section in the 
constitutional law covering the intervention of the private sector in the 
governmental economic units.47The labourers’ unions, therefore, sued the 
French Government on that the transfers of governmental assets were not 
constitutionally correct.   
 One of the most important suits was made by the labourers’ unions 
against the governmental company (Remix) in 1986 (before the issuance 
of the Privatization Act). The company undertook the administration of 
                                                 
46 - Nationalization Laws: April 1939, 1953 and 1957 impose very complicated procedures and 
parliament approvals for permissions to the private sector to contribute in any governmental productive 
units. The government, with regard to international economical changes, found that it is very important 
to contribute the private sector in many different governmental productive units.    
47 - William, James Adams, Restructuring the French Economy p. 12, 1st ed. 1997, the Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C.  
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Renault Factories for Cars Manufacturing. Remix made a contract 
whereby the factories’ administration is transferred to a private company 
(C.G.T). The labourers’ unions considered this a revocation of the former 
nationalizations laws “mask privatization”48without legislative or 
constitutional authority. But, on 17th of July 1987, the problem was 
solved by the issuance of the Savings Act. One of the provisions of this 
Act considered all the transfers of the governmental units’ assets which 
were practised before the issuance of such law valid whenever the 
transfer is exercised under pressure of urgency.49 By this Act, all former 
privatization operations (before 1986) found their legality. 
 In countries which formerly followed the former Soviet Union in 
their economies, Hungary and the Czech Republic were the leaders in the 
Central and Eastern Europe. Until 1992, Hungary had the best 
privatization track record in Central and Eastern Europe after the East 
Germany.50The Czech Republic became a serious contender with its mass 
privatization of 1200 SOEs in 1992, followed by 1200 privatizations in 
1993. Mass privatization enabled the Czechs to speed up the privatization 
process by making SOEs responsible for preparing their own privatizing 
plans and by selling tradable low-cost vouchers to citizens who then 
exchange them for shares in privatized companies.51    
  Poland was the first European country that liberated its political 
and economic system from the domination of the former Soviet Union. 
Paradoxically enough, the labourers’ unions, who are presumed to defend 
the public sector, were the leaders of this entire change before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. Poland was the cradle of the mass 
                                                 
48 - Mask Privatization is expression used for all privatization operations which were exercised before 
the issuance of the Privatization Act 1986; it was commonly used by the media and opponents of the 
privatization in France. 
49 - Ahmed Mohriz, supra 25 p. 24. 
50 - Due, Jean M., and Allan Bollard, Corporatization and Privatization in Europe p. 67, 1996 ed., 
Stanford University Press. 
51 - Id p.69. 
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privatization concept, but a political controversy prevented a mass 
privatization scheme from being enacted into a law until mid-1993. But 
after 1993 a mass privatization scheme was executed by issuing the 
Privatization Law of 1993.52 
 In the rest of the countries which adopted the former Soviet Union, 
the pace of privatization has been slower. The continuing civil war in 
what used to be Yugoslavia had put damper on privatization efforts, with 
limited exception of Slovenia. The distressed state of the Romania and 
Bulgaria combined with political instability, prevented privatization from 
really getting off the ground. However, the access to the European Union 
will compel many countries to revise their economical programs to fulfil 
the Union requirements. Any country formerly adopted the Soviet Union 
without basic reforming, will find huge a number of difficulties for 
handling with the Union countries.53    
 Privatization operations in what was formerly the Soviet Union, in 
Russia,   began immediately after the collapse of the Union. The figures 
show that most shops, restaurants, and small businesses passed into 
private hands. By the end of 1993, the mass privatization began in Russia 
and assisted by a permission to hundreds of foreign companies, including 
the American companies, to involve in the Russian economy. The number 
of privatized enterprises progressed to amount 1000 by the end of 1993.54
  
 
 
 
                                                 
52 - Id p.71. 
53 - There is a big competition to implementation. Such implementation requires reforming of many 
fields and in the candidate country. For example, Turkey is struggling for many years to implement. 
The number of the requirements directed Turkey, many times, to accept different conditions despite its 
peoples’ pressure.  
54 - Liberman, Russia as Emerging Capital Market p. 16, 1996 ed. London Economic School with 
Institute of Economic Affairs. London.  
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Latin America: 
In Latin America, Chile and Mexico have become the leaders. 
Chile’s program which essentially falls into two phases began during the 
mid-1970s. From 1974 to 1978, the country’s military-led government 
privatized 207 companies which yielded $1.2 billion in revenues for the 
government. The government relied on three privatization methods 
during this phase, that is, liquidation, direct sales, and auctions. Then, 
after the military governance, the democratic government found the road 
open to embark on mass privatization program.55The former military 
government prepared and executed, to some extent, the legislations for 
the later democratic ones.56   
 At its beginnings, Argentina’s privatization program had succeeded 
in privatizing only 5 percent of its SOEs, worth $1.5 billion until 1991. 
But, in 1992 alone the government sold its stake in Telecom Argentina 
for $1.2 billion, the electric utility SEGBA for $1.05 billion, and Gas del 
Stado for over $3 billion. Other sales in 1992 included various oil, 
highway and railways concessions, television channels, and many other 
monopolistic activities. These sales and concessions saved the country 
from inevitable economic disasters caused by the great mistakes of the 
former governmental planners.57  
 
Asia: 
Through 1991, Asia has relatively small number of privatizations (2 
percent of the total). Those Asian countries with the largest public sector, 
that is China, India, Vietnam and North, Korea have not begun large- 
scale privatizations programs. But, in the few recent years, China has 
                                                 
55- Shliefer, Andrie, and Robert W. Vishny, Politicians and Firms pp. 187-88, 1999 ed. Job Hopkins 
University Press.  
56- It is a common concept that the nationalizations and monopolies of economic activities are initially 
related to practice of military and dictator governance, it seems the Chilean case is a unique one.  
57 - Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary Shirely, supra 1.   
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launched a big security market, and a number of Chinese SOEs have 
begun to raise capital by selling shares to domestic and foreign investors. 
Also, Vietnam recently hired an advisor to work in designing for the 
privatization of its SOEs. Elsewhere in Asia, the newly industrialized 
countries such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia; have seen 
a little privatization activity for the simple reason that they do not a have 
big number of SOEs.58 
 
Africa: 
African countries have begun to think seriously about the future of 
their weak economies with regard to the new international competitive 
market. Despite the fact that the movement towards privatization in most 
of African, Asian, Latin American and even European countries began in 
the last three decades, the first sign for privatization was alarmed from 
African country that is Cameroon in 1965, after few months of the 
Cameroon’s independence. The feature of the privatization was enshrined 
in a 1965 speech by Ahmadou Ahidjo, the President of Cameroon.59            
       Nowadays, the African countries, commonly, move to tackle 
budget deficits and stimulate economic activity. They are looking at 
privatization as a tool for economic growth. They are supported by 
development banks like the World Bank and the African Development 
Bank, which have made privatization a vital component of their economic 
reform package in Africa. According to the World Bank, there were 
nearly 3000 SOEs in thirty countries of Sub-Saharan Africa by mid 
1980s. Of these, 337 were privatized through 1991(immediately after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union), which represented 17 percent of the world 
                                                 
58 - Spulber, Nicolas and Sabbagi, Privatizations Activities in Asia p. 9, 1996 ed. World Bank 
Publications, Washington D.C.  
59 - Gerald Bisong  Tanyi ,Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa; Law, Economics and Practice 
p.3, 1st ed. 2004, Praeger Publishers, USA.  
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wide total. Guinea was reportedly the leader with over than 60 
privatization operation in mid 1980s. Nigeria which has one of the largest 
economies in Africa, came in second, with about 50 privatizations 
through 1991.  In a move to increase self sufficiency, the Nigerian 
government, in 1990, cut subsidies to public enterprises by %50.60 Cote 
d’ Ivories has also been actively privatizing its SOEs and has used a 
somewhat unconventional means of targeting potential enterprises for 
privatization. Rather than designate candidates for sale, the government 
has indicated that it is willing to consider offers for any enterprise 
deemed an attractive investment by private companies. Using this 
method, the government has spared itself nearly 30 enterprises, most of 
which are industrial or agro-industrial concerns.61   
In Egypt, the idea of privatization began in 1973, three years after 
the death of President Jamal Abd-Alnassir. At the beginnings of Al-Sadat 
era (1970-81), the government decided that there must be some sort of 
equilibrium between the public and private sectors in driving the national 
economy. Also, the government decided that there must be a creation of 
competitive climate between the two sectors, and there must be some way 
of opening the economy as a whole.62Opening the Egyptian economy 
became a declared policy in 1974 after the issuance of the Law No.43-
1974. Such Act contained a number of sections encouraging the private 
sector to participate powerfully in the Egyptian economy. It included tax 
exemptions and reduction of customs for the sake of the private sector. 
The most important feature of this Act is that it permits capitals 
movement into/out the state. Then, in 1989 in the era of President 
Mubarak, the Investment   Act of 1989 was enacted. This Act provided 
                                                 
60 - John R. Nellis, Public Enterprises in Sub-Saharan Africa p.5, 1995 ed., World Bank Publications 
Washington D.C. 
61 - Id p.10. 
62 - This policy recognized as “Opened Economy”, it facilitated the road to the next Egyptian President, 
Hosni Mubarak, to execute mass-privatization operations.   
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for the rules of the investment in desert lands, industry, and tourism. The 
main guide to privatization was the Public Sector Companies Act 1991 
which provides for listing the shares of a big number of the public 
companies in the stock exchange. This Act frankly targeted to transform 
the governmental companies into private ones and to minimize the role of 
the public sector in the economic activities as a trader.63 
             
(4) Movement towards Privatization in Sudan: 
 In the beginnings of the National Salvation Revolution, the regime 
found huge difficulties to control the national economy because of the 
sanctions which were imposed by the western world on Sudan as a result 
of the extreme slogans which were declared by the regime.  At that time, 
Sudan largely depended on many subsidies and loans given by many 
foreign banks and funds; the only way for the government to solve the 
financial crisis was to declare the liberalization of the economy so as to 
provide big financial resources to the public treasury. Three methods 
were adopted to provide financial sources. The first way was to open the 
door widely for imports to provide big amounts from taxations and 
custom. The second was to attract foreign investors to invest in Sudan to 
benefit from the hard currency brought by them. The third was to 
privatize the SOEs to avoid the state the permanent losses and liabilities 
of employees. The element which assisted privatization of SOEs in Sudan 
was that Sudanese SOEs presented disappointing performance. Most of 
them were a burden than a help. 
 The Disposition of Public Enterprises Act was enacted in 1990. 
This Act determined the Higher Committee for Disposition of Public 
Enterprises (HCDPE) to specify the candidate enterprises for 
                                                 
63 - Ahmed Mohriz, supra 25 pp. 105-12.  
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privatization according to clear measurements mentioned in the law,64 
and to conclude privatization contracts on behalf of the state.65 HCDPE is 
authorized to windup any SOE whenever it thinks winding up is the only 
solution for such SOE.66HCDPE is also authorized to terminate the 
service of labours.  
 The Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 also provides for 
the Technical Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprises (TCDPE). 
The missions of this committee are: to undertake all  technical work such 
as preparing advertising papers (brochures) of candidate SOEs, and 
determination of technical, financial, and administrative systems of the 
candidate SOEs in the preparations period.67  
 The two committees executed many privatization operations; some 
of them were important and strategic whilst some were less important. 
The two committees have exercised their missions under many criticisms 
of the media, former employees, and the public opinion.  
 
(iii) Definition of Privatization:  
 The majority of privatization writers stated that privatization is not 
a goal as it is a set of strategies for achieving certain objectives. In the 
absence of a strictly legal meaning, the World Bank writers have 
differently defined the word ‘privatization’. 
 One definition of privatization is:  
“Privatization is the general process of involving the private sector in the 
ownership or operation of state-owned enterprises. Thus, the term refers to the 
private purchases of all or part of a public company; and also covers contracting out 
                                                 
64 - S. 4 (b) of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 
65 - S.4 (c) of the same Act. 
66 - S. 4(e) of the same Act. 
67 - S. 6 from (a) to (l) of the same Act. 
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and the privatization of management through management contracts, leases or 
franchise arrangements.”68 
 
 Another one is: 
 ‘Privatization is an element of broader economic policy comprising the 
deregulation and liberalization with the emphasis generally as such on improving the 
efficiency of retained SOEs as on efforts to divest. Even, when government intends to 
continue state-ownership, various measures can still be implemented to improve 
efficiency and reduce costs.’69 
 
A third definition reads: 
 ‘Privatization means more than the sale or ailing public companies at fire sale 
prices. Privatization can be defined broadly as the transfer or sale of any asset, 
organization, function or activity from public to private sector. As such, in addition to 
the sale of publicly owned asset, the term also applies to join public-private ventures, 
concessions, leases, management contracts, as well as to some instruments such as 
Build-Own-Operate and Transfer (BOOT), or Build-Own and Transfer (BOT)’.70 
 
A fourth definition gives four meanings for privatization: 
 1- Privatization means the widening of private property and granting an 
increasing role for the private sector in the national economy.    
  2- It means an instrument to dispose of the loosed state owned enterprises, and 
transfers these SOEs to the private sector. This conception is adopted in Britain and 
Australia and the two countries are the pioneer in the privatization field. 
 3- It means the divestiture of the Socialist Economy, because it is an 
ideological and economic philosophy that began to decline all over the world. 
 4- It means the opposite word for the word ‘nationalization’. If the word 
‘nationalization’ means the transfer of the private property to public one, then the 
word ‘privatization should’ have the opposite meaning. The evidence for this is that 
                                                 
68 - Barbara Lee and John Nellis, Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Socialist Economies p.1, 1991 
ed., World Bank, Washington DC. 
69 - Charles Vuylsteke, Techniques of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises p.1, 2nd ed. 1995 World 
Bank Publications. Washington D.C. 
70 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 pp. 10-11.  
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the companies which were formerly nationalized are the same companies which are 
recently privatized.71 
 
A good definition for privatization, depending on the size of the 
privatization operation has been presented by Pierre Guislain. This 
definition ranked the privatization operation into three levels:72 
 1- At the first level it refers to the privatization of public enterprise, whether 
through divestiture. In a narrow sense, privatization implies permanent transfer of 
control whether as a consequence of transfer of ownership right from a  public 
agency to one or more private parties or, for example, of a capital increase to which 
the public-sector shareholder has waived its right to subscribe. 
 A broadest definition of enterprise-level privatization includes any measure 
that results in temporary transfer of the private sector or activities exercised until 
then by a public agency. Such definition also covers subcontracting, management 
contracts, lease of state-owned enterprises and concessions. 
 2- At another level is privatization of a sector. Sector’s privatization holds a 
broadest definition than of enterprises in the techniques and legal methods of 
privatization. 
 3- At a third level, the word privatization can have an even connotation, to 
include the privatization not just of enterprises and sectors but of an entire economy. 
The degree of privatization of a given economy will depend on the state’s prior 
ownership, the and control and the scope of the reform program undertaken. 
 
  Our humble view, the word “privatization” simply means: the 
whole or partial transfer of governmental ownership, property, or 
missions to private body, whether for consideration or not, temporarily or 
permanently. 
 
                                                 
71 - Ahmed Maher, supra 7 pp. 24-27.  Our humble view, like these definitions are essentially written 
by writers from countries suffered for a long period from the intervention of the state in the economical 
life namely, the former socialist or communist countries. In these countries the socialism and 
communism presented  bad performance; a thing which resulted in very strong reaction. On the other 
countries which haven’t suffered the directed or communism or socialism economies, the estimation of 
privatization seems to be objective and neutral.  
72 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3. p. 10. 
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(iv) Structure of the Research:  
1- Privatization strategy is a comprehensive plan which forms the 
integral parts of the privatization operations legally and economically. 
The most important element in the privatization strategy is the 
determination of objectives of the privatization program. Clear objectives 
are determinants in specifying the legal preparative steps like the break-
up of legal monopolies and winding up the candidate enterprises to be 
privatized. Clear privatization objectives are also determinants in 
specifying the suitable method of privatization like auctions, tenders, 
management contracts, and direct sales contracts. Therefore, chapter 2 
will be devoted to analyze the legal aspects of privatization strategy. 
2- Despite the common notion that privatization is a sale 
(divestiture) of the public enterprises to private entities, a number of 
formulas of privatization contracts explain that privatization can be 
executed without transfer of public ownership of enterprise. Types of 
privatization contracts will be the subject of Chapter 3. 
3- Constitutions of some countries, especially the former socialist 
and Marxist-Leninists ones, may stand as barriers on the road towards 
privatization. Some constitutions expressly provide for the prohibition of 
transfer of public ownership to private parts, others put complicated 
procedures for the transfer. Therefore, Articles of these constitutions 
should be amended or circumvented to achieve smooth application of 
privatization program. Also treaties, conventions, and bilateral agreement 
to which a country is a party may foster or delay the application of the 
privatization program. Effects of constitutions and the international law 
will be the subject of Chapter 4. 
4- Competition is likely to be a more important determinant of 
economic performance than ownership. Therefore, transfer of state-
owned enterprises to private ownership without application of the rules of 
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fair competition results in the same problems that formerly compelled 
states to privatize their state-owned enterprises. Fair competition 
legislations are required, but the strict application of these legislations in 
a country remains the main challenge for execution of good privatization 
program. Chapter 5 will discuss the affection of the competition on 
privatization. 
5- Public sector management legislations in a country may be 
sufficient to achieve successful application of privatization program. In 
the advanced countries, public sector management legislations specify the 
methods of the transfer of the public enterprises and their assets. 
Furthermore, in the advanced countries the public sector management 
legislations may preserve good performance of the privatized enterprises 
after the privatization. The role of public sector management legislations 
will be discussed in chapter 6. 
6- In the absence of efficient public-sector legislations, countries 
legally implement their privatization program by passing law on 
privatization which specifies the scope of the program, establishes the 
institutional authority to conduct the privatization program, and defines 
the most important elements of the process. In some countries a separate 
law is required for any privatization operations. Therefore, chapter 7 will 
be devoted to discuss the different types of privatization laws. 
7-The institutional framework is required to conduct privatizations. 
Determination of the institutional framework requires the definition of the 
roles, responsibilities and authorities of the various actors in the 
privatization operation, such as the legislature, the government, 
individual ministries, and the transaction body. Chapter 8 will shed light 
on the institutional frameworks of privatization.  
8- In most of the countries; infrastructure sectors are, or were, 
usually thought to exhibit monopoly characteristics; that is, one operator 
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should be able to provide the services more efficiently than could several 
operators acting separately. According to their nature, infrastructure 
sectors have special legal features; therefore, the legal preparative steps 
and the special formulas of privatization of these sectors will be 
explained in Chapter 9. 
9- It is a universal concern that privatization will result in major job 
losses as new owners of privatized SOEs shed excess labour to improve 
efficiency and to minimize costs regardless the social reflections; 
therefore, sufferance of labour and the ideal methods to adjust them will 
be explained in Chapter 10.  
10- In addition to the recommendations of the international writers 
of privatization, the conclusions and recommendations of the researcher 
will be dealt with in a separate chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 Privatization Strategy 
 
Privatization strategy is a comprehensive plan which forms the 
integral parts of the privatization operations economically and legally.73 
In fact, since most privatization programs are integral parts of more 
comprehensive economic reforms,  the privatization strategy should 
define the key objectives driving the government’s overall economic 
reforming program. The absence of clearly stated objectives weakens not 
only the perception of the privatization process, but also makes an 
ambiguity in the legal methods that shall be adopted to carry out the 
privatization processes.   
 Selling SOEs should not be an end in itself, but one instrument of 
economic policy among others. Some writers argue that privatization can 
be an objective in itself, especially for transition countries on the way 
from the command economy to free market economy. If privatization is 
understood in its broad concept as a part of the entire liberalization of the 
whole economy, then this would indeed be right74 (see definitions of 
privatization in the Introductory Chapter). 
The short-term privatization strategy, from its name, implies 
irrational rush of privatization legislations and operations, a thing which 
may result in bad consequences socially, politically, economically and, 
                                                 
73 - It is very important to note that there are big differences in the expert’s opinions about the 
privatization with regard to the entire economic reform. Some of them consider privatization, 
separately, a goal regardless the entire reforming of the national economy; they do not look to the 
privatization as an integral part of overall economy reform. Theoretically, according to this approach, a 
country may execute privatization program without involving any other economical reforms. We 
believe this may be right that in UK the famous privatization program was executed without any other 
reforming steps like liberation of prices, since the prices were already liberalized in a free market 
country like UK.  But, on the other hand, the majority of economical experts look to the privatization as 
a part of entire economy reform, especially in the developing and least developing countries.  
74 - Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge p.15, 4th 2001, World Bank Publication. Washington 
DC. 
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indeed, legally. But, short-term strategy does not always mean inevitable 
privatization failure as it indicates urgent necessity for reforming state-
owned enterprises. Also, SOEs and sectors to be privatized should 
accurately be characterized and analyzed to determine whether it is 
suitable to privatize them or not. 
This chapter sheds light on the different states’ objectives of 
strategy with regard to the suitable legal methods of privatization. In 
other words, every objective requires adoption of suitable legal method 
for its application. Ranking enterprises for privatization according to their 
legal status or with regard to the governmental portion in such enterprises 
normally leads to ideal methods of preparing and privatizing them. Such 
ranking has an important role in the eye of the public opinion. For 
example, enterprises in which the government is a minority shareholder 
can easily be privatized without great opposition. Privatization of sectors 
has its special legal preparative methods which should accurately be 
adopted to absorb the negative results of privatization. Without 
underestimating the important role of the short-term strategy as a tool to 
achieve privatization program, part of this chapter will be devoted to 
illustrate the effect of the deluge of laws in the short-term privatization 
strategy. 
 
(i)Privatization Objectives as Determinants of Legal Methods: 
In fact, the selected objectives have significant implications not 
only in the legal preparative methods before privatization like break-up of 
existing monopolies, but also in the legal formulas of the contracts of 
privatization.  
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(1) Objectives of Privatization       
 Many objectives of privatization have been introduced by 
governments and privatization experts. For example, in Africa the 
majority of countries ranked a number of objectives for privatization. 
These objectives were summarized in the great reference of Gerald 
Bisong Tanyi. This reference covers almost all strategies of privatization 
in Africa.75The core objectives in African countries are mentioned as 
follows:       
• To improve public finance (e.g. by using the proceeds from the sale 
of state owned enterprises to reduce the public debt and by 
eliminating the need to subsidize loss-making enterprises). 
• To boost economic efficiency. 
• To redistribute wealth to previously disadvantaged groups. 
• To increase the local investors’ base. 
• To attract foreign capital and facilitate the transfer of technology. 
Then, Tanyi said: 
  “Designing and implementing the objectives of privatization in Africa presents 
socio-political challenges, because privatization is commonly perceived in the 
continent as a euphemism for unemployment. Whereas most governments in Africa 
welcome privatization to the extent that it offers an opportunity to spin off loss-
making enterprises and to generate revenue in the short term, they are not impressed 
with the argument that privatizing a profitable state-owned enterprise is perhaps even 
more rewarding than selling a few loss-making enterprises. This explains why the list 
of candidates in most African countries typically excludes profitable enterprises and 
also explains why these privatization programs have been stalled.”76 
 
From the above statement, we can deduce that most African 
privatization objectives are designed to avoid the government financial 
                                                 
75 - Gerald Bisong Tanyi, Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa p.14, 1st ed. 2004, Praeger 
Publishers. U.S.A. 
76 - Id, p. 15. 
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crisis regardless the social reflections of these objectives. The usual 
method of privatization in Africa normally is the ‘divestiture’ (i.e. 
transfer of governmental ownership by sale). With regard to the 
incapability of most of the local investors, divestiture usually results in 
great intervention of foreign investors. Usually, foreign investors do not 
concern themselves about the creation of new jobs to the local work 
force. The successful SOEs in Africa are normally excluded from 
privatization. This is not a good idea that in many countries with 
successful privatization programs good SOEs are privatized before the 
bad ones.77  
    The declared objectives of privatization in Egypt are to:78 
* Increase the levels of employment in the privatized SOEs. 
* Limit dissipation of finance resources and achieve reasonable levels for 
the exploitation of such resources. 
* Provide opportunities to contact with the foreign markets, provide 
modern technologies, and attract foreign capital to invest in the 
republic. 
* Widen the distribution property between the citizens, and increase the 
participation of the private sector in the national investment. 
* Create new jobs. 
* Allot sales’ proceeds for paying government’s debts due to the banking 
sector and rehabilitate the other SOEs and reduce their budget deficits. 
* Reactivation of stock-exchanges.79 
 
                                                 
77 - The profitability of SOE is not a good justification for remaining the governmental ownership, 
since that other SOEs in the same country will go to privatization and, consequently, to competitive 
climate. Usually the privatized ones win the governmental SOE. 
78 - Source: Procedures and General Instructions for Governmental Program for Widen and Reforming 
the Property in Enterprises Sector (Booklet) Technical office, Ministry of Finance, Cairo 1993.  
79 - The Egyptian objectives are translated from Arabic by the researcher.  
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   After many decades of privatization experiences, World Bank 
experts presented a bundle of proposals for the objectives to be adopted 
by countries in privatizing both SOES and public sectors.80 These are: 
* Efficiency and development of economy. This includes: 
(a) Creation of market economy. 
(b) Encouragement of private enterprises to expand of the private sector 
in general. 
(c) Promotion of macroeconomic or sectoral efficiency and 
competitiveness. 
(d) Fostering economic flexibility and eliminating rigidities. 
(f) Promotion of competition, particularly by abolishing monopolies. 
(g) Establishing or developing efficient capital markets, and mobilizing of 
domestic savings. 
(h) Improving the access to foreign market for domestic products. 
(i) Promotion of domestic investment.  
(j) Promoting the integration of the domestic economy into the world 
economy. 
(k) Maintaining or creation of new employment. 
 
* Efficiency and development of enterprises. This can be achieved by: 
(a) Fostering the enterprises’ efficiency and their domestic and 
international competition. 
(b) Introducing new technologies and promoting innovations. 
(c) Upgrading plants and equipment. 
(d) Increasing productivity. 
(e) Improving the quality of the goods and services produced. 
(f) Introducing new management methods and teams. 
                                                 
80 - Source: Pierre Guislain, supra 2 pp. 19-20.  
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(g) Allowing the enterprises to enter into domestic and international 
alliances essential to survival. 
 
* Budgetary and financial improvements. This includes: 
(a) Maximizing net privatization receipts in order to fund government 
expenditures, reduce taxations, trim the public sector deficit, or pay off 
public debt. 
(b) Reducing the financial drain of SOEs on the state (in the form of 
subsidies, unpaid taxes, loan arrears, guarantees given, and so on). 
(c) Mobilize private sector to finance investments that can no longer be 
funded from public finance. 
(e) Generating new sources of taxes revenues. 
(f) Limiting the future risk of demands on the budget inherent in the state 
ownership of businesses, including the need to provide capital for their 
expansion, or to rescue them if they are in financial troubles. 
(g) Reducing capital fight abroad and repatriate capital already 
transferred. 
 
* Income distribution and redistribution. This includes: 
(a) Fostering broader capital ownership and promoting popular or mass 
capitalism. 
(b) Developing a national middle class. 
(c) Encouraging employee ownership (also important for many reasons). 
(d) Restoring full rights to former owners of property expropriated by 
former regimes. 
(e) Enriching those managing or implementing privatization projects 
(rarely admitted objective). 
 
* Political considerations. This includes: 
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(a) Reducing the size and scope of the public sector or its share in 
economic activity. 
(b) Redefining the field of the activity of the public sector, abandoning 
production tasks and focusing on the core of governmental functions, 
including the creation of environment favourable to private economy 
activity. 
(c) Reducing or eliminating the ability of a future government to reverse 
the measures taken by the incumbent government to alter the role of the 
state in the economy. 
(d) Reducing the opportunity for corruption and misuse of public property 
by government officials and SOEs managers. 
(e) Raising the government’s popularity and its likelihood of being 
returned to power in the next election. 
 
 The declared objectives of the privatization strategy in Sudan are 
the following:81    
* Reducing Budget deficit, absorb excess liquidity and curb inflation, 
* Encouraging the private sector to increase expenditure and investments, 
and causing private companies to increase their capital stocks to assist in 
mobilizing the economy. 
* Utilizing liquidity available to the private sector according to priorities, 
* Expanding the range of competition between investors to serve the 
public good, 
* Enlarging direct private ownership by converting some public entities 
into general joint–stock companies that accumulate small investors. 
* Improving the investment climate to attract local and foreign 
investments, 
* Acquiring and utilizing advanced technologies, and 
                                                 
81- Source: www. mof@sudan.net (site of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in Sudan). 
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* Eliminating bureaucratic behavior and practices improving the 
administrative system and generalizing principles of transparency. 
 The declared objectives of privatization in Sudan, to some extent, 
represent the real motives of the government. Real objectives were 
frankly declared without the tendency to absorb social or political 
opposition. This is clear from that the list of objectives does not include 
redistribution of wealth to previously disadvantaged groups (like most of 
African countries objectives), or increase the levels of employment (like 
Egyptian objectives). On the other hand, they have no any extraordinary 
objective; they almost resemble the objectives of many other countries 
and they do not regard the special circumstances in Sudan. For example, 
despite the fact that Sudan is in the recent years suffering large regional 
conflicts based on marginalization, there is no any mentioning of the 
regional development in the privatization objectives.82 Whether the 
Sudanese objectives accommodate the legal methods by  which  Sudanese 
SOEs and sectors  were privatized is a matter which will be discussed in 
other part of this chapter. 
 
(2) Preparations before Determining the Legal Method of Privatization: 
 As we have mentioned in the introductory chapter (Definition of 
Privatization), privatization may be defined in the level of SOE, and in a 
wider level as privatization of sector. For both SOEs and sectors, some 
preparative steps must be followed before determining the suitable legal 
methods of privatization (types of contracts). Characteristics of SOE can 
determine the methods to be taken for preparation and implementation. 
For example, the legal status of the candidate enterprise, to a far extent, 
may ascertain the required preparation before its privatization. Also, the 
                                                 
82 - Privatization may be a good opportunity to ensure the regional development since that many of 
privatized SOEs located in the regions, not in Khartoum, such like Atbara and Rabak cement factories. 
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size of the candidate enterprise has important implications for the 
required preparations.    
 
(a) Legal Status of SOE: 
The legal status of SOE means the degree of domination of the 
government in the targeted SOE, or state’s controlling power in its 
holdings of the targeted SOE. Pierre Guislain, an expert in the World 
Bank, differentiate between three bundles of SOEs and state holdings, 
going from entities with limited autonomy from the government to 
companies in which the government is an ordinary, non-controlling 
shareholder:83 
 
-Public-Law Entities. This includes; 
*Government departments or ministries, and division, thereof, without 
distinct juridical personality. 
*Autonomous entities with their own budget but without separate 
juridical personality. 
*Public agencies with juridical personality. 
*Statutory corporations, public establishments and national corporations 
which may be subject in part to private-sector laws. 
 
 
-SOEs Organized under Private Company Law. This includes: 
*Joint-stock companies wholly owned by the public sector (state and/or 
public agencies). 
*Joint-venture companies whose shareholders include public entities and 
private partners (local and/or foreign).  
  
                                                 
83 - Pierre Guislain, Supra2 pp. 26-27. 
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-Minority Shareholdings: 
* These include enterprises in which the state or other public entities have 
a minority or non-controlling stake. 
  To apply the World Bank’s expert ranking in Sudanese SOEs and 
state holdings, good examples should be accompanied with such ranking. 
 About the first bundle it is clear that ministries and its departments 
are of sovereignty nature, and there is no way to speak about privatizing 
them in Sudan.84 But in the same bundle of entities, statutory corporations 
such like Sudan Railways, National Electricity Corporation and National 
Water Corporation could be privatized only if a legal preparative step 
occurred to repeal the statutes that previously founded them. Then, new 
Acts are required to transform them into share-capital companies under 
the provisions of the Companies Ordinance 1925. Then, the government 
can sell the shares.  
In the second bundle, joint-stock companies wholly owned by the 
state, the matter is easier and there is no need for double-step legal 
method as a preparative method (repeal of Act, and transformation into 
share-capital companies) that the governmental shares could directly be 
sold. A good example for this appears from the privatization of Atbara 
Cement Factory that the Factory Company was registered under the 
provisions of the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925. All the shares of 
the Factory Company were registered in the Sudanese government name; 
only one share was registered under the name of the Bank of Khartoum 
which was governmental ownership at the time of the factory’s 
privatization. Also Rabak Cement Factory, at the time of its privatization, 
was wholly owned by the government. About the joint-venture companies 
whose shares are owned by public entities and private partners (local 
                                                 
84 - This is the case in Sudan and almost all the developing countries, but in country like USA even a 
serious ministries activities like Internal Affairs were privatized (the prisons administration). 
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and/or foreigners), the matter seems to be easiest since the government 
can sell all/or some of its shares to  private investor. Selling the 
governmental shares in the joint ventures may, sometimes, result in 
problems for the private part in the joint venture. The private part in many 
cases would have never involved in a joint venture unless he had been 
guaranteed the permanence of the governmental ownership of the rest of 
shares, because of some merits and protective reasons. In such a case, the 
private partner should be granted a pre-emptive right to purchase the 
government’s shares.85 
 About the third bundle: in the case of private enterprise in which 
the state or other public entities have a minority or non-controlling stake, 
the matter is easy; the state is free to sell to any private sector, unless 
there is a pre-emptive right to the majority shareholders. A good example 
for divestiture of public shares was Kenana Sugar Factory. The 
government, under a financial crisis, decided to become a minority 
shareholder by selling considerable portion of its shares to the private 
Kuwaiti partner. This transaction happened before the current wave of 
privatization.  
 Abstractly, according to their big size, some enterprises may have 
to be subject for company law (that is, private law) before they can be 
transferred to the private sector as legal entities. In other words, the 
transformation of public enterprise to a company with shares facilitates 
privatization of such enterprise. 
The following table shows some preparative legal methods for 
privatization in Sudan: 
 
Table No. (1): Samples of Legal Preparative Methods for Privatization in 
Sudan.  
                                                 
85- Grant of pre-emption right to the private part may lead to amend the Article of association.  
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             SOE Legal  Preparative Method           Result 
 
Bank of Khartoum 
 
To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
 
Turned into public limited 
company. 
 
Cooperative 
Development Bank 
 
To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
 
Turned into public limited 
company. 
 
Real Estate Bank 
 
To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
 
Registered as private 
company. 
 
Rabak Cement Factory 
 
A public limited company. 
 
Registered as a private 
company.  
Friendship Palace Hotel 
 
A private limited company. 
 
Turned into private limited 
company. 
 
Source: www. mof@sudan.net (site of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy in Sudan). 
 
(b) Size of SOE: 
The size of SOE to be privatized is also critical. At first sight, small 
SOEs such  as small hotel or petroleum station are far different from 
those of big size like national telephone companies or cement factories. 
Many transition countries have adopted two-stage legislations of 
privatization by focusing first on small privatizations before moving on to 
larger operations. Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, and some other former 
socialist countries86 have even enacted separate laws providing for 
different legal methods of privatization for each group. For example, in 
Ukraine, the Law No.2171-XII ( March-1992) on privatization of small 
                                                 
86 - Earle, John S., Roman Frydman, Andrzej Rapaczynski, and Joel Turkewitz, Small Privatization: 
The Transformation of Retail Trade and Consumer Services in the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland, pp.184 -85, 1st ed. 1994, Central European University Press, Budapest. Hungary.   
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state enterprises was enacted. It provided for the organization of 
privatization of small enterprises before any other privatization laws (for 
large enterprises).87After small enterprises’ legislations proved their 
success, legislations for privatization of large enterprises were issued. 
This method seems to be the safest that the government will benefit from 
its mistakes by smaller expenses.88 
In Sudan, SOEs have been privatized randomly regardless of the 
size of the SOE. For example, Atbara Cement Factory (the largest cement 
factory in Sudan) was privatized on August 27th 2002 for US $ 
42,000,000, while the Friendship Palace Hotel was privatized in July 20th 
2002 for  US$ 12,000,000. The Friendship Palace Hotel is of less 
importance and value than Atbara Cement Factory. According to the 
Ukrainian experience this is incorrect, and the Friendship Palace Hotel 
should rank before Atbara Cement Factory in the privatization list. This 
example does not so much mean that all the large SOEs in Sudan were 
privatized before the small ones as it means that privatizations of SOEs in 
Sudan have randomly been exercised regardless of the size or value of the 
enterprise.     
 
(c) Legal Preparations of Sector: 
Legal preparations and even final legal methods of privatization of 
a sector are influenced by the  market structure, as well as by other 
sector-specific characteristics. The structure of a market may be 
determined mainly by legal or economic variables, as the case may be. 
Legal variables dominate, for example, in the presence of legal 
monopolies.  In this case, the law forbids any one except the holder of the 
monopoly franchise to engage in specified activities. The economic side 
                                                 
87 - Id p. 189. 
88 -  Our humble opinion, this method should be followed in Sudan to allow the country to benefit from 
the mistakes of privatization of small SOEs before involving in large ones.    
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dominates in cases of natural monopolies,89 where only one company 
could survive. In other words, in the case of legal monopoly the legal 
preparative method is the demonopoliztion of such monopoly. In the case 
of natural monopoly, where the large costs restrict other investors from 
involving the monopolistic activity the preparative steps are economic. 
“Demonopolization” of legal monopoly means the process of the 
elimination of the legal barriers in the face of private contribution.  For 
example, by repealing the legislations or regulations that formerly granted 
the monopoly.90Demonopolization of natural monopolies is of an 
economic nature; the government can break up such type of monopolies 
by attracting foreign investor or by developing the capacity of the local 
investors through economica programs and procedures.91 
Table No. (2): Samples of Legal and Natural Monopolies in Sudan. 
Entity Type of    
Monopoly 
Preparative Method 
towards Privatization 
 
Result 
Sudan Free Shops 
and Zones 
corporation. 
 
      Legal To be transformed into a 
public limited company in 5 
years time. 
 
Turned into private 
limited company. 
 
Sudan Shipping 
Lines Corporation. 
 
     Natural To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
 
Study under 
revision. 
 
Sea Ports 
Corporation. 
     Legal To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
Study under 
revision. 
                                                 
89 - A natural  monopoly prevails when one producer can supply a given market at a lower cost than 
two or more competing producers (without legislative protection) because of the heavy sunk costs; 
water distribution is a typical example 
90 - Pierre Guislain, supra 2 p. 37. 
91 - This means not that the law has no role in demonopolization such types of monopolies. The role of 
the law may be indirect; it may be by issuance of suitable legislations to attract capable foreign 
investors. The good legislations may also develop the local investors’ capability to compete with the 
foreign investors or, at least to contribute with them to break-up the natural monopolies. Good 
examples for enabling legislation are the taxations legislations, investment legislations and custom 
legislations. 
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Roads and Bridges 
Public Corporation. 
 
     Natural To be transformed into a 
public limited company. 
 
Turned into public 
limited company. 
 
National Electricity 
Corporation. 
 
     Legal Under restructuring for 
accommodation of private 
investment. 
 
BOT system 
financing has been 
incurred. 
 
Illustrated by the researcher  
 
  The question which may arise is: can all types of sectors be 
privatized? Different terms are used for sectors or activities that are 
deemed to be ineligible for privatization. In some countries, reference is 
made to strategic or vital economic sectors and activities. The magic 
word, in particular in Latin countries, may be the “public service”. Such 
word includes many activities like postal services, education, health, 
social security, justice, and national defense.92The term “public services” 
itself is ambiguous; it has never been precisely defined and it is often 
used subjectively.93 To some, privatizing a public service is tantamount to 
selling off the family jewels or abandoning the key role of the state. Our 
humble view is that peoples are usually not so much concerned by the 
body who provides the services as they are with the quality, price, and 
stability of such service.     
Telecommunications sector may be a good example for public 
service’s sector which can rationally be privatized.  Until the last decade 
of the past century, in every part of the world, telecommunications sector 
was dominated by national monopolies. As a result, most countries lacked 
in domestic investors with relevant sector experience. But in some other 
                                                 
92 - Regozenski, Credible Privatizations; Lessons from Latin America p. 142, 1996th ed., Oxford 
University Press.  
93 - Pierre Guislain, supra2 p. 24. 
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countries, the concept of privatization has been deeply rooted and 
developed to treat privatization as an instrument for the improvement of 
the public service regardless of the type of ownership.94   
The demonopoliztion or break-up of the telecommunications sector 
in Sudan resulted in a good example for the capability of the private 
sector to present the ‘public service’. The demonopolization began on 
December 6th 1992 by the break-up of the monopoly of the National 
Telecommunications Corporation. Thereafter, the Sudanese government, 
represented by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, 
concluded a primary agreement with a group of local and foreign 
investors whereby those investors shall establish a public company under 
the provisions of Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925. The final 
agreement was signed on April 19th 1993, and a joint venture company 
was established. The objective of this company was to exercise 
telecommunications activities in Sudan. Each investor shall pay the 
amount of his shares in cash, while the government’s contribution shall 
be paid as the assets of the former Telecommunications Corporation. 
With regard to the principles of privatization, the only mistake we have 
illustrated in this agreement was that the government granted a 15-year 
legal monopoly for the new public company (Sudatel).95 This mistake 
resulted in delaying many other capable companies to participate for 15 
years, a thing which resulted in a total absence of competition and, 
consequently, high tariffs. However, recently, after the end of the 
monopoly, many capable companies joined such activities, and the 
market now witnesses frequent reductions of tariffs for the sake of 
Sudanese citizens. 
 
                                                 
94 -  Id p. 23. 
95 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
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(3)Preparative Legal Methods as Tools to Achieve Privatization Objectives: 
Two elements are determinant in achieving good preparative steps 
and final privatization contracts; the financial capacity of the citizens and 
the existence of active market of shares. In other words, if the 
shareholding class  exists in a country, this will largely facilitate the 
preparative legal methods and final legal methods of privatization. As an 
example, a country with stock-exchange will never face the problems that  
a country without regular stock-exchange does. In the case of the 
existence of regular stock-exchange, the door will be opened for the state 
to adopt many options to prepare SOEs or sectors to join privatization. 
For example, waiving of shares will be available and will achieve, 
realistically, the objective of the distribution of ownership for prior 
disadvantaged groups.96Another example, in preparation of SOE to be 
privatized, listing SOE’s shares in the stock-exchange emanates the 
credibility of the government on the eye of people in that a public 
company will actually supersede the former SOE. However, exercising 
stock-exchange activities for lay-people, to a large extent, is a matter of 
culture. In many countries, despite the financial capacity of its citizens, 
transaction on stock-exchanges is not familiar or not popular. Following 
is a general overview the that shows the experience of some countries in 
preparing and transferring their SOE. 
 
 In Former Socialist Countries: 
 In the former socialist countries, market economy had to be 
created almost from scratch. The need to create a shareholding class and 
the political difficulties of the reform process, together with the difficulty 
of arousing investor interest, has led some countries in central and eastern 
Europe and in the former Soviet Union to adopt a completely novel 
                                                 
96 - As we have previously mentioned, this objective listed in most of African privatization objectives. 
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approach of privatization. First, private ownership had to be authorized 
and encouraged to facilitate large-scale and speedy transfer of productive 
assets from the public to private sector. The legal methods97 of 
privatization had to be supplemented by new ones, such as transfer of 
SOE or shares to the entire population under mass privatization 
program.98 
 
 United Kingdom and France and Some European Countries: 
 The United Kingdom’s and French privatization programs aimed at 
wide spread share ownership. Both countries, however, could rely on 
their established capital markets and securities exchange mechanisms. In 
the United Kingdom, privatization was part of an ambitious economic 
reform program, so all the known legal methods of privatization have 
been exercised. The French program was more self-contained and limited 
in scope: utilities and transport sectors were not included; therefore, 
complicated legal methods for preparations and privatizations operations 
have not been taken. Waiving of shares was the most legal method for the 
most of operations. Other European countries, including Italy, Portugal 
and Spain, have also relied heavily on public floatation.99  
  
 Latin America: 
 In Latin America, except Brazil, the existence of a continuous 
financial crisis affected the governments’ options to achieve their 
declared privatization objectives. Most of Latin American countries were 
compelled to execute short-term programs in their privatizations to gain 
quick incomes through direct sales to avoid political and economic 
                                                 
97 - The traditional legal methods of privatization, for example are: direct sales to private investor or 
investors, lease contracts, management contracts and concessions. 
98 - Barbara Lee and John Nellis, Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Socialist Economies pp. 18-
19, 1990 ed., The World Bank Washington, D.C 
99 - Pierre Guislain, supra2 p. 31. 
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risks.100A great confusion between the objectives declared in privatization 
strategies and legal methods resulted sometimes in the reluctance from 
privatization itself.101 
 
  
 
Asia: 
 In Asia, the divestiture (total or partial transfer by sale of SOEs and 
sectors) 102trend has not been as pronounced. Few countries adopted or 
implemented large divestiture programs. The others have adopted 
macroeconomic liberalization and opening of certain sectors (including 
infrastructure) to provide investment through BOT system, namely BOO 
formula (build, own and operate).103It is obvious that in the majority of 
Asian countries governments did not aim to make completely abandon 
SOEs and sectors.104     
 But in some countries in Asia; divestiture took grand area, namely 
in the Philippine. The Philippine is among the leading Asian countries in 
number of divestitures. This may be explained by that Philippine has 
involved in a financial crisis for many decades; the government directly 
targeted the income gained by full divestiture. 
 
 Africa: 
                                                 
100 - Regozenski & Others, supra 20 p. 221.   
101 - Back movement to socialism, by Hugo Chavez (president of Venezuela) leadership, obviously 
explains the tendency of some Latin American countries to reluctance from the privatization.    
102 - Divestiture is a partial or total transfer of existed governmental ownership to private sector or 
investor and usually, without imposing any conditions providing for some sort of control after 
privatization such as intervention in the future way for management of the privatized SOE. Also 
divestiture, usually, doesn’t impose any restrictions in the future options of the new owner to transfer 
the ownership of the privatized SOE.  
103 - Button K., Privatization and Deregulation, its implications in Asia p 98, 1998th ed. Harper & Row 
USA.   
104 - BOO implies that privatization is not for former established SOE or sector, it implies break-up of 
former monopoly. On other words privatization is in permission for exercise an activity formerly 
monopolized for state, without permission to future transformation, unless the contract otherwise 
provides.    
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 In Africa, where most of SOEs were in a state of virtual bankruptcy 
and lacked financial statements, privatization has often had to be effected 
through liquidation, thereby allowing buyers to acquire SOE assets 
without incurring the risks of large, uncertain, or contingent liabilities. 
Africa is the continent where, on average, the least progress has been 
achieved in privatization.105 
 
 Sudan: 
In Sudan, there are two periods or eras affected the accommodation 
between the declared objectives and privatization’s legal methods. The 
declared objectives were stable through the period from 1990 to 2005; 
they were of a realistic nature without a tendency to absorb the public 
opposition or slogan purposes (see the introductory chapter). The first 
period took place before the oil production. In this period the government 
was in bad need for hard currency resources. Therefore, many productive 
and important enterprises were essentially transferred to private investors 
to repay debts of the government. The majority of the sales proceeds were 
used to address immediate economical crisis. Divestitures by direct sales 
come on top of the legal methods of privatization of the first period of 
privatization in Sudan. Examples for divestitures through direct sales in 
the first period are: 
• Blue Nile Packing Company: sold to the Afro-Asian Company for 
Development and Investment in October 24th 1992 for a 
consideration of about SP 113.000.000. About half of the amount 
of the sale was considered as repayment of a former debt.106 
• Sata (Sudanese Company for Shoe Production), was sold to the 
Afro-Asian Company for Development and Investment in 
                                                 
105- Pierre Guislain, supra  2 p. 30.  
106 - Source: Internal files of TCDPC. 
 51
November 1st 1993 for about $15.000.000. Only $3.000.000 was 
paid directly to the Sudanese government. The rest, 12.000.000, 
was considered as a repayment for former debt.107 
• Riaa & Kiriekab Sweets Factory (former nationalized company), 
was sold to Mr. Samir Ahmed Gasim for a consideration of about 
SP55000.000. This amount seems to be very low unless it is 
justified by the deep financial crisis of the Sudanese government at 
the time of the sale (January 7th 1992).108 
In the second period of privatization (after oil production), many of 
financial crisis in Sudan were resolved and different types of privatization 
legal methods were followed. Followings are the varieties of privatization 
legal methods after the oil production: 
• Real Estate Bank: according to the resolution of the Council of the 
M Ministers No. (389) 2001it was listed as a candidate SOE for 
privatization. In December 2002, the Sudanese government 
concluded a contract with Jumaa El-Jumaa for Trading and 
Investment Company (private company). The important note is that 
the government, after oil production, began to impose some 
conditions in privatization contracts. In this privatization process, 
the government imposed that the bank shall be transformed into a 
public company five years after signing the sale contract.109 This is 
a good step to grant a portion for the Sudanese people or, at least, 
big numbers of investors (included foreigners) in a big economic 
corporation like the Real Estate bank. 
• Sudan Airways: The fixed assets of Sudan Airways were estimated 
at $50.000.000. The study of estimation was prepared by an 
international expert establishment that is Barons for Financial 
                                                 
107 - Id. 
108 - Id. 
109 - Source: TCDPE Annual Report 2005 p.32. 
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Services. All offers presented in March 2003 were rejected. The 
government refused to accept any of them depending on that the 
deep financial crisis has been resolved by oil production, and that 
there was no need to conclude low sale contract. Thereafter, 
TCDPC presented a proposal whereby a ministerial committee has 
to undertake the supervision of Sudan Airways privatization. The 
ministerial committee is also responsible for preparing a clear plan 
for reforming the company to become more attractive.110 
• Sudanese Free Shops and Zones Corporation is a good example for 
privatization of SOE through an ideal legal method.111 This 
company is a grand-scale company that exercises very important 
activity. If the activities of this company are properly administered 
the state will gain good hard currency income. Therefore, the 
government after the oil production thought that it is not suitable to 
sell the company to individual investor by a sale contract. Despite 
the long period and the complicated procedures of the 
transformation into a share-company, the government selected this 
legal method. In other words, if the privatization of such 
corporation had happened in the period before oil production, the 
deep financial crisis would have compelled the government to use a 
sale contract to individual investor so as to provide quick financial 
sources of hard currency. 
Abstractly, and from the practical view point, in the case of 
privatization of SOE: governments should declare the real objectives and 
select the suitable legal method without tending to absorb public 
opposition. Undeclared objectives will lead to the use of wrong legal 
methods, a thing which may result in an incredibility impression on the 
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government and, consequently, in the privatization program as a whole. 
Accommodation between objectives and legal methods is required, for 
example, where efficiency and maximization of privatization proceeds 
are sought, a call for bids is generally preferable to direct negotiations 
with a single investor. Free vouchers or discounted employees shares are 
not appropriate instruments if the main objective is to maximize revenue, 
but they may well serve the political objectives of privatization program. 
Similarly, a public floatation may be the right legal method to promote 
the wide spread of shares ownership and stimulate financial markets.  
In almost all African countries (including Sudan), the people’s 
culture, to a far extent, limit the objectives of privatization. For example, 
in the event of that the key objective of the program is to make a wide 
spread of shares ownership, the public offering of shares becomes the 
most suitable legal method of privatization. But, the individualist 
tendency of the African investors will not help in achieving such 
objective. 
 
(ii) Short and Long-term Strategy: 
 As we have previously mentioned, the short-term strategy, without 
underestimating its role as a well-known type of privatization strategies, 
implies an irrational rush towards privatization. For example, in many 
countries, short-term strategy resulted in a deluge of big numbers of laws 
in a limited time, a thing which resulted in very complicated political and 
social problems. Another result for short-term strategy appears from that 
many countries were compelled to discontinue this type of strategies and 
began to prepare long-term strategies. This change resulted in very high 
losses for these countries. Moreover, it resulted in delaying the 
privatization program itself. A short-term strategy requires countries with 
special features in their laws and the local market. In other words, it 
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needs a country already prepared before the privatization decision. For 
example, prices in the country are already liberalized, and the yearly 
income of the citizen is of reasonable level. Privatization essentially 
requires liberalized prices, but the sudden jump of prices will lead to 
strong opposition against privatization.  
In this part, we will discuss the experiences of some countries with 
the short-term privatization strategy:  
(a) Deluge of Laws: 
  Peru is the most obvious bad example for the short-term 
privatization strategy. The Financial Times wrote: 
  ((“10-days of 126 laws, more than half of them intended to stimulate private 
investment, has brought about the most radical reorientation in the Peruvian state or 
more than 20 years…state monopolies have been eliminated, private individuals and 
companies may be now compete directly with the state in such varied areas as 
telecommunications, the generation and transmission of electricity, and the provision 
of postal and railway services. They may apply for concessions to administer state 
owned hospitals, airports and even schools. There is what minister call an aggressive 
plan to sell-off public companies, which have drained to Peruvian exchequer of up to 
$2,5 billion annually.” The article also quoted then-prime minister Alfonoso De Los 
Heros of the importance of these reforms relative to Peru’s terrorism problem. 
“Much more important is an adequate legal framework. If these decrees survive then 
investment, both national and local, will come.” 
*(Source Financial times, 20 November 1991, p.8). 
  “The reforms have indeed survived: many SOEs, including the 
telecommunications and power companies, have been privatized, raising over $4 
billion and generating investments or plans of equal magnitude; SOE subsidies have 
been cut from their astronomical reform levels (4,2 billion in fiscal 1989-90); 
interested rates and exchange rates have been liberalized; the quotation of Peruvian 
debt to secondary markets has risen from 5 percent to 60 percent and more of face 
value; the securities exchange index has soared; inflation has been brought under 
control, dropping from over 7,000 percent in 1990 to about 11 percent in 1995; 
foreign investment has risen substantially, and real GDP rose by an average  of more 
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than 8 percent a year from 1993 to 1995. These impressive results, however, have 
been achieved at a cost of severe restriction of freedom. In April 1992 Parliament was 
dissolved, half of the members of the Supreme Court were dismissed, and strict 
control was instituted over television programs, all in the name of the fight against 
terrorism. It is said, also, that income distribution worsened over this period.” 
*Source: the Economist, 11 December 1993, pp. 90-91; Financial Times, 20 
November 1991, 19 February 1994, and 7 March 1996.)) 112  
 As mentioned above, this irrational wave of privatization resulted 
in a big political problem by dissolving the parliament, and legal problem 
by dismissing the members of the Supreme Court. The members of the 
Supreme Court were dismissed because of their inability to play their 
essential role in protecting those who suffer from the sudden increase of 
costs of their everyday needs, termination of jobs and, consequently, 
ambiguity of the future. In Peru, the parliament was dissolved because of 
the non-compliance of the president and government with its decisions to 
stop the deluge of privatization laws without a prior preparation of a legal 
framework. Such a framework should patiently be prepared to consider 
the different probable impacts on society.   
 Despite the fact that the short-term privatization strategy is a well- 
known type of privatization strategies, the issuance of 126 laws in 10 
days is a matter that seems to be irrational, and implies unpleasant bad 
political pressure towards privatization.113  
 If the only measurement for the success of a privatization program 
is the increase of the state’s privatization proceeds; the Peruvian 
experience will, indeed, be categorized as one of the most successful 
experiences. On the other hand, if the measurement is the good reflection 
                                                 
112 - Pierre Guislain, supra2 p. 16 
113 - This matter can be justified by that in the period immediately followed the collapse of former 
Soviet Union, the western countries hurried to impose free market economies all over the world. Most 
Latin American economies at that time were directed ones, so, the wave of privatization was 
concentrated sharply in Latin America to eliminate any feature of socialism and communism. 
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in providing citizens’ everyday needs at a lower cost, then the Peruvian 
experience will be considered as one of the failed experiences.     
The deluge of privatization laws makes the legislative authority 
just like a dummy in the hands of the executive authority. Consequently, 
the parliament will lose its dignity in people’s eyes, a thing which will 
increase the public opposition against the privatization program as a 
whole. 
   
(b) Reverse Privatization Strategy: 
 Some countries who adopted a short-term privatization strategy 
found big difficulties in continuing such a strategy. They found 
themselves between two hard choices: whether to continue in the short-
term strategy, a thing which may result in bad reflections (mentioned in 
the Peruvian experience), or to reverse their strategies from short to long-
terms strategies, a thing which is very costly. Despite the high cost of 
reversing privatization strategy, some countries like Hungary opted for 
this choice. The new government of Hungary (elected in 1994) noted that 
the foreign investment refused to contribute in the privatization processes. 
Reports of experts proved that the short-term strategy lead foreign 
investors to fear that such a strategy may result in people’s revolution 
against the privatization processes and, consequently, their ownership in 
the privatized SOEs and sectors may face re-nationalization. Despite the 
higher costs of reversing the strategy, the new government reversed the 
strategy, a thing which resulted in a large flow of foreign investments into 
the country.114  
 
Conclusion:  
                                                 
114 - Kathy Megyery  and Frank Sader, Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatization p. 11, 1st ed 
1997, the International Finance Corporation & the World Bank, Washington D.C.  
 57
Privatization strategy is a comprehensive plan which forms the 
integral parts of the privatization operations, economically and legally.  
 The absence of clearly stated objectives of the privatization 
strategy weakens not only the perception of the privatization process, but 
also makes for an ambiguity in the legal methods that shall be adopted to 
prepare SOEs for privatization, and to implement privatization processes. 
Determining the objectives of privatization program is not a matter of 
mere slogan; it is a matter of accommodating these objectives with the 
available instruments of the state to achieve these objectives. Many 
countries declared objectives (like creation of new jobs) other than the 
actual ones so as to absorb the public opposition, but after a period of 
time, methods and results of the privatization program showed the real 
objectives: voluminous numbers of jobs have been terminated, and public 
opposition has largely increased. 
The Sudanese government has not declared fictitious or slogan 
objective for its privatization program. Therefore, despite the painful 
results and the public opposition, the objectives of the privatization 
program represent the reality. The vast majority of privatization processes 
in Sudan were practiced through direct sales. 
After objectives have been defined, many legal preparative 
methods have to be prepared such like demonopolization of monopolies, 
or to transform some productive governmental units into companies with 
shares. The legal preparative methods, for example in privatizing SOEs, 
should consider the legal status and the size of SOE to be privatized. As 
for monopolies, the matter requires preparation of new laws to 
demnopolize them if they are legal ones. If the monopolies are natural 
ones, the government should, even from scratch, take the required steps to 
create competition. 
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There are two types of privatization strategies: short-term strategies 
and long-term strategy. Despite the fact that short term strategy may 
result in some bad features of privatization such like the deluge of big 
numbers of laws for executing  privatization program, it remains a well-
known type of privatization strategies.  Success of short term strategy 
fosters the execution of the privatization program. A long term 
privatization strategy seems to be more acceptable in the majority of 
countries all over the world. The long term of the execution of the 
privatization program until now (more than 17 years) implies that the 
Sudanese strategy is a long term one. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Patterns of Privatization 
 
Privatization requires heavy governmental involvement because 
politicians involved are frequently setting up the legal methods and 
running up the sale process. According to some privatization writers; this 
may lead to favouritism and other manifestations of corruption. For 
example, in Argentina as in other countries, an obscure of bidding 
process raised doubt of corruption and political 
favouritism.115Privatization may be the last chance for politicians to 
appropriate cash flows and deliver favours that further their political 
objectives.116The role of politicians in privatization is central in two main 
areas, the legal methods of privatization chosen and the types of contracts 
written.   
The way the privatization carried out is of great importance. A 
successful program can increase social welfare and bring efficiency gains 
while bad application of a privatization program may create opportunities 
for inefficiency and corruption.117    
While the choice of specific privatization legal methods should rest 
with the responsible privatization agency and depend on the SOE to be 
sold, the government will have to define which legal methods will be 
applied in the privatization program. At the most general level, 
government can decide to either initiate a partial or full transfer of 
ownership through some types of sales agreements. In other cases, the 
government may opt to maintain ownership while involving private 
                                                 
115 - Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez (Ch)., Privatization in Latin America p. 39, 1st 2005, Stanford 
University Press and the World Bank. 
 116 - Earle, John and Gehlbach, A spoon of Sugar: Privatization and Popular Support for the Reform in 
the Czech Republic p.188, 2003 ed. (International center for Economic Growth) press.     
117-  Id. p. 189. 
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operators through a management contract, or a lease or concession 
arrangement. While the latter approach is not a privatization in a narrow 
sense; that the government hands the assets of the public sector to private 
sector, it might still be an appropriate measure in some circumstances.    
 Governments use a variety of legal methods for transferring SOEs, 
sectors, and services to private sector. The main methods include the 
following:     
• Auction: here the SOE assets are sold to the highest bidder in open 
bidding. 
• Negotiation sales: here the price and terms of the transaction 
agreed upon by direct negotiations between the purchaser and the 
vendor. 
• Tender: Bidders submit sealed bids, which are opened at 
announced time, with the property generally going to the highest 
bidder. 
• Public offering of shares: the government’s shares are offered in 
local or international capital market. 
• Management/employee buyout: SOE management and/or 
employee buying a controlling interest in the company. 
• Stock distribution: here a percentage of shares in the SOE is given 
or sold at preferential terms to employees and other special groups 
such as former political prisoners. 
• Vouchers or coupon privatization: eligible citizens are given or are 
sold coupons or vouchers at nominal prices which can be 
exchanged for shares in former state-owned companies or in 
investment funds that control the actual company shares. 
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In addition to transfer of ownership (divestiture), there are other 
legal methods for achieving many of the objectives of the privatization. 
Despite that part of privatization writers do not mention them as legal 
methods of privatization, the majority of privatization writers mentioned 
them as fundamental legal methods of privatization according to the wide 
concept of privatization. The wide concept of privatization includes, in 
addition to the transfer of ownership public assets, transfer of 
governmental activities by management contracts or lease of the 
governmental assets and so on. The following shows these types of legal 
methods: 
• Joint ventures: The private investor and the SOE join forces to 
form a distinct legal entity that preserve the distinction between 
public and private capital. 
• Build-own-operate-and-transfer (BOT) agreement: Such 
agreements are used mainly for infrastructure projects. For 
example, private investor paying a cost of constructing a toll road, 
bridge, or facility and then is entitled to collect a share of the 
revenues for an agreed-upon period of time (say, 20 years), after 
which time ownership reverts to the government. 
• Leasing: The private investor pays an agreed-upon annual fee to 
operate an SOE or other publicly owned facility but is entitled to 
keep the balance of the operating profits. 
• Management contract: the government pays a private operator an 
agreed-upon fee to operate an SOE or other facility. 
 
(i) Auctions: 
Auctions so far have been used mostly for small businesses, such as 
retailing shops which, in general, are of little interest to major investors. 
In the Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, tens, if not 
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hundreds, of thousands of such auctions have been conducted. In any 
case, the states employees who ran these shops or establishments are 
given the first chance to bid for them before the bidding is opened to the 
other investors. There have been some cases of state-owned medium or 
large enterprises (MLE) being liquidated, and their assets sold at auctions, 
particularly in the developing countries.118 
 However, some examples for privatization of MLEs through 
auctions happened in Mexico that the vast majority of the privatized 
SOEs were, at the beginnings of the execution of the Mexican program, 
of small and middle sizes.119 
 The main role of auctions in privatization processes appears as an 
instrument to dispose of SOE assets. If the government thinks that certain 
governmental enterprise is not attractive to be sold as an entity, selling 
assets of such SOE will be the optimum choice for the government to 
dispose off such SOE. Here the transaction consists basically of the sale 
of  assets, rather than shares in a going concern. In other words, the sale 
of separate assets may be the only means for selling the enterprise as a 
whole.120 Despite that biddings or tenders may be used to achieve the 
same goal, auction comes first because it crystallizes the transaction since 
that it is normally exercised upon open doors. 
In Sudan, auctions are mostly exercised in selling the liquidated 
SOEs. It is unheard for invitation for auction to sell one of the SOEs 
itself; all privatization operations were executed by other legal methods. 
The privatization operation of the Printing and Publication Corporation 
was concluded through auction. Selling of such corporation as an entity 
                                                 
118 - Using auctions for selling retailing shops and restaurants can not be illustrated in countries other 
than the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Even, in the developing countries 
which formerly followed the socialism, the degree of intervention of the state in the economical life 
didn’t reach this degree of  intervention in retailing shops and the similar.   
119 - Alberto Chong and Florencio Lopez, supra 1, p. 40. 
120 - Charles Vuylsteke, Techniques of Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises p. 20, 2nd ed. 1995, 
World Bank Publications, Washington D.C.   
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became difficult for that it was suffering huge number of debts and 
losses. For example, in the internal files of TCDPE121, an agreement was 
made on 8.2.2003 to settle a debt of SD11. 984. 000 due to Hilton Hotel. 
Khartoum-North District Court judged the full amount of the debt to the 
Hotel on 8/9/2001. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy 
offered to pay %25 of the total amount of the debt as a settlement and the 
Hilton Hotel administration accepted this settlement. Also in the internal 
files of TCDPE, we found another settlement agreement dated: 
24/2/2003.122 By this agreement; Danfodio Company sold printing 
machines to the Printing and Publication Corporation. The cheque 
rejected and a suit was presented to Khartoum Divisional Court. After a 
long time of negotiations, Danfodio Company accepted a sum of 
SD7.000.000 as a settlement for the bigger amount.123   
From the above, we can deduce that selling of the assets of this 
corporation may be the ideal solution for TCDPE to dispose off this 
corporation. The entity of such SOE was not attractive to private 
investors because it was burdened with huge numbers of debts.         
 
(ii) Negotiated and Direct Sales: 
In a negotiation sale or direct sale (used interchangeably), the SOE 
and/or its owners (the government) negotiate directly with a single 
investor or a group for the transfer of all or part of its shares to the 
investor. This method in the European countries is used mostly to 
privatize successful SOEs. In some cases the parties are brought to the 
negotiating table by an investment bank or other financial intermediary. 
In other cases, the negotiations are the result of direct contacts between 
the vendor and the prospective purchaser. Some countries such as the 
                                                 
121 - Without number. 
122 - TCDPE, headed paper No LF/ MTA / A. 
123 - The full amount of the debt does not mentioned in the agreement.  
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Czech Republic, even allow investors to choose their own programs for 
privatizing an SOE.124 
A few European countries, such as Germany, have made extensive 
use of negotiated sales to divest their SOEs. However, as a rule, 
negotiation sales are less common than the other types of legal method of 
privatization in the rest of the European countries, and when they are 
used, they tend to be reserved for the largest SOEs.125 
In a little number of the European countries; negotiation sales were 
successfully used as a first step for wider share distribution. For example, 
in the case of Montedison, in which ENI (Italy’s energy sector holding 
company) had acquired a controlling interest of about %30, ENI 
concluded an agreement for GEMNIA (a largely private financial holding 
company) to acquire this interest to investors in a private sector.126  
From the vendor’s point of view, there are several disadvantages 
associated with the negotiated sales. First, a negotiated sale is widely 
regarded as too time-consuming although this is not necessarily the case. 
Second, it tends to result in a lower selling price than a tender, because 
the element of competition is absent. Third, because the negotiations take 
place out of the public view; there is a possibility that opponents of the 
government or for the privatization process will try to make political 
problems by accusing the government’s negotiators by that they are 
selling at lower prices.  
 The experts of the World Bank advise that the application of the 
negotiated and direct sales of privatization requires the government to 
undertake ‘wide investor research’.127For example, in Argentina, the law 
of privatization and the implementing decrees provide for some 
                                                 
124 - Dmitri Pluonis and Andrew McWilliams, Privatization; Investing in State-Owned Enterprises 
Around the World p.20, 1994 ed., John  Wiley & Sons, Inc. USA.    
125 - Id p.21. 
126 - Charles Vuylsteke, supra 6 p. 18. 
127 - Id p. 17. 
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manufacturing enterprises and petrochemical concerns, a competition 
depending on the purchasing party’s general reputation, financial 
strength, records of former performances, etc. In Spain, these conditions 
are required for all direct and negotiation sales regardless of the size of 
the SOE.128   
Also, because of the seriousness of the negotiated and direct sales, 
some countries have adopted many preventive procedures to control the 
legality of such transactions. A number of countries have introduced 
mandatory procedures or guidelines for negotiated sales. For example, in 
Philippine, the guidelines of the Privatization Trust provide minimum 
standards for such types of sales; negotiated offers can be restored to only 
if tenders’ biddings proved unsatisfactory, impractical or inappropriate.129    
 In the majority of the African countries, the matter differs: the 
negotiated and  direct sale contracts take their feasibility from that Africa 
is still now suffering from the huge number of regional and ethnic 
problems. The marginalized regions are always struggling with the centre 
for  development and  national economic equity. Governments in Africa 
may want to take accounts for the country’s multi-ethnic dimension and 
ethnic rivalries to ensure that lucrative enterprises are not acquired by 
purchasers from a single group. Similarly, the government may want to 
ensure that the purchaser with the best investment plan (i.e., capable for 
creating jobs and boosting development) prevails. Also in Africa, given the 
fact the this legal method of privatization is essentially private and susceptible to 
abuse, there is a strong need for transparency. For example, a big number of SOEs in 
Africa have been sold to special interest groups (especially from the former colonial 
powers) and to so-called foreign investors who are mere fronts for certain domestic 
political elites. Such irregular transactions create the spectre of renationalization 
                                                 
128 - Id p. 17. 
129 - Id p. 18. 
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once a new government takes over.130But in some African countries, like Togo, 
the matter differs. That Ministry of State Enterprises has formulated 
detailed guidelines for such type of contracts. They essentially provide 
for the preparation of a dossier (in terms of items to be addressed by 
interested parties) and a brochure for each enterprise, to be distributed 
through all available channels such as local and foreign banks, chambers 
of commerce, and foreign trade offices and embassies. Interested parties 
are invited to make a field visit. Following an initial contact, the Minister 
of State Enterprises authorizes plant visits and the gathering of further 
data and information. Upon the receipt of an offer from an interested 
investor, the Ministry verifies if all elements specified in the dossier in 
respect of investor qualifications and contents of proposal are included. 
An inter-ministerial commission will meet to consider the investor’s 
proposals, and select the suitable investor for negotiations.131 
 Despite the fact that successful negotiated sales, by their nature, 
depend on the trust of the government in its officials or representatives, it 
is advisable to follow the Togo’s method that it creates a reasonable level 
of transparency in selecting the suitable investor. However, one of the 
advantages of the negotiated sales is that the prospective owner is known 
in advance and can be evaluated, and may be selected based on the ability 
to bring a number of benefits such as good management, technology, 
market access, and the like. In many instances, the future success of the 
operation may be as important to the government as the proceeds from 
the sale itself. In addition, negotiated and direct sales are advisable; they 
assist the government to negotiate with the new investor about the future 
of the work force of the SOE to be privatized.132 
                                                 
130 - Gerald Bisong Tanyi, Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa; Law, Economics, and Practice 
pp.82-83, 1st  ed. 2004, Praeger Publishers, Westport USA. 
131 - Charles Vuylsteke, supra 6 p. 18. 
132 - Id p. 19. 
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In Sudan, there are many cases of negotiated sales, but the most 
important one is Atbara Cement Factory Company sale contract.133 From 
the terms of the contract we can deduce whether it has achieved a 
successful privatization operation.  Followings are some terms of the 
contract (see the appendix):134   
 
INTRODUCTION: 
“This agreement is made and entered into on August 27th 2002 by and between: 
* The Government of the Republic of the Sudan, represented by Mr. Alzobier Ahmed 
Alhassan, Minister of Finance and National Economy. 
* The Sudanese African Company for Trading and Investment, thereinafter referred to 
as ‘the second party’ 
* Whereas the Sudanese Government is debited for the Sudanese African Company 
for Trade and Investment by $41,000,000.,and whereas Atbara Cement Factory 
Company “registered under the provisions of the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 
1925, under the registration No. C 2785” is, with all its shares and portable and fixed 
assets, goodwill, trademarks and intellectual property right; the first party offered the 
sale of the company’s shares to the second party.  
* The second party accepted to sell the offered shares of Atbara Cement Factory 
Company.  
SALES: 
(2)The sales are: 
a- Atbara Cement Factory Company, free of any former obligations, legally and 
financially, and this includes 10,000 fully-paid shares. 
 b- Brick Factory in Atbara. 
 c- All assets and lands owned by Atbara Cement Factory Company Ltd. 
d- All lands and real estates owned by Atbara Cement Factory Company Ltd., as 
mentioned in the fourth schedule of  this agreement.    
e- Fixed and portable assets as mentioned in the balance sheet on 30-6-2002.  
                                                 
133 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
134 - Translated by the researcher (there is no English copy in TCDPE). 
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 f- All the intellectual property rights of Atbara Cement Factory Company Ltd, and 
this includes goodwill, business names, patents and any other evaluated property 
owned by the sold company at the day of this agreement. 
 PRICE AND PAYMENTS: 
(3) The two parties agree that the purchase price shall be an aggregate amount of 
$41,000,000. (fourty one million American dollars) , and the second party shall pay 
the purchase price in the following manner:    
a- By a deposit of $20,500,000, upon the execution of this agreement. Half of the 
deposited sum shall be paid in cash, the rest shall be considered as repayment for the 
debts of the first party (see the introduction). 
b- $20,500,000 shall be paid as five instalments of $4,100,000 each. The period of the 
payment of the instalments shall be as follows: 
First, the first instalment shall be paid one year after the handover of the factory. 
$2,050,000 shall be considered as a repayment of first party’s debts (mentioned in the 
introduction).  
Second, the second instalment, ($4,100,000); shall be paid two years after. 
$2,050,000 shall be paid as a repayment of the first party’s debts (mentioned in the 
introduction). Third, the third instalment ($4,100,000) shall be paid three years after. 
4,050,000 shall be paid as repayment of the first party’s former debts (mentioned in 
the introduction). Fourth, the fourth instalment, ($4,100,000) shall be paid three 
years after. $2,050,000 shall be paid as repayment of the first party’s debts 
(mentioned in the introduction). Fifth, the fifth instalment of $4,100,000 shall be paid 
after five years. $2,050,000 shall be paid as a repayment for the first party’s debts 
(mentioned in the introduction). 
  
 From the above contract we can come with the following: 
1- The Sudanese government was debited for the purchaser by a large 
amount of money: $41.000.000. Because of this debt, the Sudanese 
government was not in a good position to impose strong conditions in the 
contract.  
2-  The Sudanese government found that it can not maintain part of 
the ownership of the Company. The purchaser was in a strong negotiation 
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position and could impose that he must be the only owner,135a thing 
which would not achieve a wide spread of shares of one of the greatest 
and strategic factories in Sudan.  
3- Despite that such type of agreements usually requires intermediary 
or guarantor, the Sudanese government wasn’t in a good position  to 
require so.136 
4-  Negotiated sales, for transparency purposes, were rarely used in 
the European countries (except in Germany), while in Sudan, the 
negotiated sales were widely used137.The justification is that after the 
National Salvation  regime took the governance in 1989, the state faced a 
big deficit in the public budget. Also, the new government faced big 
difficulties to borrow money from the international financial institution. 
Therefore, it borrowed a lot of hard currency loans from some Islamic 
institutions funds like Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami. The government also faced 
financial problems to repay such loans and, consequently, relied upon the 
negotiated sales in many of governmental productive units to repay these 
loans.     
5- The Sudanese government did not take the reasonable time to make 
“wide investor research". 
6- The Sudanese government did not adopt any sort of competition to 
find out the suitable investor depending on his good reputation, financial 
strength etc. like in Argentina, Brazil, and Togo. 
7- Because of the heavy debts, there was no way for the Sudanese 
government to impose any restrictions in using negotiated sales such like 
Philippine. The Philippine government, as mentioned previously, adopted 
                                                 
135 - To some extent, Sudanese government; kept the right of wide spread ownership for one of the 
most important and largest industrial schemes. The Sudanese government imposes in the terms of the 
contract that the purchaser shall, after five years from signing the contract, transform the sold Company 
into public one. 
136 - This was, also, because of the former debts. 
137 - Two negotiated sales explained infra prove and explain this result. 
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the negotiated sales only if the tender biddings proved unsatisfactory, 
impractical, or weak offers.           
  It is to be noted that in the following examples of negotiated sales, 
the terms of Atbara Cement Factory sale were used verbatim. Therefore, 
we will not repeat them, and will only concentrate on some terms. We 
will leave the area of the privatized SOE and the price paid, without any 
discussion. We do not want to accuse anybody.138 
 Another example for using negotiated sales for repaying former debts 
is the negotiated sale contract of the Blue Nile Company for Packing and 
the Afro Asian Company for Development. The sold shares of the two 
companies were fully owned by the Sudanese government. The area of 
the two companies is (29.955 SQ.M), located in Khartoum-North 
Industrial Area: No. 1/1 and 1/2, Block No. 4 (East). The vendor was 
TCDPE; the purchaser was the Sudanese African Company for Trading 
and Investment. The price was $5.221.000, in addition to SP61.000.000. 
The $5.221.000 was considered as repayment for former debts due to the 
purchaser, and the SP61.000.000 was considered as an advance payment. 
The above example, indeed, presents one of the negative examples for 
using the negotiated sales for the privatization of the Sudanese SOEs. 
This is clear from that the creditor usually does noy accept one of the 
loss-making SOEs. On the other hand, the debited government usually 
finds itself in a weak negotiation position and, consequently, accepts all 
the conditions imposed by the creditor. 
A third negative example is the negotiated sale of the Sudanese 
Company for Shoes Production (SATA), (formerly BATA).139The 
company is located in Khartoum-North Industrial Area No. 12 Block 
                                                 
138 - The price of Atbara Cement Factory Company seems to be a huge one with regard to the other 
negotiated sales between the Sudan government and the Sudanese African Company for Trading and 
investment, but we do not have any measurement to determine or to estimate the fair price. 
139 - One of the former nationalized companies. 
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No.4 and No. 15 Block No.5, the area of the factory is 63,000 SQ.M. The 
price was $3.000.000 in addition to SP12.941.000. The $3.000.000 was 
considered as a repayment for former debts for the purchaser company on 
the Government of Sudan, and the sum of SP. 12.941.000 was considered 
as an advance payment.140 The method of paying the price seems to be 
unfair for a big factory like SATA. Such a factory possesses a big area in 
the greatest industrial area in Sudan as a whole, and it has, in addition to 
the financial value, a very respectful goodwill in Sudan.            
 A fourth example for negotiated contracts is the contract of the 
Fine Spinning Factory (Khartoum North) on 24.11.1997.141 The vendor is 
TCDPE, the purchaser is the Arab Islamic Company for Gulf Investments 
(Al-Sharija – United Arab Emirates), a subsidiary for the Holding 
Company; (Dar A-lmaal Al-Islami). The area of the Factory is 50.000. 
sqm. The price was $14.000.000. The full amount of price was 
considered as a repayment of former debts. After signing the contract, the 
purchaser company shall exempt the rest of the debt (the total amount of 
the debt is more than the price), and give a clearance-certificate to the 
Sudanese government. The purchaser company shall be obliged to 
rehabilitate the factory. The government shall be obliged to pay all the 
obligations resulting from the termination of jobs. In the case of the 
purchaser failing to operate the factory within the determined period, he 
shall be obliged to pay SP1.000.000 for every week after the determined 
date. The purchaser company shall not be entitled to sell the factory at 
any time before the rehabilitation, but can make a partnership with any 
technical or financial partner. The governing law is the Sudanese law, and 
the arbitration shall be subject to the Civil Transactions Act 1983, and its 
decision shall be final. 
                                                 
140 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
141 - Id. 
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 In this contract, the price as a whole was considered as repayment 
for former debts. Therefore, from the lessons of the other negotiated 
contracts, we claim that, in Sudan, negotiated sales are not successful, 
especially where the government is indebted to the purchaser. The ideal 
way to repay debts through privatization proceeds is to open the wide 
door for tenders with closed envelopes. After determining the highest 
price, creditors may be granted priority to pay price and, consequently, 
own the targeted SOE. Thereafter, whether the price is considered as a 
repayment for former debts or not, is a matter of less importance.   
 Exercising negotiated sales by the manner in which these sales 
were applied in Sudan will open the door widely for accusing the 
government of favouritism and other types of corruption, a thing which 
may harm the credibility of the privatization program as a whole.       
 It is important to say that one of the main elements of the success 
of privatization program is the public confidence in the persons who are 
responsible for attracting and treating for foreign and local investors. We 
do not want to accuse any person. Moreover, we consider the 
circumstances which compelled the government to conclude such 
contracts. But in the future, we call for guidelines for the negotiated sales 
such as in Togo, Philippine, and Argentina. 
 
(iii) Tenders: 
Unlike an auction, which as a rule is issued to dispose of the asset 
of an SOE, normally in liquidation, a tender often is used to divest SOEs 
as entities that are going concern. In a tender privatization, prospective 
investors in an SOE submit their bids in sealed envelopes, which are 
opened publicly at announced time and place. Many governments prefer 
tenders because of their relative simplicity and ease of implementation. 
Tenders also, in general, result in higher prices than negotiated sales, due 
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to the element of competition. Governments using tenders in privatization 
also feel less vulnerable to politically motivated accusations of poor 
negotiating performance or improprieties in negotiations, because the 
tender process is conducted in the public eye according to predetermined 
guidelines.  
(1) Important Documents for Tenders:  
For a tender to be perfectly exercised,  the followings are required:142  
• Confidentiality agreement. Potential bidders should confirm that any 
information received by them will only be used in the context of 
formulating an investment decision and not for commercial 
purposes. 
• Information memorandum. This document outlines the activities, 
history, competition, ownership structure, and the financial 
performance of the SOE over the last three or five years. 
• Questionnaire on potential acquirers. The vendor must ensure that 
bidders are reputable, technically competent, have sufficient funds 
to effect the purchase of privatizable SOE, and that they are not in 
bankruptcy.  
• Draft Sales and Purchase Agreement. The terms and conditions of the 
sale should be prepared in advance and submitted to potential 
acquirers at the time they receive the information memorandum. In 
the tenders, it is important that the vendors should insist on 
negotiating on the basis of their own legal documents, rather than 
the purchaser’s. This is important because having control of 
drafting of legally binding documents reduces the chances that the 
final agreement does not reflect what was agreed upon during 
negotiations.   
                                                 
142 - Olivier Fremond (Ch), Case-by-Case Privatization in the Russian Federation; Lesson from 
International Experience pp. 40-41, 1st ed. May 1998, World Bank, Washington DC.  
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• Access to data room. In addition to the documents outlined above, for 
those parties who have demonstrated that they are bona fide 
“would be” investors, access to “data room” and of the 
management of the company is granted. As its name indicates, 
“data room” is a room in which confidential information on the 
company is gathered. Potential bidders whom the room may take as 
many notes as they wish from the documents made available to 
them but they cannot copy them or take them outside of the room 
because the information made available to bidders is likely to be 
valuable to competitors. It is important to limit access to data room 
only to those who are most likely to bid for the company. 
 
Tenders contracts, as we have previously mentioned, are used for 
MLEs (middle and large enterprises). These types of SOEs are of big 
importance for the state, and many countries in the world aim to make 
some contribution by local investors. Weakness in the capability of local 
private sector in a country may lead to that the majority of purchasers are 
foreigners. Because of this, governments often impose conditions for the 
sale of their SOEs and companies. In some countries, especially the 
developing ones, tenders contracts of privatization usually contain 
condition that if the new owner is a foreigner; a percentage of the shares 
of the privatized SOE will be offered again to the local investors.143 
Generally, in all operations of privatization processes the role of the 
legal advisors as well as economic advisors should not be underestimated. 
The legal advisor may ascertain the method of privatization prior to the 
economical advisor since that the legal adviser is presumed to know well 
about the legal requirements. The legal requirements in many countries 
beat the economic benefits. This often happens if the legal requirements 
                                                 
143 - Id pp. 42-43. 
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overlap the economic benefits. The following privatization operation 
from Canada explains this opinion: 
Telesat Canada was established in 1969 as a joint venture between 
the government and Canada’s major telecommunications carriers. (Most 
Canadian telecommunications were investor-owned). Its mission was to 
develop a domestic satellite-based communications system. It is the only 
carrier providing domestic satellite facilities. It operates two satellites and 
a network of 500 earth stations and, in 1992 it launched two new 
telecommunications satellites: the Anik E2 and Anik E1. It is also the 
only Canadian carrier providing basic telecommunications facilities to 
northern communities and to remote region in Canada. 
Telesat’s major shareholders were the government of Canada with 
3.225.000 shares held directly and indirectly or %53 of the total, and the 
Canadian telephone companies 2.535.000 shares or %41.6 percent of the 
total. Telesat accounted for about one percent of total Canadian 
telecommunications industry revenue in 1992. The company had 877 
employees with 672 located at the head office in Ottawa and the 
remainder were in the regional offices.  
The privatization of Telesat was announced in the 1991Canadian 
budget. Wood Gundy, a Canadian merchant/investment bank, was 
engaged through a competitive process as the government’s financial 
advisor. Valuation, resolution of policy issues, and privatization options 
were taken to government, and a privatization plan was approved. There 
were two sales options considered for privatization; public offering of 
shares and tender’s sale. The public offering from the economic view 
point was more gainful. After many economic and legal discussions, the 
government opted for privatizing Telesat through tender’s sale. The 
ground of such selection was that the legal advisor was of the opinion that 
public offering takes a long time and the employees wages will remain 
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and their post services rights will increase. Therefore, the government 
agreed to privatize the company through trade sale. A legislation to allow 
sale was passed at the end of 1991. 
In 1992 the government announced for tenders. The government 
stated that its decision on a purchaser would be based on the “best overall 
offer”. This was understood by the business community, on the basis of 
the past sales, to be the best cash price.144       
In Sudan, banks are the main and important SOEs which were 
privatized in the last years. A good example for tender’s privatization 
processes is the operation of Elnilein Industrial Development Group. This 
privatization process was exercised by fulfilling the entire legal 
requirements and, according to our humble view; a high level of 
transparency was applied. Good ranking for legal preparations for 
privatization, consultation prior to participation, clear tender 
announcement in newspapers, and efficient privatization agreement 
presented one of good example for privatization.  
As a first step after listing the bank on the candidate SOEs for 
privatization, the Bank of Sudan (the major owner of the bank by %99 of 
shares) obtained a legal opinion from a neutral legal advisor about the 
legal settings and the ideal method to privatize the bank. The neutral legal 
advisor, Mr. Hashim Abu-Bakr Al-Jaalie (advocate), prepared the 
following legal advice:145  
“Elnilein Industrial Development Group was established under Elnilein 
Industrial Development Group Act (1994). Such Act provided that the group shall 
have a separate legal entity and seal, and can sue and be sued under its name. Also, 
the Law provided that the Bank of Sudan shall own %99 of its shares and the Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy shall own the rest %1 of the capital. 
                                                 
144 - Id, p. 50-53. 
145 - Source: Department of legal Affairs of Bank of Sudan. 
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Since that Elnilein Industrial Development Group is a public utility and, 
accordingly, was established by a special Act, any change in its position shall be by a 
new Act. Therefore, if the owners decided to dispose of this Bank or to sell the shares 
of this bank to any private part, wholly or partially, this will not be valid unless it is 
exercised according to a new legislation from the same authority that formerly 
enacted the law of the Bank. In this case it is the National Assembly or the 
Parliament.  
Therefore, we advise that the national legislative authority shall issue a 
legislation whereby Elnilein Industrial Development Group shall be transformed into 
a public share company, and registered under the provisions of the Companies 
Ordinance 1925. Such company shall exercise banking activities. The mentioned 
legislation shall include a provision whereby all the rights and liabilities of the 
former Elnilein Industrial Development Group shall be transferred to the new 
company. Also the legislation shall include a provision whereby all the capital and 
property rights shall be transformed into equal shares, %99 for the Bank of Sudan 
and 1% for the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. Thereafter, the Bank of 
Sudan and the Ministry of Finance will be free to sell their shares, wholly or partially. 
If the Bank of Sudan and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy aim 
to maintain their shares in the new company, the legislation shall permit the company 
to increase its capital. The recent capital can be evaluated as shares and allotted to 
the Bank of Sudan and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. The additive 
capital can be offered to the public at large or to any other investor by public offering 
of shares.”146 
   
The important advice that can be implied from Mr. Hashim’s note is 
that Elnilein Industrial Development Group cannot be privatized 
according to the provisions of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 
1990. Also, the note contained long complicated procedures without 
referring to any other law or provision prohibiting the sale under the 
Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990.  
                                                 
146 -This legal advice was presented in Arabic; translated to the English by the researcher. Source: 
Internal files presented to the researcher by Legal Affairs Department in Bank of Sudan. 
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  On 21.3.2006, the Head of Legal Affairs Department in the Bank of 
Sudan, Mr. Osman Ahmed Mahjoub, prepared a legal opinion. This legal 
opinion contained very strong evidences that there is no legal barrier 
against the privatization of Elnilein Group under the provisions of the 
Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990. His opinion reads as 
following:147 
       
 “I have read the legal opinion presented by Mr. Hashim Abu-Baker Al-Jaalie 
(copy accompanied). I, respectfully, do not agree with him because of the followings: 
 (1) Elnilein Industrial Development Group is a public corporation established 
as a bank according to s.4 of Elnilein Industrial Development Group Act 1994. This is 
true and there is no issue in this point. 
(2) The Bank (the group) cannot be wound-up without legislation according to 
S . 29 of the same Act. This is true and also there is no issue here.  
(3) Winding-up the (group) or selling it, does not require a legislation to 
transform the (group) into a public shares company registered under the provisions of 
the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925 etc, as  mentioned in Hashim’s opinion. 
(4) The mentioned bank is a state-owned enterprise. The definition of “state-
owned enterprise” mentioned in S.2 of the Disposition of Public Enterprise Act 1990 
typically covered it. The definition in S.2 reads:  ‘enterprise means: any public 
corporation, public establishment, or any public sector company owned wholly or 
partially by the state. 
(5) According to term (4) above; the law by which the group is wound-up or 
sold is the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990, and according to s.4 of the 
same Act, the matter does not require anything other than a decision from the 
HCDPE. S.4 of the Disposition of Public Enterprise Act 1990 authorizes HCDPE to 
take the decision of the disposition through one of the following: 
(a)  Participating with any part other than the state, by any form of participation; 
(b)  Selling to parties other than the state; 
(c)  Final liquidation. 
                                                 
147 - The researcher found this legal opinion and the  legal advice in the internal file titled Elnilien 
Group Agreement, in the Bank of Sudan 
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 The required legislation for selling or winding up the Bank (the group) is 
already existent. Therefore, we do not agree with Mr. Hashim in the requirements 
mentioned in his note.”148  
 Thereafter, invitation for bidding was prepared as the follow: 
Invitation for Bidding 
Elnilein Industrial Development Group (NIDBG) came into being in 1993 as a 
result of merging two pioneer banking establishments: the former Industrial 
Development Bank of Sudan (a branchless specialized financing institution 
established in 1961) and Elnilein Bank (a pioneer commercial bank with more than 
30 (thirty) branches spreading all over Sudan, established in 1964). 
The new objective of the new NIDB is to promote industrial development at 
large along with extending multi-faceted and full-fledged banking services to all other 
sectors of the economy at both local and international levels. 
 
Main Activities: 
NIDB undertakes the following activities: 
i- Extending multi-faceted and full-fledged services to all sectors of the 
economy at both local and international levels. 
ii- In the context of development financing; NIDBG assume the following 
functions: 
*Providing financial and technical assistance for the establishment of 
new industries and modernization and/or expansion of the existing ones. 
* Providing finance to agriculture and service sector. 
* Promoting investment opportunities among Sudanese expatriates and 
foreign potential investors. 
* Extending medium and short-term credit to finance working capital 
requirements. 
* Extending technical consultancy services to industrial venture and 
other forms of business. 
* Co-operating with government units in conducting researches and 
studies pertaining to development issues. 
                                                 
148 - Source: Legal Affairs Department .Bank of Sudan. 
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* Providing support to local technical innovations, with special 
attention to small-scale industries, artisans, craftsmen and family-run 
business. 
* Participating in share-capital of some regional financing institutions 
and domestic companies. 
 
As such you are here to by request to provide your proposal for acquiring %60 
percent of Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group (NIDBG) shares within two 
weeks time based on the following: 
1- Your future vision for the bank. 
2- Your plans to promote the role of the bank in the financial market. 
3- The proposed price for the shares. 
The proposals should be handed over in sealed envelopes to Mr. Mohamed Abbas, 
with the following title: 
BIDS FOR ACQUIRING SHARES OF ELNILIEN BANK 
GROUP. 
(The dead line for receiving bids is 12:00 noon of August 15th 2006.) 
 
 Thereafter, Bank of Sudan appointed a committee to verify the 
bids. The committee determined specific measurements for selecting the 
winner candidate. The committee received twenty nine sealed-envelope 
offers from in/outside Sudan. Primarily, twenty offers were considered as 
candidates according to the legal entity, C.V and the financial capacity of 
the candidate. 
The following investors were excluded as candidates because of 
the followings: 
• Mirgani Abdelraheem & Co., because there is no legal entity or 
documents supporting financial capacity. 
• Salaheldeen Ahmed Idris & Jamal Elwali, because there is no legal 
entity. 
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• Alzoora Group, because there is no legal entity or documents 
supporting the financial capacity. 
• Susiness Group, because there is no C.V and financial capacity. 
• Elshiekh Sultan Bin-Khalifa Bin-Zaied Al-Nahian, because there is 
no legal entity, C.V or documents supporting the financial 
capacity. 
• Noor Investment Co., because there is no financial capacity. 
• Waiel Abd-Elgadir & Others, because there is no financial capacity 
documents or legal entity. 
 
  The Committee determined the points for the competition as follows: 
First: The Technical Part, 55 points, divided as: 
 a - Legal personality: 10 points. 
 B- Former experience in banking field: 7 points. 
 c- Number of general experience: 3 points. 
 d- Proposed frame-work plan: 35 points. 
 
Second: The financial part, 45 points, divided as: 
a- Advanced payment amount: 30 points. 
b- Conditions and period of payment: 10 points. 
c- Financial situation and administrative parts: 5points 
. 
The final list of candidates ranked the candidate companies, groups 
and legal entities according to their points as follow: 
a- Al-salaam Bank & Iemaar Co:  90.7 points. 
b- Hamad & Qatar Bank International:  60.8 points. 
c- Saudi Facilities Holding Co: 61.6 points. 
d- Gasha for Shipping & Handling Co: 58.2 points. 
e- Dubai Islamic Bank: 57.9 points. 
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Therefore, the committee recommended the acceptance of the offer 
presented by Al-salaam & Iemaar co. Also, the committee recommended 
that the proposed frame-work plan and the time-table program should be 
considered an inherent part of the contract. Thereafter, a very accurate 
agreement with clear rights and liabilities for both parties was signed. 
Some terms of the contract read the follow (Also see the appendix):149 
 
Shares Sale Agreement150 
This agreement is made in November 11th 2006 and entered into by and 
between Sudan Central Bank (thereinafter referred to as “the Vendor”), represented 
in this agreement by Mr. Bader-Alden Mahmud Abbas, Vice-Governor of Sudan 
Central Bank, and Al-salaam Bank group (thereinafter referred to as the 
“Purchaser”), represented in this agreement by Mr. Hussein Mohammed Salem Al-
miza, and on the address of the Vendor and the Purchaser referred to in S. 13 of this 
agreement. 
 Section (1): Introduction 
Whereas Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group is a bank established 
under the provisions of Elnilein Industrial Development Group Act 1994 and its main 
office in Khartoum of Republic of Sudan, to exercise the activities detailed in S.5 of 
the mentioned Act, and whereas the nominal capital of the Bank is SD. 5,000,000,000 
(five billions Sudanese dinar). The Purchaser owns 99%, and the Ministry of Finance 
and National Economy owns %1 of its shares. And whereas the Vendor offered to sell 
%60 of its shares in the mentioned Bank, and whereas the Purchaser offered and 
accepted to buy these shares with absolute knowledge of the financial situation of the 
mentioned Bank on 31.12.2005, and thereafter the Vendor has agreed to the 
Purchaser’s offer the two Parties have agreed to the following: 
Section (2): 
                                                 
149 - We haven’t found the English copy of this contract. Legal Affairs Department in Bank of Sudan 
said; the English copy may be existed in the TCDPE. Also the TCDPE said there was no English copy 
signed.  Like these documents should be existed in any related unit of the government and by many 
languages, that these document represent good advertisement for the investment in Sudan. We believe 
that the documents of this operation are legally attractive to any investor according to the competitive 
steps which were exercised in this privatization operation.    
150 - Source: Legal Affairs Department, Bank of Sudan. 
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 In this agreement, unless the context requires otherwise; following words and 
expressions means: 
“Vendor”: thereinafter means the Central Bank of Sudan. 
“Purchaser”: thereinafter means Al-salaam Bank Group. 
“Bank”: thereinafter means Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group 
“Agreement”: thereinafter means this agreement. 
“Closing”: thereinafter means the date of Purchaser’s fulfilling purchase of shares 
according to S.(6) of this agreement. 
“Main accounts”: thereinafter means audited account lists on 31.12.2005. 
 “Closing Accounts”: thereinafter means final accounting lists of the Bank in 
15.11.2006. 
 “Act”: thereinafter means Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group 1994.  
Section (5): Shares price 
The full price of the purchased shares shall be $80, 000,000 (eighty millions 
American Dollars). 
Section (6): Payments 
The Purchaser shall pay the price of the purchased shares in this agreement as 
follow: 
(1) %50 (fifty percent) of the total amount; in cash at the time of signing this 
agreement. 
(2) %50 (fifty percent) of the total amount after the Vendor completed the 
transference and received a registration certificate, within a period not 
exceeding six months after signing this agreement. 
Section (11): Governing Law 
The governing Laws for this agreement shall be the Sudanese laws. 
Section (12): Arbitration 
In the event of any conflict between the two parties to this agreement about the 
application or interpretation of the provisions of this agreement; solving of such 
conflict shall be by direct negotiations between the two parties. In case of failure, the 
solution shall be in reliance to arbitration. The applicable law in such a case shall be 
the Sudanese Arbitration Act 2005. 
Section (13): Notifications 
All notifications and correspondences between the two parties shall be to the 
addresses of the parties as follows: 
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(1) Vendor’s address: 
Khartoum-Sudan 
P.O. Office: 313. 
Fax: 00249-183-780273. 
E-Mail: sabir@bankofsudan.org. 
(2) Purchasers address: 
United Arab Emirates-Dubai  
P.O. Office: 120180- Dubai 
Fax: 009714-3193114 /or/ 009714-3673156. 
E-mail: djabr@amlakfinance.com. /or/ Djab@leadercapital.com  
Parties:  
* Vendor: Central Bank of Sudan, represented by Bader El-din Mahmud Abbas  
Vice-Governor of Central Bank of Sudan. 
* Purchaser: Al- salaam Bank Group, represented by Hussein Mohammad Salem 
Al-miza   
  All following steps of privatization were accurately exercised. Both 
parties fulfilled their obligation in the determined time. Despite some 
little legal and financial disputes here and there, the privatization 
operation is considered as one of the most impressive privatization 
operations. The new company of the Bank on 26.8.2007 published the 
following: 
“Elnilein Bank would like to inform all Sudanese peoples, especially his 
respectful customer that, thanks to god, Elnilein Industrial Development Group 
has been registered as a limited private company according to the provisions of 
the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925. Registration certificate No: (C.31030) 
has been issued by the Registrar of Companies. The Bank will continue to exercise 
banking activities in accordance with the same objectives of the former Bank 
(included in the memorandum of the new company.)”151    
 
As a summary for Elnilein privatization operation, we can say that 
the high level of transparency, which was exercised in the different steps 
                                                 
151 - Al-Rai Alaam Newspaper, 26.8.2007. 
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of the operation, represented the key of the success of the operation as a 
whole. Appointing a committee for verifying the bids was, indeed, the 
corner stone in this success. 
 The five reports which were prepared by the above committee 
enabled the HCDPE to ensure that those investors were of reasonable 
capability to compete in this tender. The final report of the committee 
which specified the standards of competition reflected a high level of 
transparency.152 With regard to that the vender is not compelled to sell to 
a certain bidder; the selection of the highest-degree bidder as the winner 
purchaser gave the vendor (the Central Bank of Sudan) high credibility 
on exercising the privatization of the banking sector. 
 The terms of the agreement were accurately prepared and 
completely covered all the requirements of both vendor and purchaser. 
Lastly, we recommend that all high-scale enterprises such like banks, 
cement factories, sugar factories, etc., be privatized by the same steps 
which were followed in Elnilein Bank’s privatization. Adoption of 
tenders with sealed envelopes, and granting the sale to the highest-price 
competitor will prevent corruption and political favouritism. In other 
words, in privatization of small and medium SOEs, the statement: the 
vendor is not obliged to sell to the highest-price or any other competitor, should be 
exercised in a narrow sense and monitored by a neutral body. 
  The privatization operation of the Bank of Khartoum is the most 
important privatization operation in Sudan for three reasons.  First, the 
bank is the largest one in Sudan through all eras. Second, because the bank 
is one of the former nationalized banks in the May era.153Third, the 
privatization of this Bank created big opposition because of the historical 
                                                 
152 - Department of legal affairs in the Bank of Sudan. 
153 - This Bank was nationalized in 1970, by law issued by the Command Council of May Revolution. 
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background of the Bank, and the number of jobs which were terminated 
as a result of its privatization.  
The Bank of Khartoum was established in 1913, titled ‘Anglo-
Egyptian Bank’. In 1935, the name was changed to be ‘Barclays for 
Overseas Bank’. In 1954, at the beginnings of the national rule, the name 
of the Bank changed to be ‘Barclays D.O Bank’. One year later, in 1970, 
the May regime took power with socialist stream, and the Bank was 
nationalized by the state and its name changed to be ‘State’s Bank for 
Foreign Commerce’. After the socialism stream of May regime was 
marginally mitigated, the Bank was transformed into a public company 
owned by the state (%99 0f the shares owned by the Bank of Sudan, %1 
owned by the Ministry of Finance). The first step for privatizing such 
Bank began in 1993 by amalgamating the Bank with the Unity Bank and 
National Import and Transport Bank. Thereafter, the Bank was 
transformed into a public share company owned by the state (%75 of the 
shares) and other parties: Shiekan Company, Sudanese Development 
Establishment, Omdurman National Bank, Sudanese Free Zones 
Corporation and the Financial Investment Bank (%25 of the shares). The 
state began to privatize the bank by public offering (%25 of its shares). 
The public offering did not meet the anticipated success.154 
 Finally, the government (the Bank of Sudan and the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy) sold %60 of its shares to Dubai Islamic 
Bank for $57.000.000. The same steps of transparency were followed. A 
committee for determining competition measurements was appointed. 
Also, the degrees for each measurement were accurately determined. 
Lastly, the winner was the highest-price competitor. The Central Bank of 
Sudan did not use the statement which is normally used in tenders 
(vendor is not obliged to sell to the highest-price or any other bidder).  
                                                 
154 - Source: Department of legal affairs of the Bank of Sudan. 
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 In our humble opinion, this privatization operation also represents 
one of the most successful privatization operations of banks in Sudan. It 
is to be noted that the two operations of Elnilein and the Bank of 
Khartoum were prepared and concluded by the Central Bank of Sudan, 
not by the TCDPE. However, following are some terms of the Bank of 
Khartoum Agreement (Memorandum of Understanding). (See the 
appendix). 
   
“This agreement is made  on............155 day of July 2005 between: 
(1) The Bank of Sudan whose registered office is in Khartoum –Sudan (the ‘Vendor 
‘and 
(2)Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC whose registered office is at Dubai-United Arab 
Emirates and which shall include all assigns and transfers of Dubai Islamic 
Bank PJSC, including without limitation any third party to whom Dubai Islamic 
Bank PJSC transfers any shares acquired by Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 
pursuant to the terms of this agreement as ( the ‘Purchaser’). 
WEREAS, the Vendor has agreed with the Purchaser for the sale of 7,086,000 fully 
paid shares in the Bank of Khartoum Public Limited Company (the ‘Company’) 
being a company registered in the Republic of Sudan. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:  
1 Definitions 
For the purposes of this agreement: 
‘Purchase Price’ is US$ 57,000,000 (fifty seven millions); 
‘Requisite Consent’ is defined in cl 3.4; 
‘Share’ means the 7,086,000 ordinary shares of 1000 Sudanese Dinars each of the 
Company 
‘Sub-Contracts’ means the sub-contracts entered into in order to enable the 
performance of, or otherwise in connection with, the Existing Commitments; 
‘Tax’ includes (but is not limited to) income tax, corporation tax, advance 
corporation tax, capital gains tax, development land tax, development gains tax, 
                                                 
155 - The day is not mentioned because the Department of Legal affairs in the Central Bank presented 
the draft of the agreement to the researcher; they said we are not permitted to present  the original 
agreement. 
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social security and earnings related contributions, income tax payable by way of 
pay-as-you-earn deductions, estate duty, inheritance tax, capital transfer tax, 
stamp duty and value added tax, and all costs, charges, interest, penalties, 
surcharges and expenses related to any disallowance of relief or claim for 
taxation; 
‘Warranties’ means the warranties set fourth in schedule 1; and ‘Warranty’ shall be 
construed accordingly; 
2  Sale and Purchase of Sales 
  The Vendor has agreed in principle and subject to contract to sell with full title 
guarantee and the Purchaser has agreed in principle and subject to contract to 
purchase the shares for the sum of US$ 57,000,000 (fifty seven millions), 
completion to take place on the Completion Date. 
 
9 Assignment  
      This agreement shall not be assignable by either of the parties hereto 
without the prior written consent of the other party hereto. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the Purchaser shall have the right to transfer any or all of the shares 
it owns now or in the future to third parties of the Purchaser’s choosing. Any 
third party who becomes an owner of any shares following such a transfer by 
the Purchaser shall be entitled to rely upon and enforce any terms of this 
agreement against the Vendor as if that third party had been a signatory to this 
agreement. 
10 No press release, notice or other public announcement concerning the 
transaction set out herein shall be made or issued (other than to the extent 
required by the law) by one party hereto without the prior written approval of 
the other. 
13 Arbitration 
         Any dispute to any provision of this agreement shall be referred to a single 
arbitrator in London to be agreed between the parties. Failing such agreement 
within seven days of the request by one party to the other that such a question or 
difference be referred to arbitration in accordance with this clause such 
reference shall be to an arbitrator appointed by the President for the time being 
of the Law Society of England and Wales. The decision of such arbitrator shall 
be final and binding upon the parties. Any reference under this clause shall be 
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deemed to a reference to arbitration within the meaning of the Arbitration Act 
1996. 
15. Termination 
15.1 if the requisite contents are not obtained within a period of six months from the 
date hereof, then (unless the parties otherwise agree and subject to cl 15.2) 
neither the Vendor nor the Purchaser shall be obliged to complete the purchase 
and sale of the shares, this agreement shall automatically terminate upon the 
expiry of the said period and neither party shall be under any liability to the 
other by reason of such termination, other than obligation on the Vendor 
contained in cl 6.2 
17 The Governing law 
       The construction, validity and performance of this agreement shall be governed 
by the laws of England. The parties submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of 
English courts.” 
   
 It is to be noted, there was big exaggeration in the terms of this 
agreement, especially in the formalities, definitions, and in the 
introduction. The subject matter of the agreement (government’s shares) 
which is more significant has not found the same detailing in the 
agreement.156This may be justified by that in a country like Sudan, where 
corruption and absence of transparency are normal practices; investors 
will do their best to prevent any corruption. Another reason perhaps is 
that in developing countries, political regimes are always subject to 
people’s revolutions and militarily changes. Therefore, investors, 
especially foreigners, may become a good target for the new governors’ 
accusation. Such accusations may lead to confiscation or 
renationalization of the privatized SOEs. Therefore, exaggeration of the 
terms of a contract may constitute the first defence-line against such 
accusations ensuring transparency. The other important note is that the 
                                                 
156 - We have examined many privatizations contracts on different countries, but we haven’t found such 
sort of exaggeration of terms.  
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governing law is the English law. Inevitably, the Purchaser imposed this 
term in the contract to secure himself against the political changes, a 
thing which supports our view above. 
  Privatization of the Real Estate Bank privatization is the only 
operation which was executed by TCDPE. We do not have justification 
for this. Also, the personnel in TCDPE and in the Central Bank of Sudan 
have not presented any reasonable justification for the confusion of 
functions between TCDPE and the Central Bank of Sudan. The only 
justification that can be implied is that the Central Bank of Sudan has no 
right to dispose of any SOE except those in the banking sector. This may 
be argued by that the Real Estate Bank was completely privatized by 
TCDPE. On the other hand, if we say that the law gives TCDPE the 
absolute authority to privatize all the Sudanese SOEs regardless of the 
sector to which the targeted SOE belongs. This will be argued by that the 
other two of the three agreements of banks privatizations were concluded 
by the Central Bank of Sudan.157 However, following are some terms of 
the privatization contract of the Real Estates Bank (see appendixes): 
REAL  ESTATES BANK  SALE CONTRACT158 
“This contract is made in Khartoum on December 4th 2002 between: 
(a)  The Government of the Sudan; thereinafter referred to as (First Party), 
represented by the Minister of Finance and National Economy (The President of 
HCDPE). 
(b) Eljumaa Company for Trade and Investment Company; (registered under the 
Sudanese companies Ordinance 1925, by registration certificate No. (C.17153) in 
27.8.2001., the company’s head office is in; Elfaihaa Building, Fifth Floor, 
Khartoum-Sudan, and Elshiekh Jumaa Bin-Fahd Bin-Mubarak Eljumaa. 
Thereinafter referred to as the (Second Party), represented by the Head of the 
                                                 
157 - This matter will widely be discussed in the following chapters of this dissertation, especially in the 
chapter titled as Law of privatization. The agreement is translated by the researcher. 
158 - Source: Department of legal affairs in the Bank of Sudan.  
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Board of Directors of Jumaa Eljumaa for Trade and Investment, by Power of 
Attorney no. (12) – 15.10.2002.  
 (1) Whereas the First Party offered to sell the Sudanese Real Estates Bank 
including all its branches and the Sudanese Real Estates for Investment & Trade 
co. ltd, and all the Bank’s shares in all other companies, and all its registered 
fixed assets (according to the accompanied lists), and its portable assets 
(according to the accompanied lists), for a price of USA $ 15,500,000 (fifteen 
millions and five hundred thousand USA Dollars), according to his powers by 
S.(4-A) of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Law 1990. And;    
  
      (4) The First Party has agreed to sell to the Second Party; the Real Estates Bank, 
the Sudanese Real Estates Company for Trade and Investment, all the fixed and 
portable assets (mentioned in the enclosed list), and all the shares owned by the 
Bank in the other companies (mentioned in the enclosed list). 
      (5) The Second Party accepted the purchase of the Bank and to pay the price 
amount: USA $ 15,500,000 (fifteen millions and five hundred thousands American 
Dollars). 
  
      (7) The Second Party is obliged by; 
 First: Paying an amount of USA $ 15,500,000 (fifty million and five hundred 
thousand American Dollars) in cash, at the time of signing this contract. 
 Second: Transforming the Real Estates Bank into a private shares company, and 
thereafter into public a shares company five years after the transformation into 
private one.    
   
      (9) This contract shall be subject to the Sudanese laws, and shall be executed and 
interpreted according to the Sudanese law. 
     (10) Any dispute between the Parties to this contract shall be solved through direct 
negotiations between the two parties. In case of failure, the governing law shall be 
the Civil Procedures Act 1983.  
     Signatures: 
     First Party: Dr. Hassan Ahmed Taha: representative of the Minister of Finance 
     Second Party: Osama Mirgani Haj-Alnoor: Executive Manager of Jumaa El-
Jumaa.” 
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The list of privatizations through tenders in Sudan is long. Here we 
will mention some of them in brief: 
• Friendship Palace Hotel Sale Contract which was concluded on 
20/7/2002 between HCDPE, represented by Mr. Alzobier Ahmed 
Alhassan, Minister of Finance and National Economy (Vendor), 
and Jumaa Eljumaa Company for Trade and Investment, registered 
in Khartoum – Elfaihaa Builing. The Sudanese Government owned 
%100 of the Hotel’s shares.159 The location of the Hotel is No 64, 
Block No 5 (Hillat-Hamad, Khartoum-North). The price was 
US$18.000.000. One of the important Purchaser’s obligations is to 
transform the Hotel to a five star one, and to transform the Hotel’s 
company from private company into a public one. 
• White Nile Tannery Contract: the contract was concluded in 
31/1/1992 between HCDPE (Vendor), and Faisal Islamic Bank, 
Elrawasi Charity Company, Bash Investment Company, Sudanese 
Investors Company, and Elridaa Company for Investment 
(Purchasers). The price was S.P120.000.000; paid as four 
instalments, S.P12.000.000 immediately at the time of signing the 
contract, S.P48.000.000 one month after,  third  instalment of S.P 
24.000.000 one month after, and fourth instalment of 
S.P36.000.000 one month after the third instalment. By the 
                                                 
159 - This Hotel was formerly owned by Daewoo Corporation, a Korean company, (60% of the shares) 
and the Sudanese Government (40% of the shares). In 1992, Daewoo Corporation sold all its shares to 
a Chinese company (SCMC) for US$ 12, 000,000. In 28/12/1992 the Sudanese government used the 
pre-emptive right and paid the amount to Daewoo Corporation. Then the Sudanese Government sold its 
100% shares to Jumaa Eljumaa Company. A big conflict arose between Daewoo and the Sudanese 
government on the ground that the price paid by Sudanese government was lower than the real price. It 
is clear that the price agreed upon between Daewoo Corporation and SCMC Company was too low so 
as to reduce the taxations and other fees of the sale.  Then, Daewoo Corporation sued the Sudanese 
Government in London according to a term in the former contract; (the governing law was the English 
Law). Lastly, the Sudanese Government won the suit that the English court considered that the 
reduction of the price in the contract is not suitable causation to null the new contract or to compel the 
Sudanese Government to pay the difference between the paid price and the real one. Source: Internal 
files in TCDPE.     
 93
contract, the Purchaser shall be obliged to operate the tannery 
within a period not exceeding six months after signing the contract. 
The Purchaser shall not be entitled, under any circumstances, to 
sell his shares to any third party except by the written consent of 
the Vendor.160  
• Red Sea Hotel Sale Contract: the Hotel was sold in 27/12/1992 by 
a contract between the Sudanese Government, represented by 
HCDPE (Vendor), and Sudanese Kuwaiti Hotels Company 
(Purchaser). The price was S.D11.000.000, in addition to 
S.D1.600.000 as sales tax.161 The price was paid by instalments: 
%50 before signing the contract, %25 one year after signing the 
contract, and %25 two years after signing the contract.162 
 
(iv) Public Offering of Shares: 
 A public offering of SOE shares entails the sale of all or part of the 
government’s holdings in a company to be public through domestic or 
international stock markets. The price of the shares can be fixed by the 
sponsor or by the government itself, or the offering may be on a tender 
basis.  
 In order for a public offering to be successful, several grounds have 
to be preserved. First of all, in order for SOE to be attractive to the 
general public, it has to be well known as well as financially sound with 
good future potential. Secondly, an adequate distribution network of 
shares has to exist, combined with a good marketing strategy in order to 
generate sufficient interest. Finally it is important that the share price 
reflects a fair market value of the company. Too high prices discourage 
                                                 
160 - This condition in the contract constitutes t a golden share and it seems irrational. The golden share 
normally imposed by the government in privatization of strategic SOEs and sectors. 
161 - This price was not low; that in 1992; the real estates were not valuable like nowadays. Also the 
location of the Hotel is in Port Sudan not in Khartoum, the capital.  
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investors and could stall the privatization, while too low price might 
create criticism of poor management of public assets. 
 While public share offerings are most common in developed 
countries, they are not limited only for these countries. For example, 
Nigeria has privatized thirty-five SOEs through public share offerings, 
and Sri Lanka has conducted a very successful share offering since 1989. 
Chile, Jamaica, and Philippines are other examples of those who have 
used public share offering to divest SOEs. However, the capital markets 
in most of the post socialist and developing countries are either 
nonexistent or too shallow to support extensive use of this method of 
privatization. Most of their SOEs are also in too poor a condition to be fit 
for the public share offerings.163 
 World Bank experts, in developing countries, value public 
offerings of shares because they allow a wide spread of ownership 
including domestic investors, strengthen the developing capital market, 
and are by design very transparent transactions. World Bank’s experts 
also recommend that public offerings of shares should not be 
concentrated in the domestic investors, that foreign investors usually 
emanate the local stock exchanges. On the other hand, foreign investors 
gain additional confidence regarding the privatization, because the 
participation of a large number of domestic investors makes it even less 
likely that the process will be reversed. In addition, they typically find the 
shares an attractive investment opportunity only if the future profitability 
potential of the company is high. One way to support this perception is to 
combine a public offer with a direct sale of part of the company to a 
strategic strong investor. In the case of Mexico’s TELEMAX, for 
example, the government decided to first sell a minority share of about 
20% together with a management contract to a foreign consortium. It then 
                                                 
163 - Dmitri Pluonis and Andrew Mc Williams, supra 10, pp.21-22. 
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sold 25% in the domestic and international markets, resulting in a total 
revenue of about US$3 billion.164 
 The need for strategic investors is of less importance in companies 
whose future potential is driven by the access to valuable raw materials. 
In 1990, Argentina sold 45% of its national oil company YPF in domestic 
and international offers for US$ 3.3 billion. Similarly, Ghana’s Ashanti 
Goldfields offering in the London and Ghana stock exchange resulted in 
proceeds of US$ 316 million in 1994. In both cases, the sale supported 
the local capital market; the Argentina government successfully revived 
its depressed stock, while the Ghana’s stocks market capitalization 
increased almost tenfold with the Ashanti offerings.165However, in all 
these cases, effective distribution mechanisms existed. Either the 
companies were so well known that their shares could even be offered in 
stock exchange abroad, or well functioning market existed at least in the 
country. Thus Peru managed to successfully privatize a number of 
smaller companies on the Lima stock exchange.166 
 In Sudan we do not have experience in privatization through public 
offering of shares because of the following reasons:                                    
a- Weakness of the public awareness about the feasibility of public 
companies.167 
b- The former disappointing performance of public companies. 
c- Most of investors in Sudan have an individualistic tendency due to 
some primitive traditions. 
d- The Sudanese government itself did not use this method of 
privatization in all former operations. Therefore, we recommend 
                                                 
164 - Kathy Megyery and Frank Sader, Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatization pp. 14-15.  1st 
ed. 1997, the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank, Washington DC.  
165 - Id p. 15. 
166 - Id p. 15. 
167 - Nowadays there are some features for the feasibility of investing in public companies after rare 
successful experiences such as Sudatel. 
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that the Sudanese government has to execute, at least, one or two 
privatization operations to illustrate the public response for this 
method. The success of such method opens the door widely for the 
middle-class man to invest his savings in the privatized SOEs. 
Such experience should be assisted by fixing lower prices for the 
shares. In the first chapter of this dissertation we mentioned that 
gaining of big proceeds is not in itself a justifiable objective for 
privatization. Spread of company culture will support public 
offering of shares in Sudan. Since the public offering of shares is 
one of the ideal methods to prevent favouritism and corruption. 
Exercising such method will increase the transparency and 
credibility of the privatization program as a whole. 
e- The Sudanese government has unjustifiable tendency to attract the 
foreign investors by using direct negotiated sales regardless of the 
necessity of attracting the local ones. Direct or negotiated sales are 
exercised when the seller is in a weak position and the purchaser is 
in a strong position. The decision makers in this country must be 
aware of that: by oil production and liberation of price, the 
financial capacity of the local investors has largely increased and 
the deep need for hard currency has mitigated.  
f- The role of the legislature in encouraging the middle-class man to 
invest in public companies is by mitigating the burden of taxation 
law, customs tariff, and other financial burdens on the public 
companies.168For example, the legislature may state that any 
company with a determined number of shareholders, (not a number 
of shares), will be granted a fixed margin of reduction on taxations. 
                                                 
168 - Public offerings mainly targeted the middle-class and lower-class man; therefore, shares are 
floated. 
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In other words, the preferred treatment in this case will be for the 
number of the shareholders not the number of the shares.     
 
(v) Voucher or Coupon Privatization: 
Many Eastern European countries created mass privatization 
schemes in which vouchers were given to all citizens essentially free of 
charge. These vouchers could then be exchanged into shares at special 
auctions. The main advantages of this method are that the process of 
privatization gains speed by simplifying the task of divesting a large 
number of SOEs, that the transfer of ownership is highly equitable, and 
that it supports the formation of local capital market. However, this 
method clearly will not generate any government revenue, and the gain in 
productive efficiency and the profitability of the enterprises will be 
delayed. 
In the Czech Republic’s mass privatization program, all adult 
citizens were given the opportunity to purchase vouchers at the 
considerably discounted price of about US$35, which could be exchanged 
for shares in privatized SOEs that had elected to participate in the mass 
privatization program, either directly or through an “investment 
fund”.169To some extent, there may be an implicit contradiction between 
the aims of the mass privatization, which is to spread ownership of 
former SOEs as widely as possible, and the private investor’s interest in 
securing sufficient control over the SOE.  
For instance, in the Czech Republic, SOEs and other interested 
parties were invited to submit privatization proposals to the government, 
in which they were to propose the percentage of shares to be sold through 
various methods, including the voucher program. In the first wave of 
                                                 
169 - Dlouhy, Vladimir, and Jan Mladek, Privatization and Corporate Control in the Czech Republic p. 
37, 1994 ed., World Bank, Economic Department Institute Washington DC.   
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1200 MLEs SOEs to be privatized, approximately 50% of the total shares 
were sold by the voucher program, indicating that many companies were 
holding shares back in the hope of finding a “strategic investor”.170  
Russia is virtually alone in requiring foreign investors in privatized 
SOEs to purchase vouchers at auction, just like ordinary Russians. This 
requirement is probably the main reason why there have been almost no 
foreign equity investments in Russian SOEs. Instead, investors have gone 
the route of forming joint ventures with their SOE counterparts, freeing 
them from the potential risk and management headaches with voucher 
privatization.171 
 Our humble view, in all Africa, except for some few countries in 
the continent, such type of privatization cannot be exercised. This method 
of privatization requires a good level of public company culture, a thing 
which is not deep-rooted in Africa and may be in all developing and, 
indeed, the least developing countries. Another reason is the lack of 
efficiency of the administrative and executive systems in the developing 
and least developing countries. For example if, in a country like Sudan, 
the government tried to spread the vouchers method in its privatizations 
(like the Czech Republic). It will, in addition to the poor public 
awareness, find that there is no dependable record or register that 
exclusively determines the number of the Sudanese citizens. This reason 
can also be applied in almost all African countries. Therefore, it is 
unheard for application of privatization by vouchers in Africa. 
 
(vi) Joint Venture: 
 In a joint venture, a whole SOE or part of it typically forms a new 
company together with a strong outside investor. In most cases the 
                                                 
170 - Id p.49. 
171 - Gelpern A., the Laws and Politics of Privatization in Eastern and Central Europe, 1993 ed. Oxford 
University Press.  
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outside investor brings in new capital and technology, while the SOE 
provides existing physical assets. Governments often favour this method 
of privatization, because it allows them to maintain control, or at least 
strong influence, over the enterprise, while the company obtains the 
financing and expertise required for its modernization. Especially in the 
former socialist economies, governments tend to place too much 
emphasis on this approach relative to the other alternatives, hoping to 
obtain the needed capital without surrendering control over the assets. For 
that reason, the Czech Republic favoured such legal method between the 
country’s largest cars manufacturer and West Germany’s VW.172   
A very impressive example for joint venture was applied between 
U.S. Windspower and Ukraine’s state-owned Electricity. U.S. 
Windspower (a manufacturer of wind turbines for generating electricity) 
formed a joint venture with Ukraine’s state-owned electricity utility 
Krimenergo in order to develop wind power applications in the Crimean 
Peninsula. If the venture meets its founders’ expectations, it should allow 
Krimenergo to shut down the Chernobyl nuclear power station, site of a 
catastrophic accident in 1986. 
U.S. Windspower will design and engineer the wind turbines. 
Krimenergo will pay for the technology in windmill parts that will be 
manufactured at a former Soviet tank plant. U.S. Windspower officials 
declined to place a value on the joint venture because of the non-
convertibility of the Ukrainian currency, but a comparable venture in the 
United States would be worth US$500 million.173   
Joint venture is used, sometimes, as transitional method towards 
privatization. In this case the government brings a private part to 
contribute in the targeted SOE as a first step to privatize such SOE. The 
                                                 
172 - Elling and Martin, Privatization in Germany: A Model for Legal and Functional Analysis p. 111, 
1992 ed., Oxford University Press.  
173 - Dmitri Pluonis and Andrew Mc Williams, 10, p. 25.  
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second step will be a gradual divestiture of the government’s shares of the 
SOE to ensure quite transfer to the private sector, a thing which grants the 
least limits of public opposition. 
There is a very good example for privatization through joint 
venture in the privatization of the telecommunication sector in Sudan. 
Gradual steps for the transference were exercised, rational selection for 
the new contributors (local and foreigners) occurred, and reasonable 
conditions in the joint venture agreement were agreed upon. 
As a first step for executing the privatization of 
telecommunications in Sudan, the Sudanese government attracted174 some 
local and foreign investors to establish a company (Sudatel) to contribute 
with the Sudanese government in the Public Telecommunication 
Corporation. Following is the list of investors: 
 
1- The Advanced Technology Group. 
2- Naiel Investment Company. 
3- Danfodio Charity Company. 
4- Sheikh: Hamad Bin-Jamoud Elgafri (Omani).  
5- Sheikh: Adil Batargi (Saudi). 
6- Bank of Khartoum. 
7- International Sudanese French Bank. 
8- Faisal Sudanese Islamic Bank. 
9- Islamic Bank for Western Sudan. 
10- Real Estate’s Bank. 
11- Limited Investment Agency. 
12- Saudi Sudanese Bank. 
13- Bittar and Co. 
                                                 
174 - The attraction was by a promise to break-up the monopoly of the Public Telecommunications 
Corporation activities, and to grant a long monopoly for the new company.  
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14- Mohammad Abd-Elgadir Ali Elkobani. 
15- Siemens International (Germany). 
16- Ahmed Mohammed Osman Hassan. 
17- Hashim Hajoo. 
18- Mustafa Awad Allam.  
                  
Thereafter, an agreement was concluded on 6/12/1992 between the 
Sudanese Government (represented by the Minister of Finance and 
National Economy), and the invited investors, whereby: 
S.1 The Sudanese Government, and the invited investor shall, as soon as 
possible establish a public company, under the provisions of the Sudanese Companies 
Ordinance, 1925. 
S.2.1 Every investor shall pay  the full amount of  his shares, except the 
government, and all the share value shall be paid in special account, such account 
shall be by the US$. 
S.2.2 The Sudanese Government, shall be permitted to pay its portion in the 
capital from the assets of the former Public Corporation for Telecommunications. 
S.3.1 The special account shall be frozen, except for paying the agreed-upon 
expenses. 
S. 3.2 The Sudanese Government shall be obliged to issue all the required 
concessions, licences, and powers to the new Company to exercise its activities. 
S.3.3 The concession for exercising telecommunications activities shall be 
exclusively granted to the new company. 
S.3.4 If the Sudanese Government does not fulfil its obligations in this 
agreement, the investors will have the right to windup the Company. 
S.4.1 The Company shall offer not less than 25% of its shares for the public 
subscription. 
S.4.2 The portion of the Sudanese Government in the capital of the Company 
shall not, at any time, be less than %26 of the total number of shares. 
S.10 this agreement shall be terminated by winding up the company or by the 
bankruptcy of the Company. 
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S.11 No shareholder will be permitted to transfer his shares to any third party 
except by a written consent of the other shareholders.175 
 
On 7/3/1994, the investors (the founders) delivered to the Sudanese 
Government the registration certificate of the new company (Sudanese 
Telecommunications Company Ltd. (Sudatel)).176The second   step was 
made through agreement concluded on 19.4.1993 between the Sudanese 
Government and the Sudanese Telecommunications Company Ltd. 
(Sudatel), to sell the assets of the former Public Telecommunications 
Corporation. The main features of the agreement were the following:177  
According to the provisions of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Law 1990 
and whereas the investors in (Sudatel) have offered to purchase the 
telecommunication sector; 
S.1 The Sudanese Government and the Sudanese Telecommunications 
Company Ltd. shall prepare a strategic plan to develop the telecommunications 
sector.  
S.1.2 The Government and the Sudanese Telecommunications Company 
(Sudatel) shall prepare the method of the estimation of the assets of the former Public 
Telecommunications Corporation; 
S.1.3 The Sudanese Telecommunication Company (Sudatel) shall be obliged to 
present its services to the Sudanese peoples according to the international standards; 
S.4 The Sudanese Telecommunications Company (Sudatel) shall be obliged to 
provide all the services of the former Public Corporation for Telecommunications 
therefore;  
S.5 The Sudanese Government shall grant a fifteen-year legal monopoly to the 
Limited Sudanese Company for Telecommunication (Sudatel). 
S.6 The Sudanese Government shall grant to the Limited Sudanese 
Telecommunications Company (Sudatel) all the other merits conferred by the 
Investment Encouragement Law 1992. 
   
                                                 
175 -Source: internal files of TCDPE. 
176 - Source: Id. 
177 - Source: Id. 
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    Some terms of the above agreement (the legal monopoly) were 
absolutely against the philosophy of the privatization itself (see S.5 of the 
above agreement). However, the ambiguous, uncertain, and unreasonable 
terms of the agreements may be justified by that the privatization of the 
telecommunication sector is one of the earliest privatization operations 
and the experience, at that time, had not been rationalized. Another 
reason is that telecommunications sector at that time witnessed a serious 
collapse, a thing which compelled the government to accept such 
condition.  
  
(vii) Lease and Concession Agreements: 
 In a lease agreement, a private investor rents an asset or enterprise 
from the government for a specified period of time and retains the 
enterprise’s profits for its management services. A concession agreement 
is similar, in that the concessionaire pays either a fixed fee or a 
percentage of profits for the right to operate a facility or to provide a 
service, keeping the rest of the proceeds. The only practical difference we 
have illustrated between many leases and concessions agreements is that 
leasing agreements usually refer to natural recourses and manufacturing 
plants, while concessions usually refer to a public service or other 
activity. 
 A good example for lease experience in Africa was applied in 
Togo. After failing to find a private buyer for loss-making steel mini-mill, 
the government of Togo agreed to lease it to a privately owned company 
for a fixed annual fee during the first two years and an increasing share of 
the gross margin (up to 40% in the year 6 and thereafter) for the 
remainder of the lease.178 In Latin America, Argentina made an extensive 
use of concessions arrangements in its privatizations. In a wide range of 
                                                 
178 - Dmitri Pluonis and Andrew McWilliams, supra note 10 p, 28.  
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sectors, covering television channels, petroleum drilling areas, rail-roads 
operations, roads, port facilities or live-stock markets, the government 
concluded concessions worth approximately US$1.5 billion between 
1990 and 1993 with considerable participation of foreign investors.179  
While, as we have mentioned above, leases are usually used for 
natural resources and manufacturing plants, the only two leasing contracts 
in Sudan were applied in privatization of  hotels (the Grand Hotel), and a 
tourist village (Arrous Tour Village). However, the terms of the lease 
contract of the Grand Hotel were the follows (Also see the appendix): 
 
(Contract for the Lease, Renovation, and Rehabilitation of the Grand Hotel – 
Khartoum.) 
 “1-This agreement is made and entered into by and between the Government 
of the Sudan represented by the Minister of Finance and National Economy, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Land Lord” and Lanka-Suka Hotels and Resorts SDN 
BHD, a company registered in Malaysia, or its duly nominated subsidiary as the 
second duly authorized, (power of attorney, Annex A), hereinafter referred to as the 
“Tenant”. 
 2- Whereas the Land Lord has offered to lease, renovate and rehabilitate the 
mentioned hotel, 
 3- And whereas the tenant is interested to lease, renovate and rehabilitate the 
mentioned hotel. 
 4- The Tenant has agreed to lease and renovate and rehabilitate the 
mentioned hotel according to the following conditions: 
 5- The tenant has no right to change the purpose of the hotel unless by a 
written consent of the Land Lord. 
 6- Payments shall be as follow: 
 a- The first year, after the rehabilitation; the Tenant shall pay US$180,000 to 
the Land Lord. 
 b- For the second year the Tenant shall pay a sum of US$180,000. 
                                                 
179 - Kathy Megyery and Frank Sader, supra 50 p. 18. 
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 c- From the third to the fifth years the Tenant shall pay US$ 220,000 in 
addition to 2,5% from the revenue to the Land Lord, for every year. 
 d- From the sixth to the tenth years the Tenant shall pay US$220,000 in 
addition to 2,5 from the revenue for every year. 
 e- From the eleventh to the twentieth years the Tenant shall pay US$308,000, 
in addition to 3% from the revenue and 5% from the net profits for every year. 
 f- From the twenty first to the twenty five years the Tenant shall pay US$350 
in addition to 3% from the revenue and 5% from the net profits. 
 g- The payment for every year shall not exceed two months from the beginning 
of the accounting year. 
 h- The Tenant shall pay 50% from the agreed-upon amount of the first year at 
the time of signing this agreement, and the other 50% shall be paid immediately after 
the handing over of the Hotel.  
7- The Land Lord has agreed to deliver all the related concessions, facilities 
and all the exemptions granted by the Encourage of the Investment Act 1996. 
8- The lease period shall be 25 years commencing twelve (12) months from the 
date of taking over the Hotel from the actual completion of the rehabilitation 
whichever is the earlier, with an option to the Tenant to renew the lease period for a 
further 15 years upon a written request made by the Tenant not less than twelve (12) 
months before the expiry of the initial twenty-five (25) year period subject to the 
consent of the Land Lord. 
9- The tenant should bear all the costs of rehabilitation. 
10- The Tenant has the right to add any facilities or extra buildings in the 
Hotel premises in order to increase its capacity subject to the consent of the Land 
Lord. 
11- The Land Lord agrees to hand over the Hotel to the Tenant free from any 
liabilities to any other party, and with its present condition and contents as mentioned 
in the list of contents. The Tenant has to hand over back the Hotel in good condition 
at the termination of the contract without responsibilities or liabilities, which may 
accrue during the contract period. 
12- Any extensions, rehabilitation, maintenance, or renewal in the Hotel will 
be the property of the Land Lord at the time of termination of the contract period for 
any reason whatsoever or at the end of the lease period. 
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13- The Tenant should be responsible for any damage or loss in the Hotel or 
its contents during the contract period, and has to compensate the Land Lord for such 
damage or loss. 
14- The Tenant shall be responsible for any damage or loss or negligence 
caused by his sub contractors. 
15- The Tenant shall not transfer any of his rights or liabilities in the contract 
wholly or partly to any third party without a prior written consent of the Land Lord. 
16- The Tenant has the right to dispose of any tool, material or movable 
property which he has placed, provided that the replacement shall be of a better 
quality and shall be the property of the Land Lord. 
17- In the event of the Tenant’s failure to pay the annual rent agreed upon in 
the contract in the time specified in this contract, or in the event of the breach of any 
of his responsibilities and liabilities, the Land Lord shall issue a notice in writing 
specifying the default and requiring the Tenant to remedy the default within 30 days, 
and if after 30 days without the breach complained being remedied, the Land Lord 
shall have the option to terminate his contract without referring the matter to the 
court and to restore the Hotel without prejudice to all other legal rights, provided that 
all ways such as breach of contract default are not caused by any of the following: 
i- War or civil commotions. 
ii- Political or labour unrest. 
iii- Force majeure 
18- In the case of any dispute between the two parties regarding this contract, 
they shall agree to settle it amicably, and in the case of their failure, the dispute shall 
be referred to arbitration according to the civil la, and binding and the venue of 
arbitration shall be the city of Khartoum. Procedures Acts 1983 and the award of 
arbitration shall be final. 
19-This contract shall be subject to the laws of the Republic of Sudan. 
          Signatures: 
Abd-Elwahhab Osman                                Dato Ahmed Sebi 
Ministry of Finance and                           General Manager of Lanka- 
 National Economy.                                Suka Hotels Company. 
 
 
 107
Another example for privatization by lease contract in Sudan is 
Arrous Tour Village on 3/8/1993. The owner is Sudan government 
(represented by TCDPE), and the tenant is Tommy Company for Diving 
and Photography (a foreign investor). The size of the operation was not 
big and the terms of the contract were simple. The main features of the 
contract are that the tenant shall continue to work in the tourism field; the 
period of the contract was renewable for seven years. The payment was 
as follows: 
1- US$25.000 for the first year. 
2- US$40.000 for the second year. 
3- US$55.000 for the third year. 
4- US$70.000 for the fourth year. 
5- US$86.000 for the fifth year. 
6- US$100.000 for the sixth year. 
7- US$115.000 for the seventh year. 
 
However, the tenant failed to fulfil his obligations and the contract 
was terminated; thereafter, the village was transferred to the Ministry of 
Tourism and Environment.180 
      
(viii) Management Contracts: 
Under a management contract, a private operator takes over the 
management of the enterprise in exchange for a fee, while the 
government remains the enterprise’s owner. The contract is typically 
specified such that the private management has autonomy in the daily 
operations of the enterprise, while all fundamental decisions, such as 
investments, remain with the public sector. Governments typically 
establish a management contract in order to improve the SOE efficiency. 
                                                 
180 - Source: Annual Report of TCDPE 2005 p. 47. 
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However, the new investor will not risk his own capital for any 
restructuring or future investments.   
 While the contractor might be given extensive management 
powers and operational control, it has no financial exposure and receives 
its fee regardless of the profitability of the enterprise. The SOE continues 
to bear the full commercial risk and it is responsible for all working 
capital and debt financing. 
 In Africa, management contracts are mostly used in infrastructure 
areas such as the water supply in Abidjan (Cote d’ Ivories) and Guinea. 
Here the governments decided to introduce private sector efficiency, but 
were not yet willing to take the step of divestiture of the ownership itself. 
In both cases the efficiency in the supply and treatment of water has 
improved drastically.181 
Several factors will influence the design of a management contract. 
A clear agreement must exist as to the intended objectives of the 
management role and the degree of authority and control to be vested in 
the prospective manager. Management contracts are found in many 
business sectors according to the circumstances and the needs of a 
country. For example in Africa, as we have mentioned above, their basic 
applications were in the services sectors such like water services. But in 
the most of countries all over the world, they have found their widest 
application in the tourism/hotel industry.182 
However, World Bank experts argue the following: 
“The choice of the management contractor is the most important element 
determining the results of the arrangement. In some instances, the management 
contractor is a joint venture company between a government or SOE and private 
company. A properly structured remuneration package devised which will, in many 
cases, includes three features; charges of the provision of the management company’s 
                                                 
181 - Kathy Megyery and Frank Sader, supra 50 p. 20. 
182 - Charles Vuylsteke, supra 6 p.38.  
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personnel in accordance with agreed formula, including a small profit element; 
agreed reimbursable costs; and incentive payments linked to the profits, production 
or other appropriate formula. There is no standard term in the management 
contracts, but if the management company makes no investment which it needs to 
recoup over a longer duration, three to five years is normal depending on the scale 
and complexity of the problems faced.”183  
 
In Sudan, we have not illustrated any use for such type of 
agreements, but with regard to the rapid movement towards privatization, 
especially in the tourism/hotel industry, such agreements will take place. 
 
(ix)Management/Employee Buyout (M/EBO):  
 M/EBO can be defined as a pattern of privatization of SOEs 
whereby the SOE is transformed into a public company with shares, and 
thereafter, selling the whole, majority, or a part of the shares of the new 
company to the employees of the former SOE.   
Many governments attempted to support domestic investment 
through M/EBO schemes, where the management and employee of 
enterprise have the right to make an offer for their enterprise prior to 
privatization; the incentives are strong for managers and workers to make 
use of this option. Politically this approach is particularly attractive, 
avoiding the criticisms of “selling out” to foreign interests. In reality, 
however, this strategy is often counterproductive. Due to the lack of 
funds, management and workers are usually allowed to pay at a discount 
or in instalments.184   
Despite the fact that M/EBO has become the most wide-spread 
pattern of privatization of the SOEs to the former employees, it is not a 
                                                 
183 -Pierre Guislain and Michel Kert, Concessions; The Way to Privatize Infrastructure Sector 
Monopolies p.91,1995 ed., World Bank- Office of the Vice president for Finance and Private Sector 
Development – Washington DC.   
184 - Bim and Alexander, Privatization in Russia; Problems of Immediate Future p. 71, 1994 ed., Sweet 
and Maxwell.   
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wholly new method to privatize the SOEs to their employees. Many 
decades ago, before the current wave of privatization, many countries 
around the world recognized the “Cooperatives”. The state in many cases 
transferred the ownership of these cooperatives whether for the 
employees or to the beneficiaries from the services and distribution of 
consumer goods.185  
Poland is regarded as a pioneer country in M/EBO. 1110 cases of 
privatization by this method have been exercised in Poland. In Poland, 
the employees of the SOE must firstly present a request to the 
government to privatize their enterprise by this method; then an approval 
from the Ministry of Transference of Ownership in Warsaw is required. 
Missions of this ministry are to organize and monitor privatization 
operations. The first appearance of M/EBO in England was in the second 
half of the eightieth of the past century. Roadchef for Highways Services 
was the first governmental company that adopted this method.186  
 In Sudan, the M/EBO has never been practiced, but some features 
of privatization through this method appeared in the privatization of two 
agricultural corporations: the White Nile Agricultural Corporation and the 
Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation. An agreement was concluded 
between HCDPE and Eljanien for Agricultural and Animal Production to 
lease the two agricultural corporations. This agreement resulted in a 
dispute between the Sudanese government and the corporations’ farmers, 
because of tribal and ethnic reasons. Therefore, the Sudanese government 
decided that the proper method to privatize the two corporations is to 
transfer the ownership of the two corporations to the local farmers.187 
 
                                                 
185 - Mason, ESOPs and Co-operative Enterprises: The Employee Common Ownership Plan (ECOP) 
p.212, 1992 ed., Macmillan London. 
186 - Dmitri Pluonis and Andrew McWilliams, supra 10 p. 22. 
187 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
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(x) Build-Own-Operate-And-Transfer (BOT) Agreements: 
 BOOTs agreements are used mainly for large energy and 
infrastructure projects. The investors provide the financing and build and 
operate the facility for a fixed period of time. They recover their initial 
capital outlay plus a reasonable return by charging user fees. At the end 
of the contract, ownership reverts to the government.  
 The government of Malaysia awarded a concession to a private 
company, United Engineers Malaysia, to build and operate the 900-
Kilometer North-South Expressway. The total cost of the project was 
US$3.5 billion. In return, the concessionaire receives the right to collect 
and retain all vehicle tolls for thirty years. In addition, the government 
agreed to reduce the concessionaire risks by making up any shortfall in 
the projected traffic volume for the first seventeen years, as well as 
offsetting any adverse changes in the foreign exchange rate of external 
loan interest charges.188 
 As we have mentioned above, BOOT method is mainly used in the 
large energy and infrastructure projects. In this dissertation, there is a 
separate chapter devoted for the privatization of infrastructure projects. 
 
(xi) Liquidation and Asset Sale: 
When a SOE is in a particularly bad financial condition with high 
liabilities, a direct sale might prove impossible. In such a case, the 
government might opt to liquidate the enterprise and sell its assets. The 
advantage for the private purchaser is that he can acquire the SOE 
without the attached liabilities.  
 In Sudan, there are many applications for liquidation and assets 
sale as method of privatization, especially in the liquidation of the 
                                                 
188 - Mathew L. Hensley and Edward P., The Privatization Experience in Malaysia p.81, 1993 ed. 
World Bank Publications Washington DC. 
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Mechanical Transportation Corporation. The valuable component of the 
corporation was sold to private investors. The examples are:189 
 
1- Fuel station, the area is 1050 SQ.M; the location is in the centre of 
Khartoum North. The purchaser is Osman Hussein Babikir. The seller is 
TCDPE, represented by its President, Mr. Hafiz Ata-Almannan. The 
price was S.D15.000.000. Date: 2/8/2000. In our humble view, the price 
was too low. 
2- Fuel station, the area is 1500 SQ.M; the location is in the centre of 
Khartoum South. The purchaser is Nubta Petroleum Company. The 
seller is TCDPE, represented by its president Mr. Hafez Ata-Almannan. 
The price was S.D19.333. 000. Date 22/8/2000.  In our humble view: 
the price was also too low. 
3- Fuel station, the area is 2350 SQ.M; the location is in Alhilla 
Aljadeeda – Khartoum (Abu-Hamama). The purchaser is the National 
Petroleum Company. The seller is TCDPE, represented by its president 
Mr. Hafiz Ata-Almannan. The price was S.D33.800.000. Date 
30/8/2000. In our humble view, the price was too low. 
 
 
Table No. (3): Samples of privatized SOEs in Sudan (continued in the 
next pages) 
N
O 
SOE Legal Method Beneficiary Price by 
million 
year Recent 
Condition 
Notes 
1 White Nile 
Tannery 
Sale Blue Nile Co. 
Groups 
120.p 1992 Excellent Successful 
2 The Public Co. for 
Spinning 
Liquidation _ _ _ _ _ 
3 Abu- Nieamma 
Kinaf Factory 
Sale Mr. Hashim 
Hajoo 
750.p 1992 _ Failed 
                                                 
189 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
 113
4 White Nile 
Packing Company 
Sale Sudanese Afro 
Co. 
61.p+ 
US$5,2 
1993 Excellent Successful 
5 Sata Company Sale Sudanese Afro 
Co. 
12.p+ 
US$3,8 
1993 Excellent Successful 
6 Kriekab and Ryia 
Sweets Factory 
Sale Ahmed Gasim 
Sons 
95. 1991 Excellent Successful 
7 Khartoum Ternary Sale Al-hijra Co. 103,6p. 1994 Good _ 
8 Port Sudan 
Spinning Factory 
Sale Daewoo 
Company 
US$ 30 1990 Good _ 
9 Leather Trading 
and Production Co 
Liquidation _ _ 1995 _ _ 
10 Al-jazeera Ternary Joint-venture SD.G. & 
Daewoo 
_ 1993 Excellent SD.G 40% 
Daewoo 60% 
11 Atbara Cement 
Factory 
Sale Sudanese Afro 
Co. 
US$ 41 2002 Good US$10, 25 paid. 
The rest is debts’ 
settlements 
12 Rabak Cement 
Factory 
Sale Septar 
Investment Co. 
US$ 15 2004 Good US$4 paid. The 
rest installed 
13 Telecom. 
Corporation 
Public Share 
Co. 
Sud.G & 
Sudatel 
_ 1994 Excellent Public share Co. 
14 Commercial Bank Sale Farmers Bank 750 p 1992 Excellent _ 
15  Bank of 
Khartoum. 
Public Share Co Sud.G and 
Others 
_ 2001 _ 60% sold to 
Abu-Dhabi Bank 
16 Real Estates Bank Sale Jumaa Eljumaa US$15 2002 Good _ 
17 The Grand Hotel Lease Lanka-Suka Co. _ 1996 Excellent US$ 200,000 Per 
year 
18 Red Sea Hotel Sale Sud. Kuwaiti co 110 p 1993 Excellent _ 
19 Friendship Palace Sale Jumaa Eljumaa US$18 2002 Excellent _ 
20 Sud. Mining Corp. Sale Mining 
Enterprises co. 
500 p. 1993 Excellent V. good 
experience. 
21 Mechanical 
Agriculture Corp. 
Liquidation _ _ 1996 _ _ 
22 Pub. Corp. for 
Animal Production 
Liquidation _ _ 1997 _ _ 
23 Sudan Hotel Sale National Fund 
for social 
Insurance 
275 p 1993 Excellent _ 
24 Al-nuba 
Mountains agreult. 
Liquidation _ _ 1991 _ _ 
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Corp. 
25 White Nile Agrec. 
Corp. 
Liquidation _ _ 1996 _ _ 
Source: TCDPE. Annual Report 2005 pp. 42- 49. 
           
Conclusion: 
 Privatization legal methods are: 
1- Auctions: These have been mostly used for small enterprises or those of 
less importance such as retailing shops. But, there have been some cases 
of medium and large state-owned enterprises being liquidated and their 
assets sold in auctions. The liquidated SOE assets are normally sold to the 
highest bidder in opening bidding. In Sudan, auctions were only used for 
selling the assets of the liquidated SOEs. 
2- Negotiated sales: These have mostly been used to privatize the 
successful SOEs in Europe. Germany has made an extensive use for this 
legal method to privatize large number of its SOEs. Negotiated sale 
contract does not mean a total absence of competition as it means that the 
government is free to select the suitable investor depending on standards 
other than the price. But, on the other hand negotiated sales contracts 
require a high level of transparency to guard against corruption and 
public opposition. 
 In Sudan, negotiated sales were used to settle some governmental 
debts. Also, in Sudan, negotiated sales have been practiced to privatize 
both successful (Atbara Cement Factory) and unsuccessful (Sata Factory) 
SOEs. In Sudan, there is a total absence of transparency in most of 
privatization operations which were practised through negotiated sale 
contracts, a thing which resulted in public opposition or, at least, the 
absence of public support for these privatization operations. 
3- Tenders: They are used to divest SOEs as entities of a going concern. 
This is the main difference between tenders and auctions which, as rule, 
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are practiced to dispose of the assets of SOE, normally at liquidation. In a 
tender privatization, investors submit their bids in sealed envelopes, 
which are opened publicly at the announced time and place. Tenders are 
preferable for governments because of their simplicity and ease in 
application, and because of the competition. Another reason for 
preferability of tenders is that they often result in a highest price for the 
SOE to be privatized. 
4- Public offering of shares: They enable the government to sell all or part 
of its holdings in a company to be general public through domestic or 
international stock markets. The price of the shares can be fixed by an 
underwriter or by the government itself, or the offering may be on a 
tender basis. To make a successful privatization through public offering 
of shares, the targeted SOE should be attractive to the general public; 
therefore it has to be a well-known one. Also, public offering of shares 
requires the existence of active stock-exchange in the country so as to 
attract local and foreign investors. Finally, it is important that the share 
price reflects a fair market value of the company.  
 In Sudan we do not have experience in privatization through 
public offering of shares. This is because of the weakness of public 
awareness about the feasibility of sharing in the public companies. 
Furthermore, public companies in Sudan presented disappointing 
performance in the past. Another reason is that most of the Sudanese 
investors have individualistic tendency because of some primitive 
traditions. 
5- Voucher or Coupon Privatization: This has been mainly used in countries 
which formerly adopted the communist and socialist regimes, specifically 
in those which implemented mass privatization programs. In these 
countries, vouchers of SOEs were given to all citizens essentially free of 
charge. These vouchers could then be exchanged into shares at special 
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auctions. The main advantages of this method are that the process of 
privatization gains speed by simplifying the task of divesting a large 
number of SOEs, that the transfer of ownership is highly equitable, and 
that it supports the formation of local capital market. In Sudan we do not 
recognize such method of privatization. 
6- Joint Venture:  It means that a whole SOE or part of it typically forms a 
new company together with a strong outside investor. This is mainly to 
benefit from the outside investor in bringing new capital and technology.  
Governments often favour this method of privatization because it 
allows them to maintain control, or at least strong influence over the 
enterprise. 
 Joint venture is used sometimes as a transitional method towards 
privatization. In this case, the government brings a private partner to 
contribute in the targeted SOE as a first step to privatize such SOE. After 
this, the government gradually divest its shares to the public or to another 
qualified investor. 
In Sudan, the ideal example for privatization through joint venture 
is the privatization of the telecommunication sector. The government 
constituted a new company with qualified investors. Then, the 
government gradually divested its shares in the international stock 
exchanges. 
7- Lease and concessions agreements: They are to a large far extent similar. 
In a lease agreement, a private investor rents an asset or enterprise from 
the government for a specified period of time and retains the enterprise’s 
profits for its management services. A concession agreement is similar, in 
that the concessionaire pays either a fixed fee or a percentage of profits 
for the right to operate a facility or to provide a service, keeping the rest 
of the proceeds. The obvious difference between lease and concession is 
in the practical application. Leasing agreement usually refers to natural 
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resources and manufacturing plants, while concessions usually refer to 
public services. Lease and concessions have been successfully used in 
Africa and Latin America. 
 Unlike the international experience, in Sudan lease agreements 
were used in the privatization of hotels and tourist villages (see the Grand 
Hotel and Arrous Village privatization contracts in this Chapter). 
8- Management contracts: They confer a private operator to take over the 
management of the enterprise in exchange for a fee, while the 
government remains the enterprise’s owner. The private operator has 
autonomy in the daily works operations decisions, but the fundamental 
decisions, such as investment remain with the public sector. Management 
contracts are concluded mainly to improve the SOE efficiency. In Africa, 
management contracts are mostly used in infrastructure areas such as  
water supply. 
9- Management/Employee Buyout (M/EBO): This can be defined as a pattern 
of privatization of the SOEs whereby the SOE is transformed into a 
public company with shares, and then selling the whole, majority or a part 
of the shares of the new company to the employees of the former SOE. In 
Sudan such type of privatization methods has not been used.  
10- Build-Own-Operate-And-Transfer (BOOT) Agreements: These are used 
mainly for large energy and infrastructure projects. The investors provide 
the financing, and build and operate the facility for a fixed period of time. 
They recover their initial capital outlay plus a reasonable return by 
charging user fees. At the end of the contract, ownership reverts to the 
government (more details are in Chapter 10 in this thesis). 
11- Liquidation and Asset Sale: This is a suitable method to dispose of SOE 
that reflects bad financial condition with high liabilities. In other words, 
governments use this method when direct sale becomes impossible. The 
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advantage for the private purchaser is that he can acquire the SOE 
without the attached liabilities. 
 In Sudan, there are many applications for this method, especially 
in the liquidation of the Mechanical Transportation Corporation. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Impacts of Constitutions and International Law   
 
In the most of former communist countries and centrally-planned 
economies, productive assets are by constitutional law defined as public 
property. In such cases, the transfer of ownership would effectively be 
unconstitutional. This was the case in many countries such as Hungary 
and Poland190which until the last of the ninetieth of the past century 
recognized the right to private property only to a very limited extent. 
Therefore, constitutional amendments to allow full private ownership of 
productive assets were required to allow privatization to proceed. In the 
former Sudanese Constitution of 1973, and despite the fact that there 
were no explicit provisions for prohibition of the private ownership of the 
productive assets; some provisions were, indirectly restricted the private 
sector, specially the foreign one, to join powerfully in the Sudanese 
economy.191 
 The conduct of privatization transactions in a given country can 
also be affected by the international treaties and agreements to which 
such country is a party. In other words, many countries, on all continents, 
have entered into regional agreements on trade, customs controls or 
commercial protocols. All these international agreements have a 
significant impact on the privatization in a given country, especially in 
fostering privatization operations.  In rare cases, these agreements, 
specially the bilateral ones, may be in need of amendments or even of 
                                                 
190 - This was the case despite the fact that Poland was the first country in Europe which abandoned the 
communism in its policy and economy.  
191 - These provisions were of slogan political nature, and they were stated in the Sudanese Constitution 
in the period immediately followed the abandonment of May Regime the frank communism direction 
to the socialism. More explanation will be performed in this chapter.    
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complete termination so as not to affect the entire privatization 
programme.   
This Chapter examines how a country’s constitution and certain 
provisions of international law, affect the privatization choices available 
to a government or a legislator. 
 
(i) Constitutional Requirements:  
 A country’s constitution may contain provisions that affect 
privatization operations either directly or indirectly. Provisions of this 
kind may limit the scope of the privatization program, determine to whom 
decision-making authority belongs, or impose certain control on 
privatization authorities. 
 
(a) Limits on the Scope of Privatization: 
 The constitutions of many socialist countries provided that all 
productive assets (including enterprises) were the property of the state “of 
all the people”, and granted the state (or the public sector) special 
protection and privileges. Very obvious examples for these provisions are 
in the constitution of the former Soviet Union, particularly article 4 of the 
constitution (see Table No. 4). 
 Portugal’s 1976 constitution even declared irreversible the 
nationalizations that followed the April 1974 revolution. It had to be 
amended twice, in 1980 and 1982, to authorize the privatization of these 
SOEs. The constitution of Bangladesh also had to be amended by a 
decree issued in 1977 to authorize privatization.192 
 Some constitutions continue to prohibit all private-sector activity in 
what deemed to be strategic sectors. Article 177 of the Brazilian 
                                                 
192 - Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge; A Strategic, Legal, and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience p. 34, 4th ed. 2001, World Bank Publication, Washington DC. 
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constitution gave the state a monopoly on prospecting for petroleum, 
natural gas and other hydrocarbons; petroleum refining; import and 
export of petroleum products; sea transportation of domestic crude oil; 
and pipe line of crude oil and natural gas regardless of origin. This 
monopoly was repealed in November 1995 by the constitutional 
amendment. Article 27 of the Mexican constitution contains similar 
restrictive provisions for the hydrocarbons. The Mexican constitution also 
originally contained a provision, amended in May 1990, prohibiting 
privatization of commercial banks. Such constitutional provisions  also 
cover the energy, water, and telecommunications sectors.193  
 Else where, certain types of activities are reserved to the state, 
though participation by private sector is permitted through joint-venture 
companies or under concessions, lease, or management contracts. This is 
common in the hydrocarbons sectors, as for example in Bolivia, where 
the constitution provides that petroleum deposits are the property of the 
state, which may nevertheless entrust exploration and production just 
under concession contracts.194  
 Some constitutions may include other restrictions such as the 
limitations on the foreign investment in specific activities. These 
restrictions clearly  hinder privatization programs. Until it is repealed by 
constitutional amendment of August 15 1995, Article 178 of the Brazilian 
constitution reserved coastal and internal shipping to national vessel, 
meaning vessel whose carriers, ship owners, captains and at least two-
thirds of the crew are Brazilian. Similarly, Article 176, which restricted 
mining (exploration and production) to Brazilian-controlled firms, was 
modified on the same day and now requires only that the firm be 
                                                 
193 - Francisco Anuatti-Neto, Milton Barossi-Filbo , Antonio Geldson de Carbalvo and Roberto Macedo 
(Ch), Privatization in Latin America; Myths and Reality pp. 145-151, 2005 ed. Stanford University 
Press and the World Bank.  
194 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 .p.32 
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established under the Brazilian law and has its headquarters and 
management in the country.195 
 
 In Sudan, until it was amended in 1998, the Permanent 
Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 1973; Articles 30, 31, and 32 
reads:  
Article 30: The socialist system shall be the foundation of the economy of the 
Sudanese society so as to realize sufficiency in production and fairness in 
distribution, and to introduce decent living for all citizens and prevent any form of 
exploitation and injustice. 
Article 31: The Sudanese economy shall be directed to realize the objectives of 
the development plans in order to achieve the society of sufficiency and justice and 
the state shall own and manage the fundamental means of production in the economy. 
Article 32: The Sudanese economy shall consist of the activities of the 
following sectors: 
• The public sector, which shall be a pioneer sector and shall lead 
progress in the fields of the purpose of the development, and shall 
be based on public ownership and be subject to people’s control. 
• The Co-operative, which shall be based on the collective ownership 
by all members participating in co-operative societies. The state 
shall care for the co-operative and the law shall regulate their 
formation and   management. 
• The private sector, which shall be based on non-exploiting private 
ownership. The state shall protect and encourage it and organize its 
formation to play a positive and active role in the national economy. 
 
Historically, the Sudanese Constitution of 1973 was issued in the 
period following the collapse of the communism in Sudan after the 
famous bloody struggle between the former President Numairi and the 
communist members of the Command Council of May regime in 1971. It 
                                                 
195 - Fracisco Anuatti-Neto and others, supra 4 p. 156. 
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seems that the sudden direction to liberal economy in this period was 
irrational; therefore, the constitution was designed to ensure that the 
government would not totally exclude the revolution’s slogans. This 
period also witnessed real contradiction between the declared slogans and 
policies of the revolution and the actual practice. In this period, many 
grand private investments were established in the country.196 
 However, the mentioned articles of Sudanese Constitution 1973 
state the follows: 
1- Article 30, implies that Sudan is totally a socialist state 
and the opportunities of the private sector to play an 
active role in the national economy are very narrow. 
2- Article 31 implies that the private sector would not play a 
big role in the grand schemes such like infrastructure 
schemes (water, electricity, roads and bridges etc.). 
3- The constutition ranks the private sector last, a thing 
which implies that it is of less importance than the public 
and co-operative sectors. 
We can claim that these articles of the Sudanese Constitution were 
not particularly designed to limit the role of the private sector as they 
were designed to reflect the ideological direction of the May Regime. The 
only truth we can assure is that the role of the private sector in the 
beginnings of May regime was very weak. Also the contribution of 
foreign investment was also weak because of the declared socialist 
policy. 
  The role of the former nationalizations wave (1969-1971) should 
not be underestimated in minimizing the role of the private sector in 
Sudan. It is to be noted that the current wave of privatization began 
before the issuance of the Sudanese Constitution in 1998. In other words, 
                                                 
196 - Such like International Tyres Factory in Port Sudan (1974). 
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the recent government enacted the privatization (The Disposition of 
Public Enterprises Law 1990) without amending or repealing the 
mentioned Articles in the 1973 Permanent Constitution. The privatization 
law was issued during the moratorium of the constitution (1989 to 1998).   
However, the Interim National Constitution of the Republic of 
Sudan 2005 opened the door wide for liberal economy policies without 
restricting the private ownership of any of the economic activities. The 
Interim National Constitution of the Republic of Sudan 2005 in chapter 
11 Article (10): (Fundamentals of National Economy) stated the following: 
1- The overacting of the aims of development shall be the eradication 
of poverty, attainment of the Millennium Development Goals, guaranteeing 
the equitable distribution of wealth, redressing imbalances of income, and 
achieving a decent standard of life for all citizens. 
2-The state shall develop and manage the national economy in order to 
achieve prosperity through policies aimed at increasing production, creating 
an efficient and self-reliant economy and encouraging free market and 
prohibiting of monopoly. 
3- The state shall enhance regional economic integration.  
          
          
   
 
 
  
Table No.4: Ownership Provisions of socialist constitutions. 
 Soviet Union: Article 4 of the 1936 constitution proclaimed “The economic 
foundation of the USSR is the socialist economic and socialist ownership of the instruments 
and means of production, firmly established as a result of liquidation of the capitalist 
economic system, the abolition of private ownership of the instruments and means of 
production, and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.” 
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 Bulgaria: Until its revision in April 1990, Article 13 of the constitution stated: “The 
economic system of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria is socialist; it is based on the public 
ownership of the means of production.” 
 Angola: Article 9 of the 1975 constitution stated: “The foundation of economic and 
social development is socialist ownership, consubstantiated state ownership and cooperative 
ownership. The state shall adopt measures permitting continuous broadening and 
consolidation of socialist relations of production.” 
 Guinea-Bissau: The 1984 constitution described the country as “A sovereign, 
democratic, secular, unitary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist republic.”(Article 1); the 
latter two adjectives have since been deleted. Its Article 12, which has been since amended, 
declared the following to be state-owned assets: “the soil, the subsoil, water resources, 
mineral resources, main energy sources, forests, basic means of industrial production, mass 
media, banks, insurance, roads and essential means of transportation.” 
 Mozambique: Until it was revised in November 1990, the constitution, adopted in 
1975, stated: “In the People’s Republic of Mozambique the state economic sector is the 
leading and driving factor in the national economy. State property is given special protection 
and its development and expansion is incumbent upon all state agencies, social organizations 
and citizens” (article 10).    
Source: Pierre Guislain (Foot note no. 3) p.35. 
       
(b) Parliamentary Approval: 
The constitution or constitutional traditions of a country may 
provide that privatization must be approved by parliament. This is the 
case with Article 34 of the French Constitution of 1958 which states that 
the rules governing nationalization of enterprises and transfer of 
ownership of public- 
sector enterprises to the private sector shall be set by law. The 
constitutions of Benin, Morocco, Senegal, Togo, and other countries with 
a French tradition similarly require that the transfer of majority state-
owned enterprises to the private sector be authorized in advance by 
parliament.197   
                                                 
197 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p. 37.  
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A country’s constitution, constitutional traditions198or legislation 
may allow the government or other public agencies to privatize without 
intervention by the legislature. In this case, no enabling legislation is 
legally required. This is the situation in most of the common-law 
countries, such as Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. In such system it is generally considered that, in the absence of 
explicit prohibition, the government possesses an inherent power to 
privatize public enterprises without the need for special legislative 
authorization.199  
In some other countries, the role assigned to parliament is defined 
more precisely. Not only must a law be enacted but it must also contain 
specific provisions. The Paraguayan constitution, for example, requires 
that the law spell out procedures for granting the preferential right to 
shares in the privatized enterprise to which its employees are entitled.200 
 Abstractly, while the role of the parliament in the privatization, 
sometimes, delays the privatization operation, the approval of the 
parliament gives many advantages for privatization operations. These 
advantages are: 
1- Absorbing the public opposition against privatization operations on 
the ground that members of the parliament are the representatives 
of the people of the country. All the classes of society, the business 
private sector, the middle class man and, indeed, the labourers are 
presumed to be represented in the parliament.201 
                                                 
198 - Some countries have no written constitutional law such as England, therefore, constitutional 
traditions is the suitable word. 
199 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p. 38. 
200 -  Francisco Anuatti-Neto (Ch), supra 4 p. 226. 
201 - One of the most important barriers against privatization, especially in the least developing 
countries, is the opposition of the Labourers Unions.  
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2- Giving strong support to the agency, committee or any 
governmental authority to execute successful privatization 
program.  
3-  Reflecting reasonable level of transparency. 
In some cases, the role of the parliament may cause disadvantages to 
privatization operations. It may result in: 
1- Delaying the privatization operation, because of complicated 
procedures of issuing a parliamentary approval or legislation. 
2- Political interference in economic decision. In most of developing 
countries around the world the economic performance of the 
parliament seems to be irrational for many reasons: either because 
of the know-how of the parliament’s members that they are 
usually elected just for tribal or ethnic reasons. The re-election of 
members usually motivates them to vote against or delay the 
privatization, regardless of the logical or national benefit of the 
privatization. 
3- Irrational approval of the privatization operations by the appointed 
parliaments: existence of a parliament in a country does not mean 
that such country is a democratic one. In many dictatorial 
countries, the president or other authorities (such as command 
councils of military revolutions) appoints the parliament which 
will automatically approve any governmental proposal of 
privatization regardless of its feasibility. 
              
In Sudan, the privatization law (the Disposition of Public 
Enterprises Act 1990) was enacted in the period of the absence of 
parliament. This law was prepared and enacted by the former Command 
Council of the National Salvation Revolution. The total absence of the 
role of a parliament (even an appointed one) may be one of the 
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disadvantages of such law. Absence of parliament’s role painted clouds 
of doubts over the whole program of privatization in Sudan. This appears 
from the voluminous number of criticisms of lay peoples and opinions of 
some economists which are frequently published in the newspapers. 
 The government, after widening the margin of liberties in the last 
years, is required to put the Disposition of Public Enterprise Law on the 
table of the parliament for obtaining the approval of the parliament for the 
other operations. In the Budget Speech of 2007, the Minister of Finance 
and National Economy said that the government has privatized just %30 
of the candidate SOEs. Therefore, the opportunity still now exists to 
pursue the public consent for the privatization operations. 
 The recent Parliament, although it is not democratically elected, 
represents many of the active political forces in the country, therefore the 
approval of this parliament will give credibility to the mentioned law.  
 
(c) Limits on the Discretion of the Government: 
Constitutional provisions may also limit the extent of the 
government’s discretionary powers regarding privatization. Comparison 
of the French and British examples may represent good examples for 
such limitation.  
 First, the constitutional requirement that the implementation of 
privatization program be authorized by law requires the French 
government to request prior parliamentary authorization.202In the United 
Kingdom, in the absence of such constitutional requirement, there is a 
good discretionary power for the government to implement privatization 
operations. 
                                                 
202 -Ahmed Maher, Manager’s Guide to Privatization p. 58, 2ed ed.2003, University Home 
publications, Cairo. 
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Second, the valuation of the enterprise to be privatized also differs 
between France and United Kingdom. In France, the Constitutional 
Council which is responsible for verifying the constitutionality of laws 
before they come into force, has ruled that the constitutional principles of 
equality among all citizens and Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of 
the Human Rights (see the Appendix), which mandates the payment of 
just compensation when property is confiscated, prohibit the transfer of 
public assets to private investors at less than the real value203. The 
Council judged that enterprises to be privatized therefore had to be valued 
by independent expert, and that no sale is allowed at a price below that 
determined by these experts. In the United Kingdom, in contrast, 
privatization transactions are examined only after the fact by the National 
Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee. In other words, while 
valuation of the asset to be privatized in France must be done by a neutral 
committee (non-governmental), in the United Kingdom valuation is done 
by a governmental body. Both National Audit Office and the Public 
Accounts Committee are governmental bodies. 
Third, the French Constitutional Council intervened again to try to 
regulate use of golden share by the Minister of Economy. The 
privatization laws enacted in France in 1986 and 1993 provide that, in 
any company to be privatized, the government be granted a golden share 
that would enable the minister of the economy to reject any sales 
allowing a shareholder to own more than a certain percentage of the 
governmental company’s capital204. The Council accepted the 
constitutionality of these provisions, but only on condition that the 
minister justifies each use of this right. In the United Kingdom, where 
privatization conditions and procedures need not be authorized by law, 
                                                 
203 - Id, p. 59. 
204 - Id, p.66. 
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the rule governing uses of the golden shares are contained in the article of 
association of the enterprise concerned. This contractual arrangement 
limits the basis for judicial intervention. 
If we compare the requirements of the French constitution with the 
case in Sudan we will find that: 
 First: in Sudan it is clear that there is no way to speak about any 
constitutional limitation on the discretion of the government to involve 
any privatization operation whatever the size or feasibility of the 
enterprise. This is, of course, because of the constitution moratorium 
which was declared by the Command Council of the National Salvation 
Revolution In 1989. In addition, the 1998 and 2005 Constitutions do not 
include any provisions about parliamentary or otherwise supervision over 
the privatization operations. 
 The important question here is whether it is important to put 
limitation on the discretion of the government in any future constitution? 
Since the federation will, inevitably, be the only form of governance in 
Sudan (as a result of the peace agreement), we believe that any new 
constitution should impose restrictive articles on the discretion of the  
governments of  the Sudanese regions. For example, the peace agreement 
in the South of Sudan provided real independent authorities for the 
southern government. Also, Darfur is on its way to be granted the same 
independent authorities. Therefore, exercising privatization operations by 
the new governors may result in: 
a- Irrational selection of SOEs for privatization because 
of the lack of experiences and the inefficiency of the 
new governors. 
b- Tribal and ethnic standards in privatizing SOEs may 
result in preferential or discriminative treatment in 
transferring the SOEs to private investors. This is a 
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common practice in all Africa (see Chapter 3 
“Negotiated Sales”). 
 We call for a clear role of the constitution in privatization in 
Sudan. The scope of the supervision of the constitution over privatization 
can be determined by the federal parliament. Different parliamentary 
committees like the economic committee and the political committee are 
presumed to play a significant role in rationalizing privatization 
operations politically, economically, and legally. 
     Second: The valuation of enterprise to be privatized is the 
mission of TCDPE, and according to the law, TCDPE is free to select the 
suitable technical house or expert to valuate the candidate SOE. In other 
words, the evaluation authority is in the hand of governmental body. 
Again, we call for following the French system in valuation of candidates 
(mentioned above). 
Third; Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world; services 
or products which are presented by the governmental enterprises in many 
cases, have no alternative producer. Therefore, for the protection of the 
Sudanese citizen from any prejudicial abuse; we call for enabling 
provisions in the constitution. These provisions should be designed to 
enable a minister, say the Minister of Finance, to intervene and impose 
golden shares on any privatization operation.   
 
(d) Control of Constitutionality of Privatization Legislation: 
In France, as mentioned above, the constitutional court may review 
legislation before it is comes into force. In Poland, President Lech Walesa 
referred to the constitutional court a new privatization law that had been 
approved by parliament in July 1995 over his earlier veto. Grounds for 
referral were that it violated the separation of powers between the 
executive and legislative branches by requiring a specific parliamentary 
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approval of privatization transactions in numerous “strategic sectors”. 
The court ruled that this new law is indeed unconstitutional.205 
Constitutional challenges to privatization legislation have become a 
regular feature in Turkey. In July 1994 the Turkey’s constitutional court 
ruled that privatization enabling law No. 3987, which authorized the 
government to privatize through issuance of statutory decree, was illegal 
because this power belonged exclusively to parliament. As a result for 
this ruling, the statutory decrees already issued to execute this law also 
become null and void. In India, members of parliament, public interest 
groups and labour unions petitions with the Supreme Court contesting the 
government’s telecommunications privatization policy and the award of 
specific licenses. The court ruled in February 1996 that policy matters 
were in the ambit of the legislative and executive branches, not of courts. 
It rejected the petitions against the privatization program.206 
 
(ii) Role of the International Law: 
The conduct of privatization transactions in a given country can 
also be affected by the international law (treaties, conventions, and 
bilateral agreements to which such country is a party). Many countries, in 
all continents, have entered into regional agreements on trade, customs 
controls, or broader economic integration. Examples are the European 
Union (EU), CARICOM (Caribbean), NAFTA (North America), 
ASEAN, COMESA (Common Market of Eastern & Sothern Africa). 
Such regional agreements often generate supranational law or foster 
harmonization of their legislation in their member countries.  
For example, despite the fact that EU treaty is neutral, many of the 
obligations within the treaty deduce that they encourage the privatization. 
                                                 
205 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p. 44. 
206 - Id pp. 48-49. 
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The abolition of customs barriers, liberalization of formerly monopolistic 
markets, and imposition of common competition rules on private as well 
as public enterprises all foster the entry of private operators. Privatization 
is one of the options most governments must consider in order to reduce 
public-sector debts and deficits and meet the criteria set by the Maastricht 
Treaty for joining the new European countries. 
 A good example for the role of treaties in fostering the privatization 
in Sudan is reflected by COMESA. Sudan is a member of COMESA. 
COMESA was established as a response for the Final Document of Lagos 
Work-Plan which was singed in April 1980 by African presidents. The 
Work-Plan provided that the African countries must establish many 
regional economical groups as a preface for the Entire African 
Economical Unity. Eastern and Sothern African regions were required, 
according to Lagos Work-Plan 1980,for establishing a preferential trade 
area. The governments of Eastern and Southern African countries singed 
the Preferential Trade Area Treaty (PTA) in December 1981, and the 
treaty came into force in 1982. Thereafter, the (PTA) witnessed very 
important development by signing the COMESA (Common Market of 
Eastern & Southern Africa) treaty in 1993. Sudan is not a founding 
member in (PTA), but implemented it in 1990 according to Article 46 of 
the treaty which permits the implementation of any neighbour country of 
one of the founders.207 
COMESA treaty 1993 determines many objectives. These objectives 
were prepared to create a favourable climate to enhance the economic 
performance of the member countries, elimination of barriers of trade 
between these countries, creation of good opportunity for foreign 
investment and  encourage competition between foreign and local 
investors in the member countries. For achieving the objectives; the 
                                                 
207 -  Sudan & COMESA, a brochure published by the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Trade in 2003. 
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framework of COMESA concentrates on eliminating the customs and 
non-custom barriers in goods and services trade, encouraging cooperation 
in transportation between member countries, and cooperation in the 
financial field by following matching policies between member countries. 
Therefore, there are four organs of COMESA which have the power to 
take decisions on behalf of COMESA, these being: the Authority of 
Heads of States and the Government; the Council of Ministers; the Court 
of Justice; and the Committee of Governors of Central Banks:208  
The Authority: made up of Heads of States and Government is the 
supreme Policy Organ of the Common Market and is responsible for the 
general policy, direction, and control of the performance of the executive 
functions of the Common Market and the achievement of its aims and 
objectives. The decisions and directives of the Authority are by consensus 
and are binding on all subordinate institutions, other than the Court of 
Justice, on matters within its jurisdiction, as well as on the member 
States.  
The Council of Ministers: (Council) is the second highest Policy Organ of 
COMESA. It is composed of ministers designated by the member states. 
The Council is responsible for ensuring the proper functioning of 
COMESA in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty. The Council 
takes policy decisions on the programmes and activities of the COMESA, 
including the monitoring and reviewing of its financial and administrative 
management. As provided for in the Treaty, Council decisions are made 
by consensus, failing which, by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
the Council.  
The COMESA Court of Justice: is the judicial organ of COMESA, having 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon all matters which may be referred to it 
pursuant to the COMESA treaty. Specifically, it ensures the proper 
                                                 
208 - Chapter 2 article (2) of COMESA treaty: all the structure bodies are provided in the same chapter. 
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interpretation and application of the provisions of the treaty; and it 
adjudicates any disputes that may arise among the member states 
regarding the interpretation and application of the provisions of the treaty. 
The decisions of the Court are binding and final. Decisions of the Court 
on the interpretation of the provisions of the COMESA Treaty have 
precedence over decisions of national courts. The Court, when acting 
within its jurisdiction, is independent of the Authority and the Council. It 
is headed by a President and consists of six additional judges appointed 
by the Authority. Consideration is being given to establishing the Court 
of Justice in the not too distant future.  
The Committee of Governors of Central Banks: is empowered under the 
treaty to determine the maximum debt and credit limits to the COMESA 
Clearing House, the daily interest rate for outstanding debt balances and 
the Staff Rules for Clearing House staff. It also monitors, and ensures the 
proper implementation of the Monetary and Financial Co-operation 
programs.  
By performing and explaining COMESA treaty, its decision 
makers, executive bodies, and the governing body, we are initially aim 
to express the following: 
1- The obvious role of the treaty in fostering the privatization 
program in Sudan and in all member countries appears from 
that it resembles the same role of the EU treaty in fostering 
privatization in Europe in many directions. Despite the fact 
that COMESA treaty itself is neutral with regard to the type 
of ownership, the abolition of customs barriers and the 
liberalization of former monopolistic markets are directly 
inviting the government of the country to rely upon the 
private sector to compete and fulfil the treaty requirements. 
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2- There is a clear tendency in COMESA treaty to attract the 
private sector to take big portion in the market. This is clear 
from the structure of the executive bodies of the treaty (the 
Consultant Committee of the Business Sector). 
3- Nine of member countries of COMESA enjoy the 
membership of the World Trading Organization (WTO).209 
Therefore, we can deduce that their economies are liberal. In 
most of the liberal economies the private sector takes the 
lead in the economy. Usually, the public sector is not capable 
to compete with the private sector.210  Theoretically, 
members of COMESA who are not members of WTO are 
required to create a strong private sector to compete in 
COMESA, a thing which, directly or indirectly, calls them to 
privatize their SOEs. 
4- COMESA members, who are members of other international 
treaties of trade, will remain complying with the provisions 
of international treaties and agreements which encourage the 
role of the private sector in the economy. WTO represents 
the mother of these treaties as it expressly calls its members 
to privatize their internal economies.211   
5- There is no way to argue that this treaty is a friendly one and 
its provisions are not obligatory, that its articles provide for 
the required mechanisms of its execution politically, 
technically and even judicially. 
In a meeting with Mr. Stephen Doctor Matatia; Head of COMESA 
Coordinating Unit – Sudan212; he said:  
                                                 
209 - Sudan & COMESA, supra18. 
210 - See chapter 1 of this dissertation. 
211 - A Guide for  Questions About the Free Trade Area p. 9, April 2001, COMESA Publications. 
212 - December 13th 2007 at 10:25 AM, Ministry of Foreign Trade, COMESA Unit, Khartoum-Sudan. 
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1- “Of course, COMESA represents one of the African devices to accommodate 
the international tendency towards privatization. Moreover, privatization and 
globalization are just devices, windows, or hope for achieving entire human 
development. 
2- The general belief around the world is that the public sector should be 
privatized in order to achieve efficiency and sustainability. WTO represents 
the “mother” for all current economic treaties, agreements, protocols and 
reciprocities; therefore, features of encouraging the contribution of the 
private sector in trade are there. 
3- It is true that privatization brings suffering for both citizens and labourers. 
But such suffering seems to be seasonal and for a short term that the real 
benefits of privatization normally take many years to reflect on the every-day 
life of the citizens. This period typically resembles “tighting of belts”. 
4- Privatization, especially in the least-developing countries, attracts foreign 
investment and consequently the modern technological means of production. 
5- In the other social-life activities such as education and health, privatization 
provides high quality levels of performance. 
6- In Sudan, privatization had been started while most of experts were outside 
Sudan as immigrants, this, indeed, affected the privatization. The Sudanese 
government is now required to attract them back home.       
  In another meeting with the Deputy Head of COMESA Coordinating 
Unit: Mr. Mutasim Makkawi; we asked him whether COMESA Treaty 
fosters privatization in Sudan. Also, we requested him to speak generally, 
depending on his experience, about COMESA.  He said:213 
  “This actually represents the reality; COMESA is one of the 
international bundles of treaties, agreements and conventions which are directly 
targeting to create a climate favourable for the liberalization of trade all over the 
world. In other words, this treaty is a response for the recent direction of the 
world towards Globalization. In participating our missions, we absolutely 
disregard any tendency to make any monopolistic, discriminative treatment, or 
favouritism between the member countries whether for the Sudanese investor or 
other member country’s citizen. For example, many of the Sudanese ceramic 
                                                 
213 - December 12th 2007 at 12:20 AM, Ministry of Foreign Trade, COMESA Unit, Khartoum-Sudan.  
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factories requested COMESA unit in the Ministry of Foreign Trade in Sudan to 
impose high tariff on the imported ceramic from the member countries, namely 
Egypt. We refused to respond to such request on the ground that we are obliged to 
apply the provisions of the COMESA Treaty verbatim. Another reason is that we 
are regarding the benefit of the Sudanese citizen that the cheapest good is 
favourable for the Sudanese citizen, regardless of the producer country. On the 
participation of the state in the economy as a trader, Mr. Mutasim said: This 
matter has been abandoned all over the world except in some Latin American 
countries. Therefore, in my opinion Sudan should follow the new orientation of the 
international economy towards the privatization. He also said that fortunately 
Sudan launched the privatization era in an ample time before many of the other 
African countries who are, nowadays, suffering to privatize their economies.” 
  Another example for treaties on trade to which Sudan is a party is 
the Great Arab Free Trade Area treaty (GAFTA). GAFTA was 
established as a result for the resolution of Arab Summit which was 
convened in Cairo in 1996. The Arab Summit recommended that the 
Economic and Social Council undertake and fosters setup for the Great 
Arab Free Trade Area. The Council in its meeting in Feb. 1997 agreed the 
executive programme and the proposed time schedule for establishing 
GAFTA in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement for Trade 
Facilitation and Development between Arab states and in conformity with 
the general rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO).214 
  The Arab member states are the seventeen Arab states including 
Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Bahrain, Jordan, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, 
Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, and 
Palestine.215 
  While the majority of Arab countries were required to reduce the 
custom tariff, taxes, and duties on the products of  member countries, 
                                                 
214 - Source: GAFTA Unit in the Ministry of Trade. 
215 - Id. 
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some countries, as least-developed, were granted a grace period to retain 
their custom tariff, taxes, and duties.  
   Sudan has enjoyed privilege accorded by the Great Arab Free 
Trade Area in to least-developed Arab states. This treatment was 
indicated during the Fourteenth Arab League Session dated 28/3/2002, 
and upon the resolution of Arab League No. 223, wherein the fifth 
paragraph read as follows: 
 “Offering or granting the least-developed Arab states an interim period starting 
from  the day of accession, with equal reduction annually for their tariff, taxes, and 
duties of similar effect which are imposed on Arab commodities starting from the year 
2005 to be fully removed by 2010”.216 
  This resolution grants Sudan and other least-developed Arab states 
a special status in applying a gradual reduction on their customs duties 
starting from January 2006, and over to complete the proposed plan by 
the first of January 2010.217 
   With regard to the facilities and privileges of reduction of taxes and 
custom duties which facilitate access of Sudanese exports in the GAFTA 
states, all  Sudanese embassies, attaches, and consulates were notified by 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade to insure the implementation and practice 
of Arab member states upon customs and privileges. 
  Reaffirming to the resolution No. 1565 of the Economic and Social 
Council; the Sudanese Minister of Finance and National Economy issued 
the Ministerial Decree No. 109-2005 on gradual reduction to of customs 
charges and taxes for similar effect imposed on imports of Arab origin 
products, within the framework entitled for the implementation of the 
programme proposed by the GAFTA over the period from 1st January 
2006 for an equal yearly reduction of 20% up to complete a abolishment 
ending 1st January 2010. 
                                                 
216 - Id. 
217 - Id. 
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 Sudan notified all its customs points in order to apply the decree of the 
Ministry of Finance. As a result, the customs practically applied the 
decree. In 2007, a reduction of %40 of customs was commenced as from 
January 1st  
2007. 
  From GAFTA Treaty we can deduce that it fosters privatization 
operations in Sudan depending on the following: 
1- The Economic and Social Council, which is mandated by the Arab 
Summit in Cairo-1996 to undertake and foster the set up of 
GAFTA, agreed in February 1997  that GAFTA provisions should 
be in accordance with the provisions of WTO which fosters 
privatization all over the world. 
2- Many member countries in GAFTA are already members in WTO, 
therefore they cannot agree to any provision or treatment that 
contradicts the WTO requirements.  
3- Many Sudanese crop exports to GAFTA were formerly exported 
on monopolistic basis, such as Arabic gum218 and sesame.219 
Therefore, the break-up of former monopolies arises as an 
important element in marketing such crops.  
  The table below shows the gradual increase of Sudanese exports to 
GAFTA after the break-up of some former monopolies. 
  
Box No. (5): Main Sudanese Exports to GAFTA. 2001- 2006. (Continued ion the 
next page) Value in thousand dollars.  
                                                 
218 - Arabic gum exportation was formerly monopolized by the Arabic Gum Company until it was 
demonopolized in the early ninetieths of the past century. 
219 - Sesame exportation was formerly monopolized by the Oil Grain Company until it was 
demonopolized in the early ninetieths of the past century.  
Commodity 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cotton 10632 21066 0 32512 31785 33436 
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Source: Bank of Sudan 
 
  No doubt the application of treaties to which Sudan is a party 
requires the active contribution of the private sector. These treaties were 
signed with many member countries of international treaties. Such 
treaties explicitly or implicitly impose wide participation of the private 
sector in the national economy.   
Bilateral agreements may also raise special privatization issues. 
This is the case in the privatization of airlines. Bilateral agreements 
governing air-traffic between the signatory states often require that 
“substantial ownership” or “effective control” of the designated 
companies be held by a signatory state or by national a thereof. An airline 
Arabic gum 43 2932 169 580 108 4347 
 
Sesame 58030 50055 32774 105108 74169 
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Meats 13711 17265 21578 17935 18158 4899 
 
 
Live animal 1687 115356 87111 136331 112740 
 
119803 
Leather 394 577 2301 9909 6736 
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Gold 0 2135 1929 687 670 1111 
 
Umbaz 672 708 75 1538 0 0 
 
Groundnuts 378 262 0 449 75 71 
 
Petroleum 
products 
81596 77022 88725 90546 119246 
 
268125 
 
Other 29308 24632 68501 34487 21032 
 
16033 
 
Total 196451 312010 303153 429982 384719 549558 
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privatization that would transfer control to foreign investors could then 
block the application of these agreements and result in the loss of the 
airline’s main assets, that is, its routes. There are ways to limit this risk; 
for example, when British Airways was privatised; a golden share was 
awarded to the government, which allowed it to oppose any foreign 
acquisition of shares. In the case of KLM, particularly strict 
measurements were taken. The government holds a call option that allows 
it to regain a majority shareholding if needed. In addition, the bylaws of 
the company provide that a majority of the members of the supervisory 
board shall be nominated by the government. Following is accurate 
analysis of KLM’s case, written by an international expert in the 
privatization field:220 
 “*KLM was created in 1919 on only a purely private basis. It was not until 1929 that 
a majority of shares was transferred to the state. In March 1986, on the eve of 
privatization, the state held 54.9 percent of the company’s capital. The privatization 
procedure was original: the company bought back a portion of the state’s shares and 
undertook to resell them, together with 12 million newly issued shares, to a bank 
syndicate commissioned to place them. This reduced the share of the state to38.2 
percent of the capital. In addition specific measures were taken to strengthen the 
government’s control over the company, with the purpose, in particular, to prevent 
jeopardizing the bilateral air traffic agreements concluded between the Netherlands 
and other countries. 
*The Dutch government signed an agreement with KLM providing that the state 
would lose its majority interest in the share capital of KLM as a result of the issue of 
common shares by KLM and of the sale of common KLM shares by the state. A 
provision was included allowed the state to regain its majority interest at short notice, 
if that was desirable for reasons of air transport policy or to prevent an undesired 
accumulation of power in the general meeting of shareholders. 
                                                 
220 - Dick Welch (Ch), Case- by- Case Privatization in the Russian Federation: Lessons from 
International Experience p. 122, 1st May 1998.  World Bank Publications, Washington D.C. 
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*Under the agreement KLM, granted the state the option to purchase 18,000,000 B 
preference shares. The state could exercise this option if necessary, and reasonable, 
in particular (a) “under one or more international agreements or one or more 
licences granted by whatever country, limitation or aggravating conditions would be 
imposed on the operation by KLM of scheduled services because substantial or 
majority ownership of KLM would no longer be demonstrably Dutch” or (b) it is 
necessary to prevent one person or company or a group of persons or companies from 
acquiring a stake in KLM that would result in an undesirable balance of power in the 
general meeting. 
*In addition, the government was granted by virtue by an amendment to the 
company’s article of association, a majority of the seats on the supervisory board of 
the company, even though it is only a minority shareholder. The new paragraph 13 of 
Article’s 20 of KLM articles of association provides that “the state of the Netherlands 
shall appoint the smallest possible majority of the supervisory board”.  
 In Sudan, privatization of Sudan Airways Co. may lead to 
problems for the new owner. Whether the Sudanese government has 
taken the same safeguards (mentioned above), remains an ambiguous 
matter. The file of privatization of Sudan Airways was shifted from 
TCDPE to the Council of Ministers to be executed by a ministerial 
committee. In the Council of Minsters there is no any information 
allowed about this operation, a thing which will not assist in advising, 
assisting, or analyzing such operation.   
  
Conclusion: 
The models which are examined in this chapter are generally 
considered to have precedence over ordinary law. They are by large 
binding on legislators and governments and cannot be amended except 
through lengthy and complicated procedures. Specific constitutional 
provisions and certain treaties might therefore have to be amended to 
facilitate implementation of the privatization program. 
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  Constitutional provisions may prohibit the privatization of an 
economic sector such as natural resources or infrastructure, subject it to 
special rules and limitations, or restrict foreign investment. In many 
cases, however, suitable legal techniques are available to allow the 
legislator to circumvent obstacles that may appear to be major 
constraints.  
 Other constitutions allow privatization but make it conditional in 
particular safeguards. Thus the constitution or constitutional principles in 
many countries prescribe that a law be enacted to authorize the 
privatization of SOEs (or some of them). Privatization programs may be 
subject to control by the courts of their constitutionality. 
The international law greatly intervenes for the sake of the 
privatization. WTO convention, the mother of all other trade conventions 
and agreement, supports the international wave towards privatization.  
Many regional conventions such as GAFTA expressly stated that 
there must not be any contradiction between its articles and the articles of 
WTO convention. 
 Since the membership of COMESA Treaty includes a number of 
WTO members, this implies the total compliance of those members with 
the provisions of the mother convention (WTO), a thing which requires 
the other countries of COMESA to deal with countries wherein the 
private sector has fundamental role in the production and trade. In other 
words, it has been proved that the public sector will never achieve 
anything in the existence of real competition with the private sector. 
Therefore, a country member in international or regional agreement 
should activate the role of the private sector to compete globally or, at 
least, regionally.    
Executing a privatization program is not always easy or could be 
completed without problems. For example, privatization of airlines 
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requires prior legal consultation. Bilateral agreements between countries 
are of high importance in airline activities; they are to a far extent govern 
ones of major elements in airlines activities, that is, the routes. Bilateral 
agreements usually specify the methods of engaging these routes. Before 
privatization signatories are states, but after privatization the ownership 
will be transferred to a private party, a thing which requires the 
intervention of the state to maintain control over theses routes. Golden 
share is the weapon of the state to maintain such a control.   
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Chapter 5 
 
Privatization and Competition 
 
Legislations that govern and organize the competition on the 
markets are considered as important devices to achieve successful 
privatization program. Competition is the economic democracy which 
must be adopted by all countries in all commercial transactions. 
Competition should actually be exercised, and a strong guarantee for its 
application before and after privatization operations is required.    
It is a common notion that competition is likely to be a more important 
determinant of economic performance than ownership221. Therefore, on their way 
towards privatization, countries should boost the competition rules 
between the productive enterprises regardless of the type of the 
ownership (public or private). For a privatization program to be 
successful, features of non-competitive treatment between state-owned 
enterprises and the private ones should be declined.  Adoption of non-
discrimination against the private sector, liberalization of prices, 
demonopolization, and deregulation of laws and procedures of obtaining 
licences and other official permissions, and application of suitable trade 
legislations are required for privatization. 
 We will not devote this chapter on the Sudanese laws related to 
competition that in Sudan there is a sufficient number of laws which, 
theoretically, satisfy the protection of competition such as Intellectual 
Property Act, Dumping Prohibition Act, Investment Encouragement Act 
1999, and Money Laundry Act, etc. All these acts were designed to 
protect competition. This chapter will first concentrate on the entailed 
                                                 
221 - Gorge Yarrow, Privatization in Theory and Practice p. 364, 1986 ed., Aldershot, England: Eduard 
Elgar.  
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treatment between the private and public sector. Liberalization of prices 
and its consequences will follow. Prior steps words privatization like 
demonopoliztion or break-up of monopolies and its feasibility will be 
mentioned, and deregulation of some regulations will be discussed. 
Foreign trade legislations, as a device for attracting foreign investors will 
be examined. Lastly, in a country like Sudan where serious decisions may 
be taken regardless of the public interest; we will examine some of these 
irrational decisions. These decisions usually create sorts of monopolies 
and discriminative treatment which usually harm the privatization 
program.  
 
(i) Non-discrimination against the Private Sector:      
Absence of discrimination between the private and public sector is 
an essential part of competition policy and a particularly important factor 
in privatization transactions. The private sector must be allowed to 
compete with the public sector on equal footing. This equality should be 
achieved by; for example, the removing of subsidies, elimination of 
discriminative treatment in tax system, removal of all entry barriers 
hampering the private sector, and the equal access to public contracts. 
 In some countries, Brazil for example, guarantees of non-
discrimination are, even, found in the constitution. Article 173 of the 
1988 of Brazilian constitution provides that public corporations, joint 
venture companies, and other public entities that engage in economic 
activities are subject to the same legal system as private companies, 
including labour and tax rules. In addition, public corporations and joint-
venture companies shall not enjoy any tax privileges that are not extended 
to the private sector.222 
                                                 
222 -Pierre Guislain, The Privatization challenge; a strategic, Legal, and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience pp. 53-54, 4th ed. 2001,  World Bank Publications Washington DC. 
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Abolishing preferential treatment for SOEs public supplies is often 
a vital component of a good competition policy. The public contracting 
system is important in that in most countries the state and the public 
sector in general, including SOEs and other public entities, are by far the 
largest potential consumers of goods and services. Consequently, 
governmental supplies such as petroleum, water, gas and electricity are 
more accessible for SOEs and public sector. Equal access to this market 
is of vital importance for an investor in a newly privatized company.223 
In the Salvation Revolution era (the privatization era), competition 
between private enterprises and SOEs can be divided into two periods:  
1- Abdelraheem Hamdi era (1991-1996): 
 This is the period in which the privatization operations had been 
staged. In this period there were many features of noncompetitively 
governmental policies. These policies had very negative reflection in the 
private sector. The following can illustrate this point further:  
  Followings can be illustrated from this period: 
a- The provisions of the Taxation Law had severely been activated 
against the private sector; while the public sectors and SOEs 
were almost totally exempted from the taxations, customs tariff 
s and the like. This severe treatment in the application of 
taxation and customs tariff resulted in a great damage of the 
private sector, leading many of Sudanese investors and traders 
to abandon investment and transfer their capitals (illegally) 
outside Sudan.224 
b- Governmental charity companies and organizations were widely 
spread and excersised pure commercial activities like 
importation of consumer commodities, retailing activities, and 
                                                 
223 - George Yarrow, supra 1 p.368. 
224 - One of the great traders in Omdurman  was chocked and died because of the unreasonable amount 
of taxation imposed on him 
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local trading activities, and in some events, importation of 
luxury goods. These companies and organizations were totally 
exempted from taxes, customs tariff, and any other 
governmental fees. The number of these companies and 
organizations had increased to reach 286.225 
c- The private sector had not been granted any contribution in 
public contracts, and all public contracts were executed either 
by governmental companies or by certain investors (supporters 
of the regime).226   
2- Abd-Elwahhab Osman era and the period until now: 
 Dr. Abd-Elwahhab Osman took over the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy after Mr. Hamdi. The new minister adopted different 
policies. In his era, a different reforming was applied. The following 
illustrate some features of such reforming: 
a- Reasonable taxation treatment was adopted on the private 
sector, a thing which marginally developed its role in the 
economy. 
b- The governmental charity companies and organizations were 
compelled to pay the same customs tariffs as well as the 
private investors. Despite that the preferential treatment in 
taxes had remained but, at least, some sort of reasonable 
competition between the private and public sector was created. 
c- The private sector, to some extent, has taken an opportunity to 
contribute in the public contracts.   
 
(ii) Liberalization of Prices: 
                                                 
225 - Source: Ministry of Finance and National economy-Khartoum. 
226 - It is true that there is no conclusive evidence for this, but this is a common notion on minds the 
majority of the Sudanese peoples. If it is correct; this will lead to considerable doubt that most of the 
public contracts were executed by corruption and favouritism. 
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Price liberalization should normally precede privatization; 
especially in countries which formerly controlled the prices before 
implementation in privatization such as Central Europe, Eastern Europe, 
and other countries which formerly adopted the socialist or Marxist-
Leninist ideology in their economies. Without freedom to set prices, few 
investors would be interested in acquiring SOEs. 
Prices were liberalized in Sudan in 1991; this, indeed, gave Sudan 
important advantages over many countries. Despite the fact that 
economies of these countries are more advanced than the Sudanese, many 
political concerns have delayed the liberalization of prices in these 
countries. As a result, their privatization programs were suspended until 
the liberalization of prices. Egypt is a good example: although the 
preparations for the privatization began in 1992; liberalization of prices 
did not occur until 1994.227 The justification of such delaying is that 
socialism has been deeply rooted in Egypt since 1952 and the sudden 
removal of socialist principles (the subsidy) would result in social 
opposition.  
Liberalization of prices in Sudan has a good impact in the 
performance of the privatized sectors, especially in telecommunications. 
Nowadays, telecommunications companies are strongly competing by 
reducing fees to attract more customers.     
 
(iii) Monopolies and Antitrust Provisions: 
It is better to start this part by Yarrow’s statement about the 
necessity and means of prevention of monopolies and antitrust provisions. 
Privatization is initially designed and directed to resist monopolies which 
harm the competition and, consequently, the right of a citizen to have a 
                                                 
227 - Ahmed Maher, Manager’s Guide to Privatization p.49, 2ed ed. 2003, University Home 
Publications, Cairo. 
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reasonable price through fair competition. It is unreasonable to use 
privatization itself as a device to create a new monopoly, and to turn 
down the role of privatization as an instrument for demonopolization on 
the way of the creation of competition. 
 Professor Yarrow assured: 
“To deter attempts to restrict competition it may be necessary to enact laws 
applicable to public and private enterprises that would prohibit the establishment of 
cartels, trusts, monopolies and other restrictive businesses practices. The introduction 
of such legislation might block certain privatization transactions that would have 
otherwise proceeded. For example, the acquisition of an SOE or other state asset by 
one of its competitors could result in excessive concentration. The privatization 
process should not normally lead to the simple conversion of public monopolies into 
private ones or to the formation of monopolistic situations where one or a few 
companies control the relevant market.”228 
Professor Yarrow’s statement clearly shows that we are in real 
need for laws to prohibit the establishment of cartels and monopolies 
through the privatization itself. 
 In Sudan there were many mistakes in the terms of privatization 
contracts and agreements that constituted obvious monopolies. One of 
these mistakes is in the privatization agreement of the former 
telecommunications corporation in Sudan.229 The Sudanese government 
granted the new owner (Sudatel) irrational merit. The non-competitive 
and the new monopolistic situations were not implicitly included in the 
agreement; they were explicitly declared. In the agreement between the 
Sudanese government and the Sudanese Company for 
Telecommunications On 19/4/1993, and under the signature of the 
Minster of Transportation and Telecommunications; the Sudanese 
                                                 
228- George Yarrow, Supra 1. p. 358. 
229- This doesn’t means such privatization operation was not a successful one. It is, indeed, successful 
in general, but granting such monopoly is against the philosophy of the privatization.   
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government granted a 15-year monopoly for the new owners (see Chapter 
3) . This monopolistic provision in the agreement resulted in: 
a- Total absence of competition in the telecommunications 
field from the beginnings of the ninetieth of the past 
century until the mid of the first decade of the current 
century. 
b- Fees of telephone lines and calls were very high if 
compared with the nowadays prices. 
c- The former fees of the telephone lines and calls under the 
monopoly led consumers to abandon Sudatel services and 
use mobile telephones. 
 
The above criticisms of granting monopolistic position to this 
company may be argued by that the telecommunications service is a 
strategic investment, and requires intensive capital to execute the 
infrastructure works. Accordingly, the new investors should be granted a 
monopoly to return their capital in a reasonable period of time. We don 
not accept the argument that telecommunications is not the only strategic 
service or industry in Sudan; there are many strategic services and 
industrial investments in the country. If the government grant monopoly 
for every strategic service investment; this will create wide monopolistic 
climate, abuse on fees and tariffs, and bad impression on the foreign 
investors that the investment in Sudan is not widely opened for all 
investors. On the other hand, the Investment Encouragement Acts 1991 
and 1999 (as amended in 2002) contains voluminous numbers of 
exemptions and other merits to strategic projects. Among these 
exemptions and merits the strategic projects can be exempted from all 
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types of taxations for a period reaching 20 years.230 Exemption of 
customs tariff for raw materials, machineries, and different types of cars, 
is also granted. Also, every new project with a feasibility study can be 
granted a land by encouraging price regardless of the size of such 
investment. All these merits are quite sufficient for any type of 
investment; therefore, any speaking about monopolistic treatment in a 
privatization contract seems to be a sort of abuse depending on the bad 
situation of the economy of the country. 
The above criticisms can also be supported by that Sudan at the 
time of privatization of telecommunications was not in a good economic 
position, and the government was compelled to accept the conditions of 
the new owners.  To some extent, this argument seems to be acceptable, 
but, recently and after oil discoveries and production, any feature of 
monopolistic treatment should be considered as mere corruption or 
favouritism. 
Professor Yarrow’s statement (explained above) is directly warning 
that; privatization should not be used as a device or instrument to create a 
monopoly by transferring SOE to private ownership. The legal monopoly 
is protected by the law or provision in governmental agreement such as 
the privatization agreement of the Sudanese telecommunications in 1993. 
 In addition to the legal monopoly there is another type of 
monopolies, that is the natural monopoly. The natural monopoly is not 
protected by law or governmental agreement or contract; its monopolistic 
nature appears from that there is no sufficient number of persons, 
corporations, or other entities capable of exercising a certain activity. 
Despite the fact that there is no law for the protection of the natural 
monopoly, Professor Yarrow stated that:  
  
                                                 
230 - S. 10 (a), (b) and (d) of Investment Encouragement Act 1999 as amended in 2002. 
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“In the presence of natural monopolies, regulation will often be indispensable 
to prevent the monopoly company from extracting rents by restricting supply for its 
services and selling them at high prices or otherwise abusing its exclusive market 
position. In many countries public monopolies have not been subject to regultion, 
precisely they were thought (often wrongly) to serve the public interest rather than the 
profit motive. Privatizing these monopolies is calling for the establishment of a 
regularity framework for these activities that can not be exposed to competition.”231 
Natural monopolies are concentrated in the least-developing 
countries for clear reason; the citizens of these countries mostly have no 
financial capacity for exercising intensive capital activities like 
generation of electricity, gas services, mining and other types of 
activities. In the advanced countries, most of the intensive capital 
activities are exercised by a big number of private sector investors. 
Therefore, the natural monopolies are rare in these countries.  
For the sake of competition as an important component of the 
privatization operations, the activities of the governmental natural 
monopolies should be regulated so as to: 
1- Prevent the monopolizing company or investor from 
abusing their position in the market by imposing a high 
level of prices on the consumers. 
2- To prepare them for future privatization (if they are 
public ones). The regulation of the public natural 
monopolies is, for example, by restricting their liberty in 
determining the prices of goods or services, and training 
them to face the competition in  the event of new investor 
involved in the same monopolized activity. 
In Sudan, for example, electricity generation, theoretically, became 
a natural monopoly232; that by the new Act of Electricity 2001 s.3 (a) and 
                                                 
231 - George Yarrow, supra 1 p. 386. 
232 - Electricity generation was a legal monopoly until the issuance of Electricity Act 2002. 
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(b): any company, partnership, or individual investor has the right to 
generate the electricity, or establish generation stations in accordance 
with the conditions and specifications provided for in the Electricity Act 
2001. But, as we have previously mentioned; exercising such activities 
needs intensive capital investment, therefore it may remain as a natural 
monopoly.  
The Electricity Act 2001 requires that a person who aims to invest 
in electricity generation should fulfil the following requirements:233  
a- Technical efficiency and experience in the field of 
electricity generation. 
b- Financial capacity. 
c- Compliance with the public policy of electricity in Sudan. 
d- Registration of a branch in Sudan, if the applicant is a 
foreign company. 
e- National companies shall be registered under the 
provisions of the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925. 
f- Partnerships and individuals shall register a business 
name. 
 
The only legal monopolistic feature we have noted in the 
Electricity Act 2001 is that the distribution of the generated electricity 
should be through the national electricity grid (S.4). This grid is owned by 
the National Electricity Corporation.  
S.4 of the Electricity Act 2001 creates a strange situation. While 
the Act succeeded to break-up the former legal monopoly of the National 
Electricity Corporation in the generation activity, the same Act kept the 
legal monopoly of the transmission and distribution of power on the hand 
of the National Corporation. This strange position can be justified by that 
                                                 
233 - S.7 of Electricity Act 2002.  
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since there is a grid for distribution of electricity, the new investors are 
not in need of building new ones, because it will result in high tariff. 
Theoretically, this justification seems to be acceptable, but if a new 
investor offers to build his distribution net and, at the same time, comply 
with the fixed level of tariff, s.4 will become a barrier in the face of good 
privatization offer. We do not call for the amendment or repeal of S.4 as 
we call for setting flexible provisions in the Act. For example, S.4 shall 
be followed by a provision indicating that if a potential investor offers to 
build a distribution net for his generation station, this shall be available 
provided that in such a case he will not be permitted to abuse the 
consumers. 
Finally, it should be noted that internationally the enforcement of 
anti-monopoly legislation is often entrusted to a specialized competition 
commission or office, such as the German Federal Cartel Office or the 
UK’s Office of Fair Trading and Mergers and Monopolies Commission. 
 In Sudan such enforcement is the mission of the courts which, 
normally, do not include experienced judges in this field. Therefore, it is 
better to constitute efficient commissions to enforce the competition rules 
or to train Sudanese judges in such a field through scholarships or higher 
studies like LL.M or Ph.Ds in the international commissions, or other 
institutions. 
     
(iv) Deregulation: 
Many countries are burdened by a multitude number of rules that 
govern the exercise of all economic activities. If these countries wish to 
attract investors to participate in their privatization programs, they should 
streamline these regulations and procedures for obtaining licences and 
other official permits required to conduct business. For example, a rule 
that required the use of products of domestic origin might prohibit an 
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investor from using his traditional suppliers (including companies 
controlled by the investor). The investor might therefore lose interest in 
participating in the privatization program. This was the case in the dispute 
between the   Sudanese government and the Gulf International 
Corporation in 1974. The Sudanese government decided that the Gulf 
International Corporation is obliged to use the Sudanese cotton in all 
weaving and spinning operations in the Sudanese Weaving Factory (joint 
venture). In return, the Sudanese government shall grant a big number of 
preferential treatments for the factory such as total taxation exemption for 
a long period of time,  exemption and reduction of customs tariff  on all 
imported raw materials other than cotton, and grand land area 
(400.000sq.m) in Khartoum-North Industrial Area. After a period of time, 
the Gulf International, found that the majority of the quantities of cotton 
production in Sudan are short-staple while most of the factory’s products 
in spinning and weaving require long-staple cotton. Gulf International 
requested the Sudanese government to permit the factory to import long-
staple, man-made and silk yarns so as to modernize its production to 
compete internationally. The Sudanese government refused to accept on 
the ground that it is against its public policy of imports. In addition, the 
Sudanese government claimed that the Central Bank has no sufficient 
hard currency to cover such letters of credit. Thereafter, the Gulf 
international offered to import its needs using the Nil Value method 
whereby Gulf International would be obliged to pay the hard currency 
from its own resources to cover the documents. Again, the Sudanese 
government refused to consent. A few years later, Gulf International 
stopped the production operations.234 The result was that the service of 
hundreds, if not thousands, of the work-force was terminated.   
   
                                                 
234 -  Source: old files in the stores of Ministry of Industry. 
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(v) Foreign Trade; Legislations and Practice: 
 In their negotiations with the government, investors will often try 
to have foreign trade legislation (like customs) either applied or amended 
to their advantage, a thing that may conflict with the objectives of an 
efficient and competitive economy. As an example, many investors have 
sought after special protection against competing imports (see Chapter 4; 
meeting with Mr. Mutasim Makkawi; Deputy Head of COMESA Unit, Ministry of 
Foreign Trade – Sudan). If an investor is granted exemption from the normal 
provisions of a country’s foreign trade legislations, this should be done 
transparently. An investor who produces the same commodity locally will 
obviously be willing to offer a cheaper price, a thing which will save hard 
currency and promote the local production. 
In practice, most of countries which were involved entire 
privatization programs didn not grant any exemptions of any kind against 
investors who involved in their privatization operations. But some 
countries like Guinea, Togo, have granted very generous protection in 
certain privatization operations, for example, in the form of high import 
tariff on competing products.235However, under the current directions of 
the new international economy system, exemption from foreign trade 
legislation as a discriminative treatment for the benefit of one investor 
over the others became a matter from the past. Many international 
conventions, treaties, and regional agreements prohibit or, at least, restrict 
these exemptions. 
 Some provisions in the Investment Encouragement Act 1999 as 
amended in 2002 indirectly created some features of non-competitive 
treatment between investors. All the new projects, industrial, agricultural, 
and service are entitled to partial or total exemption from taxations or 
                                                 
235 - Gerald Bisong Tanyi, Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa p.93, 1st ed. 2004, Praeger 
Publishers. U.S.A. 
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customs tariffs; a thing which will attract them to lower their prices 
depending on these exemptions. The old projects will face a big problem 
that their exemptions were expired. Therefore, they will no longer be able 
to compete with the new projects. Accordingly, decision makers are 
required to create some rational balance between old and new investors. It 
is quite clear that the preferential treatment for the new project is 
provided in the investment laws of many countries, and there is no way to 
speak about the elimination of such preferentiality treatment. We believe 
that economic and legal experts in this country are capable to make such 
balance.   
 Giving experts an opportunity to propose solutions, although they 
are not government officials, will enhance efforts of the government to 
create a real climate for competition.236The government should not isolate 
non-governmental opinions because of their opposition or their 
contradictory ideologies. 
 
(vi) Irrational Decisions: 
 The preceding parts of this chapter discussed factors which foster 
the competition and privatization such as non-discrimination against 
private sector, liberalization of prices, deregulation, and prohibition of the 
misuse of foreign trade legislations. Also, we discussed some barriers in 
the way of competition. Issues which will be discussed in this part are 
unique practices; we have not found any similar practice in all 
privatization references.  In the era in which Sudan is anticipating entire 
economic growth and self- satisfaction, many irrational governmental 
decisions have been taken. It is well known that all over the world the 
first step to launch a privatization program is to create a free trade 
                                                 
236 - All the personnel in the Ministry of Investment – Khartoum said: we do not have any solution for 
this problem. Moreover, many of them said: we are not decision makers; we are just executers for the 
public investment policy and its relative legislations. 
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climate, not to put barriers in the way of the liberty of the economy. All 
countries of the world tend to demonopolize the former monopolies, 
deregulate non-competitive regulations, and present incentives for the 
sake of equitable competition. But in Sudan the matter differs: many 
irrational governmental decisions against competition and trade liberty 
have been taken. The sorrowful thing is that these decisions are stated in 
the provisions of some privatization contracts.   
 
(a) Noncompetitively Privatization Contracts:   
Attracting the private sector to play a considerable role in the 
economic life of a country is indeed one of the most important 
components in the privatization processes. Methods of attraction are 
many; examples are: granting exemptions of taxations and customs tariff, 
lands, transfer of capital and profits into and out Sudan, and the merits 
which are provided in the Investment Encouragement Act 1999 as 
amended in 2002. As we have previously mentioned, exaggeration in 
granting encouraging facilities in the privatization contracts may 
sometimes lead to the creation of uncompetitive or discriminative 
treatment between the similar privatized SOEs. In other words, the new 
investors in the similar privatized SOEs should be granted similar 
encouraging facilities or privileges in the privatization contracts. 
Granting excessive facilities for certain privatized SOE over the similar 
ones will lead to accusations of corruption, favouritism, and political 
interests, a thing which will lead to public opposition against the whole 
privatization program. 
 The government under the pressure of the deficit of the public 
budget and the disappointing performance of the SOE may accept all the 
conditions of the buyer regardless of the harmful effects of such 
acceptance on the similar privatized enterprises.   
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 The privatization contract of Atbara Cement Factory (mentioned in 
Chapter 3 and its Appendix ) included many terms which constitute 
some sort of discriminative treatment. Therefore, the Secretary General 
of Taxation Chamber on 15/10/2002 sent a letter to the Minister of 
Finance and National Economy. The letter criticized the exaggerated 
exemptions and discriminative treatment between Atbara Cement and the 
other Sudanese cement factories. Following are some of the contents of 
the letter: 
1- Terms 5/11 to 5/14 of the contract are not constitutional and against the 
international agreements. They prejudice the rights of the state and the other 
similar factories like Rabak Cement Factory. Moreover, they are 
monopolistic and against the liberalization of economy policy. 
2- SS. 13, 20, 22, 37 are against the Additive Value Tax Act 1999; they exempt 
the imported commodities from the additive value tax and permit the sale 
without issuing sale invoices. 
3- The exemption from the additive value tax should only be exercised by a 
legislative order by the Minister of Finance and National Economy after the 
recommendation of the General Secretary of Taxation Chamber.237 
From the above, it is clear that any discriminative treatment in 
privatization contracts may result in problems between the different 
investors of the privatized SOEs and the different governmental bodies of 
one country.   
(b)Non-competitive Climate of Investment:       
Sudan is one of the major exporters of livestock and frozen meats. 
Sudanese cattle, cows, and camels are of excellent quality. They have 
great demand in the Arab countries; especially in the Gulf States (Saudi 
Arabia is the biggest importer among them). The only reason that reduces 
the number of exported livestock is the weakness of medical care in 
                                                 
237 - Source: Internal file in TCDPE. 
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Sudan. Therefore, the only logical solution is to promote the medical care 
of Sudanese livestock so as to maximize the exports. 
 Suddenly, without any prior preparations,238the Sudanese 
government on 29/9/2002 signed an agreement with the Arabian 
Livestock & Meat Company (owned by Prince: Alwaleed Bin-Talal) 
whereby the Sudanese government granted the Saudi company an 
exclusive agency for the Sudanese livestock exports in all Arab Gulf area. 
According to this agreement, the Sudanese government commissioned the 
Advanced Commercial & Chemical Works Co. Ltd., to execute this 
agreement on its behalf. The Sudanese livestock exporters would no 
longer be free to transact directly with the importers of Saudi Arabia and 
the Arab Gulf area. They should deliver their livestock imports to the 
Commercial & Chemical Works Co. which is responsible to deliver them 
to the Saudi exclusive agent.   
 Following are the main terms of the Agreement (translated by the 
researcher). (Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade):         
“This is an agreement signed on September 29th 2007, between: 
The Arabian Livestock and Meat Company, a Saudi company with limited 
liability, its head office address is Alhadab Building, King Abd-Elaziz St. Elrabia 
Area, Riyadh- Saudi Arabia P.O Box 60632-11555, represented in this agreement by 
his Royal-Highness Alwaleed Bin-Talal, Head of the board of directors., thereinafter 
referred to as the (First Party). 
The Sudanese Party: 
 Advanced Commercial & Chemical Co. Ltd., its head office in Elamarat-
Khartoum, St. No. 19, Khartoum-Sudan, P.O Box 44690 Khartoum-Sudan, 
represented by Mr. Isam Omar Shami, Head of the board of directors; thereinafter 
referred to as the (Second Party). 
Introduction: 
                                                 
238 - There was no body knew any thing about this agreement, neither the Livestock Importers Union 
nor Livestock exporter. The Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal came to Khartoum in 29/9/2002 and signed the 
agreement with the Sudanese company in the presence of the President of the Sudan and the Minister 
of Foreign Trade. Few hours after, Prince Alwaleed left Sudan.  
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Whereas the First Party aims to import varieties of Sudanese livestock to 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Area , and has the required financial, administrative and 
marketing capacities for the purposes of this agreement, the two parties have agreed 
that the First Party shall be the exclusive agent for the Second Party in  Saudi Arabia 
and the other states of the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council. Since that the Second 
Party has good relations, merits and facilities from the Sudanese government 
enabling him to fulfil the requirements of this agreement in supplying the First Party 
by good qualities and of the Sudanese livestock, the two Parties agreed to the 
following: 
Quantities: 
 Not less than 1.500.000 heads of livestock per year. 
Third: First Party Obligations: 
First party obligations are: 
1- Establishment of efficient administrations to import and market the livestock 
exported by the Second Party. 
2- Making the required advertisement in the media of the exclusive agency area. 
3- Fulfilment of all procedures required for the safety of exported livestock. 
4- Creation of new markets. 
5- Cooperation with the Sudanese Government in providing suitable solutions for 
transport and growth of Sudanese livestock number. 
Fourth: Second Party Obligations: 
The Second Party is obliged to:  
1-   Supply the First Party with the qualities and quantities mentioned in this 
agreement. The quantities shall be supplied partially as in the purchase orders 
issued by the First Party. 
2- Present all the certificates required in Sudan or in the exclusive agency area 
3- Comply with the specifications and measurements of Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council. 
4- Issue weight certificates in the presence of the First Party’s representative and 
guarantee the safety of the exported livestock up to the port of exportation. 
5- Deliver the required quantities in a period not exceeding three weeks from the 
issuance of purchasing order from the First Party, and present any document 
required by customs authorities. 
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6- The Second Party shall be obliged not to sell to any other party in the 
exclusive agency area. In the event of Second Party’s selling to any other 
party, he will be responsible to pay a reasonable compensation to the First 
Party. 
7- In the event of any production rejected for non-compliance with the conditions 
of this agreement, the Second Party will be obliged to burden all the rejection 
costs. 
Seventh: Duration: 
This agreement shall be valid for five years beginning six months after signing 
this agreement. The period of validity of this agreement shall be renewable for further 
five years unless any party of this agreement informs the other by his will to terminate 
the agreement. 
 
Eighth: Price: 
 The price shall be $1330 for ton. 
Ninth: Method of Payment: 
Payment shall be through letters of credit or bank guarantee acceptable by the 
other party. 
 
Few days later, another agreement was signed between the same 
parties. By this agreement, all Sudanese livestock exports to Egypt were 
granted exclusively to the same Saudi company.   
The Sudanese livestock exporters protested against the two 
agencies and requested the Minister of Finance and National Economy to 
terminate the two agencies. They claimed that:   
* The Sudanese exporters are not in need for the exclusive agency; they 
have their own customers in Saudi Arabia, Arab Gulf Area, and Egypt.  
* The Sudanese exporters were burdened by contractual obligations to 
their customers before singing the two exclusive agencies. 
* The Sudanese exporters can provide prices higher than those stated in 
the two exclusive agencies.  
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* The two agencies created a monopolistic position in the foreign trade, a 
thing which is not advisable under the policy of economic liberalization. 
 On the other hand, part of the Sudanese exporters supported the 
exclusive agencies on the grounds that: 
 * They provide a very strong agent in Saudi Arabia, Gulf States 
and Egypt (Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal).  
* In the absence of a strong agent, Saudi importers usually impose 
their prices on the Sudanese exporters, a thing which resulted in a deep 
reduction of Sudanese livestock prices in Saudi Arabia (the major 
importer of Sudanese livestock).  
 However, the exclusive agency was applied, and the exclusive 
agent specified a limited number of live stocks for exportation. As a 
result, a dispute arose between Sudanese exporters over the portion of 
every exporter. Thereafter, the Minister of Foreign Trade appointed the 
Committee of Exporters of the Exclusive Agency to determine the portion 
of each exporter. The committee determined the portion of each 
registered exporter of livestock. Determination of exporter’s portions 
raised a new problem that the new exporters 239(who were registered after 
the determination of the portions) requested the Minster of Foreign trade 
to determine their portions. The committee, again, repeated the portioning 
of exported livestock. 
The opposition against the exclusive agency had quickly increased 
and the exclusive agency became subject to the criticisms of the public 
opinion and media. The justifications and defences of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade failed to absorb the public opposition. Therefore, the 
Minister of Foreign Trade intervened to mitigate the public opposition. 
On 1/10/2002, the Minister of Foreign trade issued the Ministerial 
                                                 
239 - Eldamazeen co. for Live Stock Exportation, Elsawakni co. for Livestock Production, Albutana co. 
for Livestock Production, and Western Sudan for Living Stock co. 
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Decision No. 39 to organize exportation operations. The ministerial 
decision stated that: 
“2- All livestock exportation procedures shall be in accordance with the 
conditions and regulations issued by the Export Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
3- All letters of credits which were formerly opened by the exporters before 
signing the exclusive agency on 29/9/2002 shall be remedied by the 
Ministry of Foreign Trade.  
4- Advanced Commercial & Chemical Works Co. Ltd. shall no longer be 
entitled to export unless by the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. 
 These procedures had not succeeded to absorb the public 
opposition. Therefore, a ministerial committee was appointed to revise 
and propose about the exclusive agency. The ministerial committee 
included the Minister of Finance, Minister of Justice, Minister of Foreign 
Trade, Minister of Industry, Minister of Animal Resources, and the 
Governor of the Central Bank. The ministerial committee decided that the 
intermediate company (The Advanced Commercial & Chemical Works 
Ltd.) should be dismissed and the Saudi company should directly deal 
with Sudanese exporters.240 
 On 9/7/2003, basic provisions in the exclusive agency were 
repealed, and the new ones provided that the frozen-meats of camels and 
live camels be dismissed from the exclusive agency (Egypt is the major 
importer).  
As new a step for mitigation of public opposition, the Minister 
delivered a letter to the exclusive agent t on 19/4/2004, whereby: 
“exportation of all kinds of frozen meats out of the exclusive agency is permitted». 
The exclusive agent protested and delivered a letter to the Minister.241The 
letter expressed that the permission for exportation of frozen meats out 
                                                 
240- Meeting of the Ministerial Committee for Revision of Exclusive Agency of Sudanese Livestock 
exportation 14/11/2002. 
241 - Arabian Livestock & Meat Company, letter No. S. 127- 2004. 
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the exclusive agency constitutes an open breach of the provisions of the 
exclusive agency. In the same letter the exclusive agent invited for a 
meeting with the Minister to solve the problem. 
  The termination of the agreement of the exclusive agency came 
by the letter No. FT/MO/ 207, on 20/9/2004. The letter was sent by the 
Minister of Foreign Trade to the Advocate General so as to inform the 
Saudi party of the termination. (Source of all information about the exclusive 
agency is the Ministry of Foreign Trade).  
 
Despite the fact that the terminated exclusive agency did not 
directly affect one of the privatization operations in Sudan; followings 
should be noted: 
1- The terminated agency was granted to a foreigner 
party, the Saudi prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal. With 
regard to that many of Sudanese SOEs have been sold 
to investors from Arab countries, especially the Arab 
Gulf states; 242the way in which the exclusive agency 
was granted and terminated reflects the haphazard and 
floundering governmental decisions in Sudan.   
2- The terminated agency clearly showed that the 
different types of the non-competitive agreements and 
exclusive rights will no longer remain. The opposition 
against the exclusive agency began from the first day 
of the agreement and remained until the date of the 
termination (two years). 
3- In the era of the privatization and liberal market, 
politicians must be aware that any political 
                                                 
242 - Like Atbara Cement Factory, Elnilien Bank and Bank of Khartoum. 
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favouritism,243 whatever its justification, will 
inevitably lead to instability in the market and the 
investors (especially the foreign ones) will prefer to 
invest outside the country. 
A non-competitive economic climate may also be created after the 
privatization operation. In some cases after selling certain SOE to foreign 
or local investors, the government disregarded the interests of the new 
investor and took some non-competitive decisions for the sake of other 
investors in the same field of the privatized SOEs. Such practice indicates 
that the only objective of privatization in the country is to dispose off the 
SOE to avoid its disappointing performance regardless of the other 
objectives of the privatization program. For example, one of the 
government obligations in the privatization contract of Atbara Cement 
Factory is that the government shall be obliged to impose the same 
taxations and production fees on imported cement. In 2005, under a crisis 
of cement in the local market, the Council of Ministers, according to S. 
5(3) of the Customs Act 1996, issued a decision to reduce the customs 
tariff on imported cement from %45 to %35. Accordingly, the Council of 
Ministers had to reduce the production tariff of the local factories such as 
Atbara and Rabak factories, but this did not happen. As a result, the local 
factories suffered huge losses. Therefore, Mr. Omer Abd-Alati, advocate 
of Atbara Cement Factory, presented a grievance to the Advocate General 
on 10/1/2005. The grievance included that the government has not 
complied with the terms of the privatization contract of Atbara Cement 
Factory that the terms of the contract obligate the government to grant 
equal reductions for the Factory. On 12/2/2005 the Advocate General sent 
a letter requiring TCDPE to respond to the suit. The response of TCDPE 
                                                 
243 - Many of the supporters to the Exclusive Agency justify their support by that; granting the 
exclusive agency to a character like the Prince Alwaleed Bin-Talal provides strong international 
political support for Sudan in the recent circumstance.  
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was that the reduction of customs and taxations is not its responsibility; it 
should be requested from the Council of Ministers. The response of the 
Council of Ministers was delayed for many months, a thing which 
resulted in big losses for the factory.244    
Conclusion: 
            Factors of success of privatization program include, among others, 
elimination of all forms of discrimination against the private sector and 
protection of competition. In a country like Sudan, some reforms are 
needed in almost all categories of laws and agreements that may stand as 
barriers in the way of privatization.  
          Since that the public sectors products are mainly subsidized by the 
public treasury of the state; liberalization of prices represents one of the 
main features of non-discrimination between the private and public 
sector. 
            In Sudan, despite the big sufferance caused by liberalization of 
prices in the early ninetieth of the past century, such liberalization 
resulted in a solid ground for the privatization program. Countries which 
had not earlier liberalized prices found big difficulties to accommodate 
the current international wave of privatization. 
    Foreign investment legislations in a country may widen the scope 
of foreign investors’ participation in the privatization program of such a 
country. In other words, non-discriminative legislations and treatment 
between foreigners and nationals will speed up the privatization program.    
Fortunately, in Sudan there is no discrimination between the local 
and outside investors.245 Moreover, in some cases local investors grieve 
that the foreigners often enjoy preferred treatment over the nationals. 
                                                 
244 - Source: Internal Files of TCDPE. 
245 - See the Investment Encouragement Acts in Sudan (1992 and 1999 as amended in 2002). 
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 Monopolies, whether legal or natural are barriers in the way of 
privatization; they have to be eliminated. The legal and economic 
advisers of the government should work out the unnecessary monopolies 
and propose the ideal methods to break them up. In addition, non-
competitive contracts, bilateral agreements, and governmental decisions, 
should be restricted. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Privatization and Public-Sector Management 
 
 Sale and other arrangements of public enterprises affect a wide 
range of existing laws and regulations in a country. One of these is the 
constitutional laws which they have been discussed in Chapter 4.   
In many countries, especially those of French influence in their 
legislations, privatization has not been exercised by a special 
governmental body (committee or agency). Therefore, legislations of 
public-sector management are important in executing privatization 
programs in these countries that these legislations usually determine 
methods of transferring SOEs or their assets. Theoretically, these 
legislations are presumed to be satisfactory in executing successful 
privatization programs. But in many events, legislature has to intervene 
again to reorganize some norms. For example, in many countries SOE or 
some of its assets may be owned by other public entity. In this event, the 
legislature should intervene to identify the legal owner, and to identify the 
rules that govern the exercising of ownership rights. 
 In Sudan, although there is a separate legislation for privatization, 
a thing which theoretically implies that TCDPE is smoothly exercising its 
missions; the need for identifying the legal owner stands as a barrier in 
the way of TCDPE.  Also, the privatization program was launched in a 
period wherein the governance is central; therefore, after the application 
of the federal governance, TCDPE (federal committee) have faced many 
problems in transferring ownership and concessions to new investors. 
 Privatization law is not the only measure for the success of a 
privatization program in a country. A bundle of laws may participate in 
the achievement of successful privatization program. For example, 
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legislations which determine the powers between the different 
governmental bodies appear as an important factor in achieving 
successful privatization program. In other words, the clash of  powers 
between the different governmental departments widely affects the 
smooth privatization program. 
In this chapter, determination of the legal owner of a public 
enterprise to be privatized will be discussed first, followed by an analysis 
of the rules that govern the exercise of ownerships rights over these 
enterprises, assets and the concessions rights.   
 
(i) Identifying the Legal Owners: 
 Privatization involves the transfer of ownership from one entity to 
another, requiring undisputed and clear property titles and other 
documentation necessary to establish ownership. The ownership of any 
asset to be sold will have to be cleared prior to sale. In many countries the 
need to define and clear-up property titles result in lengthy delays. For 
example, on the former socialist and Marxist-Liniest countries, owners 
often challenge the privatization decision by contesting the government’s 
right to sell enterprises that have been nationalized in the past (see 
nationalizations in the introductory chapter). 
 In many countries, SOE or some of its assets may be owned by 
another public entity.  In Bulgaria, Poland246, Guinea (up to 1985)247 and 
other countries whose legal systems are or used to be modelled to the 
Soviet system, the SOEs do not (or did not) own their real estates (lands 
and buildings) or sometimes their movable assets (tools, vehicles, and 
furniture). The state financed the procurements of these assets, and in 
                                                 
246- Barbara Lee and John Nellis, Enterprise Reform and Privatization in Socialist Economies p. 26. 2nd 
ed.1991, World Bank Publications, Washington DC.   
247 - Gerald Bisong Tanyi, Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa p. 138, 1st ed 2004, Praeger 
Publishers USA.     
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return the SOE paid an annual sum representing depreciation. These 
assets continued to belong to the state and could not be sold by the SOE 
without prior authorization. This system has important implications 
particularly for the allocation of the privatization proceeds.248 
 In many socialist (or former socialist) countries, including 
Hungary, Vietnam, and the former Yugoslavia, profound confusion 
existed between state property and property of a particular enterprise. In 
addition, uncertainty prevailed as to which public authority was the true 
owner, a situation which was also found in Russia and Germany.249 These 
difficulties were often complicated because of the past nationalizations 
that many of these enterprises were nationalized without determining the 
successor body (ministry, enterprise, or authority). Prior clarification of 
ownership rights is obviously important for a smooth implementation of 
the privatization process. Examples for the necessity of clarification of 
ownership rights have happened in former Yugoslavia. In former 
Yugoslavia, clarifying ownership rights is a particularly complicated 
problem in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia because of the 
uncertain nature of the ownership of public enterprises after the 
fragmentation of the state. Article 1 of the privatization law of the 
republic of Slovenia (November 11, 1992) is informative in this point; the 
law specifies that the privatization operations will only be applied on 
SOEs which their right of ownership is clear and undisputed.250   
 In Sudan, the chronic problem facing smooth privatization 
processes is the uncertainty of ownership of lands of the privatized 
enterprises. The bad thing is that uncertainty of ownership usually 
happens because of  the clash between the authorities of the governmental 
                                                 
248- Pierre Guislain, The Privatization Challenge; a Strategic, Legal, and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience p. 90, 4th ed. 2001, World Bank Publications, Washington DC. 
249- Id, p. 91.  
250 - Id p.93. 
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bodies, the regional governments, and TCDPE which is a federal agency. 
Moreover, the worse thing is that the disputes and contradictions of tasks 
and authorities usually happen after concluding the privatization 
contracts. 
 The internal files of TCDPE contain voluminous number of 
grievances presented by the purchasers to TCDPE to comply with its 
obligations in the privatization contracts. In only one privatization 
operation; that is Atbara Cement Factory, the file contains about 24 
grievances presented by the purchaser requesting TCDPE to enable him 
to possess the factory’s lands which are listed in the schedules of the 
assets in the sale contract. The response of TCDPE was very weak; a big 
number of notes was sent from the legal adviser of TCDPE to different 
ministers, states governments, and governmental units to solve the 
purchaser’s problems. For example, one of the sold assets in the schedule 
of the contract is the land No. 18/3 Block 10 - Atbara City - River Nile 
State, registered under the name: Atbara Factory Employees Club. The 
state government refused to register the land under the name of the 
purchaser on the ground that the land was granted for one year as a 
primary lease-period and the period ended on 1/1/1985. Therefore, the 
legal adviser of TCDPE wrote a note to the president of TCDPE so as to 
make a note to the Minister of Finance, President of HCDPE, to order the 
Nile River State Governor to renew the lease-period.251 
In another example in the same file, the new investor of a 
privatized factory has wasted a lot of time, efforts and money to compel 
the government to execute its obligations in the contract. Sufferance of 
the investor appears from the following details:252 
                                                 
251 - Source: Internal files of TCDPE. 
252 - Id. 
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 1- The land No. 2/15 Block 4 (West) - Industry Area – Khartoum 
North is registered under the name of Atbara Cement Factory. Before the 
privatization process of the Factory, an agreement was signed between 
Khartoum State and the Board of Directors of Atbara Cement Factory 
Company whereby such land be transferred to Khartoum State on 
12/9/93; the price was SD.20.000.000. In addition, Khartoum State was 
obliged to grant another investment land to the factory company. 
2- Khartoum State paid the SD.20 000.000 but did not comply with 
the other part of the agreement (granting another investment land). 
Thereafter, Khartoum State built many buildings in the land and sold the 
same land to Pepsi-Cola Company. 
3- A dispute between the two companies (Atbara Factory’s new 
owners and Pepsi-Cola) had been launched about the property of the land. 
The Minister of Justice decided that the ownership of the land should be 
for Atbara Cement Factory according to the registration certificate of the 
Registrar of Land. 
4- The State of Khartoum refused to comply with the decision of 
the Minister of Justice. 
5- On 29/12/2003, TCDPE invited the Minister of Justice and 
Khartoum State Governor to meet and solve the dispute. The meeting 
failed to solve the dispute.  
6- The Federal Minister of Finance and National Economy, the 
president of the HCDPE, issued a ministerial decision on 27/8/2004 
ordering Khartoum State Governor to enable Atbara Cement Factory to 
possess and exercise all the ownership rights in the disputed land.   
The third bad example from the internal files of TCDPE about 
Atbara Cement Factory privatization is that the new investor opted to 
possess the whole quarries area of the lime stone of the factory on the 
ground that the nearer future plans of productions cover this area. The 
 176
area of the quarries is 11.904 Fadden granted to the factory in 1946 for 80 
years. Until the privatization, the actual exploited area was only 600 
Fadden. Despite the consent of the River Nile State authorities to renew 
the concession of the whole area of the quarries of lime stone (11.904 
Fadden) to the new owner; the Geological Research Authority of Sudan 
(GRAS) refused to renew the concession of the rest unexploited quarries 
area (11.304 Fadden) unless it is actually exploited. The advocate of the 
new owner Mr. Omer Abdul-Aati claimed that the Mineral Resources and 
Mining Development Act 2007 (s.4) authorizes the River Nile State 
government to grant and renew quarries of lime stone concessions 
without consent of GRAS. He also said: the central authority for granting 
and renewing quarries of lime stone was ended by the repeal of the 
Quarries and Mines Act 1972 (s.4). GRAS assured that it is the only 
authority, not the River Nile State, which is authorized to grant or renew 
the concessions of quarries of lime stones according to both old law of 
1972 and new law (Mineral Resources and Mining Development Act 
2007). Again, the new investor presented a grievance to the TCDPE (see 
more discussion about this problem in part (ii) of this chapter). 
 However, to solve this problem, after many months, the Minister 
of Finance and National Economy (the president of HCDPE) sent a letter 
to GRAS to renew to the investor.253 
A fourth bad example, in Omm-Altiyour (near Atbara) there are 
many lands formerly granted by the government to the factory as 
extensions. Before the privatization process, some of the local citizens 
trespassed on these lands and built a number of markets and shops. 
Despite that the lease-period had not ended, the local authorities of the 
River Nile State Government refused to take any decision against the 
trespassers. The River Nile State frankly informed the new owner that 
                                                 
253 - Id. 
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any decision to clear-off these lands will result in a struggle between the 
government and the local citizens.254   
In the fifth example, which is the most prejudicial one, the trespass 
to factory’s lands was practised by the State Government itself. Despite 
that the lease-period had not ended; the local government of the River 
Nile State built costly buildings for the Ministry of Engineering Affairs 
on two lands owned by the factory in Alziedab and Altina areas.255 The 
new owner requested the River Nile State to enable him to possess his 
lands. Without justification, the government of River Nile State refused to 
relief the grievance. It is clear that the River Nile State aimed to compel 
the new investor whether to shoulder the costs of the buildings or to leave 
the two lands freely.         
 We can imagine the sufferance of the new investor if we noted the 
following: 
a-  In the dispute between the purchaser and Khartoum State: the 
privatization contract was signed on August 27th 2002, and the 
decision of the Federal Minister of Finance and National Economy 
which solved the dispute was issued in 2004. The solution of the 
dispute was issued after two years from the privatization contract, a 
thing which inevitably resulted in losses for the investor. 
b- In the dispute between the purchaser and the River Nile State, 
theoretically, the foreign investor has no reason to be involved in 
such struggle that the foreign investor initially contracted with a 
federal governmental agency. Such federal governmental agency 
(TCDPE) should exercise its task to possess the new investors the 
ownership of the sold assets as a vendor or seller. To relief the 
purchaser’s grievances; TCDPE exercised the role of compromiser. 
                                                 
254 - Id. 
255 - Id. 
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c-  The new investor entered into a struggle to possess the main 
component of cement manufacturing; the quarries of lime stone. 
While cement manufacturing can start without owning an 
investment land in Khartoum, cement production will never start 
without owning these quarries. It seems to be shameful to speak 
about barriers of this kind.   
d- In the fourth position, if the new investor had sued the local 
citizens, he would have found himself in a struggle with the 
peoples who were presumed to constitute the majority of the future 
work force of the factory. Therefore, the investor presented a 
grievance to TCDPE to relief him. This grievance is still now 
suspended (2008) and there is no solution blinking to relief the new 
owner. 
TCDPE is presumed to solve all the problems which face the new 
investor; TCDPE itself mentioned that it has no sufficient authorities to 
relief the investors: 
 “The delegation order of the Minister of Finance and National Economy (the 
President of the HCDPE) to the legal adviser of the TCDPE is exclusively for 
signing on behalf of HCDPE in the disposition contract; it does not delegate the 
legal adviser of TCDPE to receive certificates of registration for the sale or clear 
of mortgage purposes. For example, at the time of selling Atbara Cement Factory, 
most of the laid-off employees were debited for the company instead of real 
estates mortgages. TCDPE covered these debts from their post service rights. The 
Commissioner of lands refused to accept the legal adviser’s letters to clear theses 
mortgages because that the legal adviser of the TCDPE is not delegated to do 
so.”256 
It is clear that most of problems the new owner of Atbara Cement 
Factory has faced are about the ownership of lands which were formerly 
granted to the former owner, and about renewing the concessions. It is to 
                                                 
256 - TCDPE annual report 2005 p. 74. 
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be noted that these types of problems frequently happen in many other 
privatization operations.  If we apply Atbara Factory’s problems on the 
majority of the other privatization operations, we will find that most of 
these operations have faced similar problems; lands and concessions 
problems: 
(a) Lands Problems: 
 The problems of lands of the privatized SOEs in Sudan can be 
analyzed into three types. First, disputes of lands ownership: because of 
non-fulfilling the procedures of the former allocations (before 
privatization). Second, solving lands problems takes a long time, and may 
result in dissipation of the proceeds of the privatization. Third, some 
barriers were built by the government itself such as the exaggeration of 
fees and taxations. Fourth, annual fees of renewing lease of lands, mostly, 
were not paid by the former owners (the governmental units), a thing 
which may require the new owner to pay cumulative amounts of fees. 
 
- Disputes of lands Ownership: 
In exercising its powers according to S.4 (a) of  the Disposition of 
Public Enterprises Act 1990, certainly in exercising disposition of public 
enterprises by winding up the targeted enterprise; big problems arise that 
the documents of lands of the privatized SOE are not complete 
(certificates of ownership from the Registrar of Lands). Most of the 
privatized SOEs, or those on their way to privatization, do not keep 
registration certificates or any other documents. Many of the real estates 
of the privatized SOEs, or those on their way to privatization, were built 
on lands registered under the name of other SOEs.257   
- Time Consuming and Revenue Wasting:   
                                                 
257 - Id p 72. 
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  Solving lands problems often takes a long time and much money. 
In the event of a seller’s failure to fulfil his obligations to the purchaser; 
this will inevitably delay the payment of the price, a thing which will 
result in delaying the proceeds of privatization. In addition, the new 
investor will never start business or production before the transfer of 
lands of the privatized SOE under his name, a thing which delay the 
achievement of privatization objectives.  
 In the light of that many of lands and assets of many privatized 
SOEs are registered under the names of other SOEs; transferring the 
registered name to the name of the privatized SOE and, thereafter, to the 
new investor constitutes a double-step change in the land’s register, a 
thing which in many privatization operations resulted in paying %50 from 
the full value of the privatized land to lands authorities. 
Following are examples shown from the TCDPE annual report 
(2005): 
 In the first example, many houses owned by the White Nile 
Tannery (before its privatization) were built in a land registered under the 
name of the former Mechanical Transportation Corporation. After the 
privatization of the tannery, these houses were sold on open auctions to 
some people. Lands authorities refused to register theses houses under the 
names of the purchasers on the ground that these lands are not registered 
under the name of the tannery; therefore, TCDPE is not delegated to 
register them under the name of the tannery.  
 The second example is the flats which were built and sold by the 
Real States Banks to the peoples without following the right legal steps. 
In 1987, the Real estates Bank built theses flats and sold them to the 
people with stark ignorance that these lands were not finally allocated to 
the bank and they were still registered under the name of Sudan 
Government. Therefore, the bank was required to obtain allocation of the 
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land under its name, a thing which would result in paying big amounts of 
money. The second step which was neglected is that the bank was 
required to open files for these flats in the land authorities. All these steps 
had not been fulfilled. After the privatization of the bank, the purchasers 
of the flats found themselves in a problem that they had to pay for the 
allocation of land under their names; they were also required to pay so as 
to open files in the land authorities for these flats. The problem is still 
now pending (until 2008). Land authorities are still now refusing to 
permit registration of these flats under the names of the purchasers unless 
the fees of the double-step are paid (almost %50 of the land’s value). 
- Exaggeration on Lands Taxations and Registration Fees: 
Lands authorities in many cases hamper the privatization 
operations by changing the type of the ownership of the SOE’s lands. 
Many lands of SOEs are owned as a free-hold ownership and the new 
investors bought these lands depending on this information. But in many 
cases, without justification, lands authorities changed the type of 
ownership from free-hold ownership to preferential allocation. Examples 
for this irrational practice happened in the privatization of the lands of the 
Real Estates Bank (mentioned above). In addition, land authorities, 
taxations Chamber, Zakat Chamber, and Commissioner of Land impose 
very high amounts of money for changing the register under the name of 
the new owner. It appears that there is a big absence of coordination 
between TCDPE and the ministries and other governmental bodies. 
Taxation chamber directly works under the supervision of the Minister of 
Finance and National Economy (the president of the Higher Committee 
for Disposition of public enterprises), Zakat chamber is directly working 
under the supervision of the President of the Republic (the President of 
the Council of Minsters), and Commissioner of Land which is directly 
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work under the supervision of the Chief Judge.258 Coordination between 
all above authorities is not impossible, and it should be one of the basic 
tasks of TCDPE. 
(d) Non-payment of Annual Fees of Leases: 
Before their privatization and for long periods some SOEs hadn’t 
paid the annual fees of leases of their lands depending on that these lands 
are governmental ones and the concerned SOE itself is a governmental 
ownership. After privatization, TCDPE found that these fees were greatly 
accumulated. As a result TCDPE paid big amounts of money to renew to 
the new owner. This certainly happened in the privatization operation of 
Atbara Cement Factory.  
There is an explicit provision in the Land Settlement and 
Registration Act 1925 for the responsibility of the Sudanese Government 
(represented by TSDPE) to complete all the procedures of the registration 
for the new owner. S.56 (a) 0f this Act reads: 
“On the transfer of lease held under this Act, until the contrary is expressed 
in the transfer, there shall be implied in the following agreements that is to 
say:- 
a- an agreement on the part of the transferor that the rent, agreements and 
conditions reserved and contained in the register lease and on the part of the 
lessee to be paid, performed and observed have been so paid, performed or 
observed up to the date of the transfer. 
 With regard to the above section, in all privatization contracts and 
agreements we have read in the central bank or in the TCDPE office; 
there is no expressly condition or clause in a contract that exempts the 
government from its liability to pay all pending fees. TCDPE is the 
representative of the government in exercising the tasks of selling 
                                                 
258 - During the last years, the Chief Justice issued many orders to reduce the registration fees. This 
usually happens in the last three months of the calendar year so as to satisfy the requirements of the 
judiciary budget. Therefore, TCDPE can coordinate with the Chief Justice to reduce the registration 
fees for lands of the privatized SOEs. 
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governmental enterprises, therefore; TCDPE, before selling any SOE, has 
to be assured that all fees of the lease of the targeted SOE are paid. 
Without such assurance; TCDPE will find itself in problems with the new 
owners and it will gradually lose its credibility and dignity.   
 Our humble view is that TCDPE, in exercising its tasks, should 
accurately preserve the following provision of laws and regulations to 
avoid relevant problems in the cases of non-payment of lease fees.   
 S.53 of the Land Settlement and Registration Act 1925 reads: 
“The registrar shall, on proof to his satisfaction of the termination of a 
registered lease, enter in the register a note of the fact of the termination.”259 
With regard to the above section, and by coordination between 
TCDPE and the land authorities, TCDPE can benefit from non-payment 
of annual fees of leases and terminate the leases of the SOEs to be 
privatized. After the termination, the land will return under the name of 
Sudan Government. Consequently, such lands could be sold to the new 
investor without complicated procedures. The real motivation for such 
termination will not, of course, be the confiscation of the property as it 
means an instrument for saving time and costs for the sake of 
privatization.  
The question which may arise is who has the right to terminate the 
lease, and on what basis? The logical answer for this question is that the 
                                                 
259 - The Commissioner of Land General issued the circular No.25 1950 which reads: 
“1- we have heard that Chiefs of land registration offices, some times, terminate registrations of lease 
contracts by order of the district commissioner; a thing which resulted in many suits presented by the lessees. 2- S. 
53 of the Land Settlement and Registration Act 1925 gives the commissioners, on proof of his satisfaction, to enter 
in the register a note of the fact of the termination. 3- The Advocate General; after a discussion with me about the 
‘satisfied proof’, advised the following; a- the authority granted in s. 53 depends on presenting satisfied proof for 
termination of the registered lease, b- the question which arises is what is the satisfied proof?, c- when the lease 
contract contains a clause that ‘the leaser has the right to terminate the lease in the event of any breach of the 
lease contract done by the lessee’, in this case the leaser will have the right to terminate the lease without relying 
upon civil courts. The leaser right in such a case shall only be excersised according to lessee’s non-opposition, 
therefore, in the event of lessee opposed on the ground that the breach does not reach termination limit; the 
termination shall be according to judgement.” Instructions contained in the above circular do not constitute 
barriers on the face of termination of leases of lands of the privatized SOEs; that the above circular was 
issued to restrict the disputes between private lessees and the leaser (the government). TCDPE is 
required to coordinate with the Chief Justice terminate leases of the targeted SOEs. Here no dispute 
will occur that the lessee and the leaser are the same entity. The justification for termination here is to 
avoid the complicated procedures and high costs.          
 184
entity that formerly granted the lease is presumed to be the same entity 
that has the right to terminate such leases. Since that most of privatized 
SOEs are industrial ones, the concerned bodies are; the Ministry of 
Industry and Land Authorities (all leases prior and during the sixtieth of 
the past century were granted by the Ministry of Industry). 
  Reasons for the termination of leases have two legal grounds: either 
for the public interest as it is mentioned in the constitutional law, or for a 
breach of contract. Using of the Constitutional Law to terminate leases of 
SOEs seems to be irrational. Therefore, TCDPE, in coordination with 
states governments (after the application of the federation), has to exploit 
the opportunity to rely upon non-payment of rents as breach of contract to 
terminate the lease of SOE’s lands. Such practice will not face public 
opposition since these SOEs have historically presented disappointed 
performance. Also, by following this method, TCDPE will benefit from 
the termination of leases in two directions. First, it will avoid the double-
step payment of fees in transferring some SOEs (mentioned supra) that 
the ownership will return to the Sudanese government without allocation 
to any SOE. Second, by coordination with the ministers of investment 
and land authorities (federal and regional); TCDPE can directly allocate 
the land which its lease is terminated to the new investor.   
 It is to be noted that majority of the targeted SOEs in the current 
wave of privatizations were granted leases in the sixteenth, and prior to 
sixteenth of the past century. At that time, lease contracts were formed to 
ensure the necessity of paying the annual rent of lands. Followings are 
clauses which were usually included in the context of lease contracts. 
Such clauses related to payment of annual fees of lease contracts in this 
period. Following is a form of former lease contracts:   
“This lease made on the first day of ……………… between ……… … and 
………………… or on behalf of the Republic of Sudan (hereinafter called ‘the 
 185
Government’) of one part and ……………… (Hereinafter called ‘the lessee’ 
which expression shall include his successors and assigns) of the other part.   
1- The government hereby leases in the lessee the land described 
above (which land together with the buildings at any time erected thereon is 
hereinafter called ‘the said premises to hold for the same preliminary term of 
one year from the date hereof and if at or before the end of that period the 
lessee should have produced to the local land registry certificate from the 
Governor that a building or buildings have been completed thereon in 
accordance of Clause 4 (2) hereof then to hold the same for a further term 
expiring on the 31st of the day of December the annexed calendar year). 
2- The lessee shall pay to the government for the said premises the 
yearly rent of …………………… 
3- The rent shall be payable in advance on the first day of January in 
every year and the first of such yearly payments or the proportionate part 
thereof shall be  made by the lessee on signing of this lease.”260 
- Changing Purpose of Allocation:   
Depending on that the allocation was for governmental units and 
the owner is Sudan Government; most of the former managers of theses 
units ignored the purpose of the allocated lands. Thereafter, in many 
cases after signing the privatization contract, TCDPE found that the 
purposes of the allocated lands are totally different from those of the SOE 
itself. As an example, Atbara Cement Factory, at the time of its 
establishment, some of its lands were built in agricultural lands without 
changing the type of these lands to industrial ones. When the new owner 
opted to change the type of land-hold from agricultural to industrial; the 
River Nile State authorities required big amounts of money for changing 
the purposes of allocation, a thing which resulted in a big burden on 
TCDPE.261 
In the other hand, changing the purpose of land allocation may 
assist TCDPE in solving some problems. In other words, following 
                                                 
260 - Source; Internal files in the Ministry of Industry.  
261 - Internal files of TCDPE. 
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termination of leases as result for the misuse of allocation of land will 
constitute a good opportunity for TCDPE to avoid time consuming and 
money wasting.  TCDPE, in coordination with the concerned authorities, 
can terminate the leases and transfer them without paying big amounts of 
money. 
Changing purpose of allocation of land constitutes a strong reason 
for termination of land concession. Countries all over the world have 
granted investment privileges such as land allocation according to 
economical measures. Such measures usually balance between the local 
needs for the licensed project and the granted privileges. Land, of course, 
is one of the main privileges with regard to the necessity and size of the 
project, therefore, the state should have the right to return the land 
ownership whenever a misuse or un-consented change of the purpose of 
allocation is committed. The authority to return investment land 
ownership is usually provided in the investment legislation of a country, a 
thing which makes the investor aware about this matter.262This is the case 
in the current law of investment in Sudan (Investment Encouragement 
Act 1999 as amended in 2002). S.24 of this Act (conditions of the 
continued enjoyment of the license and privileges) reads: 
“No investor shall take any of the following measures, during the period of 
validity of the license and privileges, granted under the provisions of this Act, without 
obtaining a written approval, from the Minister or state’s minister, as the case may 
be, the measures being to: 
a- conduct any amendment, or alteration, of the size of the project, or object 
for which the license has been granted, or transfer the project, from the 
place thereof prescribed in the license; 
                                                 
262 - One of the  misuses of the investment lands in Sudan is that many granted entities, whether private 
or public, have not executed the project for which the land is granted. Private entities usually consider 
the allocated lands as freehold ownership and wait for selling them at higher prices. Public entities in 
Sudan acquired the allocated lands and left them without executing the licensed projects, buildings or, 
even, registering them in their names. Such type of acquisition resulted in many problems for TCDPE 
in privatizing (mentioned supra in this chapter).   
 187
b- use, or sell any of the equipment, machinery, apparatuses, materials or 
spare parts, with respect to which privileges have been granted, for any 
other purpose, other than the purpose for which the license has been 
granted;   
 c- change the purpose of the use of the land allocated for the project, sell, 
mortgage, hire the same totally, or partially.” 
 
S.26 of the same Act (the investor contravening provisions) reads:   
         “(1) an investor shall be deemed committed a contravening of the 
provisions of this Act, where he; 
  a- contravenes the provisions of sections 19, 24 and 25. 
       (2)  Without prejudice to any such penalty, as may be provided for any 
other law, the Minister, or the state’s minister, as the case may be, may in 
case of commission, by the investor, of any of the contraventions, provided in 
subsection (1), impose any of the following sanctions in accordance with the 
size of the contravention and the circumstances of commission thereof, and the 
extent of such damages, as may affect the national economy; 
       e- Revocation of the licence and the same shall result in acquisition of 
the land granted to him under the provisions of this Act.”  
- Consent of the Council of Ministers: 
Many SOEs were privatized before 1/2/2003, but their new owners 
hav not registered lands of these SOEs under their names. On 1/2/2003 
the Council of Minsters issued a decision for the prohibition of selling the 
governmental lands and assets without the prior consent of the Council.263 
Therefore, the Commissioner of Lands refused to register all former 
unregistered transactions regardless of the time in which these tractions 
were exercised. As a result; TCDPE wasted a lot of time to coordinate 
with the Council of Minster to issue the required consents. 
TCDPE exercises its missions under the supervision of HCDPE. 
HCDPE includes the Minister of Finance and National Economy 
                                                 
263 - Council of Ministers Decision no. 24/2003. 
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(president), Minister of Justice, Minister of the concerned ministry, and 
the Minister of Investment. Therefore, the claim of TCDPE that it all the 
time finds problem to obtain the consent of the Council of Minister seems 
to be unjustifiable. TCDPE was essentially established to avoid the 
bureaucratic procedures in executing the privatization program; it is 
required to execute privatization contracts, even from scratch, not by 
publishing its lack in its annual reports. 
In a meeting with Mr. Hassan Alkhier, Head of the Investment 
Promotion Department in the Ministry of Investment, about the problems 
of the investment lands and the proposed solutions,264 he said: 
 “1- Most of the investment lands which were formerly granted to the governmental 
productive units in the fortieth, fiftieth, and, seventieth of the past century, especially 
those were granted outside Khartoum, have no records in the lands authorities. 
Therefore, after their privatization in the past and the current century; governmental 
bodies of these productive units failed to determine boundaries of these lands, a thing 
which resulted in many problems for the government and the owners after 
privatization. 
2- The former governmental management bodies of units which were granted these 
lands are presumed to be responsible for such negligence. They are the persons who 
were responsible to pursue surveying and registering these lands under the names of 
these units. 
3- The governmental management bodies have to inform TCDPE that these lands 
have not yet been registered under the name of the targeted SOE. Informing TCDPE 
enables it to solve problems of surveying and registration before privatizing the 
targeted SOE. 
4- TCDPE, now, is required to register all lands of the targeted SOES, (listed in the 
schedule of the Disposition of Public enterprises Act 1990), under its name. Such 
registration will enable TCDPE to exercise the privatization operations as the owner 
not as a representative; a thing which will emanate its negotiating position. 
- Concessions Problems: 
                                                 
264 - Ministry of Investment- Khartoum, January 8th 2008 1: 15 AM.  
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Renewing investment merits is not only on leases rights. In many 
other events, it relates to other types of rights on land such as 
concessions. Cement factories are examples for the strategic SOEs which 
were privatized in Sudan; they have faced big problems in exercising 
their concession’s rights in the lands of the privatized factory (see the 
problem between GRAS and the new owner of Atbara Cement Factory in 
Chapter 5).   
In a meeting with Mr. Majzoub Ahmed Alkhalifa, Secretary of 
Quarries and Mines Department in GRAS265, we asked him about the 
dispute between the new owner of Atbara Cement Factory and GRAS. He 
said: 
 “First, before enacting the Mineral Resources and Mining Development Act 
2007, we were not concerned with the lime stone quarries of Atbara Cement Factory. 
Before 2007, limb-stone activities were treated as quarries activities and, according 
to the old law of 1972, the power for granting them was left to the local authorities of 
the region in which the quarries are located . But, the new Act of 2007 determines 
GRAS to be the concerned authority of all quarries resources which are in need for 
conversional treatment; cement activities are, indeed, one of them. 
 Second, we found that lime stone quarries of Atbara Cement Factory were not 
granted to the Factory, but randomly possessed. In addition, we have not found any 
maps determining the boundaries of these quarries. Therefore, for the legality of 
possessing such quarries, we required the new owner to exploit them actually so as to 
give us a good justification to register them under his name. 
 Third, our basic mission in GRAS is to organize and facilitate exploitation of 
the Sudanese geological resources for the benefit of the country as a whole; not to 
sophisticate such exploitation. However, we settled the problem, and the new investor 
now is enjoying all the concession’s rights. 
 
(ii) Exercise of Ownership Rights: 
                                                 
265 - Khartoum. The Geological Researches Authority of Sudan (GRAS), January 8th 2008. 11: 15 AM. 
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In countries which have not appointed certain agency or committee 
to exercise privatization activities; once the legal owner is identified, the 
next step is to ascertain who has the power to exercise the owner’s rights.   
If no provisions in the legislation governing public enterprises or 
assets spell out who has capacity to sell SOEs, other parts of the country’s 
legal framework might provide guidance. In New Zealand, for example, 
in the absence of specific legislation to the contrary, the government or 
specific ministers are deemed to be authorized to sell public assets. The 
same situation prevails in most common-law countries.266  
(a) Alienation of Public Enterprises and Shareholdings:  
  The legislations of public sector management in some countries 
sometimes explicitly authorize their privatization by subjecting it to 
specific, and usually, very basic rules. For example, the Mexican 
program, one of the most ambitious and successful programs, is based 
largely on the provisions of the public enterprise law of 1986. Article 32 
of that law provides that when an SOE ceased to be of strategic 
importance, or when the public interest or national economy so requires, 
the minister responsible for privatization shall, taking into account the 
views of the concerned sectoral ministers, propose to the government the 
sale of the state’s holdings in the enterprise. Article 32 further provides 
that in the event of such a sale, the employees of the SOE shall enjoy a 
pre-emptive right. Article 86 states that the sale of shares may be carried 
out through the stock exchange or through financial institutions. This 
shall be on the basis of guidelines issued jointly by the minister of 
programming and budget and the minister of finance and public credit. 
These two articles form the legal basis for most Mexican privatization 
operations.267 
                                                 
266 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p. 94. 
267 - Id, pp. 94-96. 
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 Similar provisions are found in SOE legislations of some other 
countries (especially in the African countries). For example, in Burundi; 
Article 6 of the Decree-Law No. 1/027 of September 1988, which sets the 
legal framework for the public law companies and the joint-venture 
companies under private law, provided that the state participations can be 
alienated only by a presidential decree issued on the advice of the 
Minister of finance and of the minister with jurisdiction of the SOE to be 
privatized. This general provision was replaced by Decree Law No. 1/21 
of August 1991 on privatization of public enterprises that delegates the 
power to privatize to the government, regulates the privatization 
procedures, and empower the Minister of Finance to sign the deed of sale 
on behalf of the government.268  
 In Sudan the matter differs; the Sudanese legislator in the 
Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 provides for establishing two 
committees to manage the execution of the privatization of the candidate 
SOEs; the Higher Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprises 
(HCDPE) and the Technical Committee for Disposition of Public 
Enterprises (TCDPE). HCDPE includes the Minister of Finance and 
National Economy (President), Minister of Justice (the Attorney 
General), the concerned minister, President of the General Corporation 
for Investment, and the Auditor General.269Therefore, unlike the Mexican 
approach, in Sudan the concerned minister is only a member in the 
                                                 
268 - Gerald Bisong Tanyi, supra2 pp. 161-162.  
     In Guinea, Article 7 of Ordinance No. 91/025 on March 1991, on the institutional framework for 
public enterprises provides that:  
 ‘The state shares in public enterprise are managed by a specialized department of the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Finance. This department may transfer all or part of these participations to private person on terms to 
be set by a privatization agreement.’ Just over a year later, this provision was replaced by a new Article 7 
which provides that:’ The state’s shares in a public enterprise shall be managed by specialized department of 
the Ministry of Finance, which may transfer all or part of these participations on the terms set by law.’ 
(Ordinance No. 22/092 of May 1992). A law setting the rules governing SOEs privatization was not 
enacted until more than a year later (August 20 1993). Source: Gerald Bisong Tanyi, supra 20 p. 164. 
269 - S. 3 of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990. 
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privatization committee. The Sudanese approach widens the ground of 
decision making in the privatization without the total ignorance of the 
role of the concerned minister.270The Sudanese legislator also gives the 
technical part an important role in the decision making of privatization. 
The Disposition of Public Enterprises Act provides for establishment of 
the TCDPE under the supervision of HCDPE.271TCDPE is concerned 
with the creation of suitable preparations for the HCDPE before 
concluding privatization contracts.272   
The Sudanese approach can be criticized by that the appointment of 
two committees working in the same field may result in delaying the 
execution of the privatization program. The long list of tasks and 
missions of the two committees may also result in the clash of powers, or 
the interference of one committee in the missions of the other. On the 
other hand, this can be argued by that despite the complications of 
missions; the Sudanese approach confers reasonable credibility for the 
execution of the privatization operations. Individualism in decision 
making may create a climate favourable for corruption and favouritism.   
 
(b) Alienation of Public Assets: 
                                                 
270 - S. 3 of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 determines the missions of HCDPE to be: 
Taking the decision of the privatization of the targeted SOE. 2- Determining the targeted SOE. 3- 
Concluding privatization contracts on behalf of the Sudanese government. 4- In the events of sale, or 
joint venture privatization contracts; HCDPE has the right to: (a) rehabilitate the targeted SOE 
according to certain steps; (b) Transforming the SOE to be privatized to public company with shares, or 
provides for participation of employees in the shares of the SOE to be privatized, (c) Considering the 
state’s due to the purchaser as a part of the price and; (d) Installing payment of the privatization 
amount, or order that the payment shall be in cash. 5- In the event of disposition by final liquidation of 
the targeted SOE; it has the right to order so, and to transfer all the assets of such SOE to any other 
governmental body. 6- To exercise any other legal authority for termination the service of employees of 
the targeted SOE, without any violation of any right of the employees. 7- To issue its internal 
regulations.  
271 - S. 4 of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990. 
272 - Some of the missions of TCDPE (mentioned in s.3) are: 1- Determining the financial, technical 
and administrative systems of the targeted SOE during the privatization period. 2- Receiving, analyzing 
and evaluation of privatizations offers. 3- Presenting advices for HCDPE about any former 
privatization operation or any future operation. 4- Determining enabling systems for the prospective 
investors to have full information about the SOE to be privatized according to the instructions of 
HCDPE. 5- Issuing its internal regulations to organize its meetings and tasks.   
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 The difference between alienation of public enterprises and 
shareholdings, and alienation of public assets is that the alienation of 
public enterprises and shareholdings is the alienation of legal entity with 
its assets, while alienation of public assets is the alienation of all or some 
of the SOE’s assets without alienation of its entity. On other words, 
despite that the alienation of assets of certain SOE may, in some events, 
represent the bigger part of its value; it doesn’t mean the alienation of 
legal entity of such SOE. With regard to this; alienation of public or 
SOE’s assets should, theoretically, be easier than the alienation of the 
SOE itself in two directions. First, the body which is entitled to alienate 
the assets is the managers of the SOE itself. Second, procedures of 
alienation of assets seem to be not complicated when compared with the 
procedures of alienation of the SOE as legal entity.   
 The alienation of public assets is often governed by administrative 
laws or specific legislation on public property or public finance 
legislation. In countries with French influence, a distinction is sometimes 
made between assets forming part of the state’s public domain and those 
belonging to the state’s private domain; the latter can be alienated more 
easily. Public domain assets can not be alienated except by transferring 
them first to the state’s private domain, a thing which can only be done 
by issuing a law for such purpose. The fact that public domain assets can 
not be sold does not mean that they cannot be used by private parties, for 
example, they can be leased. Morocco is a good example of countries 
with French influence. Following are the main features of the situation of 
alienation of assets of state’s public domain and state’s private domain in 
Morocco:273 
                                                 
273- Ayassor Adji, Privatization of Public Enterprises and its Impact on the Promotion of Private Sector 
in  Africa p. 112, Ph. D Dissertation 2002, University of Wisconsin, Law School.USA.   
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• The legislation governing the state’s assets, in particular its public 
domain, has constrained the privatization of some SOEs in 
Morocco. 
• All assets assigned to the provision of public service are considered 
to be part of the public domain in Morocco.  
• Roads, rail roads, ports, and telephone lines, among other assets are 
inalienable. 
• Those parts of the public domain may, however, be reclassified by 
a decree by the prime minister.274 
• Public domain assets cannot be sold, but they are allowed for the 
private use by methods of temporary occupation or a concession. 
• Temporary occupation and concessions can be granted for a 
maximum duration of ten years with annual fees. 
The rules governing the sale of public assets, where such rules 
exist, are often not assisting the needs of the privatization program. In 
Italy, for example, the rules governing the sale of state property dated 
back to a 1924 law that imposed very complicated administrative 
procedures, including review by the council of state and control by the 
court of accounts. To speed up the privatization process, a decree-law 
was enacted in 1993 that authorized the government to follow greatly 
simplified procedures for the alienation of state assets.275In Egypt, as for 
the sale of SOEs’ assets, SOEs legislation and statutes usually 
empowered the management bodies of an SOE to sell its assets, subject to 
certain limits.276In Vietnam, a Ministry of Finance circular No. 95 TC/CN 
prescribes that a public enterprise must obtain the approval of its 
                                                 
274- This discretionary power of the prime minister represents the corner stone in the entire privatization 
program in Morocco. Without this enabling authority the legislator would find difficulty that the scope 
of public domain is very wide in Morocco. 
275- Pierre Guislain, supra note 3 p. 99. 
276 - Monir Ibrahim Hindi, Privatization; Abstract of International Experience p. 157, ed. 2004, Modern 
Arabic Office- Alexandria- Egypt.  
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supervising ministry if its assets are to be used to establish a joint-venture 
company; to purchase share in joint-stock companies or to invest in 
limited liability companies.277 
In Sudan, it is to be noted that in the most of the privatized, or to be 
privatized SOEs, the main attractive elements for the new investor are the 
entity, concessions, privileges and monopolies (whether natural or legal). 
In most of the privatized SOEs, or those which have been preparing for 
privatization; assets are not attractive to new investors. Assets or 
machineries in most of these SOEs are obsolete or depreciated. For 
example, in Sudan Airways privatization preparations; TCDPE found that 
all aircrafts owned by the company are totally depreciated and there is big 
difficulty to evaluate them. Despite this fact, TCDPE refused to consider 
or to evaluate them as scrap on the ground that such evaluation may 
reflect the bad situation of the company, a thing which will result in 
weakening the offers of the potential investors.278   
 Later, TCDPE expressly declared that it has no technical experts to 
determine the situation of the mentioned aircrafts; whether to be 
considered as valid, rehabilitable, or a scrap. It appears that considering 
aircrafts as valid may result in a fictitious value and, consequently, delay 
or prevent the privatization operation. On the other hand, underestimation 
of them may lead to public opposition or accusation of corruption. 
However, the Council of Ministers took the mission of privatization of 
Sudan Airways and appointed ministerial committee to evaluate and 
privatize the company.279 
 Hesitation of TCDPE shows the feasibility of relying upon the 
internal management bodies of the SOE in the event of  the privatization 
of SOE’s assets. Management bodies of the targeted SOE should be 
                                                 
277 - Pierre Guislain, supra 3 p. 101. 
278 - Internal File in TCDPE. 
279 - Id. 
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granted considerable role in the disposal of SOE’s assets. They are the 
persons who know well about value, technical position, current situation, 
and otherwise specifications of assets of the SOE. The total ignorance of 
role of these bodies will result in costly procedures in identifying and 
estimating SOE’s assets that the government will be required to contract 
with outside experts.  
In the absence of a clear role for the management bodies of the 
SOE in the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990, the only way to 
enable the management bodies to contribute in the privatization is 
through the Financial and Accountancy Procedure Regulations 1992. 
Under the light of that most of assets of the privatized, or those on their 
road for  privatization, are almost obsolete or depreciated; considering 
them as a surplus seems to be rational. According to the Financial and 
accountancy Procedure Regulations 1992, the internal management 
bodies have, indirectly, major role in preparing SOEs for the privatization 
operation. By virtue of their experience they can determine the current 
position and value. Also, by such Regulations managers of SOEs can 
exercise the authority of the disposal of them. 
 At first sight, one may think that selling governmental assets 
through internal management bodies can be criticized by that it may be 
exercised without efficient monitoring by specialized body like TCDPE. 
Also, assets may be sold without equitable competition, a thing which 
may result in favouritism, underestimation, or any other sort of 
corruption. Rules of dispose of surplus in the Financial and Accountancy 
Procedure Regulations 1992 contain efficient measurements for the sake 
of competition and transparency. Following is a summarized explanation 
for the disposal of surplus sections in the Financial and Accountancy 
Regulations of 1992: 
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a- To ensure that the disposal of surplus is exercised by approval of the 
highest concerned authority, regulation70 provides that: “no one of 
State organs shall dispose of surpluses, save upon the approval of the minister or 
state’s minister”. 
b- To ensure that the disposal is exercised through a suitable and 
transparent method, regulation73 provides: “1- no sale by auction, or 
tenders shall be made, save after completion of the followings: 2- (a) disposal of 
cars, machineries, heavy equipments, scrap iron and stagnant new spare parts 
shall be made through tenders, or public auctions only; 2- (b) the items intended 
to be sold shall be disposed of, other than those mentioned in paragraph 2- (a), 
through tenders, public auction or direct contracting”. 
c- To ensure an accurate evaluation of the sold assets, the regulations 
provides for formation of evaluation committee therefore, 
regulation74 provides: “1- The head of unit shall form a committee, under the 
chairmanship of one of his assistants and membership a representative of the 
Accounts Administration, one or more technicians and two representatives of the 
ministry, or the state’s ministry, as the case may be. 2- the evaluation committee 
shall classify the offered materials intended to be sold in homogenous groups, 
together with showing the weight, number of measurement and any other 
specifications of every item, to prevent any change that may occur, upon offering 
the items prepared for sale and evaluation and pricing thereof. 3- The chairman 
and members of the evaluation committee shall prepare the report, sign and 
submit the same, to the head of unit, for approval. 4- The head of unit shall 
approve the reports of the evaluation committee and its lists, and such lists shall 
be absolutely secret, and delivered to the chairman of the sale committee, and 
shall not be opened, save on the day of auction.” 
d- Formation of the sale committee requires express provision for 
methods of formation. Therefore, regulation75 provides: “the head of 
unit shall form a committee from those possessed of competence, to be known as 
the “sale committee”, to sell the items intended to be disposed of, in accordance 
with the procedure provided in regulation 76”. 
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e- Regulation.76 provides: “1- The sale committee, upon sale of items intended 
to be disposed of shall follow the following procedures; 1-a: advertisement of the 
items intended to be sold shall be made in detail, in the local newspapers, or 
other media of publicity or through internal publications in remote are; 1-b: fees 
shall be collected, according to the size of tender, and as the head of unit may 
specify, in consideration of obtaining the specification book, and be non-
returnable; 1-c: in case of high price reached by the auction being bellow the 
basic price of the item, the sale committee shall recommend postponement of 
sale, for another auction, and submit the matter, to the head of unit, to take such 
auction, as he may deem fit. 2- a: the chairman of the sale committee shall 
deposit the final price of the item, and record the number thereof, at the back of 
the deposit receipt of the purchaser; 2-b: the price at which the auction settles 
shall be corded in the sale ticket of an original and two copies, signed by the 
member of the sale committee, who prepares the tickets, and approved by the 
chairman of the sale of the sale committee; 2-c: the original ticket shall be 
delivered to the unit, in cause of auction held at public corporations and 
institutions, and the body in which the return of auction vests; 2-d: in case of 
auctions, the sale committee may seek the help of the sufficient number of police 
for keeping the order; 2-e: the chairman of the sale committee shall be entitled to 
exclude any purchaser, who causes any type of rioting or contravenes the 
procedure of auction. 3-a: auctioneers approved on the state’s register shall, 
according to the directions of the chairman of the sale committee, offer the items 
intended to be sold to the public; 3-b: the member of the auctioneers union shall 
direct the public to the area concerned, according to contracts to be concluded 
between the selling body, of the first party and the auctioneer of the second party; 
3-c: in the case of non-existence of an auctioneer in the area concerned, one of 
the employees of the ministry, or the state’s ministry, as the case may be, shall 
conduct the operation of offering. 
It is clear that the Financial and Accountancy Procedure 
Regulations 1992 contain very satisfactory requirements and instructions 
to monitor and organize the disposal of public assets. Such regulations 
can help privatization operations in Sudan, especially when the assets of 
the targeted SOE are depreciated. On other words, according to the 
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situation of the SOEs in Sudan, where the assets are obsolete or 
depreciated; using internal bodies of management of the SOE as device 
for privatizing such SOE, seems to be more desirable than the 
privatization through TCDPE. Privatization of Sudan Airways shows 
that privatization of SOEs exclusively through TCDPE is not always the 
ideal method. 
 
(c)Prohibition of Alienation of Public Assets:  
 In some instances, a government may wish to declare a moratorium 
on all transfer of assets or shares of public enterprises. This may be the 
case where prior reforms are part of comprehensive program of public-
sector reform or where they arise from radical changes in the political 
regime, events that often are attended by instability and uncertainty 
concerning the exercise of ownership rights. Such moratoriums have 
adopted in Bulgaria, Cambodia, Russia, and Ukraine, for example to stop 
contradictions that took place during transitions in these countries. 
However, prohibition of transfer of public enterprises or assets is usually 
limited in time.  
Conclusion: 
The privatization process is affected directly or indirectly bya big 
number of rules, regulations, and legislations. Privatization is a public act 
involving a transfer of assets and entities owned by the public sector. It is 
also a process managed by public agencies and officials. 
An important distinction needs to be drawn between the public 
agency with the right of ownership over enterprises or assets covered by 
the privatization program (the state, or other agency or public entity), on 
the one hand, and the authorities empowered to exercise those ownership 
rights, in particular; the right to alienate enterprises and assets on the 
other hand. The privatization agency or committee should have strong 
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power to eliminate all barriers on the face of the privatization processes. 
The privatization committee in Sudan is a federal one, headed by the 
Federal Minister of Finance, who is entitled to obtain the consent of the 
Federal Council of Ministers to solve any barrier that may impede, delay 
or, sometimes, cancel any privatization operation.  
Coordination between the Council of Ministers and the 
privatization committee in Sudan will avoid all problems discussed in this 
chapter. For example, in the case of good coordination; identifying the 
legal owner of the SOE’s assets, land, or concessions is easy since that 
any SOE, regardless of the ministry or any other governmental body 
claiming its ownership, is a public property and the law gives the 
executive authority absolute power to alienate such SOE. Therefore, it is 
shameful to note that the privatization committee in Sudan has suffered a 
lot to obtain the consent of the Council of the Ministers to conclude a 
privatization contract because of bureaucratic formalities. In many cases 
the privatization committee in Sudan faced many barriers to enable the 
new purchasers to exercise their ownership rights because of the 
decisions of the council of the minister itself (see the decision of the 
Council of Ministers No. 24/2003, mentioned in part (i) in this chapter). 
Absence of coordination between the privatization committee, the 
regional governments, and other governmental bodies, namely the bodies 
responsible to grant some concessions to the enterprises after the 
privatization, caused many problems for the committee and the new 
investors.  
As we mentioned in this chapter, some regional governments place 
many difficulties in the face of the new owners of the privatized SOE, 
such as like renewing concessions, leases, and the like. On the other hand 
some concerned governmental bodies and agencies refused to grant or 
renew some concessions to the new owners after the privatization on the 
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ground that they are the concerned bodies to grant or renew such 
concessions (not the TCDPE).  
Despite the fact that the TCDPE is a federal committee and, 
according to the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990, can impose 
its orders on any regional governments and any other governmental body; 
a suitable coordination between TCDPE and regional government and 
other governmental bodies is required. TCDPE structure has to include a 
representative or coordinator between TCDPE and the regional 
governments and the authorities which are responsible to grant and renew 
special types of concessions such like GRAS (Geological Researches 
Authority of Sudan).  
  
 
 202
Chapter 7 
 
The Privatization Law 
 
The majority of countries legally implement their privatization 
program by passing law on privatization which specifies the scope of the 
program, establishes the institutional authority to conduct the 
privatization program, and defines the most important elements of the 
process. However, a separate law is not necessary in all cases. Existing 
legislations may be sufficient to conduct the privatization programs (see 
Chapter 6). 
When a privatization law is required, it must typically specify the 
extent of privatization by generally defining what is to be privatized. 
Rather than listing governmental SOEs that will be sold, the law may 
provide a general right to privatize all existing SOEs. The government 
might choose to define a clear negative list of SOEs or sectors that will 
not be subject to privatization because of their special status or strategic 
importance. 
The law should also define the specific entities responsible for 
privatization, clearly specifying their rights and responsibilities. It is 
particularly useful to establish clear authority and control over the process 
to avoid misunderstandings and political quarrels later in the process. 
Such authority should have the necessary flexibility (by the privatization 
law) to conduct the privatization program until it is completed. 
Entities responsible for the application of privatization and their 
tasks and authorities will be the subject of the next chapter. Therefore, 
this chapter deals with the enabling provisions which are frequently found 
in privatization laws. After the discussion of the main legal instruments to 
execute privatization and the scope of privatization laws, the following 
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parts will explain: the valuation of SOEs to be privatized, the selection of 
buyers, and the employees’ preferential schemes which enable the 
employees of SOEs to own the SOE according to many provisions in the 
privatization laws. Lastly, we will perform the required structure of a 
privatization law as recommended by one of the famous and important 
international discussion papers.  
 
(i) Privatization without Specific Legislation: 
In fact, many countries began their privatization programs without 
specific or a separate law. This was the case in Hungary where 
privatization began in 1988 with “spontaneous privatization” which 
allowed, by virtue of Act VI of 1988 on companies, the transformation of 
state’s enterprises into companies on the basis of management decisions 
and thus allowed the sale of part of state property. However, because that 
the process was unmanaged and led to abuse; the State Property Agency 
was established and a new legal framework for privatization was put in 
place.280 
The advantage of a specific privatization law is the high degree of 
accountability and formal authority for the entity in charge of conducting 
the privatization program. In addition, the existence of such a law clearly 
indicates political support and commitment by the legislative authority 
and government. However, there is also the danger of major delays 
through the long-time political debates in the parliament of a country 
prior to passing a privatization law. In addition to the parliamentary 
delays, enacting privatization legislation may require major challenges 
bigger than the ordinary parliament debates.  It may require amendment 
in the constitution of the country and other legislations in such country 
(mentioned in Chapter 4 of this thesis). Amendment of the constitutional 
                                                 
280 - Privatization in Hungary p. 9, 1994, AVRT Publications. (No author’s name). 
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law in a country may require years or months to happen. Also, the 
amendment or repeal of current legislations which put some obstacles in 
the face of privatization may require a long period, a thing which is 
inevitably time-consuming. 
In the absence of specific legislation to privatization, and where the 
government does not want to involve the complicated procedure of 
enacting a specific privatization law, a government with good 
imagination and creativity of its lawyer can circumvent the amendment of 
many legislations. These circumvents, in addition to solving legal 
problems, may result in solving some technical obstacles or barriers. 
  The following examples represent a high degree of the 
professionalized treatment of lawyers of some countries in circumventing 
the legal and other obstacles and barriers in the face of privatization:281 
*In Vietnam (a former communist state), the ownership of SOE’s land 
can not be transferred to a private enterprise. The problem has been 
solved by establishing joint-venture companies whose public sector 
partner held the rights to land use of granted long leases. 
*In Nicaragua, the state’s ownership titles to certain assets are imprecise 
or disputed. Therefore, making sale of these assts to private enterprise is 
very difficult. The problem was solved by that the state has concluded 
leas-sale contracts allowed assets to be transferred without immediate 
sale. A lessee was given an option to purchase these assets at the end of 
the contract. 
*In Brazil and Mexico, the exercise of certain activities cannot be 
transferred permanently to the private sector. Therefore, the contracting 
authorities concluded concessions contract providing for the transfer of 
                                                 
281 -Pierre Guislain, the Privatization Challenge: a Strategic, Legal, and Institutional Analysis of 
International Experience pp. 113-14, 4th ed. 2004, World Bank Publications, Washington DC. 
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assets to the concessionaire for the duration of the concession. Assets 
shall be returned to the contracting authority at the end of the contract. 
 
(ii) Privatization by Legislation: 
As we have previously mentioned, most privatizing countries have 
enacted specific privatization legislations whether or not required to do so 
by the constitution. In the case of specific legislation, countries have to 
choose between general legislation applicable to all SOEs to be privatized 
or specific law for each SOE or group of SOEs. In some cases, the 
targeted SOEs are specifically named, and in others the law addresses one 
or more categories of enterprises without naming them.  
The scope of some laws, but in rare countries, may be limited in 
time. As an example for privatization legislation limited in the time of 
execution: Article 1 of the Moroccan privatization law of 1990, which 
sets the deadline for the completion of privatization on 31 December 
1995. The law was amended in January 1995 to extend the deadline to 
December 31 1998, and to add new enterprises to the list.282 The 
restrictions of this kind, which are usually found in laws with a positive 
list of the privatizable enterprises, can result in great deterrants of 
privatization. They weaken the government’s position in negotiations 
with buyers, especially when the legal time is nearing expiration. 
 In the event of enacting legislation for privatization, such law may 
take a general shape when it does not provide for determining specific 
SOEs to be privatized, specify the methods by which privatization 
processes shall be executed, or restrict its scope in one privatization 
operation. The specific privatization legislation may provide for 
appointing a list of SOEs to be privatized without providing for the 
                                                 
282 - Ayassor Adji, Privatization of Public Enterprises and its Impact on the Promotion of Private Sector 
in African p. 78, Ph. D Dissertation 2002, University of Wisconsin, Law School. USA.     
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methods of privatization. In another feature, the legislator may determine 
the methods of the privatization of the listed SOEs.  
(1)General Legislations: 
A law of general scope should be considered if common rules for 
all privatization transactions are deemed important. Such a law may 
confer a general mandate on the government or an agency to privatize 
SOEs. 
 A suitable example for general law has been enacted in 
Philippines, where the law provides that it is up to the president of the 
republic to decide which state-owned enterprises shall be privatized 
(Article IV of the Presidential Proclamation December 8 1992).283 
A law that confers broad authorization to privatize without 
specifying the enterprises usually defines its scope of application either 
by defining “privatization” or other word for the same meaning.284 The 
privatization mandate may thus be limited by excluding particular sectors 
or SOEs, as happened in the former East Germany, where the 
privatization law excluded, among other sectors, transportation 
infrastructure, the postal service, and municipal enterprises.285 
In Sudan, the privatization law (Disposition of Public Enterprises 
Act 1990) is a general legislation. This law confers wide authorities on 
the Higher Committee for disposition of Public enterprises (HCDPE) 
without specifying SOEs to be privatized. S.3 of this law provides for the 
establishment of HCDPE to include: 
*The Minister of Finance and National Planning (president). 
*The Minister of Justice and the Attorney General (member). 
*The concerned Minister of the targeted SOE (member). 
*The President of the General Corporation of Investment (member). 
                                                 
283-  Guislain, supra 2 p. 116. 
284 - Such like the word “Disposition” in Sudan. 
285 - Guislain, supra 2 p. 117. 
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In the same section, the Act authorizes HCDPE to execute the 
privatization program and to exercise all the powers necessary for its 
mission. For example, to take the decision of the disposal of any of SOE, 
it orders the General Corporation for Investment to take the supervision 
over the targeted SOE until its privatization, conclude the privatization 
contracts on behalf of the state, rehabilitate the targeted SOE after the 
privatization decision (before signing the final contract), exercise any 
legal authority necessary for the termination of the services of the 
employees of the targeted SOE, and enact its internal regulations. 
 The law provides for the establishing of the Technical Committee 
for Disposition of Public Enterprises (TCDPE) as assistant committee for 
HCDPE. S.4 of the same Act provided for the missions of TCDPE, for 
example; to prepare the suitable methods for advertising the targeted 
SOEs for privatization, estimate the assets of the targeted SOE, determine 
the number of employees and their legal rights, determine the financial 
system that should be followed while privatizing the SOE, prepare the 
data rooms for the potential investors, and enact its internal regulations. 
(2) Legislations Specify the Privatizable Enterprises: 
The law may list SOEs to be wholly or partially privatized. 
Therefore, government’s authority is limited to these listed SOEs. 
Listing privatizable SOEs is not necessarily a good solution 
because it limits the discretion of the government. In addition, frequent 
changes in the local and international market may also dictate priorities 
other than those originally prescribed by the law.   
Some countries have issued decrees pursuant to the privatization 
law so as to widen the list of the candidate SOEs, a thing which harms the 
stability of the privatization law. For example, in Mozambique, an initial 
list of SOEs was adopted by a decree in November 1991. New SOEs 
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were added in 1993 and 1994 by decrees taken pursuant to Article 14 of 
August 1991 privatization law.286  
Despite the fact that Sudanese privatization law is a general one, 
the actual practice in Sudan carries some features of this type of 
privatization laws. The resemblance between Sudanese experience and 
this type of privatization laws is clear from that despite HCDPE is 
concerned with specifying the SOEs to be privatized; it usually prepares a 
list of the targeted SOEs and delivers them to the Council of Ministers to 
be approved. There is no provision for the approval of the Council of 
Ministers in the law. The logical reason for the approval of the Council of 
the Minister is that HCDPE aims to give the privatization strong political 
support and to absorb the public opposition. 
 
(3)Legislations Applying to Certain Types of Privatization: 
The legislation may also subject different types of privatization to 
different regulations. In France, for example, the privatization laws of 
July 2 and August 6, 1986, provided different privatization patterns. The 
procedures set in these laws apply to the enterprises listed in their 
annexes as follows: 
 First, a prior legislative authorization is required to privatize 
majority state-owned enterprises (state ownership of %50 or more). 
 Second, a legislative approval is not required in enterprises in 
which the state directly holds less than 50 percent of the shares. Also, 
legislative approval is not required in the case of the partial sale of shares 
of public enterprises in which the state is a majority shareholder and 
remains the majority shareholder after such sale.287 
                                                 
286 - Id p. 118. 
287 - Pierre Guislain, supra 2, p. 119.  
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 Specific laws authorizing the privatization of one or more SOEs 
have been enacted in many countries such as Canada. Such privatization 
laws tend to be used when the scope of the privatization program is 
limited or an SOE or group of SOEs possess special problems that can 
not be easily resolved in a general enabling law. This would normally 
apply to the privatization of an entire sector, especially a highly regulated 
sector such as natural resources or infrastructure sectors.288Some 
countries with a weak legal framework have turned to a very special type 
of privatization law. Thus in Guinea, agreements for the sale of particular 
enterprises have been ratified by a presidential ordinance in order to give 
them full effect, notwithstanding conflicting provisions of other 
legislation. This enabled Guinea to start privatizing SOEs in 1986 without 
having to wait for revision of all its business legislations or the enactment 
of a privatization law which occurred only in 1993.289 
 
In Sudan, despite the fact that the Sudanese legislation of 
privatization is a general one; there is some resemblance with regard to 
the Guinean privatization laws. In some privatization processes, namely 
in the banking sector, we have noted that the Central Bank of Sudan 
obtained the consent of the Council of Ministers before involving these 
operations. But, it is to be noted that the privatization law does not 
require this consent; many other privatization operations were executed 
without seeking permission of the Council of Ministers.   
 
(iii)Valuation and Sale of Enterprises: 
                                                 
288- Dick Welch, Case by Case Privatization in the Russian Federation: Lessons from International 
Experience pp. 81.82 and 83, 1st May 1998 ed. World Bank Publications, Washington D.C. 
289- Beesley and L. Stephen, Privatization in Africa: Principles, Problems, and Priorities p. 114-15, 
1994 ed., Clarendon. London. 
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Parliaments and governments often build safeguards into their 
legislations to ensure transparency of the process and reduce some of the 
risks typically associated with privatization. The law commonly imposes 
basic rules to be followed by the implementing agency or committee, 
particularly regarding the prior valuation of SOEs, the use of specific sale 
method, and the procedures for selecting buyers. 
(1) Valuation: 
Valuing public enterprises or public assets is a difficult operation 
because public officials normally wish to avoid being accused of giving 
away the valuable properties of the society. High valuation affords them 
political protection in the event that the decision to sell at a given price is 
disputed.  
In most cases, overvaluation of the SOE has led to delay or even 
cancellation of many SOEs from the list of the candidates. For example, 
in the case of VSNL, the Indian International Telephone Company: The 
public floatation of VSNL was cancelled on May 3, 1994, in response to 
a negative reaction to the high share price. The high valuation of the 
company’s share happened as a reaction for the former parliament 
committee’s accusation to the government for selling some governmental 
holdings (in 1992-1993) at prices below their true values. The 
government did not wish to lower the price for fear of being accused of 
selling the company at a discount to foreigners.290From the case of 
VSNL, we can imply that the valuation of SOEs by certain experts 
(privatization legislation usually sets them) is a technical one, and in 
many events does not represent the reality.  In many cases, the real price 
(market price) is profoundly less. 
 Our opinion, despite the fact that setting a reference price is useful, 
it may be preferable to obtain the real price through competitive, 
                                                 
290 - Dick Welch, supra 9 p. 85. 
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transparent, and open sale procedures with wide dissemination of 
information. A competitive procedure usually offers the government 
better guarantees than does expert valuation performed before the sale. 
Therefore, providing for obligatory-expert valuation in the privatization 
legislation seems to be irrational. However, when a valuation is required 
by legislation it should be carried out by independent and qualified 
experts and in conformity with generally accepted valuation principles. 
The market price is, indeed, among them. The cost of the valuation must 
not exceed the benefits it is expected to yield.  
Some countries have established evaluation commissions or other 
special bodies responsible for setting minimum prices. Our humble 
opinions is that the members of these commissions and bodies have no 
real stake in the success of the privatization program; they tend to be 
concerned only with not selling too cheaply, and they often end up setting 
price floors that are too high.   
Fortunately, the Sudanese privatization Act (Disposition of Public 
Enterprises Act 1990) does not provide for obligatory-expert valuation, 
and provide for the HCDPE (S.3) to take such mission. TCDPE has relied 
upon the valuation of different expert houses in valuing many SOEs, a 
thing which implies that it has exercised valuation tasks neutrally.    
As we mentioned in chapter 3 of this dissertation, most of the 
privatization operations in Sudan have been practised through negotiated 
sales. Therefore, practically, most of the privatization contracts have been 
concluded according to the agreed-upon prices.  
Unfortunately, save in rare privatization operations in Sudan, there 
is a total absence of transparency in practising these operations. Absence 
of transparency, even without corruption, leads to clouds of doubts on the 
privatization program in Sudan as a whole. 
(2) Authorized Privatization Method: 
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All too often that privatization laws and regulations prescribe the 
authorized privatization methods. In the absence of restrictions on the 
privatization legislation, the better approach would be to investigate what 
method would be more suitable.  In practice, the legislator is usually 
neither familiar with privatization method nor in a position to predict the 
various circumstances that may necessitate special methods. The 
privatization law should therefore be draft in broad terms, having the 
executing authority to choose the appropriate methods of privatization.  
The Argentine example shows how it is important to avoid the 
provisions in the privatization law that restrict the range of the authorized 
body or agency to select the privatization method that can be used. The 
diversity of legal status and economic characteristics of the enterprise to 
be privatized has compelled the authorities to resort to a wide range of 
privatization methods. Privatization program of the Ministry of Defence 
in Argentina, explains how it is important for the privatization law not to 
restrict the range of the authorized methods of privatization for the 
privatization agency. Following are the examples:291 
*The Ministry of Defence in Argentina has a minority participation in the 
capital of Petropol, Monomeros, Vinilicios, Induclor, and Polisur (all part 
of the Bohia Blanca petrochemical complex). The most suitable method 
for privatization was to sell all governmental shares to one private 
investor. 
*In Tandanor shipyard where the government is a majority participant in 
the SOE’s capital; different blocks of shares were sold to different 
investors. 
                                                 
291 - Flouret and Emiliano, Private Sector Involvement in Latin America pp. 201-5, 1995 ed., 
Aldershot, England. 
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*In Area Material Cordoba (aviation company), enterprise forming part 
of the armed forces, the ideal method for privatizing was to corpotorize 
such SOE to allow the later sale of state’s shares. 
*In unprofitable SOEs such like Hipasam (mining), which is heavily 
subsidized by the government; the ideal method of privatization was the 
direct sale of SOE’s asset to the private sector. 
*In Somia (a large iron and steel company), which is heavily indebted 
company, the suitable solution was the creation of new company, to be 
privatized, to which some of the assets and liabilities of the former 
enterprise were transferred. The other assets of the former SOE were sold 
directly, and the debts not transferred to the new entity continued to be 
the government’s responsibility 
*In enterprises that do not own the land they occupy, like Tames, the 
ideal privatization method was the use of leases contracts. 
*In the large multipurpose enterprises that do not possess a juridical 
personality like Altos Hornos de Zapla (an iron steel company with forest 
resources for production of blast furnace charcoal); the solution came by 
restructuring, before privatization, into various commercial companies, 
each operating in a separate area of activity. 
In Sudan, despite the fact that some privatization methods are 
mentioned in the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 in s.4 
(authorities of HCDPE), such mentioning does not come in a context 
restricting the authority of HCDPE to exercise other patterns of 
privatization. Such section provides that HCDPE, if decided to conclude a 
sale or joint venture contract, has a discretionary power to rehabilitate the 
SOE, transfer SOE into company with shares, consider the price as a 
repayment of a former debt, and to divide prices into instalments.292 
                                                 
292 - See s. 3 (a), (b), (c), and (e) of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990. 
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In Sudanese privatization legislation, unrestricting the authority of 
HCDPE in selecting legal methods of privatization clearly appears from 
that HCDPE has almost used all the known patterns of privatization 
(except two or three).293  
 
(iv) Selection of Buyers: 
 Selection of buyers is difficult with regard to the problems which 
happened in many countries because of corruption, nepotism, 
favouritism, and discrimination against foreigners and certain minorities 
or ethnic groups. The law should lay down the broad lines for the 
selection of buyers, typically by mandating a competitive and transparent 
process. This includes a rule on advertising the sale, disclosure of 
information to investors, amount of time given to investors to prepare 
their bids, and so on.294 
  
 The selection of buyers can be derived directly from the choice of 
privatization method.  For example, if a company is privatized by way of 
a public offering of shares, the selection will be anonymous and all 
investors can subscribe and be allocated shares. If mass privatization is 
chosen, all eligible citizens will have the opportunity to buy or receive 
shares or coupons. 
 Under other privatization method, the government or privatization 
agency or committee may have more discretion in the choice in the 
selection of buyers. This is the case, in particular, in the direct or 
negotiated sales which are preferred in many countries (like Sudan); the 
discretion of the government and the privatization agency will be wider in 
selecting strategic or core buyers. Therefore, we will explain how the 
                                                 
293 - See chapter 3, Box No. (3).  
294 - Pierre Guislain, supra2, p. 124. 
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privatization law in many cases is directly intervening in selecting the 
buyers of the privatized SOEs. The well known methods of intervention 
of the privatization legislation in selecting buyers are: the direct 
restrictions on buyer selection, special or golden shares, and restrictions 
on foreign participation in the privatization. 
(1)Restrictions on Entity of Buyers: 
The privatization law should be free of unnecessary restrictions of 
the selection of buyers. Some restrictions, such as the exclusion of public 
agencies as buyers of privatized enterprises, may, however, be necessary 
to protect the objects of the privatization program.  
In order to reduce the role of the public sector in the economy, 
many countries like Poland and Bulgaria295have restricted the role of the 
public-sector entities to participate in the privatization process by buying 
shares of other SOEs. Thus, Article 1 of the Moroccan Privatization Law 
of 1990 explicitly prescribes that the ownership of shares held by the state 
or other public agencies in the companies listed in an annex to the law 
shall be transferred from the public to the private sector. Moreover, some 
countries have inserted more restrictive rules under this head in their 
privatization laws to further support the object and consistency of the 
privatization program by limiting the creation of new SOES. The same 
Moroccan law discussed above prescribes that, except when affected by 
law, the creation of any new public enterprise, subsidiary, secondary 
subsidiary of a public enterprise, and any new participation by a public 
enterprise in the capital of a private enterprise must be authorized, under 
penalty of nullity, by a government decree proposed by the minister for 
privatization.296   
                                                 
295 -  Lipton, David and Jeffery D. Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe; the Cases of Bulgaria, 
Hungary, and Poland pp. 124 -26, 1994 ed., New York: Oxford University Press. 
296 - Pierre Guislain, supra2 p.125. 
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Despite the fact that restrictions on transferring SOE to other SOE 
and other public entities have been adopted by different countries, the 
Sudanese government has not benefited from these lessons. Tens of SOEs 
have been transferred to other SOEs and public entities.  However, 
followings are samples of SOEs which were transferred to other public 
entities: 
 
Table No.(6) Transfer of SOEs to Public Entities in Sudan. (continued in next 
page) 
N
o. 
SOE Legal 
method 
 Beneficiary Price by 
million 
Year Recent 
position. 
Notes 
1 Gadaw Factory Transfer River Nile 
State 
_ 1990 Bad Failed 
2 Karima Dates 
Evaporation 
Factory.  
Sale Northern 
State 
SP 
11.400  
1993 Good _ 
3 Fila toxin Factory   Transfer Red Sea 
State 
_ 1993 Bad _ 
4 Dryly Onion 
Factory- Kasala 
Transfer Kasala State _ 1995 Bad _ 
5 Arooma Cartoon 
Factory 
Sale Farmers Un. 
Cooperation 
SP2.500 1990 Bad _ 
6 Red Sea Tannery  Transfer Red Sea 
State 
_ 1995 Bad _ 
7 Nayala Tannery Sale Sothern 
Darfur State 
18.300 1993 Bad Unpaid  
8 Kadogli Weaving 
Factory 
Transfer Southern 
Kurdfan 
State 
_ 1997 Bad _ 
9 Babanosa Milk 
Factory 
Transfer Western 
Kurdfan 
_ 1995 Bad _ 
10 River Transfer Northern _  1993 _ _ 
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Transportaion- 
Karima 
State 
11 Sudan Hotel  Sale National 
Social 
Insurance 
Fund 
SP.275 1993 Good _ 
12 Kha. Co. for 
Albutanaa Milks 
Transfer Al-Shaheed 
Charity   
Organiz. 
_ 1994 Bad _ 
13 Wafra Chemical 
Factory 
Transfer Al-Shaheed 
Charity 
Orgaiz. 
_ 1993 _ _ 
14 Juba Hotel Transfer Baher 
Eljabal State
_ 1992 Good _ 
15 Oil Crops 
Company 
Transfer Al-Shaheed 
Charity Org.
_ 1993 _ _ 
16  Atbara Rest Sale Northern 
State 
SP5 1992 Good Unpaid 
17 Kosti Rest Sale White Nile 
State 
SP2.5 1992 Good Unpaid 
18  Alnouba Lake 
Fish Corp. 
Transfer Northern 
State 
SP280.7 1993 Good Unpaid 
19 Algash Delta 
Corp. 
Transfer Kasala State _ !993 Good Unpaid 
20 Tokar Delta Corp. Transfer Red Sea 
State 
_ 1993 Good Unpaid 
21 Arrous Tourist 
Village 
Transfer Minis.of 
Tour.& Env.
_ 1993 _ _ 
22 North Jazeera 
Milks 
Transfer Aljazeera 
State 
_ 1994 Bad _ 
23 Colds & Supplies 
Corp. 
Transfer National 
Fund for 
Student Aid 
SP128 1993 Good Unpaid 
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24 Coaks Production 
Project 
Transfer People’s 
Police 
_ 1995 Good _ 
25 Heating Block 
Factory 
Transfer Northern 
State 
_ 1993 Good _ 
Source: Annual Report of TCDPE 2005 pp. 24- 43- 44 and 45. 
 
   The transfer of SOEs to public entities, as in the above table, 
implies the following: 
*A big number of the Sudanese SOEs was transferred to their local states 
(states of their locations).  
*Prices of many transferred SOEs have not been paid; therefore, the 
central government or the privatization agency has not gained any 
considerations. 
*TCDPE itself estimated the recent conditions of the transferred SOEs 
(after the transference) as negative.     
As the above table shows, and as a result for absence of a provision 
prohibiting or restricting the transfer of SOE for another SOE or other 
public entity; the Sudanese government and the privatization agency 
(HCDPE) has transferred big number of SOEs to public entities. The 
other countries of the world, when prohibiting or restricting such practice 
in their privatization legislations; are inevitably considering its effect in 
achieving the objectives of the privatization. In addition many of these 
countries prohibited establishing any new SOEs so as to avoid the 
repeating of the former disappointment performance of former SOEs and, 
consequently, launching new privatization programs to privatize the new 
SOEs.  
As we mentioned in this thesis, executing privatization program is 
not easy task; it costs a lot of time, money, and effort. The Sudanese 
privatization legislation does not provide for the prohibition of 
establishing new SOEs or even restriction on them; a thing which may, 
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theoretically, result in establishing new SOEs. Because of the 
disappointing performance of the former Sudanese SOEs, the Sudanese 
legislator is required to provide for this meaning in the privatization 
legislation, or to enact a specific legislation to prohibit or limit the 
establishment of new state-owned enterprises. 
(2)Restrictions on Foreign Participation in Privatization: 
Foreign investment can play a very important role in a country’s 
economy and private sector development. Despite the fact that the good 
role of the foreign investment is obvious, it is not uncommon for 
privatization legislation to include express restrictions on participation by 
foreigners in the privatization program in a country. The degree of 
restriction or limitation varies from one country to another according to 
the type and size of the enterprise to be privatized. Followings are 
examples for provisions of restrictions and limitations in different 
countries: 
* In Senegal, Article 11 of Law No.87-23 of August 1987 on SOE’s 
privatization provides: 
 “For each enterprise, the minister with responsibility for the state portfolio 
shall set the proportion of shares that can be transferred in priority to natural or 
juridical persons of Senegalese nationality”.297 
*In Chad, Article 9 of Ordinance No.017/PR/92 of August 1992 on 
divestiture of SOE holdings Provides:  
“In the sale and/or transfer of state held assets, priority shall be accorded to 
natural or juridical persons of Chad nationality”.298 
*In Burkina Faso, Article 10 of Ordinance No. 91-0040/PRES of July 
1991 empowers the minister responsible for SOE supervision to reserve 
in priority a share of each privatization for Burkinabe nationals.299  
                                                 
297 - Beesley and  other, supra 10 p. 121.  
298 - Id. p. 122 
299 - Id. p. 122. 
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*In Brazil, Article 13 of Law No. 8031 of April 1991 limited holding by 
foreigners to 40 percent of voting shares. This restriction has failed by a 
provision taken in October 26, 1993, allowing foreigners to acquire 100 
percent of the shares of privatized SOE.300 
*In Czechoslovakia, Article 3 of the Law of October 1990 on small 
privatizations provides that only national of Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic, and companies or other legal entities whose members or 
owners are all nationals, may become owners of enterprises and assets 
privatized pursuant to this law. The law on large privatizations does not 
contain such a restriction.301 
*In France, Article 10 of the law of August 1986 limited the total amount 
of shares transferred by the state to foreign persons, directly or indirectly, 
to 20 percent of the SOE’s capital. This provision was first amended by 
Article 8 of the Law of July 1993, which provides that this ceiling shall 
not apply to European Union investors; an amendment of April 12, 1996, 
abolished the remaining restrictions.302  
From the above sections, we can say the limitation or restriction of 
foreign investment in the privatization takes three forms: 
a- Absolute priority for the sake of nationals in some African 
countries is imposed (Chad and Senegal).  
b- In some European countries such as Czechoslovakia, the 
size of SOE to be privatized determines the scope of the 
participation of the foreign investment. In the little SOEs, 
foreigners are absolutely prohibited from participation, 
while in the large SOEs; participation of foreign 
investment is unlimited. 
                                                 
300 - Pierre Guislain, supra 2, p. 132.   
301 - Lipton and others , supra 16 p. 139. 
302 -  Pierre Guislain, supra 2 p. 130. 
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c- In some European countries, such as France, the portion 
of foreigners in the privatized SOEs was limited at the 
beginnings of the earlier wave of the privatization. After 
spread of the conception and culture of privatization 
internationally, the limited or restrictive provisions were 
gradually absorbed by new laws. 
d- In Latin American country (Brazil), the limited and 
restrictive provisions for the foreign participation were 
concentrated not according to size of SOEs or the 
percentage  
of shares allowed to foreigners. The limitations and 
restriction is on the controlling power of the foreign 
investors (the voting shares). 
The above restrictions and limitations are detrimental to successful 
privatization processes. This lesson was learned by France and Brazil; 
after introducing restrictions on foreign investors in privatization, they 
abolished them. It is important to note that the success of the objects of 
the European Union compelled France to repeal the restrictive provisions 
in its privatization laws (France is one of the leader countries pressuring 
towards European Unity).  
In the Sudanese privatization Act (Disposition of Public 
Enterprises Act 1990) there are no restrictions on the face of the foreign 
investment. On the contrast, there is clear tendency to maximize the 
participation of foreign investment in the privatization program. This 
appears from the big number of the large SOEs which have been 
privatized by selling or leasing them to foreign investors. Moreover, the 
frequent investment laws (1992, 1999, and 2002) provide for a big 
number of guarantees to the foreign investors about their investments in 
Sudan such as, non confiscation of their investments, non-discrimination 
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against them, and retransfer of their capitals outside Sudan. Many 
Sudanese investors and, even, the public opinion always claim that there 
is a clear discriminative treatment against the Sudanese investors for the 
sake of the foreigners. 
 
 
(3)Special or Golden Shares: 
The golden share technique has been used in some countries like 
France, Belgium, Brazil, Spain, and United Kingdom as a method to 
maintain some governmental control over the privatized company, mainly 
with respect to future transfers of shares. By allowing the government to 
veto some decisions or share transfers, this technique remains state 
control after privatization, even though the state is now only a minority 
shareholder (sometimes with a single share).   
The golden share became an effective device to enable 
governments to control the transfer of blocks of shares of privatized 
airlines, so that any future change in shareholders do not bring the 
enterprise under foreign control, thereby causing it to lose the right to 
operate certain international routes. Golden share is also commonly used 
in privatizing infrastructure companies.  
The rights conferred by golden shares are not, however, necessarily 
limited to controlling shareholder; they can extend to other decisions of 
the company, as they do in Senegal. The Senegalese privatization law 
authorizes the use of special or golden shares in certain circumstances, 
mainly in order to protect the state’s interests as creditor of privatized 
enterprises that have repayment or guarantee obligations to the state. 
Article 14 of the law provides that:  
 “the minister in charge of state holdings may decide by a ministerial order 
that one of the share held by the state in an enterprise to be privatized that has 
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previously received loans guaranteed or onlent by the state shall be converted to a 
special share carrying special rights. The special share allows the minister in charge 
of state holdings, under conditions and procedures prescribed by decree, to ensure 
that the enterprise takes all necessary measures to provide for payment of the loans 
guaranteed or onlent by the state”. 303   
As we have mentioned above, France is among the countries which 
widely used the golden shares technique in its privatization program. The 
experience of France clearly appears the methods and purposes in which 
golden shares are used. Followings are examples of imposing golden 
shares: 
Article 10 of the French Privatization Law of August 6, 1986, 
authorized the minister of the economy to determine, for each of 65 
privatizable companies listed in the annex to Law No. 86-793 of July 2, 
1986,  protection of national interest by that a special share be granted to 
the state. The privatized company’s articles have to be amended 
accordingly.  
Article 10 of the above law reads:  
“The special share allows the Minister of the Economy to approve 
shareholdings by any person or group of persons acting together exceeding %10 of 
the capital. The special share may be permanently converted into an ordinary share 
at any time by an order of the Minister of the Economy. This conversion shall 
normally take place automatically after five years. In cases of violation of the 
provisions of the first paragraph hereof, the holder(s) of the holdings improperly 
acquired may not exercise their voting rights and must transfer such shares within 
three months.” 
 
 In practice, however, there was little application for these 
provisions in the period of 1986-88, and most SOEs were privatized 
without resources to this mechanism. Other legislation in effect at that 
                                                 
303-  Beesley and others, supra 10 p .143.  
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time empowered the government to control, and sometimes block, 
undesirable takeovers.304  
In Sudan, there is no express provision in the privatization 
legislation (Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990) for the golden 
shares, but in many privatizations contracts we have noted that there is 
express mentioning for the golden share. The golden shares have been 
used in many sorts of the privatization contracts in Sudan suck like 
negotiated sales and leases. Golden share in Sudan has been used to 
confer the Sudanese government some sort of control after privatization. 
For example, in Atbara Cement Factory privatization (see the appendix), 
the  
golden share was imposed to remain the company’s objects, forming the 
shape of enterprise after the privatization, and the future transfer of 
shares.  
Followings are the articles of the company’s agreement which 
constitute the golden shares: 
* Article 6-(3) of the agreement provides:  “The second party shall be 
obliged not to amend the objects of the company.” 
* Article 6-(4) provides: “The second party agrees to transform the 
Factory Company from private company to public one after five years from the 
beginning of production operations.” 
 *Article 6-(5) provides:  “The second party agrees not to sell the Factory 
at any time, but, has the right to involve any co-ownership in a sense not effecting the 
terms of this agreement.” 
In the privatization operation of the Real Estate Bank, golden share 
took the shape of transforming the privatized company from private to 
public. Article 7 (second) reads: 
 “Transformation of the Real Estates Bank into private shares company, and, into 
public shares company five years after the transformation into private one.” 
                                                 
304- Guislain, supra 2 p. 134. 
 225
Following table shows samples of golden shares in some Sudanese 
privatization contracts: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table No. (7) Golden shares in some Sudanese privatization operations 
(Continued in the next page) 
SOE Form of Golden share 
 Atbara Cement 
Factory. 
• The purchaser shall not amend the objects of the 
Factory Company. 
• The purchaser agrees to transform the Factory 
Company from private to public, five years after 
privatization. 
• The purchaser is obliged not to sell the Factory at any 
time, but has the right to involve any co-ownership in a 
sense not affecting the terms of the agreement. 
Fine Spinning 
Factory. Khartoum 
North. 
• The purchaser company shall not be entitled to sell the 
Factory at any time before the rehabilitation, but can 
make a partnership with any technical or financial 
partner. 
 
Real Estate Bank • The purchaser shall increase the capital of the Bank to 
fulfil the Central Bank decisions on specialized banks. 
• The objects of the Bank shall include that the bank 
should finance building house complexes by gathering 
the financial resources from the saving of the 
beneficiaries and other financers (banks, corporations, 
organizations, and companies. 
 
Elnilein Industrial 
Development 
• The purchaser agreed to keep the activities of the Bank 
as they are in the law of the Bank (Elnilein Industrial 
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Group. Development Group Law 1994); as developmental 
commercial bank until this law is repealed or amended.  
Friendship Palace 
Hotel. 
• The purchaser is obliged to transform the Hotel into a 
five stars one. 
• The purchaser is obliged to transform the Hotel’s 
company from private to public company. 
White Nile Tannery • The purchaser shall not be entitled, under any 
circumstances, to sell his shares to third party unless by 
a written consent of the vendor. 
The Grand Hotel • The tenant shall not transfer any of his rights or 
liabilities in the contract, wholly or partly, without 
prior written consent of the landlord. 
Illustrated by the researcher.  
 
(v)Preferential Employees Schemes: 
Privatizations laws often require the allocation free or discounted 
shares in privatized companies to specific groups, including employees 
and small shareholders, as well as other special benefits. The reasons for 
such giveaways vary but generally include the object of winning the 
targeted groups over to the privatization cause. These benefits may, for 
instance, create worker support for privatization (or reduce their 
opposition) and favorably impress citizens. For example, in Argentina, a 
portion of the shares, often about 10 percent, has generally been 
embarked for employees under privatization operations. By May 1993 
about 117.000 employees had acquired shareholdings in this way in 64 
privatized SOEs. Employees are allowed to pay for the shares allocated to 
them out of dividends. The Banco de Nacion Argentina is the depository 
for these shares.305    
In Bulgaria, Article 22 and 23 of the 1992 privatization law 
contains such provision with respect to the privatization of SOEs 
                                                 
305 -  Flouret and others, supra12 p. 229. 
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organized under the company law Article 22, which applies to SOEs 
organized as joint-stock companies, states that the discount is 50 percent 
and that up to 20 percent of the shares belonging to the state can be sold 
in this way. It determines the total value of the discount to which each 
worker is entitled at an amount determined according to the worker’s 
seniority and salary, and provides that these preferential employee share 
will be nonvoting shares for the first three years.306 
In France, the privatization law of August 1986 prescribed that 10 
percent of the shares offered for sales had to be set aside to employees 
(and some former employees). It authorized discount for employees of up 
to 20 percent of the share price, with payment in installment of a 
maximum period of three years. Employees receiving a discount of over 5 
percent, could not, however, transfer their shares in the first two years, 
while those granted payment facilities were required to retain them until 
they had paid for them in full. 307 
In Poland, Article 24 of the privatization law provides that up to 20 
percent of shares be reserved for workers of the company at 50 percent 
discount on the sale price to the general public (Polish citizens). 308  
In Sudan the wide powers of the HCDPE in the privatizations 
operations, theoretically, enable it to grant such treatment for the 
employees of the privatized SOE.  In practice, similar treatments were 
practiced in Sudan in privatizations operations of the agricultural SOEs; 
those are White Nile Agricultural Corporation, and Blue Nile Agricultural 
Corporation. A prior contract was concluded between HCDPE and 
Eljanien for Agricultural and Animal Production Co. to lease the two 
agricultural SOEs. This agreement resulted in dispute between the 
government and the farmers of the two SOEs because of tribal and ethnic 
                                                 
306 - Lipton, and others, supra 16 p. 188. 
307 - Guislain supra 2 p. 133. 
308 - Lipton and others, supra 16 p. 190. 
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reasons. Therefore, the government decided to transfer the ownership of 
the two SOEs freely to the farmers. (See Chapter 3) 
The difference between the Sudanese and the international 
experience is that the decision of the Sudanese government (transfer the 
ownership to the farmers) was taken without an express provision in the 
law. In other words HCDPE practised discretionary power to solve the 
farmer’s dispute. 
(vi) Structure of Privatization Law: 
A discussion paper proposed the ideal structure of a privatization 
law. We will mention the proposals of the contents of a privatization law 
from this discussion paper verbatim:309 
Summary of privatization law contents: 
This section sets out what is usually contained in a privatization law. The 
contents of the law and the institutional and decision-making framework 
must avoid over-design and elaborate processes, instead adopting an 
approach that reflects the needs and resources of the country in which it is 
employed. It is desirable that policies, procedures, institutional and 
organizational frameworks contain much of what is set out here so that 
the primary privatization law is not over -burdened. 
Principal Contents of Objectives of a Privatization Law: 
A law should: 
*Make provision to establish an institution responsible for privatization 
(e.g., Privatization Board (PB)) with a supporting executive made up of 
specialists (supported with specialist advice and assistance). 
                                                 
309- Peter Young, Building an Institutional Framework for Privatization: the Importance of Strong 
Institutions, Adam Smith International Limited, a discussion Paper, 2007.     
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* State the powers, duties and functions of the PB and grant the necessary 
authority to the Board to carry out privatization policy and implement 
transactions according to a specified process. 
*Ensure that the PB will be small enough to be effective but 
representative of government, the private sector and different elements of 
society. 
* Ensure that privatization is a private sector activity in a public sector 
setting and brings to bear a mix of commercial, political and 
administrative skills and experience as needed. 
* Enable the PB to meet regularly – e.g., once a month. 
* State what can be privatized – e.g., all government property, broadly 
defined to include direct and indirectly owned, managed or controlled 
property. 
Detailed Provisions of the Privatization Law: 
A privatization law usually has two main types of provisions: 
* Enabling provisions setting out powers, duties and functions. 
* Facilitating provisions permitting the body to undertake certain 
activities which would otherwise be in conflict with prevailing law or the 
responsibilities of other bodies. 
Enabling Provisions:  
These may be provided for in the primary law, in secondary legislation 
(rules or regulations) or in procedures adopted under the authority of the 
primary law. 
* Who can initiate and request the initiation of the process for a specific 
enterprise. 
* Who can prepare the enterprise for privatization? 
* Who can prepare documentation? 
* Who can perform processes? 
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* Who can determine the extent of authority of the privatization body if 
there is a dispute with other parts of government or SOEs? 
* The methods and techniques that can be used. 
* Arrangements for carrying out privatization. 
* Who negotiates? 
* Who signs agreements? 
* Who implements the process and transactions? 
* Who executes steps in the aftermath of a sale? 
* Who monitors ongoing issues? 
* Who resolves conflicts between privatization law and policy and other 
laws and policies? 
* The milestone approval system and who gives the approvals. 
* What happens to revenues raised in sales? 
* Whether there is a need for sunset provisions (i.e. special powers that 
cease after a defined period). 
* Reporting and accountability requirements, including Parliamentary 
oversight, once created. 
Facilitating Provisions: 
These usually provide for: 
* Ease of conveyance and registration of property by the body in a 
manner that expedites the process and determines who has power to vest 
property/title issues. 
* Authority to exercise ownership rights over assets/shares that the 
privatization body does not own, (although it is better if the board owns 
then all, as it makes the negotiation process a lot easier). 
* Entering into agreements on behalf of other bodies to sell the assets of a 
company/unit of government or to re-organize/merge/consolidate 
enterprises or activities. 
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* Management and restructuring prior to - and in the process of – 
privatization (legal/corporate restructuring, financial restructuring and 
ironing out debt issues but rarely production restructuring). 
* Power to perform functions through other bodies might be established, 
or to act through advisers/sub-contractors etc. 
* Power to enforce disclosure of information /co-operation. 
* Power to investigate and obtain information from SOEs and units of 
government. 
* Power to receive and take possession of property, rights, obligations, 
liabilities, shares etc. 
* Power to wind up/dissolve/liquidate/legally restructure/break-up/hive 
off/convert legal form etc (needs examination of interaction with other 
laws, rights and obligations). 
* Powers of entry and inspection. 
* Power to handle claims against bodies. 
* Power to receive payments and to operate a privatization fund/special 
accounts (to be compatible with general government accounting 
requirements). 
* General approach to recurring issues such as (a) debt and non-
performing assets; (b) labor matters including Voluntary Redundancy 
Scheme (VRS)/compensation/protection of rights;(d) other liabilities; and 
(e) use of proceeds. 
* Accountability, audit, prevention of fraud and corruption issues, 
avoidance of conflicts of interest. 
* Financing of on-going costs including liabilities for VRS and other 
employee funding. 
* Appointing advisers. 
* Dealing with borrowings of SOEs. 
* Warehousing of shares (perhaps a privatization trust). 
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* Development of government/public sector asset register. 
* Private financing of infrastructure. 
* Regulatory issues. 
Conclusion: 
Most countries rely upon specific privatization laws to execute 
their privatizations programs. This is the case in most countries regardless 
of the existing legislations that are sufficient to conduct the privatization 
program. Once, however, privatization law is enacted, it must specify the 
requirements of executing a privatization program. Such law must 
accurately list the targeted SOEs for privatization, and its provisions 
should be flexible to include any future SOEs to be privatized. On the 
other hand, many countries began their privatization programs without 
specific law. This was the case in Hungary where the privatization began 
in 1988 with “spontaneous privatization”.   
 It is to be noted that specific privatization legislation may take the 
form of general legislation applicable to all SOEs to be privatized or 
specific law for specific SOE or group of SOEs. In some case, the 
targeted SOEs are specifically named and in others the law addresses one 
or more categories of enterprises without naming them. The scope of 
some specific laws may be limited in time, a thing which weakens the 
government’s position in the negotiations with the buyers, especially 
when the legal time is nearing expiration. A law of general or long scope 
seems to be more rational and accords the state a strong negotiating 
position. The Sudanese privatization legislation (Disposition of Public 
Enterprises Act 1990) is from this category. 
The privatization law intervene in many cases to impose basic rules 
of evaluation of SOE to be privatized, the legal method of privatization, 
and in rare cases, the privatization law may intervene in selecting buyers 
of the SOE. In addition, the privatization legislation, sometimes, 
 233
determines the methods of the evaluation of the privatized SOEs. 
Privatization legislation usually peruses the transparency, but the problem 
is that public officials normally wish to avoid being accused of giving 
away the valuable properties of the society. Therefore, they decided to 
determine high prices of SOEs. High valuation affords them political 
protection in the event that the decision to sell at a given price is disputed. 
Therefore, rational balance is required between the officials’ evaluation 
and the real prices of such SOEs. 
The privatization legislation may put some restrictions, such as the 
exclusion of public agencies as buyers of privatized enterprises, a thing 
which may however be necessary to protect the objects of the 
privatization program. But, in some cases, the privatization legislation 
puts some restrictions in the face of foreign investors to participate in the 
privatization program. We believe that it is not suitable for a legislation to 
include express restrictions on participation by foreigners in the 
privatization program in a country.   
Many countries used the “golden share” to enable governments to 
maintain some control on the SOE’s company after the privatization. The 
rights conferred by golden shares are not; however, necessarily limited to 
controlling matters; they may extend to other decisions of the company 
such like future transfer of shares, or the change of the object of SOEs 
namely in the strategic SOEs like banks and cement factories (in Sudan). 
Privatizations laws may require the allocation free or discounted 
shares in privatized companies to specific groups like employees and 
small shareholders. The reasons for such giveaways vary but generally 
include the objective of winning the targeted groups over to the 
privatization cause. These benefits may, for instance, create workers’ 
support for privatization or reduce their opposition and favorably impress 
citizens. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Institutional Framework for Privatization 
 
  The institutional framework is necessarily required to implement 
and conduct privatizations. The institutional framework defines the roles, 
responsibilities, and authorities of the various actors in the privatization 
operation, such as the legislature, the government, and the transaction 
body.   Despite the fact that the parliament is a legislative authority; in 
many countries, its role in the privatization has been broadening to reach 
conducting privatization operations. The role of the government in the 
institutional framework of privatization appears from that it often 
determines the general policies and appoints the agencies or committees 
of privatization to carry out the privatization program on its behalf. 
Privatization raises very complex legal issues that must be resolved in a 
timely and satisfactory manner. Therefore, international experts of 
privatization often concentrate their recommendations on the necessity of 
accurate adoption of the delegation of power and guarantee of the rule of 
the law principles. These principles are determinant factors in smoothing 
the task of the institutional framework as a whole.  
This chapter firstly investigates the role of the parliament in the 
institutional framework, the main features of the institutional framework 
will annex, and lastly the necessary principles of law that should be 
accompanied with the institutional framework will be performed and 
discussed. 
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(i)Role of the Parliament:  
In most countries the parliament has played an important role in the 
privatization process as evidenced by many privatization laws world 
wide. Some parliaments have given themselves a role in the 
implementation stage, such as the adoption of annual privatization 
programs. This is relatively common in the transition countries, where the 
scope of the privatization law is usually very broad (this is the case in 
Poland as mentioned in Chapter 7). Privatization may also come under 
parliamentary debates as part of the security of the budget law or finance 
act, the program of a new government, parliamentary questions, and so 
on. 
In some cases, legislators have given themselves prerogatives that 
have sometimes led to micromanagement of the privatization process and 
to direct opposition with the government.  
  In Argentina, a joint house senate parliamentary commission 
representing the various politically parties initially had to ratify most 
privatizations. In the early stages, the joint commission played an active 
role in the privatization process, for example, by requiring that the terms 
of the ENTEL (the greatest telecommunications SOE) call for bids be 
modified. The commission’s power have since been curtailed: if it does 
not take a position within thirty days, privatization can proceed.310 
In Hungary, parliament first placed the new privatization agency 
under its own authority (Law No.7 of January 1990). Less than a year 
later, following the criticism of the first privatization operations, the law 
                                                 
310- Francisco Anuatti-Neto, Milton Barossi-Filbo , Antonio Geldson de Carbalvo and Roberto Macedo 
(Ch), Privatization in Latin America; Myths and Reality pp. 192-197, 2005 ed. Stanford University 
Press and the World Bank.  
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was amended to place the agency under the authority of the council of 
ministers.311 
In the Slovak Republic, successive governments have tried to 
cancel privatizations agreed by their predecessors. In 1994, for example, 
the new parliament enacted a law invalidating many privatization 
transactions concluded by the former government shortly before the 
elections of October 1, 1994. However, this law was overturned in May 
1995 by a ruling of the constitutional court that found that the parliament 
had acted beyond its constitutional powers.312 
Degrees of intervention of the parliaments in privatization, with 
regard to the types mentioned above, are generally detrimental to the 
smooth implementation of the privatization program. Members of 
parliaments usually have no tendency to speed up the privatization 
process. As the examples above show, some countries have tried to limit 
the role of the parliament during the execution period. 
International experience with privatization shows that relations 
between parliament and government can be strained at any stage of 
privatization process even where the government is in a bad need for 
enacting the privatization legislation rather than executing such program. 
The bad face of the intervention of the parliament appears from that it 
constrains the privatization from the first step (enacting the required 
legislation). Delays attributable to intervention by parliament may be 
more detrimental in countries with bicameral systems.313 Following are 
examples for tensions between parliament and government:   
*In Poland, the government announced a new program in June 
1990 providing for speedy privatization of about 400 SOE through 
                                                 
311- Anderson, Robert E,. Privatization  in Transitional Economies p.77, 1996 ed., World Bank Policy 
Research Department, Washington DC. 
312 - Id p. 80 
313- Pierre Guislain, The Privatization challenge pp. 149-150, 4th ed. 2001, World Bank Publications, 
Washington DC. 
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investment funds whose shares would be sold to the Polish citizens. 
However, the lower house of parliament, dominated by the opposition, 
succeeded in blocking the project by sending it back for examination at 
the next session of parliament. However, the law was, after long time of 
delaying, enacted on April 30 1993.314  
*The best well known example for tension between government 
and parliament was probably between the Russian Federal government, 
on the one hand, and the national parliament and some local assemblies, 
on the other. Russia experienced countless strains between the 
government and the parliament, which culminated in the overthrow of the 
Supreme Soviet by force and the declaration of early elections in October 
1993.  The shutdown of the parliament provided an opportunity for 
privatization by the stream lining of the process. Before these events, the 
responsibilities for privatization have been divided between the Russian 
Federal Property Fund, responsible for sales and reporting to the Supreme 
Soviet, and the privatization ministry (GKI), responsible for policy and 
answering to the government. Following the overthrow, the minister 
assumed the responsibility for overseeing both organizations and came to 
be in charge of both policy and sales. Much progress of privatization was 
made in this period. The Duma (lower house) that followed the Supreme 
Soviet in December 1993 was less powerful than parliament.315   
*Bulgaria provides another example of the institutional statement 
that can result from conflicts between government and parliament. From 
February 1990, when Zhivkov government took the governance, 
privatization was a priority goal of successive governments. By May 
1990 a privatization bill, drafted by the Ministry of Economic Reform, 
was ready. In addition, several decrees were issued in 1990 to allow for 
                                                 
314 - Anderson and others, supra 2 p. 118. 
315 - Id, p. 126. 
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the privatization process to be started without waiting for the new law to 
be enacted. To speed up the process, the Council of Ministers set up a 
privatization agency by  the Decree No. 16 of February 8, 1991. The 
agency’s function was ambiguous. A year later the agency had still taken 
no major initiative, the small privatization program by the Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce in 1990 had come to a halt, and the privatization 
law drafted in April 1990 and submitted to the national assembly in 
September 1990 had not yet been enacted, even though the government 
had  an absolute majority (over 80 percent from January to October 1991) 
in the national assembly. These delays were largely caused by political 
rivalries and compromises that reflected the lack of confidence among the 
groups involved: the parliament, government, president, parties and 
factions, and privatization agency. The law was finally enacted by the 
national assembly on April 23, 1992, two years after the first draft was 
adopted by the council of ministers, and a new privatization agency 
replaced the one set up in 1991. It then took several months to appoint the 
director general of the agency and members of the oversight council. The 
year 1993 brought other institutional ups and downs. Another government 
decided to replace of the oversight council of the privatization agency 
who had been appointed by the previous government. The members filed 
suits against the decision. The court declared the replacement illegal 
because none of the causes of termination of functions (per Article 12 of 
the 1990 privatization law) were present. Abstractly, because of this 
political struggles: Bulgaria’s privatization program made little harvest 
during this period; only two major privatizations took place between 1990 
and 1993. It is to be noted; during this struggles between the Bulgarian 
politicians, the other Eastern Europe countries Achieved high levels of 
major privatizations operations.316   
                                                 
316 - Id. pp. 134-37. 
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In Sudan, the privatization law was enacted in 1990 by the 
Command Council of Elinqaz Alwatani Revolution during the 
moratorium of the constitution and absence of the parliament. Absence of 
the role of the parliament in the stage of enacting the privatization 
legislation, to some extent, assisted the government to implement and 
speed the privatization operations in Sudan. In its counterpart, the total 
absence of role of elected parliament creates clouds of doubts about the 
credibility of the privatization program as a whole. Despite the 
disadvantages of the deep intervention of the parliament in the 
privatization; the role of the parliament can not be ignored that the 
privatized enterprises are public ownership and members of the 
parliament are presumed to be the representatives of the peoples. In 
addition, the role of the parliament as a monitoring authority should not 
be underestimated. 
 
(ii)Structure of the Institutional Framework: 
Countries around the world have chosen a variety of structures to 
implement their privatization program. The role of the legislature (the 
parliament) has been discussed in the previous part of this chapter. This 
part concerns with the executives bodies. In other words, it deals with the 
agencies or committees of carrying out the privatization.   
 The privatization bodies usually consists of two levels of agencies 
or committees. The first level is the political body (the steering 
committee/agency) which includes the head of the state, or the whole 
government, or group of ministries. The task of this committee (the 
steering body) is to define the privatization program, set its priorities, and 
take the major decisions. The second level is the technical part which is 
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represented by the executive agency which carried different titles in 
different countries like “privatization agency”, “privatization committee”, 
and “technical committee”. While in some countries the structure of 
second level has a total independence from the political apparatus, in the 
others these committees/agencies have no/or/little independence. 
However; at all levels of privatization bodies, depoliticizing and 
institutionalizing structure of privatization bodies are required.  
(1)Depoliticizing the Institutional Framework: 
Privatization is politically dangerous and bound to affect many 
interested groups. These include managements of the SOEs listed to 
privatization, workers who face uncertain future under the new 
ownership, and members of the government itself. 
We can imply that governments are always the  facing the 
accusation of selling out  valuable properties to foreigners, or 
inefficiently promoting ownership by local entrepreneurs. This is more 
likely to occur in instances where the process is not clearly defined or 
lacks transparency. In addition, within government itself, not all ministers 
embrace privatization with equal degree. Concerned ministries will often 
resist the privatization of enterprises under their authority because of the 
loss of the political leverage and power, which they derived from 
controlling SOEs.   
The inclusion of various interested groups in the decision making 
process can transform a privatization program into highly politicized 
event. This, however, results in delays and uncertainty for the bidders 
involved. When foreign investors recognize that politics and 
indecisiveness are central features of a privatization progress, they will 
hesitate to participate, resulting in loss of bidders and potential investors 
for the privatizing government. 
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The case of Goplana (a Polish Chocolate Factory) illustrates 
several of the difficulties which occur when various interest groups have 
power to turn privatization into a highly political event:317Goplana is a 
major polish chocolate plant which had a %15 market share in the early 
1990s. Nestle, already with an established presence in Hungary and the 
Czech Republic, became interested in Poland with its market of 40 
million people. In 1993, when Nestle decided to purchase Goplana, ED & 
F. Man, a British sugar and coca brokers and its partners, had set up a 
joint venture with Goplana management which required only the 
privatization minister’s signature. However, the privatization minister had 
appeared to have reservations regarding the joint venture arrangement. It 
was felt that selling to a “flagship” company such as Nestle would 
promote Poland to other investors. The situation was complicated by the 
fact that the workers, who in Poland hold the veto power over 
privatization transactions, wanted the joint venture arrangement and 
decided to oppose the Nestle deal. At a considerable political lobbying 
and efforts, Nestle eventually managed to get workers on its side, and the 
government announced to hold an open tender for joint venture 
arrangement. In the tender, ED & F. Man’s offer was $35.9 million for 
%46 share of the joint venture vs. Nestlé’s offer of $31.00 million for a 
%47 share. In order to enlist the support of workers, Nestle afforded more 
employment guarantees than ED & F. Man. It also established close 
contact with the workers’ council to resolve exceptional differences. 
Nestle was eventually declared the winner, and the deal was sealed in 
early 1993. 
In Sudan, the problem of the conflicts of interest appears from what 
could be called “ideological interests”. The “ideological interests” in 
                                                 
317 - Kathy Megyery  and Frank Sader, Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatization p.26, 1st ed 
1997, the International Finance Corporation & the World Bank, Washington DC.  
 242
Sudan is a unique practice; we have never noted such practice among the 
international experiences or the international texts of privatization. It is 
correct that some African countries have tailored their privatization laws 
with regard to some ethnic or otherwise measures so as to create some 
sort of internal equilibrium in the distribution of the national wealth (see 
chapter 2 and 3);318but we have not illustrated any ideological balance in 
the privatization laws or operations in theses countries. To explain this, 
we have to note that the current governing regime in Sudan, from the first 
day of its existence, is strongly connected with the international stream of 
the political Islam. This stream has many institutions like banks, finance 
houses, and charity organizations. The objectives of these institutions are 
to spread the Islamic concepts in the investment; for example, prohibition 
of usury in transactions and spread many of the Islamic formulas like 
murabaha, mudaraba, etc... The clear economic relationship between the 
international political-Islam institutions and the current regime in Sudan 
clearly appears from the huge amounts of money which were granted or 
loaned by these institutions to the Sudanese government in the ninetieth 
of the past century   (see chapter 3). Our humble view, selling SOEs to 
these institutions constitutes sort of abuse; therefore, these institutions 
should be dismissed from the competition of selling the Sudanese SOEs. 
Involving these institutions in the Sudanese privatization operations 
widely affected the decision of the privatization committees. 
 
 
Box no. (8): Samples of SOEs Sold to International Islamic Institutions. 
SOE Beneficiary Year
Atbara Cement Factory. 
 
Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami. 
(Sudanese Afro Company for Trade 
2002 
 
                                                 
318 -See Chapter 3  of this dissertation (negotiated sales) 
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Blue Nile Company for Packing and the 
Afro Asian Company for Development. 
 
 
 
Fine Spinning Factory – Khartoum North 
 
 
 
 
 
Sudanese Company for Production and 
Distribution of Shoes (SATA), formerly 
(BATA) 
and Investment). 
 
 
Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami. 
(Sudanese Afro Company  
for Trade and Investment). 
 
 
Dar Al-Maal Al-Islami. 
 Arab Islamic Company for Gulf 
Investment (Al-sharija – United Arab 
Emirates). 
 
 
Dar AL-Maal Al-Islami. 
(Sudanese Afro Company for Trade 
and Investment). 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
2000 
Illustrated by the Researcher. 
 
   Moreover, experts of the World Bank recommend the following: 
“To avoid the politicization of its privatization program, any government 
should be concerned with establishing a clear-cut chain of command, unmistakeably 
specifying the authority to privatize. The right to make individual sales decisions 
should be concentrated to reduce the risk of political interference and lengthy internal 
debates. Of particular importance is the exclusion of any party that has particular 
short-term interests in individual companies, especially the workforce, the 
management, and the line ministries.”319 
 From the above, it is clear that the minister of the line of the 
candidate SOE to privatization should be sacked from its privatization. 
The Sudanese government has not benefited from the advices of the 
international experts of privatization. This is clear from that the 
privatization Act in Sudan (Disposition of Public enterprises Act 1990) 
expressly puts the line minister of SOE to be privatized as a fundamental 
                                                 
319- . Kathy Megyery  and Frank Sader, supra 8 p.22. 
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member in the privatization committee. S.2 of such law provides for the 
establishment of HCDPE to include: 
*The Minister of Finance and National Planning (president). 
*The Minister of Justice and the Attorney General (member). 
*The Minister of the line of the targeted SOE (member). 
*The President of the General Corporation of Investment (member). 
 (2) Institutionalizing Privatizations: 
Any privatization body, especially the executive 
committee/agency, can function effectively only if it is sufficiently 
empowered to execute its mandate. The ability to carry out decisions is 
linked to political commitment that is ensuring the mandate to the 
privatization body and provides sufficient powers, scope and freedom 
from political interference to implement privatization. For investors, the 
knowledge that the agency has a clear mandate and authority will 
increase their trust in the overall process that they are in need to know the 
limits of the authority of their negotiating part.   
As we have previously mentioned, countries have adopted different 
institutional frameworks characterized by varying degrees of 
independence of the privatization body (committee/agency) from the 
political apparatus or the head of the state. At one level, the privatization 
body (the steering committee) is an extension of the political system with 
limited autonomy and authority. This can include specialized government 
ministry or agency as in Poland and Hungary.320 The other options 
concentrated on politically independent and empowered entities as in 
Mexico or Peru.321 
The “executive agency” or commission is the entity that effectively 
implements privatization by actually selling SOEs. It should be 
                                                 
320 - Anderson and other, supra 2 p. 161. 
321-  Francisco Anuatti-Netoto and others, supra 1 p. 211. 
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established as independent agency, reporting only to the steering 
committee. Typically, this agency prepares the guidelines for the sales, 
proposes which enterprises are to be sold and by which legal methods, 
and finally controls the complete sales process until the singings of the 
sales contract. In order not to overburden itself with the time-consuming 
details of individual transactions, such an agency often creates special 
committees or task forces for each particular SOE. These committees 
report back to the agency and make detailed proposals on each sales 
transaction. In addition, the agency should have some support services 
such as legal and technical advisory houses. These will typically provide 
specialized services to the task forces, facilitating their work while 
guaranteeing continuity of the agency’s procedures.   
The dual or the contradicted authorities between the steering 
(privatization body) and the executive body has a bad reflection in the 
performance of the privatization body, and in many cases it resulted in 
delaying the execution of the privatization program as a whole.     
The case of Hungary is a suitable example for the affection of the 
duality in executing the privatization program:322 Hungary privatization 
program, while overall quite successful, has suffered from the creation of 
an institutional twin structure. Initially the task of privatization was 
delegated to the State Property Agency (SPA) directly under the Minister 
of Privatization. After elections in 1992, however, the new government in 
addition created the Hungarian State Holding Company HSHC with the 
mandate to take control over strategic enterprises in which the 
government intended to retain at least some ownership. The new 
government transferred many large SOEs from the SPA to HSHC. Not 
surprisingly, the existence of two privatization agencies created political 
tensions, overlapping authority, and, consequently, confusion over the 
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effective responsibility for privatization in Hungary. By late 1994, the 
decision has been taken to group the two bodies under the supervision of 
a specially appointed commissioner, motivated in large part by the desire 
to stream line the process for investors. However, this process proved 
politically difficult, and Hungary’s privatization program came to a 
virtual halt until mid-1995.323 
  After mentioning the Hungarian experience, it is important to say 
that clear separation of the responsibilities between the political steering 
committee and the executive agency is fundamental in the success of 
privatization program. The segregation of the roles of the steering and the 
technical bodies is a necessary precondition in that it separates decision-
making on particular issues that are primarily political from the task of 
“selling”. Typically, the clearer the distinction between the two levels, the 
more likely that the executive or technical committee is equipped to 
handle transactions in neutral way. 
    Peru is a good example of countries which presented a good level 
of independence of privatization bodies. Peru’s privatization agency 
COPRI represents an excellent example of the ideal relationship between 
the government and the privatization agency. The COPRI is very 
independent and operates outside the political environment. This freedom 
was certainly a key factor in speeding up the process and rendering fast 
decisions. COPRI’s board, which consists of five key ministers, sets 
policies and objectives. Under it, the Executive Directorate (ED) has a 
relatively small staff of only 14 employees who coordinate the transaction 
                                                 
323 - In Poland, privatization has been a highly politicized process since its beginning. The impact of 
this has been compounded by the frequent elections. There have been five ministers since the program 
formally got underway. This has resulted in frequent changes in policy direction, privatization priorities 
and strategies as well as of the teams in place. Further, the Polish can require authorization from 
several levels of government and ministers as well as approval of mangers and workers. For foreign 
investors, the complexity of understanding the role of various players, discontinuity in procedures and 
the difficulty of establishing on-going relationships have been major impediments to investing in 
Poland in the context of privatization. (See Anderson, Robert E., supra note 2 p.  185).  
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work which is effectively conducted by the special committees called 
CEPRIs. Each CEPRI has three to four top executives, usually from the 
private sector, with one committee for each SOE to be privatized.324 
Based on this structure, Peru managed to develop one of the most 
effective privatization programs in the world. Privatization has, to a long 
extent, been unaffected by short term political concerns. Dynamic and 
highly motivated staffs combined with the experience of the senior 
managers in the CEPRIs have resulted in a very smooth process, and 
virtually all investors involved praise the agency for its efficiency, 
fairness, and technical skills. The result has been an intense competition 
for most of the enterprises for sale, translating into sales prices often 
beyond the most optimistic expectations of COPRI itself.325 
  Ghana and Mozambique, for example, created a similar 
institutional frame work without being a subject to great political 
interference. Both privatization agencies, Ghana’s DIC as well as 
Mozambique’s UTRE, were established as similarly independent 
agencies in carrying out privatization transactions. Legally, both have the 
authority to conduct sell-off, and are quite capable of concluding 
privatizations in a reasonably efficient manner despite some investor 
criticisms that they seem to suffer from a lack of sufficient technical and 
financial skills. In practice, however, political intervention is not unusual 
that individual ministers or even the heads of the state themselves 
intervene by overturning decisions by the privatization agencies.326 
  In Argentina, SOEs were primarily entrusted to the Ministry of 
Economy with only some failing under the responsibility of the ministry 
of defence. Mexico’s UDP was established directly under the control of 
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the Ministry of Finance. Both arrangements appear to lend themselves to 
substantial political interference. In fact, however, this does not occur, 
and both agencies managed to operate very efficiently. The Mexican 
government was well aware of the dangers of politics and bureaucracy in 
privatization, and, driven by the desire for an efficient administrative 
solution, it granted the agency broad powers and autonomy. In Argentina, 
the success of the privatization is attributed in large part to the great will 
of the president in harnessing privatization to support his economic 
reforming program. His commitment and drive actually overcame some 
of the short-comings of the institutional framework.327 
 From the above experiences; one may think that the only 
measurement of the good performance of the privatization agencies is the 
independency of the privatization bodies. But, Peru’s experience clearly 
appears that independence of the privatization bodies is not the only 
measurement; the real measurement is member’s capability to resist 
political interference.   
  We have mentioned that the instability of the privatization body by 
creating additional bodies with contradicted authority (like in Hungary), 
or by frequent change of the executive privatization body (like in Poland). 
It is clear that the Sudanese government has not benefited from 
international experience in guaranteeing reasonable stability in the 
structure of the privatization bodies (steering and executive committees). 
As we mentioned above, the instability and frequent changes in the 
structure of the privatization bodies make foreign and local investors 
hesitate to involve in the privatization program in a country. The 
Sudanese government committed the same bad practise of the Polish 
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government. In Poland, seven privatization ministers were appointed in a 
period of five years.328 
Box no.9 below shows the number of frequent changes in the 
structure of the steering (HCDPE) and executive committees (TCDPE) of 
the privatization in Sudan. 
 
Table No. (9): Changes in the structure of the Privatization Bodies in Sudan (continued 
in the next page). 
Committee President Course 
Higher Committee for Disposition 
of Public Enterprises (HCDPE). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical Committee For 
Disposition of Public Enterprises 
(TCDPE). 
1- Abd-Elraheem Humdi. 
2- Abdallah Hassan Ahmed. 
3- Dr. Abd-Elwahab Osman. 
4- Dr. Mohammad Khair Elzobier 
5- Abd-Elraheem Humdi. 
6- Elzobier Ahmed Elhassan. 
 
 
 
1- Ali Mohammad Osman Yassin. 
2- Dr. Omer Mukhtar Ojool. 
3- Mohammad Elhassan Abd-
Elsamad. 
4- Hafiz Atta-Elmannan 
5- Abdelrahman Omer Hassan 
6- Abd-Elrahman Noor Eldeen. 
1990-1992. 
1992-1994. 
1995-2001. 
2001. 
2001-2003. 
2003-2007. 
 
 
 
1990- 1992. 
1992-1998. 
1998-1999. 
 
2003-2005. 
2005-2006 
2006 …… 
Illustrated by the researcher from annual reports of HCDPE 
 
  Despite that s.3 of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Act 1990 
clearly determines the steering committee (HCDPE) to exercise the 
mission of signing final contracts of privatization; HCDPE, TCDPE and 
the Vice-Governor of the central bank have interchangeably signinged the 
final contracts. The dual authority which affected the execution of the 
                                                 
328 - See the foot note no. 14. 
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privatization program in Hungary (mentioned above), has similarly been 
practised in Sudan. Tableo No.10 appears such mess. 
 
Box no. (10):  Mess in Signing the Final privatization Contracts in Sudan 
(Continued in the next page). 
Privatization Contract Privatization 
Method 
Signature Year 
Real Estate Bank 
 
Elnilein Industrial Development  
Bank 
Atbara Cement Factory 
 
Blue Nile Co. for Backing and 
the Afro-Asian Co. for 
Development 
 
 
Sudanese Co. for Shoes 
Production  and  
Distribution 
Fine Spinning Factory-
Khartoum North 
El- Khartoum Bank 
Friendship Palace Hotel 
 
White NileTannery 
 
The Grand Hotel 
Tender 
 
Tender 
 
Negotiated Sale 
 
Negotiated Sale 
 
 
 
 
Negotiated Sale 
 
 
Negotiated Sale 
 
Tender 
Tender 
 
Tender 
 
Lease 
Minister of Finance and National 
Economy (HCDPE) 
Vice-Governor of the Bank of 
Sudan
Minister of Finance and 
National Economy (HCDPE) 
Technical Committee for 
Disposition of Public 
Enterprises 
 
 
 
Technical Committee for 
Disposition of Public 
Enterprises 
 
Technical Committee for 
Disposition of Public 
Enterprises 
Governor of the Bank of 
Sudan 
Minister of Finance and 
National Economy 
igher Committee for 
Disposition of Public 
Enterprises 
2002 
 
2006 
 
2002 
 
2002 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
1997 
 
2005 
2002 
 
1992 
 
   - 
 251
Minister of Finance 
(HCDPE). 
Illustrated by the researcher. 
 
With regard to the levels of independence of privatization bodies, 
the privatization body in Sudan is a governmental body which functions 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. According to the 
privatization law, the president of HCDPE is the Minister of Finance and 
National Economy, and the contracts of the privatization are signed by 
him. While the HCDPE is steering committee of the privatization in 
Sudan; the executive body of the privatization in Sudan is TCDPE which 
is responsible for preparation of targeted SOEs by rehabilitating them, 
terminating the service of their employees, winding up some of them if 
the situation so requires, make the required advertisement, and the like.329 
To compare the Sudanese case with the international experience; 
the following should be noted:   
According to the Disposition of Pubic Enterprises Act 1990, 
TCDPE is the executive body of the privatization operations in Sudan. It 
is really, the entity that practically applies privatization by selling out 
most of the Sudanese SOEs. There are clouds of doubts about  the 
independency of such committee, at least, at the beginnings of the 
execution of the Sudanese privatization program at the early ninetieths of 
the past century. In this period the country was in a very bad economic 
situation, a thing which compelled the government to intervene in the 
missions of TCDPE so as to foster the divestiture of SOEs. In our humble 
opinion, the governmental intervention strongly affected the evaluation of 
SOEs (see chapter 3). The ideological stream of the regime at the time of 
                                                 
329 - See s.6 of the Disposition of Public Enterprise Act 1990. 
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launching the privatization operations in Sudan also affected the role of 
the TCDPE in the selection of buyers (see Table No.8). 
TCDPE has not created any special committees or task forces for 
each particular SOE so as to benefit from their detailed proposal on each 
sales transaction. Therefore, TCDPE had been overburdened with time-
consuming details of individual transactions. Therefore, TCDPE is now 
required to create these committees or other bodies to avoid time 
consumption. 
 TCDPE, in all the privatization operations, depended on its legal 
consultant (appointed as a representative of the Attorney General 
Chamber). Frankly speaking, the nature and size of some privatization 
operations are beyond the capacity of the legal consultant of TCDPE. 
Therefore, TCDPE should pursue efficient legal advisory body. This will 
provide specialized legal services on all branches of law, facilitate the 
legal work, and guarantee   precise privatization contracts.330 
   
 
 
(i)Fundamental Principles for the Institutional Framework: 
According to international legal experts of privatization;331strict 
application of principles of guarantee of the rule of law and delegation of 
powers strongly emanate the  institutional framework of privatization. 
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 Guarantee of the rule of the law in a country represents the first 
step for investors to invest in the privatised SOEs, a thing which will 
inevitably reflect in the success of the privatization program as a whole. 
Assurance of the principle of the rule of the law in a country provides 
many advantages for the privatization program; it provides many 
guarantees for investors, especially the foreigners. In addition, the 
delegations of powers represent the corner stone in smoothing 
privatization operations. Without reasonable delegation of powers, 
transactions of privatization will become very sophisticated and difficult, 
the matter that may result in reluctance of   investors from participating in 
the privatization.  
(a)Guarantee of the Rule of the Law: 
The rule of the law implies certain legal concepts. For example: 
*Publicity of the rule of the law; which enables all parties to have access 
to the laws and regulations that affect their activities after privatization. 
*clarity and certainty of laws and regulations allow parties to understand 
the specific meaning of the law, and to understand which individual laws 
apply to their particular situation. 
*Predictability in the application of the rule of the law reduces the risks 
linked to changing interpretation, implementation, and enforcements of 
laws. In addition, it constitute strong guarantee for buyers that their 
properties will never be renationalized. 
*Systematic stability provides assurance that the government will not 
unilaterally and unfavourably change the legal and regulatory conditions 
that underlie investment. 
Guarantee of the rule of the law also implies limitations in the 
power of the government to interfere in private economic activity. This 
means that the state redefines its role in the economy as well as its 
relationship with the private sector. 
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About the guarantee of the rule of the law in Sudan; it is better to 
declare our opinion frankly. The recent government in Sudan has 
functioned in a dictatorial environment where human rights are violated, 
political interference in the privatization operations usually occurs, 
corruption, and favouritism for the sake of the supporters of the regime 
are the norms. This makes institutional framework incredible and for 
most investors because it increases investment risks.  
Our humble view is that in Sudan, what appears in the statutes does 
not necessarily represent the reality. It is true that all Sudanese statues 
are, theoretically, just and equitable, but the strict application of these 
statutes remains the basic challenge of achieving the rule of the law. 
However, the settings in Sudan motivate us to mention the 
Chaudhri’s statement : 
 “The law at any given time and place can be best understood, not on the basis 
of what is written down, or what “the president” and other dignitaries of the regime 
say in their political pronouncements, but rather on what are the prevailing 
determinants of police and administrative behaviour in any particular locality.”332 
(b)Delegation of Powers: 
  In order to be practical and effective; privatization legislation 
should grant wide powers to the privatization commission or agency, 
clearly define the responsibilities of the commission/agency and its 
members, addresses conflicts of interest, streamline the decision making 
process in order to avoid bureaucracy, and establish controls to check 
abuses of power.  
Perhaps one of the acute problems with existing privatization 
structures in the least developing countries is that the executive 
committees of privatization have very little power and discretion because 
the real decision of what and to whom is exercised by the politicians. 
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Another problem is that, in most cases, the privatization legislation does 
not adequately address the issue of conflicts of interest.333   
Conclusion: 
 This chapter is basically devoted to the institutional framework of 
the privatization; it determines the roles, responsibilities, and authorities 
of all actors in privatization operations. In some countries parliaments 
gave themselves prerogatives to participate, even, in the execution step, a 
thing which leads to direct tensions with the governments. In other 
countries parliaments evidenced very important role in passing flexible 
privatization legislations without intervention in the executive steps. In 
other words, if the role of the parliament exceeds passing of proper 
privatization law to reach the executive details; this will create very 
sophisticated steps, a thing which implies the negative role of the 
parliament. 
For the sake of the execution of successful privatization program, a 
country should adopt institutalized program. For investors, the knowledge 
that certain agency or committee has a clear mandate and authority will 
increase their trust in the overall privatization process. The steering 
committee usually is an extension of the political apparatus with limited 
autonomy and authority. The executive agency or committee is the entity 
that effectively implements privatization by actually selling the SOEs. It 
should be established as independent agency, reporting only to the 
steering committee. Typically, this agency develops the guidelines for the 
sales, proposes which enterprises are to be sold by which legal methods, 
and finally controls the complete sales process until singings privatization 
contracts.  
For the sake of executing success privatization program, a 
distinction should be made between the responsibilities of the two 
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agencies (steering and executive) to avoid the mess in exercising their 
authorities. Also, the stability of the structure and personnel of the two 
governmental bodies will provide the trust of the investors. 
Unfortunately, the Sudanese government has not benefited from the 
international experience in both trends. 
The important element in succeeding the privatization program is 
the depoliticizing of the institutional framework of the privatization. The 
obvious cause of the depoliticizing of the institutional framework is the 
usual struggle between the different interested groups in the country, 
therefore, liberalizing the executive bodies of the privatization from any 
political pressure will lead to achieve clear privatization program without 
favouritism or any other sort of corruption. 
Application of some legal principles strongly assists the functions 
of the institutional framework of privatization. For example, delegation of 
powers assists the privatization processes at the stage of the execution of 
the program or concluding the privatization contracts. Other principles, 
like guarantee of the role of the law constitute important grounds for the 
success of the program at the stage of prior preparation before the 
implementation, and, even, in the execution stage. Therefore, both 
principles are integral parts in achieving the success of the program as a 
whole. 
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Chapter 9 
 
Privatization of Infrastructure 
 
The preceding chapters cover privatization operations in general 
without differentiation between sectors and state owned enterprises 
(SOEs). But in some sectors, some approaches and techniques that have 
to be adopted, especially in the infrastructure sectors such as power, gas, 
water, telecommunications, and transport. In most countries worldwide 
infrastructure sectors are, or were, usually thought to exhibit monopoly 
characteristics; that is, one operator should be able to provide these 
services more efficiently than could several operators acting separately. 
The feasibility of the monopolistic sector has been losing its 
ground since the early 1980s because of many factors. The most 
important factor, however, is that the technological progress and the 
advances in economic research reduced sunk costs and, consequently, the 
economic causes for remaining the monopolies of the sectors. Another 
factor appears from that the successful demonopoliztion and privatization 
in the United Kingdom and other countries emanated this direction or, at 
least, the thinking of demonopolizing and privatizing these sectors (See 
the introductory chapter).  
The movement towards demonopoliztion and privatization has not 
been uniform. One set of countries; the industrial countries (New 
Zealand, United Kingdom) and better-off developing countries 
(Argentina, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico) privatized major infrastructure 
sectors relatively early on as a part of broader privatization program. In 
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another group; most transitional countries and poorer developing 
countries are still now hesitating in privatizing infrastructure sectors.334   
Transferring infrastructure sectors to private investors has often 
been accompanied with prior restructurings. Most of restructurings 
(mentioned in privatization texts) are of economic nature. The most legal-
relate restructure is unbundling the sector; it means dividing the 
infrastructure sector into number of segments so as to undergo 
privatization on one or more of the sector’s segments. The privatized 
segment may carry new legal entity, or may remain belonging to its 
mother sector.  
This chapter, in the beginning, overviews the history of the private 
sector contribution in some infrastructure sectors, restructuring of sectors 
(namely unbundling) to be privatized will annex, and infrastructure 
privatization methods will be discussed at the end. 
 
(i)Historical Background of Infrastructure: 
 As a first impression, one may think that infrastructure sectors 
services were initially stared as public sector activities. This is not always 
the reality that infrastructures in many countries were initially started as 
private activities. Thereafter, according to different circumstances, they 
were transformed into public sector activities.335 The following overview 
shows these circumstances.   
                                                 
334 - This is not a common rule that in Cote d’Ivoire that the water supplies is a private sector service. 
Private management of Cote d’Ivoire’s water supply has improved efficiency. The experience also 
reveals the limitation of management contracts and leases as long-run substitutes for private ownership 
and good regularity policies: see “Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary Shirley, Privatization, the 
Lessons of Experience p.51, 1st ed. 1992, World Bank Publications, Washington, DC.” 
335 - It is important to bear in mind that many large infrastructure services across the world have not 
been always public. In few countries, infrastructure companies have always been and remain today on 
private hands. This is the case in the United States, which largely escaped the nationalization waves of 
the past century, with a few exceptions such as water supply and sanitation services (which are often 
run directly by municipal enterprises), some electric utilities, and some railways taken by the 
government following their bankruptcy, most infrastructure companies have always been private. See 
Foreman-Peck and Millward, Public and Private Ownership of British Industry, 1820-1990. pp. 335-
341, 1994 ed. Oxford England: Clarendon Press. 
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(1)Water: 
In Paris, the brothers Perrier distributed waters through wooden 
pipes in what was the first modern water system (1782). Thereafter, 
concession technique became prevalent in France in the nineteenth 
century, which saw the establishment of two large private water 
companies which still dominate the French water service; Compagine 
Generale des Eaux, founded in 1853, and Lyonnaise de Eaux, founded in 
1880. The fact that France, a   country that has championed the cause of 
public services and pubic enterprises, is among the few countries in 
which this sector has remained largely private is indeed notable. Private 
water concessions were also granted in England and in many other 
European cities, such as Berlin (1856) and Barcelona (1867).336 
 “In the United States of America, in 1800, private firms owned fifteen of the sixteen 
waterworks that has thus far been constructed to the few and small cities of 
predominantly ruler Unite States”. 337 
 Private provision of water services was not limited to industrial 
countries. In Morocco, for example, the water distribution system was 
developed on a private basis starting around 1914. But, after 
independence in 1956 concession with private (French) operators were 
not renewed and municipal utilities were set to take over the systems. A 
private company still provides more than one-third of Casablanca’s bulk 
water supply, however, based on a 50-year concession granted in 1994 
and is negotiating for a concession to distribute water and power in 
Casablanca.338 In Cote d’Ivoire, the water sector has been and remains 
private on a lease or affermage.339 
                                                 
336 - Pierre Guislain, the Privatization Challenge pp. 204-5, 4th ed. 2001, World Bank Publication. 
Washington DC. 
337 - Jacobson and Tarr, Ownership and Financing of infrastructure: Historical Perspectives p. 11, 1995 
ed. World Bank, Policy Research Department, Washington DC. 
338 -  Guislain, supra 3 p. 206. 
339 - In 1959, the third largest French water utility (SAUR) created an Ivorian subsidiary, the Cote 
d’Ivoire Water Distribution Company (SODECI). In 1960 SODECI won its first competitive to operate 
and maintain Abidjan’s water supply system. Under a mix of affermage (lease) and management and 
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 Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala, Italy, Macao, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States are among the countries that have 
private water distribution companies at present, some of them privatized 
recently. Malaysia and Mexico are among those with private water 
treatment and sewerage stations.340 
With regard to the economic situation in the period immediately 
following the beginning of the colonization in 1898, and through the 
national governance, one may think that water supplies in Sudan  began 
as public activity. In contrast, water supplies in Sudan began as a private 
activity operated by the English company “Sudan Light and Power 
Company”. 
By building some British neighbourhoods east of General 
Governor Palace in Khartoum, the British authorities found that it is 
important to provide clean water supplies in accordance with the 
measurement of the International Health Organization. Therefore, in 
1900, the authorities drilled the first well with water-pump to supply the 
                                                                                                                                            
concession contracts, it gradually added to its portfolio the management of sewerage and drainage 
system and small urban and rural water supply systems throughout the country. In 1978, the 
company’s shares began trading in the Ivorian stock market. Private Ivorian now holds 46 percent of 
its share capital, with SAUR retaining 46 percent, employees 5 percent, and the state 3 percent. 
  Thanks to the technical and managerial expertise of its foreign partner and the strong 
contractual incentives to cut costs, CODECI achieved remarkable results in the urban areas. By the 
late 1980s water losses had been cut to 12 percent and the collection rate had been raised to 98 
percent for private consumers. At 130 water connections per employee, labour productivity was twice 
that of the next-best West African Water Utility. Moreover, the number of expatriate staff has declined 
from forty to twelve. 
  Despite SODESI’s good record, overall performance in the water sector fared poorly because 
of the government’s investment and pricing policies. For example, the government discriminated 
against urban industrial consumers to subsidize rural investments and insisted that free connections by 
providing for targeting urban groups. Over a brief period tariffs were doubled for industrial 
consumers, curbing their production and thus reducing jobs opportunities. Overinvestment led to 
underutilized capacity 50 percent in Abidjan and 28 percent in other urban areas – and a break down 
in sector finances. In the mid-1980s the government attempted to sell to SODECI the water supply 
infrastructure that it manages (and the associated debts), but the company lacked sufficient capital to 
purchase the assets. In 1980 the government granted SODECI a further concession for urban water 
supply. Unlike the previous affermage relationship, this contract for the first makes the company 
responsible for financing future investments in urban water supply. SODECI’s experience shows that 
privatization of management is a good beginning but is only a temporary solution in sectors in which 
the government controls prices and investment policies. (See Sunita Kikeri, John Nellis and Mary 
Shirley, Privatization, the Lessons of Experience p.51, 1st ed. 1992, World Bank Publications, 
Washington, DC.) 
340- See Sunita Kikeri and Others in the supra footnote 6, p. 54. 
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Palace of the General Governor and the British neighbourhoods with 
clean water. After the success of the first experience, the authorities 
thought that it is suitable to widen water service to include the entire 
Khartoum. Therefore, Sudan Light & Power Company built the first Nile 
water sanitation station in Burri in 1924-1925 with design-capacity of 
16.000 cubic meters per-day. In the years 1927-1936, Biet-Elmaal Water 
Station was concluded with design-capacity of 20.000 cubic meters per-
day to supply Omdurman neighbourhoods. In 1954, Khartoum-North 
sanitation station was built with design-capacity of 12.000 cubic meters 
per-day to supply the neighbourhoods of the city. After the independence, 
the Sudanese government purchased all the shares of the English 
company (Sudan Light and Power Company) and, in 1957, enacted a law 
determining the Central Administration of Electricity and Water (public 
sector) to provide electricity and water services in Khartoum and some 
other regional cities like Wad-Madani and Sinnar. Water and electricity 
services in the other cities were undertook by the Ministry of Public 
Works. The most important development in water supply happened in the 
period 1964-1974 by completing the four steps of Elmugran Water 
Station to satisfy the whole needs of Khartoum and Omdurman cities, 
with design- capacity of 72.000 cubic meters per-day. During the period 
1925-1954, water supplies in Khartoum-North and Omdurman was 
known as Elnaggata (i.e. dripping system), because of the weak stream of 
water supplies in this period. But such system had gradually been 
changed to reach the recent system of water supply in 1954.341 
  
(2)Energy: 
                                                 
341- Source of all information about the historical developments of water services in Sudan is booklet 
from Khrtoum Water Corporation, titled “Life Journey” (translated by the researcher). 
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Gas utilities were established in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, primarily for lighting and heating purposes. London was the first 
city to install gas street lighting in 1813. The Imperial Continental Gas 
Association, established in 1824 in London, soon spread to the continent. 
In 1818 Brussels gave a concession to a private company to build the first 
public gas lighting system on the continent. Other cities soon followed. In 
addition to street lighting, gas became a major source of industrial and 
household energy. The strategic importance of gas industry started to 
decline with the advent of the power industry, only to regain some 
importance in the 1970s and afterward with the introduction of natural 
gas.342   
The invention of the generator by Zenobe Gramme in 1869 and of 
the light bulb by Thomas Edison in 1879, as well as the introduction of 
alternating current by Westinghouse in the late 1880s, all contributed   to 
the development of franchises for street lighting, electric street cars, and 
power distribution in the United States and Europe. In Belgium, Russia, 
and other countries, private tramway companies, which converted from 
horse-drawn or steam carriages to electric power in 1880s, used existing 
networks to bid for lighting and later power distribution concessions, 
hence becoming the pioneers of the electric power industry. Private gas 
distribution companies in Belgium, France, and Portugal were also quick 
to enter this new business, because it was a direct threat to their 
established franchises.343    
In the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, most 
electricity companies started out private. They have to a large extent 
remained private in Belgium, the United States, and some other countries. 
Colombia (in several stages beginning in the 1930s), France (1945), 
                                                 
342 -  Jacobson and Tarr, supra4 p. 16. 
343 - Id p.21. 
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Indonesia (1953) and Jamaica (1971), however, nationalized their power 
companies, while India and Philippines opted to nationalize some, but not 
all, private power companies. In Argentina, Chile, and the United 
Kingdom events have come full circle, their power companies were 
initially private, then nationalized, and finally privatized.344 
Nationalizations typically either represented a response to 
excessive fragmentation of the electric power industry, which prevented 
integration of networks and achievement of technically feasible 
economies of scale, or resulted from a failure in regulation or from 
ideological or nationalistic trends. The recent privatization came about for 
a number of reasons, headed by the huge investment in this sector, 
estimates at over $100 billion a year for the developing countries alone, 
requirement that exhausted public treasuries cannot afford to finance.345 
As well as the water services, electricity industry in Sudan began in 
1908 to supply the Palace of the General Governor, some neighbourhoods 
eastern the palace, and some governmental units by a private company; 
that is Sudan Light and Power Company which was English company. As 
we have previously mentioned, the Sudanese government purchased all 
shares of this company in 1957 (See footnote no 8). 
 The intervention of the public sector in the electricity industry in 
Sudan happened gradually by building Sinnar Dam in 1926 by the 
government. Sinnar Dam was basically built to supply the main channel 
of the Jazeera Agricultural Scheme. Two years after, the dam began to 
generate limited electricity power. The most important intervention of the 
public sector in the electricity industry was by the establishment of AL-
Rusairis Dam in the era of the President Ismiel Al-Azhari in the second 
                                                 
344 - Id p.25. 
345 - Klein Michael and Neil D. Roger, Back to Future: The Potential in Infrastructure Privatization p. 
222, 1994 ed., New York: Oxford University Press.   
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democracy (1966). In the same year, the Act of the Central Electricity and 
Water Corporation was enacted.    
    
(3)Transport:  
In the United Kingdom, private companies built and operated the 
railways under charters of the parliament. Horse traction was initially 
used until the Stockton and Darlington railway, inaugurated in 1825, 
introduced steam Locomotives; it was also the first to carry freight as 
well as passengers and to operate as a common carrier railway open to all 
shippers. The railways were nationalized in 1914 for war-relate reasons, 
privatized in 1921, renationalized in 1948 under British Rail. The US 
railways were developed in the nineteenth century by private industrialist, 
and they are mostly still private. A few were nationalized as a result of 
bankruptcy of private operators; of those, Conrail has since been 
privatized again, and Amtrak is still state-owned. Many concessions in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire were granted to the private sector from 
1836 onward, but the sector was nationalized in 1891 by the Hungarian 
government and in 1891 by the Austrian government.346    
 In France, railway lines were also developed and operated by 
private interests in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but were 
based on a national system established by the state as early as 1842. The 
basic infrastructure of the main lines was planned and financed by the 
state, whereas the superstructure (including ballast, tracks, signalling 
system, and stations was provided and financed by the private companies 
operating under concession scheme. The whole system was nationalized 
in 1937, when the Societe Nationale des Fer Francais was established. In 
                                                 
346 -  Jacobson and Tarr, supra4 p. 31. 
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Belgium, private investors were the dominant players in the early stages 
of railroad development, but the state gradually took over.347 
  In Argentina, the railways were by and large built and financed by 
the British and French companies starting in 1854, when the first 
concession was granted; they were nationalized against compensation by 
the Peronist regime in 1946-47 and reprivatized beginning 1991.348 
 A number of African railways were privately developed and 
operated, including the Benguela railways in Angola, completed in 1928 
based on a 99-years concession granted in 1902 by the Portuguese 
government.349  
 In Sudan, one of the most important transportation infrastructures 
is the railways. Sudan is a very wide extended country; its area equalizes 
a continent area. Until 1897, there are no paved or, even, gravel roads 
(Which were widely spread around the world at that era). All roads in 
Sudan before 1897, if existed, were earth roads or dirty tracks. 
 The Sudanese railway was firstly established in the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century (in 1873) in the era of the Turkish-
Egyptian governance by establishing Halfa-Karma line, but the line 
stopped at Saras (54 km. South of Halfa) because of the deficit of the 
budget of the line. The beginnings of Sudanese railways continued again 
by the ends of the nineteenth century (in 1897) to supply the British army 
to re-colonize Sudan from the hands of Al-Mahadia Revolution which 
liberalized Sudan from the Turkish-Egyptian colonization in 1885. Most 
of the Sudanese railways were completed by 1930. However, after the re-
colonization in 1898, railways strongly imposed itself in the Sudanese life 
                                                 
347- Guislain, supra 3 pp. 207-8. 
348 - Kopicki, Roland and Louis S. Thompson pp. 138-39, Best Methods of Railway Restructuring and 
Privatization, 1995 ed. World Bank Publications, Washington DC. 
349 -Gerald Bisong Tanyi, Designing Privatization Strategies in Africa: Law, Economics and 
Practice p. 161, 1st ed. 2004, Praeger Publishers, USA. 
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because it remained, and for a long period of time, the exclusive 
transporter in the country whether in passengers or cargo activities.   
In the era of May regime (1969-1985) in, politics involved and 
destroyed the good role of the Sudan Railways Corporation in the 
Sudanese life economically and socially. After the famous dispute 
between the railways labourers and May regime (1981), President 
Numairi decided to weaken such sector. President Numairi separated the 
Ports Corporation, River Transport Corporation, and Hotels 
Administration with all their assets from their mother corporation 
(Railways Corporation). It is important to note that the whole assets of 
the separated corporations were initially built and financed by the 
Railways Corporation. The second step to weaken the Railways 
Corporation was by reducing the subsidy of the state, and the   transfer 
the location of the head quarter of the administration from Atbara city to 
Khartoum, despite the fact that all the important departments like spare-
parts stores, and repair centres were located in Atbara.     
The recent Sudan railway is one of the longest railways in Africa. 
It operates a 4578 Km. The railway’s main route extends from Port Sudan 
via Atbara to Khartoum with an alternate line between Haya and Sinnar 
via Kassala. There are branch lines north to Karima and Wadi Halfa. The 
latest extensions include new lines for transportation of Sudanese crude 
oil constructed between Al-Mujlad and Abujabra (53 km.), and between 
the refinery in Abu-Khiraiz and Al-Obied station (10 km.), and Marawi 
Dam branch line from Al-Ban station, all completed between the years 
1996 and 2002.350  
                                                 
350 - Source of all information about the history of the railways in Sudan is a booklet, titled “Sudan 
Railways Corporation: Facts and Figures 2007”. Published by Sudan Railways Corporation. 
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Despite the governmental nature of building and operating the 
railways in Sudan, some features of privatization have appeared in the 
Sudanese railways (mentioned in another part of this chapter). 
 
 (4)Telecommunications: 
 In USA, the first telegram was sent in 1844 from Baltimore, 
Maryland, to Washington DC, by Samuel Morse. In England, private 
companies established telegraph links beginning in the mid-nineteenth 
century and telephone links toward the end of the nineteenth century. The 
period 1849-50 saw the birth of at least half a dozen private companies 
whose purpose was to link different countries by telegraph cable laid 
under the English Channel, between England and Ireland.351  
Most international telegraph concessions awarded in the second 
half of the nineteenth century were for an unlimited duration, but 
included fixed-term exclusivity rights. Whereas development of 
international network was undertaken mainly by the private sector, in 
many countries domestic telegraph links were run by a state entity from 
the start.352  
The telephone was patented by Alexander Graham Bell in March 
1876. By 1887, only a decade after its commercial introduction, this new 
communications device was already in use in many countries; there were 
over 150,000 phones in the United States, 26000 in the United Kingdom, 
9000 in France, and 700 in Russia, among others. While many 
communications services were launched by private companies, others 
were provided by the public sector (as in Japan, for example). Private 
telecommunications companies were often subsequently nationalized, as 
well as the case in China and France, and in some cases finally 
                                                 
351 - Barty-King and Hugh, Girdle Round the Earth: The story of Cable and Wireless p. 10-11, 1991 
ed., London: Heinemann. 
352 - Id p. 12. 
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reprivatized, as in Argentina, Chile, Jamaica, Mexico, and the United 
Kingdom. Some countries, however, including the United States and 
Philippine, have never nationalized their telecommunications sector.353 
Sudan has recognized telecommunications since the mid of the 
nineteenth century. The first telegraph line linked Jeddah with Sawakin 
was established in 1859 during the Turkish Governance. Thereafter, in 
1910 after the invention of the telephone, and in the era of the British-
Egyptian rule, the law on Postal and Telecommunications was issued. In 
the same year the Postal and Telegraph and Telephone Utility was 
established with monopoly for such activities in Sudan. 
In the era of the liberalization of economy at the beginning of the 
nineteenth of the past century (Salvation era), the decision of HCDPE 
was issued in December 14th 1990 to transform the Telecommunications 
Corporation into public company (see Chapter 3). Under the light of 
HCDPE’s decision, the privatization operation of the corporation began 
depending on gradual program.354The Republican Decision for the 
privatization of the corporation, in Paragraph (a) reads:  
“The Public Telecommunications Corporation shall be acquired by the 
Sudanese Telecommunications Company (Sudatel) in a date not exceeding December 
1995.”  
Nowadays, the new company is presenting very advanced 
information and telecommunication services according to international 
standards. 
 
(ii)Unbundling Sector as the First Step Towards Privatization:  
  According to the typical big size of the infrastructure sectors, the 
international experience indicates that there is a fundamental step prior to 
privatizing the infrastructure sector; this is unbundling the infrastructure 
                                                 
353 - Id p. 14-15. 
354 - See chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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sector. Unbundling the sectors deduces that infrastructure sector should 
be divided into separate units to simplify its privatization. One reason for 
unbundling the infrastructure sector is to enable the private sector, which 
is poor in most of developing and least-developing countries, to 
contribute in privatizing such sectors. Another reason appears from that it 
eases the control of regulators over the privatized units and facilitates 
their mission in observing the competition of the new operators for the 
benefit of the citizens (yardstick competition).       
 For example, unbundling railways sector may lead to separation in 
responsibilities of railway lines (the infrastructural segment of the sector), 
and transport services. Therefore, in Sudan, the Conference for Rescue 
the Sudanese Railways (1991), under the sponsorship of the Vice-
President of the Republic, advised that: 
(*) The infrastructure segments (railway lines, telecommunications, and 
traffic signs) should be separated from the operation segments. 
(*) The state shall adopt building and developing the infrastructure of the 
Sudanese railways (lines, telecommunications, and traffic signs).355 
 
 (1)Unbundling the Water Sector: 
Water sector is probably the most monopolistic of all infrastructure 
sectors. The water sector activities can be divided into three segments: 
production, transport, and distribution, and the commercial businesses 
(selling and collection of tariff). Unbundling water sector may be carried 
out horizontally by unbundling the sector depending on geographical 
basis by fracturing the sector into geographic areas; thereafter, all the 
segments of water service in one or more of these areas could be 
transferred to a private body. Also, unbundling can take a horizontal 
                                                 
355- In the following parts of this chapter, we will note that all the privatization the Sudanese railways 
haven’t included infrastructure segment such like: steel ways, the internal telecommunications, traffic 
signs and the like.  
 270
shape by separating the sector’s segments (production, transportation, and 
commercial segments); thereafter, one or more of these segments could 
be transferred to a private body (company or otherwise entity).356 England 
and Argentina adopted the first type of unbundling water sector 
(horizontally on a geographic basis):  
“In the United Kingdom, water supply before 1989 was accomplished by the ten 
water companies of England and Wales. These companies were called statutory water 
companies. The 1989 privatization was preceded by far-reaching restructuring that gave rise 
to independent, regional companies for water and sanitation. Water companies were allowed 
to increase their rates by more than that rate of inflation, so that they could make the huge 
investment required to upgrade capacity and bring water and sanitation quality up to the 
standards set by the European Commission directives on drinking water quality, bathing 
beaches, and urban waste water treatment. Water prices therefore rose sharply in the first 
five years following privatization” 357 
“In 1993, after an international competitive bidding process, Argentine authorities 
privatized the Buenos Aires water supply company. Five international consortia, each headed 
by a strong European water operator, were prequalified. Two of them joined forces, and four 
bids were eventually received. The consortium led by Lyonnaise de Eaux, having bid a price 
27 percent below the tariff charged by the former SOE, was awarded the contract. All water 
supply and sanitation assets of Greater Buenos Aires were winning consortium; Aguas 
Argentinas, the concessionaire company formed by the winning consortium; Aguas 
Argentinas holds a concession for thirty years, after which the sector, including the new 
investments made by the private operator, would revert to the owner, the Argentine 
government”. 358 
 
In Sudan, despite that HCDPE has not listed the water sector for 
privatization; Khartoum Water Corporation Act of 2002, which repealed 
the old law of 1995; in s (5), allowed the Corporation to operate its 
services depending on real costs. Moreover, the same section gives the 
Corporation new step towards privatization by providing that the new 
                                                 
356 - Hunt, Lester C., and Edward L. Lynk, Privatization and Efficiency in the UK Industry; an 
Empirical Analysis p. 171, 1999 ed. Oxford University Press.  
357-  Id. p. 192. 
358 - Idelovich,  Emanuel, and Klas Ringsko, Private Participation in Water Supply and Sanitation in 
Latin America p. 46, 1997 ed., World Bank Publications Washington DC. 
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technological developments and rehabilitation of the old net shall be 
considered in estimating the tariff. The above section implies indirect 
direction towards privatization in that:   
• The first step towards implementing privatization program is 
the liberalization of prices so as to make the sector (to be 
privatized) functions on real costs. 
• Operating on real costs constitutes the first defence line on the 
face of the public opposition against privatization. 
 
Another pointer for the tendency for privatizing water sector in 
Sudan is shown by the big number of licenses which were granted to the 
private sector to produce drinking water (bottled water) which is locally 
known as (health water). 
The only experience of privatization of water sector in Sudan has 
been exercised in one segment in Khartoum Water Corporation (the 
commercial segment). Despite the fact that the collection of water tariff 
has, for a long period of time, been practised by certain department in the 
Corporation, some contracts were concluded with some private 
companies to exercise such activity. Although we have not been 
permitted to see samples of these contracts, the legal adviser of the 
Corporation gave us some information about the nature and terms of 
these contracts. Followings are some features:359 
• All contracts are limited by geographic scopes.  
• All private companies are obliged (by the contract) to treat 
equally with all consumer without any discrimination. 
                                                 
359 - Meeting with his honour:  Sidding Khalid, Legal Adviser of Khartoum Water Corporation, in 14. 
8. 2008. At 2: pm. 
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• All the private companies are obliged to collect the arrears of 
tariff, although these arrears were payable before concluding the 
contracts with these companies. 
• All the collected tariffs and arrears shall be deposited in a joint 
account in a bank. The Corporation has the right to disburse 
from such account to limit of %50 without waiting the end of 
the month (the time of account settlement between the private 
Company and the Corporation).  
• The consideration (for the company) will be %10 from the 
whole collected amount. 
• The private company shall be delegated to exercise some 
Corporation’s authorities; for example, to disconnect the supply 
from any default consumer. 
• The private company shall present financial-guarantee from 
approved bank works in the Republic of Sudan. 
• Any company shall present its work-plan before concluding the 
contract. 
• The Corporation may, without causation, terminate the contract 
at any time. 
• The Corporation has the right to terminate the contract in the 
event of Company’s failure to collect %50 from the monthly 
agreed-upon amount of collection. 
• The company shall first (before signing the contract) deposit to 
the Corporation %10 from the foresee amount of 6 months 
collection.   
• The Corporation may terminate the contract in case of any 
abuse of authority committed by any of the personnel of the 
Company. 
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•  Disputes between the Corporation and the Company should be 
solved amicably. 
 
 The personnel of the Khartoum Water Corporation claim that one 
of objectives of involving the private sector is to provide high levels of 
tariff collection to upgrade the capacity and quality to reach the 
international standards of drinking water. It seems that the main objective 
of involving the private sector has not been achieved. 360 
 
(2) Unbundling Energy Sector: 
To instil competition, mobilize private capital, and take advantage 
of recent technological advances, many countries have decided to 
unbundle their power sectors. Recent international experience 
demonstrated that it is possible to introduce privatization in the 
generation segment. In the other segments, distribution in particular, the 
case for the natural monopoly may appear stronger, though unbundling 
can be introduced by separating the commercial (selling) function from 
the wire or transport business.361   
In the United Kingdom, breaking up generation into only two large 
private companies controlling nearly 90 percent of generating capacity 
(the next largest producer being British energy, the nuclear producer 
privatized in 1996) has not introduced sufficient competition in the 
market. Because he considered prices to be excessively high, the director 
general of electricity supply has been trying to boost competition in 
                                                 
360 - In a meeting with Mr. Khalid Ali Khalid (Eng.), Executive Manager of the Khartoum Water 
Corporation, he said:  
“The current price of water supplies in Khartoum, and in Sudan as a whole, doesn’t efficiently assist 
the Corporation to upgrade water services to cope with the international measurements. In Sudan, the 
real costs of water services are not applied equally between all citizens. Water tariff is divided into 
three classes (regardless the real consuming) as follow: 1- SG.45 for the first- class citizen. 2- SG.25 
for the second-class citizen. 3- SG.15 for the third-class citizen. According to this categorization, the 
first-class citizen subsidized the third-class citizen by SG.14 every month.” 14. 8. 2008. at 11: p.m.    
361 - Hunt, Lester supra 23 p. 213. 
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power generation in England and Wales. In his 1995 five-year review, the 
regulator imposed a one-time reduction of 11 percent in electricity 
distribution prices, while limiting future increase to 2 percentage points 
below the inflation rate.362 
Hungary opted to unbundle its power sector into seven nonnuclear 
power generation companies whose privatization was initiated at the end 
of 1995. A transmission company (MVM), which also operates the 
country’s only nuclear plant and is slated for privatization in 1997; and 
six distribution companies were privatized in late 1995.363  
In Sudan, some small privatization contracts in the electricity 
sector were concluded. All these contracts were concluded in the 
transmission, wire transport, and commercial “selling” activities. Despite 
the fact that S.1 of the new Electricity Act of 2002 permits private 
involvement even in electricity generation, no contract for generation has 
been concluded in such activity. However, followings are two samples of 
contracts which were concluded between the National Electricity 
Corporation and some private companies: 
*In 2003 the National electricity Corporation concluded a contract 
with Sieteet Engineering Company to commence wire transport of 
electricity to far Khartoum-North villages, and to collect the tariff from 
the customers.364 
*In 2007 the National Electricity Corporation concluded a contract 
with Wad-Tabtoub Engineering Company to undertake wire transport, 
and collection the electricity tariff from the customers of Northern-
Aljazeera area.365 
                                                 
362 - Id p. 215. 
363 - Id p. 218. 
364 - Contracts of privatization of some activities in electricity will be mentioned verbatim in other part 
of this chapter. 
365 - Source: Contracts presented to the researcher by the Legal Affairs Department in the National 
Electricity Corporation. 
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(3)Unbundling the Transport Sector:  
With the rail industry converted worldwide, regulations of the 
sector should remain simple and flexible to protect its share of 
transportation markets.  
In privatizing railways, different approaches were presented in 
unbundling the sector. These approaches differ in the scope with regard to 
the expected privatization.  For example, Argentina opted (in some 
regions) to privatize all segments of railways including the railways lines 
(the infrastructure segment). So, the government adopted wide 
unbundling depending on geographic basis. With regard to the limited 
scope of their privatization, some countries opted to start with limited 
vertical unbundling in the segments of the sector other than the 
infrastructure segment (railway lines) by granting some concessions or 
leases.366 
In addition to unbundling the segments of railways; revising laws 
and other regulations affecting railways, reducing staff, and deciding how 
much property the state should sell and how much it should remain are of 
big importance in preparing railways for privatization.  However, most 
countries achieved the objectives of stopping the industry’s drain on the 
state resources. Likewise the new owner companies succeeded in raising 
levels of productivity.367 
According to economic principles, prices of railway transport 
services should match the costs of providing them so as to make the most 
                                                 
366 - Antonio Estanche and Gines de Rus, Privatization and Regulation of transport infrastructure: 
Guidelines for Policymakers and Regulators pp. 179-80, 2001 ed. World Bank Publications, 
Washington DC. 
367 - Id p. 181. 
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efficient use of the economy’s resources. But, at the same time the private 
investor in railway should not be free to abuse the citizens.368   
“However, in the new environment which separating infrastructure from 
services, pricing principles must be put into practise by means of concrete rules 
within the contract. Because rail concessionaires are now able to set prices relatively 
freely, the concession contract should include a procedure to control the prices set by 
the operators.”369  
The first restructure of pricing policy of railways in Sudan came 
from the Conference for Rescue the Sudanese Railways 1991, under the 
supervision of the Vice-President of the republic. One of the most 
important recommendations of such conference is that the authority to 
setup prices should be the mission of Sudan Railway Corporation. Such 
authority, before the Conference, was conferred on the Ministry of 
Finance. We consider this step as the first step to organize using of 
concessions, leases, or any other sort of contracting between the Railways 
Corporation and private parts. In other words, such recommendation 
enabled the Railways Corporation to achieve some progress in the 
performances of its different segments and, at the same time, prevent the 
new transporters (concessionaires) from abusing the customers.370  
Separating infrastructure segment (railway lines) from the other 
services or activities is the corner stone of the success of the rare 
privatization operations which were occurred in this sector. The voice for 
separating infrastructure (the railway-line) from other segments and 
activities came from the Workshop of Sudan Railway 1998. The 
recommendations of the Workshop were approved by the decision of the 
Council of Ministers on 31. 12. 1998. Thereafter, the Railway 
                                                 
368 -  Id p.188. 
369 -  Id p.189. 
370 - Siddig Gasmallah Ali, Role of Private Sector in Increasing Efficiency of Operative Performance: 
Sudan Railways Corporation Case Study p.26, a Research presented as Partial Fulfillment for 
Membership of Sudan Administrative Sciences Academy, 2007. 
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Corporation Administration began to transform the recommendation into 
real plans within a transitional period (1999 – 2001). Features of theses 
plans include the ideal measurements of performance of the Railway 
Corporation during the transitional period, invitation of experienced and 
specialized houses to prepare the technical, economical and financial 
studies. The fundamental plan, and may be the corner stone of the 
Workshop as a whole, is to furnish considerable portion for the private 
sector in the Railways activities.371 
Sudan Railways Corporation succeeded to attract considerable 
number of private companies to invest in its activities depending on BOT 
system, especially BLT formula (Build, Lease, and Transfer). Permitting the 
private sector enabled Sudan Railways Corporation to: 
• Provide new locomotives and railway-carriages.  
• Rehabilitate old locomotives and railway-carriages which were 
totally stopped.  
• Finance infrastructural requirements necessarily for repairing 
the railroads. 
Moreover, to attract the private sector to participate in its activities, 
the Corporation in 2007 signed some agreements with international 
companies. For example:372 
• A contract with Transtech Company of China for financing and 
construction of a new railway line parallel to the existing line of 
Port Sudan-Khartoum according to modern international 
specifications.  
• Provision of finance by Giad Company for agricultural 
Machineries for construction of a new railway line parallel to 
                                                 
371 - Id, p. 38-39. 
372 - Source:  Sudan Railways Corporation, booklet titled: (Sudan Railways Corporation: Facts and 
Figures 2007.). 
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the existing line Babanousa-Nyala phase one Babanousa-
ELdaien with cost which amounts to US$120 millions. 
• Provision of finance by Giad Company for the purchase of 550 
freight locomotives from china. The first batch of it which 
constitutes 100 locomotives is expected to arrive during the first 
quarter of 2008. 
•  Because of successful agreements, The Council of Ministers 
approved in June 2007 the Strategic Plan for Development of 
Railroad Transport, which covers the period 2007-2026. 
Table No.11: Contribution of Private Sector in the Sudanese Railways Activities by 
(BOT).  
Company. Scope of contribution Year 
Shiekho Transport company Passengers and cargo: (provided 18 
passengers cars, 3 locomotives) 
1991. 
Al-Sikkakion Company. Passengers and cargo: (rehabilitated 25 
passengers car, 3 locomotive and 25 cargo 
cars 
2000. 
Al-Bazim (Saudi) Company Passengers and cargo: (rehabilitated 300 
passenger and cargo cars. Provided 6 
locomotives.) 
2000. 
 
Sega Company. Cargo only: (Provided 50 wheat container and 
3 locomotives. Rehabilitated 3 locomotives.) 
2003. 
Omm-Gamala Company. Cargo only: (rehabilitated 3 locomotives and 
70 cargo car.) 
2004. 
Dandodio Company. Cargo only: (rehabilitated number of cargo 
cars “uncertain”) 
2002. 
Free Zones Corp. Cargo: (rehabilitated 5 locomotives and 200 
cargo cars) 
2003. 
Saar Company. Cargo: (provided 10 locomotives and 70 cargo 
cars) 
2006. 
 Source: Siddig Gasmallah Ali ,supra 37, pp.32-35  
 (iii)Ordinary Methods of Privatizing Infrastructure: 
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One of the features of infrastructure privatization is the priority that 
needs to be given to the methods of the privatization. These methods 
should be selected with regard to that many of infrastructures are strategic 
and the total divestiture should be the last solution. 
  
(1)Divestiture: 
“Divestiture” and “privatization” are often wrongly used 
interchangeably. While divestiture involves the transfer of whole or part 
of ownership of existing enterprise to private party, which runs it at its 
own risk; privatization has wider meanings than divestiture; it includes 
many arrangements mentioned in chapter 3.  
  
(2)Concession or License: 
 We have noted that in most of international texts of privatization, 
the terms “license” and “concession” are often used interchangeably. 
“Concession” often refers to contract that grants an operating license, but 
it also includes a range of other special features. In many countries, 
concession gives the private operator only limited rights over the sector 
assets. Concessions and licenses represent the solution where, for 
constitutional, legal, political, or other reasons, it is not possible to 
transfer ownership of strategic sector assets to private parties. 
The concession (or license) entitles the holder to provide a public 
service under defined terms and conditions, including price. The terms of 
concession should define the rights and obligations of the concessionaire 
(or licensee) and limit the possibility of arbitrary or political interference 
in the day-to day management. They should clearly specify the scope of 
the license (services covered, time period, and so on). However, 
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following are the recommendations of World Bank’s experts about the 
important features of a concession contract:373 
• The contract governs the relationship between the concession-
granting authority and the private concessionaire. The 
concession-granting authority is the government, an inter 
ministerial commission, or less common and least appropriate 
the regulatory agency (see the institutional framework in 
chapter 8). 
• The concession is awarded for a limited but potentially 
renewable period. During this period the concessionaire enjoys 
the exclusive right to use the assets, exploiting existing 
facilities, and develop new ones. The contract determines the 
conditions and prices at which the concessionaire provides the 
service and uses these facilities, which continue to be publicly 
owned. 
• The concessionaire is responsible for all investments and for 
developing all new facilities; many of which are specified in the 
contract, under the supervision of the state or regulator. The 
concessionaire retains control and use rights over the new assets 
until they are handed over at the expiration of the contract. The 
contract might contain a clause specifying compensation for 
investment not fully authorized by the end of the concession 
period, and clause specifying causes and remedies for early 
termination of contract and stating penalties and fines for 
noncompliance with agreed-upon terms.  
• The concessionaire is remunerated based on contractually 
established tariffs (with appropriate guidelines for review and 
                                                 
  373 - J. Louis Guasch , Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing It Right pp.27-
28,  First Printing April  2004, WBI Development Studies: The World Bank. Washington DC. 
 281
adjustment) collected directly from users. These prices are 
typically regulated through rate-of-return or price-cap 
mechanisms, usually driven by the principle of “efficient 
financial equilibrium”, allowing the firm to earn a fair rate of 
return on its investments. 
 
Advantages and disadvantages of concessions as as pattern of 
privatization of infrastructure sector were estimated by the experts of the 
World Bank as follow:  
“1- Concession of infrastructure sectors offers several advantages. First, they 
allow private participation in sectors in which private ownership is constitutionally, 
legally, or politically untenable. Second, if awarded competitively (which tends to be 
the case), concessions enable competition for the market (as opposed to competition 
in the market) and ought to dissipate monopoly rents, ensuring the most efficient 
operator and, in principle, facilitating regulatory oversight. Third, concessions can 
encourage cost efficiency, particularly when granted under price-cap regulation or 
rate-of-return regulation if cost referential benchmarks are used. Under price-cap 
regulation, concession contracts specify maximum prices for set quantities of goods 
and services, permitting cost savings to accrue to the concessionaire, at least between 
tariff reviews. Finally, concessions can achieve optimal pricing even when sunk costs 
rule out contestability, because competition occurs before firms commit to investment 
programs. 
2- Disadvantages of concession include the need for complex design and 
monitoring system when multiple targets are involved, the inability to cover every 
conceivable contingency, the difficulty in enforcing contract (and limiting incentives 
to renegotiate), the need to account for poor service quality, and the lack of 
investment incentives towards the end of the concession period because of the fixed-
term nature of contract and the inability to commit to price adjustment over the life of 
the concession. Government’s inability to be credible in the commitment to no 
renegotiations creates opportunities to use and abuse renegotiation, raising doubts 
about the initial price bid on which a concession is awarded. 
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Incentives for concessionaires to maintain transferred assets properly can be 
strengthened by compensating them at the end of the concession period or to 
investments not yet depreciated. Bidding for concessions remains an attractive 
approach if properly designed, and if abuses after the award are contained, 
enforcement is appropriate, and (especially) if repeated bidding is practical.”374   
      
(3)Joint venture: 
 Creating a new independent company by combining the efforts of 
two or more parties. For example, in some cases, one firm supplies 
technology and know-how, with another has knowledge of market 
opportunities and customer contacts. For good example for joint venture 
privatization, see the privatization operation of the telecommunications in 
Sudan (see Chapter 3). As we previously mentioned, in Sudan, joint 
venture was used as transitional device to privatize the 
telecommunications sector. The government gradually sold its shares in 
some international stock-exchanges to some international specialized 
companies in the field of telecommunications (see Chapter 3). 
 
(4)Management Contracts: 
Introducing private participation in a public sector is, simply, by 
contracting out the sector management. In this situation, the government 
is the owner of the infrastructure, but a private firm can provide a more 
commercial approach to operations. The public sector in this case faces 
both investment and risks, because managers do not invest their own 
capital in the sector.  
In Sudan, management contracts have been used in rare cases. 
Because of the small size and scope of management contracts in Sudan, 
one may not put big attention to feasibility for these contracts.  
 
                                                 
374 - Id pp. 31-32. 
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(5)Leasing: 
Governments authorities simply renting infrastructure assets (land 
or may be equipments) to private operator for a fixed period to obtain 
income from contracts fees, contrary to concessions contracts, firms that 
lease are usually not required to make investment, therefore they only 
assume commercial risk. (see Chapter 3 of this thesis). 
(6)Public floatation:  
A large number of infrastructure companies have been privatized 
by a means of public floatation to the general public. Most of these were 
relatively well-run telecommunications companies of industrial countries 
such as Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) (see chapter 3), British 
Com (privatized in three tranches between 1984 and 1989), and 
Koninklijke PTT Nederland (KPN, two tranches in 1949 and 1995).375 In 
Sudan, we have not illustrated any use for this method. 
 
(7)Privatization of infrastructure by methods of BOT System: 
The concept of building, operating, and transferring according to 
the definition of United Nation Committee for International Commercial 
Law, is a shape of schemes financing, whereby, certain government 
grants, for a period of time, one of the private financial unions (named: 
the scheme company) a prorogation to execute certain scheme. 
Thereafter, the scheme company builds, operates and manage such 
scheme for fixed period of time. The scheme company returns its costs 
and achieves interests by operating the scheme and exploiting it on 
commercial basis. At the end of the prerogative period, the ownership of 
the scheme returns to the government.376 
                                                 
375- Pierre Guislain, supra note 3 pp. 255-56. 
376 - Jamal-Eddin Nassar, Infrastructure Projects Execution by BOT System: Conditions of Contract 
for EPC/Turnkey projects, p. 10, first ed. Sep. 1999. Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration “CRCICA”. 
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The above definition includes number of different contractual 
arrangements which, as a whole, fall under the big title of the BOT 
system. 
Table No: (12): Different Methods of BOT system. 
Abbreviation Meaning 
BOT Build, Operate and transfer 
BOT Build, Own and transfer 
BOO Build, Own and Operate 
BOR Build, Own and Renewal of Concession 
BOOT Build, Own, Operate and Transfer 
BLT Build, Lease and Transfer 
BRT Build, Rent and Transfer 
BT Build and Transfer 
BTO Build, Transfer and Operate 
DBFO Design, Build, Finance and Operate 
DCMF Design, Construct, Manage and Finance 
MOT Modernize, Own/Operate and Transfer 
ROO Rehabilitate, Own and Operate. 
ROT Rehabilitate, Own and Transfer 
Source: Jamal-Eddin Nassar, Infrastructure Projects Execution by BOT System: Conditions of Contract 
for EPC/Turnkey project p. 11  , first ed. Sep. 1999. Cairo Regional Centre for International 
Commercial Arbitration “CRCICA”. 
 
BOT system presents solution for infrastructure finance, whereby, 
the government can gain infrastructural scheme without relying on 
borrowing from the banking system or burdening the public budget big 
deficits. Moreover, this system presents scientific attitude to achieve 
privatization of public sector (the large economic stream in the recent 
time). 
Generally, BOT system cannot be considered as a modern 
innovation; that its roots refer to the era of what known as prerogative 
contracts, which formerly spread in France and other countries in ends of 
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the nineteenth century. France used these contracts to execute railways 
schemes, stations of electricity generation, and water supplies. Egypt 
recognized this system in the fortieth of the past century when New-
Egypt neighbourhood was supplied by electricity, drinking water, and 
tram-lines according to this system.  In eightieth of the past century, 
namely in 1984, two important developments happened in application of 
such system. In this year, The Channel Tunnel Convention, which 
connected England with France, was signed between British and French 
governments from one side, and Eurotunnel Company on the other. 
Invitation of the former president of Turkey (Turgot Ozal) to use this 
system in execution the infrastructure in Turkey (Phosphor Bridge, and 
electricity station) represented the second development.377  
BOT system does not present any new technological innovation in 
what related to execution the infrastructural scheme, as it presents new 
shape of the contractual framework for executing infrastructure scheme in 
certain organizational and administrative aspects. In other words, by BOT 
system the investor (company of scheme) is burdened the designing and 
constructing liabilities. In the classic systems of constructing and 
executing infrastructure schemes, these liabilities are, classically, 
burdened on different bodies. In addition, in the BOT system the investor 
is burdened the financing liabilities, which are classically burdened by the 
government. The direction of joining designing with constructing 
operations is increasingly adopted all over the world because of the good 
results which were achieved in saving the courses of schemes execution 
and in supplying designers by good experiences of developers.378   
In Sudan, we have illustrated two applications for the BOT system. 
One is in some privatization operations in the Sudan Railway 
                                                 
377 - Id.10. 
378 - Id.10. 
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Corporation. As we have mentioned, the recommendations of the 
Workshop of Railways of 1998 which were confirmed by the decision of 
the Sudanese Council of Ministers on 31.12.1998, were concentrated on 
granting considerable role to private sector to rescue the Sudanese 
railways. Sudan Railways concluded some contracts with private parties 
to invest in railways transportation. Despite that these contracts were 
concluded under different titles, in fact they were concluded under the 
BOT system; namely the BRT formula (Build, Rent and transfer). The 
main feature of these contracts is that they were concluded in a narrow 
scope. So, wording of such contracts makes them appear just like 
ordinary rent contracts. But from the obligation of the tenants in these 
contracts, we find that they were included obligations on the tenants like 
rehabilitation of locomotives and gas tank-wagons, and railway-carriages 
instead of reducing the ton-price, a thing which constitute BOT system 
(see Table No.12 above). Following is a good example for such contracts: 
 
This agreement is made on …….. Between Sudan Railway Corporation …….. 
Represented by ….. (hereinafter referred to as: the First Party), and ……… 
(hereinafter referred to as: the Second Party). 
Whereas the Second Party is interesting to transport gas to ………, and, 
whereas the First Party is the exclusive owner of gas tank-wagons, the two parties 
agree to the following: 
Firs/ Duration of Contract:  
The two Parties agree that the duration of the contract shall be ………. Beginning 
in…… ending in………. 
Second/ First Party Obligations 
The first party is obliged to: 
A/provide the agreed upon  ............ (number) of gas tank-wagons and put them on the 
agreed-upon loading areas.  
B/tow and  the wagons, after loading operations are completed. 
C/repair and rehabilitate parts of wheels. 
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D/not to make any arrangements in the rehabilitated gas tank-wagons by any of 
transactions during the duration of this agreement, unless by written consent of the 
Second Party. 
E/reduce the freight fees by %10. 
Third/Second Party obligations 
The Second Party shall be obliged to:   
A/ rehabilitate the agreed-upon …………………... (number) of  gas tank-wagons to be 
ready for carrying gas, under the supervision of the First Party.  
B/ pay a sum of ……….. as insurance. 
C/The method of payment is the deferred payment which shall not exceed the 15th day 
of the next month. 
D/ present all documents and certificates required by the concerned authorities. 
E/complete all loading and pouring operations within the period stipulated in the 
Railway Regulations of 1999 (Transportation Conditions), or any other regulations.  
F/pay for every delay for loading or pouring according to the provisions of the 
Railway Regulations of 1999.  
G/ load wagons-tanks  according to method determined by the First Party, to balance 
the shipment on the wagon; the First Party may, at anytime, require the presence of 
his representative to monitor this operation.  
H/pay for the regular maintenance, which will be from ………. To ………. 
I/comply with all laws which organize the treatment of the flammable petroleum 
materials. 
K/pay for taxations, levies or any other financial costs imposed by the state. 
L/ pay for any increase in the operational costs if imposed by the state with 
accordance to the policies of the Ministry of Finance on ported-ton fee. In such a case 
the First Part is obliged to inform the Second Part one week before any amendment of 
ported-ton price. In turn, in the event that the operational coasts reduced as result for 
policies of the Ministry of Finance; the Second Party shall be entitled to such 
reduction of ported-ton price.   
Fifth: General Rules: 
A/This contract is subject to the Transportation and Storing Conditions which are 
provided in Railway Regulation 1999 or any other regulations replace the 1999 
Regulations.    
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B/The agreed-upon freight fees belongs to the First Party without taxations or any 
other fees imposed by the state; therefore, the Second Party is obliged to pay for any 
taxations or other sorts of fees. 
 
The second BOT privatization process is in the infrastructure sector 
of water services   between the Sudanese Government and the Islamic 
Bank for Development in 10.5.2000; this is Khartoum Water 
Transportation and Sanitation Scheme. This operation assures that one of 
the most important merits of the BOT system in the infrastructure sectors 
is that it presents solution for infrastructure finance that the government 
can achieve infrastructural scheme without relying upon borrowing from 
the banking system, and without burdening the public budget big deficits. 
The big cost of execution of such scheme ($14.775.000) shows the 
necessity of this system. On the other hand, it is quite clear that the 
financial and technological parts in this operation are of great necessity; 
therefore, joining the two capacities (technical and financial) will result in 
good performance.   
Despite that the agreement was made under the title of “Istisn’aa” 
contract379, the formula of the contract appears it as one of methods of 
contracting according to one of the formulas of the BOOT system; this is 
BT (Build and Transfer). (see Table No. 12). 
The agreement is very long; therefore, we will mention some of its 
important terms: 
Agreement for Execution of the Constructional Works of Khartoum Water 
Transportation and Sanitation Scheme  
This agreement is made on 10th of May, 2000, between Sudan Government 
(thereinafter referred to as the “Purchaser”), and the Islamic Bank of Development 
(thereinafter referred to as the “Seller”). 
Whereas: 
                                                 
379 - One of the formulas of Islamic contracts. 
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A/ the Buyer required the Seller to execute the constructions described in appendix 
no. 1 of this agreement (thereinafter, referred to as the “Constructions”), by the 
method of “Elistisn’aa”, in the scheme described in the appendix no. 2 of this 
agreement; 
B/ the Seller consented to execute the Constructions for amount not exceeds $million 
14.574.000, and to sell them to the Purchaser on a price to be determined according 
to this agreement within (12) years, after primary grace period (3) years, be 
considered as preparations period.  
C/ the Purchaser have been informed by the conditions and rules mentioned in 
paragraph (B). 
Third Section: 
3-2 the Seller’s obligation to execute the scheme depends on the obligation of the 
Purchaser to delineate the boundaries of lands on which the scheme will be executed, 
and, on granting the required permissions to the Seller to execute the scheme on these 
lands. 
3-3 the Purchaser shall be represented by Khartoum Water Corporation in all 
concerns related to the execution of this agreement. 
3-4 to avoid any future ambiguity, the Purchaser agrees to permit the Seller to 
execute the constructions by means of sub-contracting with agreed upon developer. 
Thirteenth Section: 
Ownership and depreciation 
The ownership and depreciation of the constructions shall, automatically, be 
transferred to the Purchaser at the time of handover. 
Fifteenth Section: 
Sales-Price Payment 
15-1 the sales-price shall be equal to the wholly costs, in addition to %5.5 annual 
margin of interest. 
15-2 the Purchaser agrees to pay the sales-price as 24 half-year instalments.     
15-3 in the event of the Purchaser paying two of the instalments in or before the fixed 
date, he shall be entitled to reduction of %15 from the margin of interest of such two 
instalments. 
15-5 Any amount due in accordance to this agreement, including the sales-prise 
amount, will be considered as actually paid to the Seller, when one of the following 
banks confirms that such amount is deposited in any of the following accounts: 
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1- Payment in American Dollar: 
     Account No. 001591.11 – Saudi International Bank 
          99 Bishops gate, London EC 2M 3TB 
          Telex numbers: 8812261- 8812262. 
          Account No. B 10507. 
          Arab Banking Corporation – P.O. Box: Manama, Bahrain. 
          Telex Numbers: 9385 9431/2/3. 9442 ABCBAH BN. 
2- Payment in French Frank: 
Account No.96965.9.00.00 
Union De Banques Arabes Et 
Fransaises (U.B.A.F) 
190 Avenue Charles De Gaulle 
92523 Neuilly Cedex, France 
Télex Number : 610334 UBAFRA 
3- Payment in Sterling Pound: 
Account No.70872 
Gulf International Bank 
2-6 Canon Street, London EC 4M 6XP 
Telex Numbers: 8813326 8812889. 
 
Golden Shares in Privatizations of Infrastructure: 
 After the privatization of the infrastructure, the government will 
inevitably find itself in need to keep sort of control over the privatized 
infrastructure sector that most of the infrastructure activities are of 
strategic necessity.    
The U.K privatization has, as a rule, used “the golden share”. 
Generally speaking, a golden share gives the government the right to 
intervene to block changes in sector or enterprise control, takeovers, and 
foreign participation. Samples of golden shares appear from the cases of 
Cable & Wireless, British Telecom, British Gas and British Airways. For 
these, and for power generating and transmission companies, the golden 
share has no expiration date. In other instances, it expired on a specific 
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date: December 31, 1994, for the regional water distribution companies, 
and March 31, 1995, for regional electricity distribution companies. The 
main motivation for indefinite golden shares was often national 
security.380 
 
Conclusion: 
The earlier private beginnings of infrastructure sectors indicate that 
there is no any barrier on their road to be re-privatized. Another indicator 
for the possibility of the private sector to undertake the former 
infrastructure sectors appears from that France, a country that has 
championed the cause of public services and public enterprises is among 
the countries in which this sector has remained largely private. The two 
large companies, Compagine Generale des Eaux, founded in 1853, and 
Lyonnaise de Eaux, founded in 1880) are still now occupying big share in 
water sector in France and in some other places out side France. 
Moreover, in some developing countries like Cote de’ Ivories, in which 
the basic service should be freely or cheaply presented; the private sector 
is still now undertake providing this service. 
In the early nineteenth and early twentieth century, most electricity 
companies started out private. In many countries they have to large extent 
remained private, like Belgium and the United States. Furthermore, 
Nationalizations which underwent in the first quarter of the nineteenth 
century and in the meds of the same century were just response to war-
relate circumstances.381The railways have a similar history for private 
nature, and the same war-relate circumstances in nationalizations. 
                                                 
380 - Pierre Guislain, supra note 3 p. 260. 
381 -Some of the Nationalizations in the mentioned century were exercised depending on ideological 
basis. For example, Nationalizations in the former Soviet Union, some South American countries and 
many Marxist-Liniest countries in the different continents of the world, were not constituted a good 
evidence for the bad performance of the private sector as they reflected ideological direction (See 
chapter 3).  
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Nowadays, when most of the countries opted to privatize or re-
privatize their infrastructure sectors; features of infrastructure sector have 
led to the adoption of special reform to prepare these sectors for 
privatization. Most of these reforms are economic in nature. Others are of 
legal nature. The most important legal restructure is unbundling the 
sector. Importance of unbundling the sector come from that it put many 
options on the table of the government. For example, a government may 
select to unbundle the sector as a whole depending on the geographic 
basis so as to minimize the cost of private contribution in the targeted 
sector. On other option, government may opt to fracture the targeted 
sector into separate segments matching its essential activities. Thereafter, 
these separated segments may be transformed into companies or 
otherwise legal entities. Of course, in some of these segments, the state 
will inevitably remain maintaining its complete ownership to impose 
some regulations which serve social, economical, and political purposes. 
 Infrastructure segments in sector, like railways line and general 
distribution grid in electricity and water services, should remain as state 
ownership because it enables the government to prevent new operator’s 
abuse. 
Despite the fact that it is possible to use all the methods of 
privatization of SOEs (mentioned in Chapter 3) for privatization 
infrastructure sectors; concessions and licenses (used interchangeably in 
most of privatization texts) remained the preferred methods of 
privatization. The reason for such preferring appears from that, in most 
cases, infrastructure sectors are closely related to everyday-needs of 
peoples; therefore, total divestiture of such sectors will weaken the role of 
the state in the event of new owner misuses his property rights. 
It is obvious, while the methods of privatization (mentioned in this 
chapter) are used for privatizing existed infrastructure, BOT system (save 
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in rare formulas of the system) is used for building infrastructure 
activities.  BOT system presents solution for infrastructure finance, 
whereby, the government can gain infrastructural sectors without relying 
upon borrowing 
 
  
from the banking system and without burdening the public budget with 
big deficits. 
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Chapter 10 
 
Privatization and Labour 
 
Despite its importance, labour is one of the least addressed issues 
in privatization. It is a universal concern that privatization will result in 
major job losses as new owners of privatized SOEs terminate excess 
labour to improve efficiency and to minimize costs regardless of the 
social reflections. Fearing unemployment and the loss of benefits, state 
enterprise workers and unions are often among the most organized 
opponents of privatization; they usually take actions to delay or block 
privatization. In many countries the difficulties are compound by the 
absence of social safety nets and functioning labour markets. These 
factors have often led governments to delay privatization, particularly of 
large state enterprises like infrastructure and heavy industries where 
major labour adjustment may be needed. With regard to the great 
importance of privatization in this era, and the political and social 
sensitivities involved, it is important that governments find ways to    
labour adjustment and to develop strategy that wins labour support for 
privatization and creates efficient social safety net for laid-off workers.  
Generally speaking, depending on illustrations of international 
experts,382 discussion about the privatization affection on labour and the 
remedies required will be focused under four titles. First, how 
privatization affects labour is the first question that should be answered. 
Of course, too many employees, the generous pay and benefits and the 
restrictive labour contracts during the former governmental ownership 
(before privatization) will be the targets for the new private owners.  
                                                 
382 - Sunita Kikeri, Privatization and Labour: What Happens to Workers When Governments Divest 
(World Bank Technical Paper No.396) p. 3, First Printing, February 1998, World Bank Publications, 
Washington DC.  
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Second, reemployment, or creation of new jobs for the laid off workforce 
remains the main challenge for governments. Third, dealing with the 
workforce to participate with them in decision-making, assists in winning 
their encouragement for privatization, a thing will, inevitably, assist in 
achieving a smooth application of the privatization program as a whole. 
Fourth, some international finance institutions have widely involved 
adjusting labour force; mainly by assisting the “generous severance 
pays”. This chapter will be devoted for the above titles.  
 
(i) Impacts of Privatization on Labour : 
The subsidy and other governmental protection conferred on SOEs 
usually lead them to involve many sorts of irrational practices such like 
overstaffing. In many countries, SOEs often pay their employees’ wages 
and benefits higher than in the private sector counterparts. Often, 
employees of public sector are governed by rigid labour contracts.383 
Usually, new owners do their best to avoid such treatment and privileges.  
 
(1)Too Many Employees:  
Governments all over the world have employed too many workers 
in their enterprises. Many of these enterprises were in fact designed as 
vehicles for job creation to attain political support for governments and 
absorb public opposition. Levels of overstaffing in big number of 
countries clearly justify the sharp affection of privatization on labour. 
“In India and Turkey, for example, state enterprises were estimated to be 
overstaffed by nearly 35 percent in the early 1990s. Of 120.000 people employed in 
Sri Lanka’s state enterprises, 40-50 percent is estimated to be laid off. In Ghana and 
Uganda estimates of overstaffing levels commonly run to 20-25 percent. Over staffing 
                                                 
383 - However, this is not the case in Sudan. It is true that in the Sudan, in the period immediately 
followed the colonization and during the national governance until the early seventieth of the past 
century, the public labour was granted very good service conditions; therefore, they were occupied a 
good situation over the private labour. Nowadays, because of the great levels of overstaffing, and the 
poor of the country, private labour have been largely over public labour.  
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in some Egyptian steel companies reached 80 percent in 1991. Turkey’s loss-making 
steel enterprises were overstaffed by as much as 30 percent. In Brazil about 20.000 
employees of the 42.000 of the railways enterprises were surplus with lower 
productivity levels than those in industrial countries as well as neighbouring 
countries such as Argentina and Chile. Power utilities in many African countries, as 
well as in India and Pakistan are severely over staffed, with fewer than 50 customers 
per employee (compared with more than 200 in countries such as Chile, Indonesia, 
and South Africa). In Pakistan’s water system for Islamabad, for example, there are 
45 staffs per every 10.000 water supply connection, compared with 3 staff per 1000 
water connection in efficient water companies in Latin America. Overstaffing usually 
occurs in administrative and clerical positions, not in the more technically skilled 
jobs for which there is high demand.”384   
With regard to the above statistics of overstaffing, one comes out 
with the following: 
• Overstaffing in the intensive capital enterprises such as steel 
industries (as in Egypt and Turkey) seems to be greater than in 
other enterprises.  
• There are many measurements for levels of overstaffing, for 
example; by the number of connections (customers or 
consumers) compared with the number of staff undertaking the 
public service. 
• Overstaffing usually occurs not in the most important activities 
of the enterprise like the more technically skilled jobs, a thing 
which supports the new owners to lay-off the overstaffed 
labour. 
 
(2) Generous Pay and Benefits: 
Because of week wages and salaries in many countries, some of 
these countries conferred further benefits on its workers such as bonuses 
                                                 
384 - Sunita Kikeri, supra 1, pp. 3-4.  
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to degree that in some countries wages and basic salaries have greatly 
been eroded if compared with these benefits. Such practise, in the event 
of privatization will, of course, lay burdens on the new investors.  
 In Bangladesh and Egypt, where wages and salaries have eroded, 
special allowance and bonuses are offered to state employees to 
compensate week wage and salaries. In the absence of wider social safety 
nets, state enterprises in many countries also provide, at great expense, 
services such as housing, health care, education, and transportation. In 
1980s these nonwage benefits were equivalent to 20 percent of wages in 
Africa, 20-35 percent in Asia, and 24-37 percent in Latin America. 
Among a sample of 361 Mexican state enterprises privatized between 
November 1983 and June 1992, extreme benefits in many companies 
tripled the wage bill.385According, new investors after privatization will 
do their best to drop down such benefits. In some countries, governmental 
enterprises pay their lower-skill labours much better than in their private 
sector. In Turkey, for example, workers in loss making state-owned 
textile, iron, and steel firms earn three times more than people doing 
equivalent works in the private sector, a thing which, in the event of 
privatization, will be unacceptable for the new private owners.386    
The generous payment and benefits in Sudan are inherent 
sequences for the weak wages and salaries. The current government in 
Sudan, to avoid paying high levels of wages and salaries, opted to grant 
many other facilities and benefits like bonuses, transportation, and 
performance incentives on public labour. The justification is that growing 
of basic wages and salaries burdens the state much more costs than 
growing of bonus and benefits. A high level of wage or salary means 
                                                 
385 - Sunita Kikeri, supra1, p.4. 
386 - Id p.4. 
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increase of different rights that counted as fixed percentage from the 
basic sum of wag or salary. 
 
(3) Restrictive Labour Contracts: 
In some countries, rigid labour contracts come as a response for the 
ideological stream. Under the light of that many programs of privatization 
have been executed in the former socialist or Marxist-Liniest countries, 
where labour is extremely protected, and rigid labour contracts are faced 
by great tendency to break up these contracts by the new private owners. 
In addition to the high job security (including guaranteed life time 
employment in some cases) enjoyed by state enterprises workers, such 
contracts often place restrictions on the right of the employer to hire and 
fire. Private investors, especially the foreigners, usually come from liberal 
economies where hire and fire is fundamental right on the hands of the 
employer. The strong evidence for problems caused by such type of 
contract obviously appears in infrastructure sectors where strong unions 
often succeed to impose such anti productivity provisions.387  
 
(ii)Employment After Privatization: 
Given these distortions in state enterprise labour market, many 
observers fear that privatization will have a negative effect on labour as 
governments prepare enterprises for sale, and as new investors strive to 
raise productivity. Labour force reductions have often accompanied 
privatization; but many enterprises, particularly those already operating in 
competitive markets without governmental subsidy, have been sold with 
their labour force. 
 
 
                                                 
387 - Id p.4. 
 299
(1)Labour Force Reduction: 
In general, privatization has a minimal effect on employment in 
countries that carried labour reforms before privatization. Chile, for 
example, began extensive labour market reforms in the early 1970s by 
rationalizing state enterprises employment and wages and changing 
labour market regulations regarding the hiring and firing workers. Those 
reforms led to significant employment reductions by the early 1980s in 
both public and private firms. As a result, the second round of 
privatization that began in 1985 and involved large firms and sectors such 
as communications and electricity resulted in no layoffs. In fact 
employments in these firms increased by 10 percent as a result for overall 
improvements in the economy and also for the investments that 
accompanied privatization.388 
However, large employment reductions have often accompanied 
the privatization of state enterprises that were, in past, heavily subsidized 
and protected from competition. In steel railways and energy enterprises, 
overstaffing often lead to employment reductions before privatization as 
governments prepare the companies for sale and after as privatized 
companies continue to shed labour. The following review illustrates 
labour force reduction in some countries.389 This review will be 
mentioned with comparison to the situation in Sudan. One paragraph 
states: 
*In Argentina, a recent review of five major privatization transactions 
(telecoms, electricity, water and sanitation, and energy) found that close to 30 percent 
of employees in the five enterprises lost their jobs by the time privatization took place. 
The reductions ranged from 3 percent in telecoms to 72 percent in energy. Severe 
employment cuts were also made in other sectors, including railways and steel. Low 
productivity and interference by labour unions in management decisions had made 
                                                 
388 -  Id, p.10. 
389 -  Id, pp. 5, 6 and7. 
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the cost of keeping loss-making enterprises in the state sector so high that the 
government was willing to undertake the necessary employment reforms to facilitate 
privatization. The cuts were made through transfers of staff to other parts of the 
government, early retirements, voluntary departures, and lay-offs; some workers were 
even sent home with 50 percent of their salaries. 
 
In Sudan, privatization has been accompanied by a big number of    
laid off employees. For example, by privatizing 22 units in the industrial 
sectors such as Atbara Cement Factory, Rabak Cement Factory, and Sata 
Shoes Factory; 5.504 workers were laid off. By privatizing some units in 
the banking sector, 2.098 have lost their jobs. By privatizing some of the 
governmental transportation units, 3.803 were laid off. The following box 
illustrates the number of the laid-off employees in different sectors in 
Sudan until 2005: 
Table No.13: Laid-off labour Force in Sudan until December 2005.  
Sector Units Number 
Industrial                    22 5505 
Transportation 4 3803 
Banking 6 3098 
Tourist 10 2207 
Agricultural 21 14310 
Energy and Petroleum 1 234 
Variant 17 3329 
Total 81 32485 
Sources: TCDPE annual report 2005 p. 58. 
 
Another paragraph in the mentioned review reads: 
“In Bangladesh, more than 22.000 workers in the state’s jute corporations 
were retrenched between 1990 and 1993 as part of the restructuring and privatization 
program. In little number of state enterprises new jobs opportunities increased to 
meat the new market requirements.” 
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In rare cases in Sudan, the number of employees of the privatized 
enterprises has increased as a result of privatization. It is obvious that 
increasing in the number of the work force has resulted from that the new 
investor has capacity and future plans that require maintaining the former 
employees. A good example for such increasing in the labour levels is the 
Sudanese Company for Telecommunications (Sudatel). Labour force in 
this firm was 2100 in 1994 (before privatization), increased to 2974 in 
2004 (after privatization), with increasing- percentage of %42.390  
With regard to paragraphs of the mentioned review, we have 
illustrated that in some countries there is a sort of rational differentiation 
between the different jobs of the privatized firms. In other words, high-
skill jobs are differentiated from the low-skill jobs; in the event of 
privatization, most of the new owner to maintain the high-skill worker to 
benefit from their former experiences. 
  In Sudan, the annual reports of TCDPE illustrated the number of 
the terminated jobs regardless of their types, whether high-skill or 
otherwise. 
 
(2)Changes in Terms and Conditions of Services: 
The productivity gains from employment termination often result 
in wage improvements for employees who remained with the privatized 
enterprise. In Argentina the real wages and salaries of employee of Entel 
and the Buenos Aires water concession increased by 45 percent in the 
three years following privatization. In Chile new owners of the electricity 
companies (Chillgener and Enersis) increased wages and introduced 
profit-sharing schemes. Malaysia’s Port Kelang workers who remained 
with the partly privatized company received compensations increases 
average 12 percent.  In Mexico wages in a sample of privatized firm 
                                                 
390 - TCDPE Annuel  Report 2005 p. 22. 
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increased far in excess of rates elsewhere in the economy, with the mean 
annual wage rising from $14.952 before privatization to $26.348 in 1993. 
In Ghana salary levels in privatized textiles and printings companies 
increased to 10-15 percent above industry standards. 391 
In exchange for higher wages, rigid labour contracts often have 
been revised. In Latin American countries, for example, rigid work rules 
and condition of services were renegotiated to provide managers greater 
flexibility with respect to decisions on content and pace of working 
conditions. In Argentina’s Entel and Segba (electricity company) the new 
collective bargaining agreement increased the work week from thirty five 
to forty hours, linked wages to productivity, and eliminated certain types 
of overtime and leave. 392   
In Sudan, in the absence of information about the circumstances of 
employees who are remained with the private firms, it is difficult to 
determine whether the new service conditions or contracts have achieved 
situation better than that in the former state owned firms. The annual 
report of TCDPE of 2005 mentioned only one privatized firm wherein the 
new contracts achieved better service conditions for the remained 
employees; this is Sudatel. The annual report of 2005mentioned the 
follow: 
“1- One of the Advantages of privatization policy in Sudan is that it widened 
job opportunities for the employees as a result for additive fields or finance in the 
firms which have been directly or indirectly privatized. The Sudanese 
Telecommunications Company (Sudatel) is a good example. 
2- The remained employees in the privatized firms have enjoyed better service 
conditions and good work environment, a thing which positively reflects in their life 
levels.” 
 
                                                 
391 - Sunita Kikeri, supra 1 pp.7-8 
392 - Id, p. 8. 
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(3)New Job Creation: 
Abstractly, while privatization often results in employment 
reductions it also creates new jobs; jobs are created when private 
operators used assets more productively and made new capital investment 
that might not have been made in the absence of privatization.  
 
(iii)Dealing with Labour Issues: 
To facilitate privatization, governments need to deal with the 
labour issues early before executing privatization operations. Because of 
varying conditions in economic and legal and political environment, the 
ways in which the labour issues are dealt vary from one country to 
another and from one enterprise to another. 
 
(1)Role of Employees’ Participation: 
Workers opposition to privatization involved because governments 
often fail to involve labour unions and address their concerns early before 
beginning privatization operations. By contrast, Labour tensions could 
significantly be reduced when governments recognize the constructive 
role that labour can play; make explicit efforts to inform unions and 
workers about privatization, and involve them in the process through 
employee ownership schemes and the like (see the introductory chapter 
and Chapter 3).  
Efforts to explain the government’s privatization plans, assure 
labour that their interests are fairly represented, and assure them that their 
sacrifices will be balanced by sufficient measures to allow workers to 
share in the benefits of privatization. The government should: 
“*Explain the rationale, costs and benefits of privatization, and the costs of non-
privatizing. In countries such like Argentina, Uganda and many others, workers 
supported privatization when they understood through the government’s 
communication efforts that privatization is needed to obtain capital for new 
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investments and improve access to services, and that closure of the loss of even more 
jobs often is the only alternative for privatization. 
*Enhance their understanding of the timing and methods of privatization. In many 
cases labour unions recognize that the time for change has come but their position 
stems from lack of information about the government’s plans for privatization. 
*Describe the incentives and social safety net measures being put in place. Often, the 
lack of information about the severance policy and supporting measures, has created 
uncertainties for workers and increased their opposition to reform. Particularly, in 
developing economies with share ownership and weak capital markets, employee 
share ownership programs require a comprehensive information program to educate 
employees on the meaning and benefits of share ownership. Such a program needs to 
explain such concepts such as property rights, shares as an alternative to bank 
deposits, the difference between interest and dividends, the impact of retained 
earnings, the impact of inflation, the difference between an investment with a 
predetermined value and one whose value could change based on supply and demand, 
and understanding balance sheets and profit and loss statements. 
*Inform them about the regulatory and other arrangements being designed to protect 
consumer and labour interests. Often, labour unions concerned not only about job 
privatization, but also about the broader social, environmental, and gender impacts of 
privatization. The more governments can explain their plans in these areas the more 
the chances are of winning labour support.”393 
The Sudanese labour Union mentioned that it had been consulted 
and participated in the first Conference of Economic Reforming at the 
beginning of the eightieth of the past century. In this conference, the main 
features of liberalization of economy and privatization policy were 
agreed.394 
In a country like Sudan, especially in the beginnings of the 
National Salvation era, it is difficult to determine whether labour union 
actually represented the real opinion of labours. However, in a paper 
                                                 
393 - Id, pp. 20-21. 
394- Adil Mohammad Salih Bashir, Privatization: the Future and Affection (paper presented in the 
Workshop of: Privatization: the Theory and Application, General Union of Sudanese labour 
Syndicates, Khartoum – 2008. 
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presented in the Workshop of the Sudanese labour Union titled: 
(Privatization: the Theory and Application)395 the reporter mentioned: 
“The Syndicate movement in Sudan achieved reasonable contribution in the 
first economy reforming conference. In this conference the Sudanese syndicate 
movement, despite the great sufferance, sacrifices and burdens on labours, decided to 
assent and to support the privatization and the economy liberalization policy. The 
Sudanese syndicate movement considered the circumstances which compelled the 
government to involve this trend such as the war in the southern Sudan, the 
prejudicial international surrounding, and the new global economic system. 
The Sudanese syndicate movement and the Council of Ministers, represented 
by the Higher Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprise, agreed the following 
basis for privatization: 
1-Privatization should be executed depending on patient studies and the 
concerned syndicate should actively be contributed. 
2-Privatization operations decisions should be issued from the Council of 
Ministers. 
3-Privatization order should not be issued unless by the consent of the 
Sudanese Labour Union. 
4-Consent for paying employees’ rights should be issued by the National 
Pension Fund and the National Insurance Fund before privatizing any state owned 
enterprise.” 
Indeed, the above report appears that Sudanese government has 
followed the international experts’ recommondations in communicating 
with employees before and during privatization.396  
                                                 
395 - Id, p. 23. 
396-The recent speeches of the President of the Sudanese Labour Union imply that the former 
contribution of the labour union was just a device to absorb the labour opposition. The sufferance of 
labours remained and has been expressed by many of labour leaders, for example, the President of 
Labour union said: 
 “The Union is not against privatization operations in the country, in the same time labours should be 
benefit from the positive affections of privatization and avoided from the negative affections. Our mission is to 
protect the country and labour. The new administrations of the privatized enterprises haven’t complied with the 
conditions which were formerly agreed before privatization. As a result, labours suffered bleeding injure by the 
frequent lay-off of labours. We are still supporting the privatization program in the country, provided that lay-off 
of labours should not be the only result of privatization.” 
(Source: Akhir Lahza newspaper, 26/10/2008.) 
 Another evidence for that contribution of labour was used just a device to absorb labours 
opposition appears from that many labour syndicates have declared that they haven’t been adjusted 
after privatization. The Postal Labour Syndicated of Khartoum state declared that, despite the 
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(2)Pensions and Social Insurance Implications: 
  In countries where pensions and insurance systems are weak, the 
major concern is that the early retirements accelerate pension liabilities 
and so exaggerate the financial strains on pensions systems and other 
components of the social security system.  
In countries such as Turkey, early retirement policies clashed with 
the recommendation to increase the retirement age to resolve the 
pension’s crisis. In low-income countries, however the problem is often 
reversed: weak social security systems impede early retirement because 
no worker will want to take retirement knowing that the system will not 
be able to honour its obligations. For this reason, Congo and Uganda 
among others are exploring the option of creation independent, privately-
managed pension funds that would receive debts owed to the social 
security system by state enterprises. These funds could then be used to 
pay employees taking early retirement.397 
In Sudan, and in the light of that the most commonly used method 
to downsize labour force is through early retirement, theNational 
Pensions Fund and the National Social Insurance Fund, who are required 
to provide the rights of the laid-off workforce have involved big 
difficulties. The National Pensions Fund has suffered a lot because of the 
early retirement policy that S. 5(8) of the Public Service Pensions Act 
1993 (as amended in 2004) provides that in the case of employee being 
referred to early retirement  as a result for cancellation of job; such 
employee shall be entitled to application of a formula adds one year to his 
pension service instead of every five years remaining between the 
                                                                                                                                            
agreement between the government and the Labour Union which was agreed in the Economic 
Reforming Conference in 1990 which provided that labour union should consulted, and labour’s 
adjustment should be settled before execution of any privatization operation; the President of the 
Technical Committee for Disposition of Public Enterprises declared that the Committee is only 
responsible to fulfil the legislative rights of labour regardless any syndicator claims. 
 (Source: Akhir Lahza newspaper, 25/11/2008). 
397 - Adil Mohammad Salih Bashir, supra 13, p.18. 
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employee’s age at the time of job cancellation and the obligatory pension 
age (60 years). For example, “A” is a fourty-ager; his pension service is 
20 years; in the event of job cancellation, A’s pension service will be 
counted as 25 years.  
In a meeting with Mr. Makkawi Jaielani Al-Tiriefi, Directorate of 
States’ Affairs in the National Pensions Fund, he said:398 
 “National Pensions Fund has been affected by the consequences of privatization 
that: 
a- Voluminous number of payers of pension’s instalments has been referred to early 
retirement, a thing which results in reduction of the financial sources of the Fund.  
b- Pensions Fund liabilities have largely increased because of the voluminous number 
of the early-retired employees as a consequence for cancellation of jobs”. 
 
In the light of that part of the laid off workforce is entitled to take 
social insurance rights (part of SOEs employees are employed on private 
basis); the liabilities of the Fund have largely increased because of the big 
numbers of the laid off work force.  The big number of the insurance 
instalments payers who were laid off minimized the Fund’s financial 
sources and at the same time widened the number of persons who are 
entitled to insurance payments. Furthermore, big number of the privatized 
firms do not pay the monthly instalments of their private employees, a 
thing which resulted in difficulties in fulfilling the insurance rights of the 
laid off employees.    
In a meeting with Mr. Adil Diab, official in the National Social 
Insurance Fund, he said:399 
 “In many cases, failure to pay the monthly instalments of the social insurance of 
SOEs compelled the fund to accept some assets owned by these SOEs as payment for 
the social insurance instalments.” 
                                                 
398 - National Pensions Fund building.  Khartoum,  8.10.2008 at 10 AM. 
399 - National Social Insurance Fund. Khartoum-East. 8.10. 2008 at 12 AM. 
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Main issues of the laid off work force in Sudan can be analyzed 
under the followings:400 
1- S.4 of the Disposition of Public Enterprises Law 1990 provides: 
notwithstanding any acquired post-service rights, HCDPE has the right to 
exercise any legal procedure to terminate the service of the employees of 
the targeted SOE. 
2- The Council of Ministers, by the Ministerial Decision No.46/ 
2003, decided instant payment for the laid off work force rights after 
privatization decision and before the actual execution. The ministry of 
finance and national economy is obliged to pay these rights without 
waiting for the proceeds of the privatized SOE. The ministerial decision 
hasn’t been fairly executed in all privatized SOEs. Work force of some 
SOEs benefited from the precise application of the ministerial decision; 
others found many difficulties by delaying the application of such 
ministerial decision. 
3- Some inequitable settings may occur as a result for cancellation 
of job. For example, in the event of employee being laid off before the 
obligatory age of pensions (60 years), he may find a job in the private 
sector; consequently, he will be entitled to social insurance rights. As a 
result, the laid off employee will enjoy dual-right (pensions and 
insurance). By this treatment the terminated employee will have 
preferentiality over the remained employee (pension’s rights). 
 
(3)Generous Severance Payment: 
In countries where the need to reward labour is strong and the 
social safety nets are lack, governments have restored to voluntary lay off 
(departure lay off) by providing generous severance payment that have 
                                                 
400 - Source of all information in the analysis is the annual report of TCDPE,2005 and Adil Mohammed 
Salih Bashir supra 13. 
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exceeded legally mandated requirements. The size of payments has varied 
widely between countries, and within one country between enterprises in 
different sectors, depending on legal and contractual obligations and the 
strength of labour unions.    
 Argentina, for example, reduced employment on a voluntary basis 
largely through generous severance pays (two to three year’s salary) The 
Argentinean approach succeeded because basic salary in Argentina was 
too low, a thing which made the post-services rights such like pensions 
and social insurance also too low. Moreover, in Argentina the advanced 
age of many workers made generous severance pay equivalent to a 
generous retirement bonus. Large-scale reduction in Bangladesh’s jute 
labour force between 1990 and 1993 were possible largely because of 
severance payments that averaged about three years’ wages (and even 
more in other sectors with strong unions); in 1990 some 9.000 workers 
applied for the scheme of severance payment , compared with normal 
retirement of 700 a year. In Peru, most of the 20.000 to 30.000 cut in the 
state enterprise employment in the early 1990s were achieved through 
severance payment schemes.401 
Our humble opinion, the main challenge facing the voluntary 
retirement through generous severance pays lies in devising a severance 
policy that is both attractive to workers and financially feasible in the 
short run.    
In some cases inadequate funds have forced governments to delay 
severance payments, which in addition to imposing social difficulties and 
reducing the value of severance has seriously eroded government 
credibility. In Argentina, one of the labour reduction program’s main 
concerns was credibility that is, whether the government, in the midst of 
                                                 
401 - Sunita Kikeri, supra 1 pp. 14-15. 
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severe fiscal crisis, would be able to pay the generous amounts it had 
promised to pay. However, severance payment can be financed by:402 
• Allotting privatization proceeds of the privatized firms for 
severance payment for their laid off labours, as in Turkey and 
Tunisia.403  
• Setting aside budgetary funds, as in Argentina and Peru where 
World Bank adjustment operations tied the release of loan funds 
to designation of budgetary fund for paying severance. 
• Privatization proceed of certain enterprise may be used to 
satisfy severance payment for labours of other enterprise. 
Malaysian sold shares of profitable enterprises to generate 
proceeds that could subsequently be used for financing 
severance in future transactions. 
• Sharing the burden with the new buyers, as in Argentina and 
Pakistan. 
Despite the weakness in the social security net in Sudan, generous 
severance payment hasn’t been exercised. It is true that some privatized 
enterprises were sold at lower prices. But, other were sold at high prices. 
For example, privatization operation of Atbara Cement Factory and Fine 
Spinning Factory resulted in $45.000.000.404 Such amount could 
constitute great source to finance big number of severance payments in 
many following privatizations operations. Also, new private owners 
haven’t been requested to contribute in the severance payment of labours 
of their privatized enterprises.  
As we have mentioned above, some international institutions have 
strongly contributed in financing generous severance payment (see the 
                                                 
402 - Id, p.17.  
403 -In low-income countries like Sudan, however, this option is limited because proceeds from sales 
are often not sufficient to cover severance costs. In many cases enterprises have been sold at low prises 
with long repayment periods and default rates have been high (see chapter 3 of this dissertation). 
404 - See chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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contribution of the World Bank below). In Sudan, a scheme for 
establishing safety net to treat the negative affection of the privatization 
was proposed by HCDPE. Therefore, HCDPE at the beginnings of the 
eightieth of the past century, requested UNIDO to contribute in this 
scheme. UNIDO accepted and sent an international expert to Sudan. The 
expert attended and prepared a report to UNIDO, but the political 
circumstance at that time created a barrier on the face of this international 
contribution.405   
 
(iv) Contribution of World Bank:406 
Since 1991 the World Bank has increasingly involved in supporting 
labour market reforms more broadly, as well as in the specific context of 
enterprise restructuring and privatization. Between 1991 and 1995 the 
Bank approved 156 projects with components aimed at improving the 
functioning of the labour market to enhance efficiency, welfare, and 
poverty reduction. These operations supported the development and 
strengthening of labour market information and monitoring, employment 
services, training, pensions system reform, labour code revision, women’s 
labour market issues, public works, micro-enterprises, and social safety 
net programs including unemployment insurance. 
In addition, the Bank has approved close to 50 operations with a 
component supporting labour adjustment in the specific context of 
privatization and state enterprise reform. Most of the operations are 
concentrated in transition economies and Latin America, but other 
regions are seeing rising support as privatization become part of the 
reform agenda. To date such support has primarily included institutional 
support for the preparation and implementation of labour adjustment 
                                                 
405 - See Adil Mohammad Salih Bashir, supra 13, p.12. 
406 - Sunita Kikeri, supra 1, p-p.  32-36. 
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programs. More recently, the Bank has moved from indirect to direct 
financing for severance pay. In addition, support to redundant state 
enterprise workers is also being provided in the context of broader 
poverty alleviation programs. 
Bank’s operations have financed technical assistance for a range of 
institutional support activities. A number of operations have provided 
assistance to help governments develop a strategy and action plans for 
labour adjustment, both for the overall privatization program (as in 
Argentina, Ghana, and Peru) as well as for specific enterprise (as in 
Argentina railways, Mozambique railways and ports, and Pakistan 
power). Argentina’ public enterprise reform execution loan, for example, 
is providing technical assistance for the development and implementation 
of a labour rationalization program focusing on concrete programs for 
staff reduction and redeployment including detailed estimates and targets 
of labour redundancies, and reform of labour contracts focusing on the 
redesign and renegotiation of collective labour agreements. In the railway 
sector, the project financed technical assistance to help the Railway 
Employee Management Unit evaluate the railway’s labour force, analyze 
work rules and propose changes, and develop and manage a program for 
labour reduction that considered buyouts, early retirement, and retaining 
options. Increasingly, Bank operations are also providing support for the 
design of severance pay package and programs, as in Kenya, Tunisia, 
Venezuela and Yemen. 
These components have frequently been combined with support for 
active labour market programs such as retaining and job search 
assistance. Such programs are the most frequently occurring labour 
component in Bank operations and have been supported across a wide 
range of countries in Africa (Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Zambia), 
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Asia (Bangladesh and India), and Latin America (Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Mexico and Peru).    
Active labour programs are widely supported in transition 
economies, including in Armenia, Macedonia, Poland and Russia. In 
addition to such support, in many countries the Bank has assisted 
governments and municipalities deal with pervasive problem of social 
assets during state enterprise restructuring and privatization. In china, for 
example, the Bank has helped municipalities develop market-based 
housing systems of social safety nets to free enterprises of their direct 
welfare responsibilities. Similarly, operations in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz 
Republic are supporting pilot programs to facilitate the transfer of social 
assets such as housing, health care, and education from restructured 
enterprises to local governments. In sectors and regions that are 
undergoing major restructuring, the Bank has provided the full range of 
institutional support for labour adjustment to speed up the restructuring of 
enterprises and improve the delivery of benefits. In Russia, for example 
the Coal Sector Restructuring Adjustment Loan (1996) helps 
commercialize and demonopolize the coal sector and eliminate subsidies 
while ensuring that laid-off workers receive a variety of assistance 
package. An innovative feature is the temporary redirection of subsidies 
to the sector to establish a safety net for redundant workers. The support 
includes counselling, severance and disability payments, and community 
employment programs. Agreements with the government stipulated that 
counterpart funding would be used to finance these measures.  
In the past, the World Bank involved only indirectly in financing 
severance pay, with government using the counterpart funds generated by 
adjustment operations to finance severance. Close to thirty retrenchment 
programs supported by the Bank financed severance in this way. A 
notable example is Argentina, where severance for laid-off state 
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enterprise employees was financed largely by Bank-generated funds from 
the Public Enterprise Reform Adjustment loan (1991). The loan 
conditions stipulated that a certain amount of budgetary funds be set aside 
for severance. They also required the authorities to certify the names, 
other identifications, and voluntary arrangements for the departure of a 
certain number of workers. In the particular case of the railways, $300 
million of the total severance of $1 billion was financed with counterpart 
funds of the adjustment operations; the rest was funded directly by the 
government. Annual wage savings for the state enterprise sector as a 
whole were calculated at $1 billion a year, with $239 million a year in the 
railways sector. In the Kyrgyz Republic, where more than 30.000 state 
enterprise workers have been laid off during restructuring, the Bank 
helped design a severance package and reached an agreement with the 
government that counterpart funds from the Privatization and Enterprise 
Sector Adjustment Credit (1993) would be used to finance severance pay. 
At the same time the Social Safety Net Project (1995) supported the 
provision of employment services, including training and temporary 
income support for laid off workers as well as development of 
government capacity to monitor labour markets and poverty indices.  
In the past the Bank was not allowed to directly finance pay 
because it was not considered a productive investment. There were also 
concerns about the effectiveness of retrenchment schemes and the bank 
vulnerability to accusation of supporting and financing unemployment. 
But a number of factors led the Bank to decide in February 1996 to allow 
direct Bank financing for severance pay as part of investment operations. 
These included the importance of large-scale restructuring and 
privatization, the potential obstacles arising from lack of financing for 
labour shedding prior to sale, the growing evidence on the economic and 
financial returns to severance pay, and the limitations of adjustment 
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lending. As a result, finance of severance pay can now be provided for 
individual state enterprises or groups of enterprises throughout the reform 
process than that are, from corporatization to restructuring prior to 
privatization. 
Conclusion: 
   Termination of labour force service is inevitable sequence for 
privatization in most of countries all over the world. While numbers of 
countries haven’t taken reasonable methods to settle labours problems 
during or before the execution of privatization program, others adopted 
accurate procedures to settle their grievances, and consequently mitigated 
public opposition.   
It is true that the governments, especially in the mids and the last 
quarter of the past century, hired excessive number of peoples in the 
governmental enterprises according to political-relate reasons. Also, the 
states issued different labour legislations which granted restrictive 
contracts. The restrictive contracts of work force made the right of the 
state to terminate labour service very difficult, a thing which created 
considerable difficulties after implementing privatization. But, the above 
practises should not be justifications for any prejudicial treatment in the 
event of termination because of privatization.  
 Save in rare cases, new owners of the privatized enterprises opt to 
reduce the number of labours. Privatization usually results in limitation of 
the protection conferred on workers in concern of the authority to layoff 
them. On its counterpart, privatization may result in creation of new jobs. 
Creation of new jobs can only be achieved if the new owners of the 
privatized enterprises opt to enlarge the activities of these enterprises. 
The international experience indicates that the role of employees’ 
participation in determining the ideal methods of termination should not 
be underestimated. Dealing with employees before privatization mitigates 
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their opposition to the limit that they may be converted to become 
supporters for the privatization program. The support of work force for 
privatization can only be achieved if the safety net (social insurance and 
pensions) is strongly enhanced to create better future for the terminated 
workers.   
In Sudan, the two integral parts of the safety net have been 
burdened a lot because of many factors. Early retirement, in addition to 
the excessive burden of the new terminated workers resulted in great 
dropping in the finance resources of the safety net (the monthly 
instalments). 
 In a country with weak safety net, other options are preferable 
such as generous severance pay for laid off workers. By the generous 
severance pay, the terminated workers can establish private business; 
these businesses may extract their incomes, a thing which may encourage 
other employees in the candidate enterprises to support privatization.  
The World Bank opted to participate in supporting retrenchment 
programs in big number of countries. Many countries like China, 
Argentina, Mexico and Peru have enjoyed World Bank support to finance 
their labour adjustment programs, a thing which assisted them to achieve 
remarkable success in their privatization programs. Also, many of the 
least developing countries like the African countries (Mozambique, 
Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Zambia) have relied upon the World 
Bank assistance to finance  programs related to their laid off workers.  
In Sudan, we have not illustrated any contribution by the World 
Bank in privatization program as a whole. The internal political situation 
in Sudan in the last twenty years has resulted in total absence for the role 
of the World Bank in the various economic activities. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The privatization program involves a big number of preparations in 
a country’s legal and economic settings. It requires lawyers and 
economists of a country to prepare a precise privatization strategy before 
implementing privatization processes.  
The main challenge facing privatization executers is the application 
of ideal legal methods of privatization to achieve the objectives of the 
strategy of privatization.   
Efforts of lawyers should also be concentrated on amending some 
provisions of constitutions and legislations whenever these provisions are 
standing as barriers on a country’s road towards privatization. In addition, 
efforts of lawyers should be concentrated in provisions of conventions, 
treaties, and bilateral agreements to which a country is, or may become a 
party to ascertain and solve the difficulties that may face implementing of 
privatization program.  
Since competition is considered as important tool for success of 
privatization program, rules of the competition should be preserved in the 
different legislations and in decisions of governments of a country. 
 Many countries have not specific law or specialized bodies with 
exceptional authorities to implement their privatization program; in such 
a case their public-sector management legislations should be efficient to 
execute their privatization program. Privatization law, if enacted, should 
include the institutional framework of the privatization program; organize 
the execution of the program, and determine the roles and authorities of 
the different actors in privatization.  
In addition to state-owned enterprises, a privatization program may 
be extended to include some sectors with special features like 
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infrastructure, the matter that requires more preparative legal procedures 
before implementing privatization. 
 Laid-off work force is an important issue before implementing 
privatization program.  Absence of efficient social safety net (pensions 
and insurance funds) often results in strong opposition for privatization. 
So, some other alternatives have to be therefore solving the problems of 
retrenched employees. 
  Followings are the conclusions and recommendations: 
The Privatization strategy: 
Before implementing privatization operations in a country, a clear 
strategy for application of such program should be prepared to determine 
the scope of the privatization operations. The privatization strategy is a 
comprehensive plan which forms the integral parts of privatization 
operations economically and legally. 
  Preparing the governmental productive firms and sectors for 
privatization requires repealing, amending, and enacting many laws. 
Regarding its legal part, launching privatization strategy prior 
privatization greatly facilitates avoidance of different problems after 
privatization. For example, implementation of privatization operations in 
certain state-owned enterprise without undergoing the required revision 
on the legislation that formerly established such enterprise will, 
inevitably, result in big problem for both government and new owners of 
the privatized firms. Another example, labour settings should precisely be 
analyzed to specify the ideal methods to treat with them before 
implementing privatization operations, a thing which smoothes the 
privatization program and absorb the public opposition during and after 
privatization.  
Ranking of clear privatization objectives facilitates selection of 
suitable legal methods to execute privatization program. For example, if 
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the key objective of privatization is to improve public finance by using 
the proceeds of the sale of state owned enterprises to reduce the public 
debts; efforts of lawyers in a country should be concentrated in preparing 
accurate divestiture (selling) contracts. In the other types of privatization 
like management, lease, and concession; sale contracts become 
unfeasible. As a common feature in Africa, privatization objectives were 
declared just to mitigate the public opposition or to create a sort of 
euphuism for privatization; the real objectives were not declared. In 
Sudan, however, the declared objectives of privatization do not contradict 
the applied legal methods of privatization, a thing which gives some 
credibility for the Sudanese privatization program. 
One of the most important purposes of preparing privatization 
strategy is that it enables the government to put some safeguards and to 
benefit from the former experiences. For example, good privatization 
strategies in some former socialist countries created some sort of rational 
graduation in executing privatization program; they opted to enact two-
stage legislations of privatization by focusing first on small privatizations 
before moving on to larger operations. The Sudanese government hasn’t 
made a distinction between the large and small enterprises in the 
privatization operations. Large-scale and small-scale enterprises have 
coincidently been privatized. 
While a long-term privatization strategy implies patient preparation 
for planning and implementation of privatization program, Short-term 
privatization strategy implies irrational deluge of privatization 
legislations and operations during short period of time.  
However, the short-term strategy as well as long-term strategy has 
its feasibility as a tool to achieve quick privatization program. In Sudan, 
the government has not determined dead time to finish the privatization 
operations. Close to twenty years were spent and the Higher and 
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Technical committees for disposition of public enterprises are still now 
exercising their tasks. 
Under the light of that in Sudan the bigger part of the targeted 
enterprises for privatization (%60) have not been privatized, small-scale 
enterprises should be privatized before the large-scale ones to benefit 
from the disadvantages at lower costs. 
 
Patterns of Privatization: 
Despite the common notion that privatization is a transfer (selling) 
of governmental ownership to private party, there are many other legal 
methods which can be considered as privatization. In general, 
government can either initiates a partial or full transfer of ownership 
through some type of sales agreements, or to maintain ownership while 
involving private operators through other legal methods like management 
contract, lease, and concession arrangement. 
Negotiated (direct) sales come first in countries with low level of 
transparency that such countries are often governed by dictatorial 
regimes. The most dangerous thing in concluding negotiated sales 
contracts is that price and terms of the contract of the privatized SOE are 
agreed behind closed doors. The only safeguard for application of such 
agreements is the confidence of the state on its public officials. In 
exercising their tasks to negotiate with private parts, public official 
usually face pressure to sell for certain persons or interest groups. 
Politicians’ intervention in the direct negotiated sales may either be 
motivated by financial interests or by ideological interests. For example, 
in Sudan most of direct and negotiated sales contracts were concluded 
with Islamic financial institutions. These contracts were concluded to 
privatize considerable number of the most attractive public enterprises 
like Atbara Cement Factory, Rabak Cement Factory, and Sata (formerly 
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Bata) for shoes production. The bad thing is that the prices of these 
attractive firms were considered as repayments of former debts to Daar 
Al-lmaal Al-Islami. It is clear that government was not in good 
negotiation situation to impose strong terms on the direct sale contracts, a 
thing which created clouds of doubts over these privatization operations. 
Negotiated and direct sales contracts may form good results in countries 
with good mechanism to monitor different sorts of corruption and 
favouritism like in England and other Western Europe countries. 
Auction, despite it is usually used for privatizing small businesses 
(like retailing shops), reflects high levels of transparency that SOE assets 
are sold to the highest bidder in open bidding.  Auctions have contributed 
in privatizing one of the loss-making Sudanese enterprise; the Public 
Corporation for Printing and Publication. Despite the fact that auctions 
are often used for the privatization of small enterprises, it remains as one 
of the ideal legal methods for creation of high levels of transparency. 
The only difference between auctions and tenders is that auction as 
a rule is exercised to dispose of the assets of SOE in the event of 
liquidation; governments often use tender to divest the going concern 
SOEs. In privatization by tenders, investors in certain SOE submit their 
bids in sealed envelopes which are opened publicly on announced time 
and place. In Sudan, one of the important privatization operations was 
executed through tender; this is Elnilein Group for Industrial 
Development operation in 2006. High level of transparency was applied, 
good ranking for legal preparations, legal consultation prior involvement, 
clear tender announcement in newspapers, and efficient privatization 
agreement have presented one of the good examples. Also, Bank of 
Khartoum, Real Estate, and Friendship Palace Hotel privatization 
operations presented good examples for the privatization through tenders. 
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 A public offering of SOE’s shares means the sale of all or part of 
the government’s holdings in a company to peoples through domestic or 
international stock markets. The price of the shares can be fixed by the 
government. Beyond doubt, this type of privatization methods, if properly 
exercised, reflects a good level of transparency. In addition to the weak 
public awareness about the feasibility of investment in the public 
companies, former bad performance of these companies minimized the 
contribution of the public offering in the current privatization operations 
in Sudan. Also, in Sudan and in many of the least developing countries, 
investors have individualism tendency, a thing which limits public 
offering of shares as privatization method. 
 In many countries, vouchers become a well-known method of 
privatization. In mass privatization programs, governments give all the 
peoples of the country vouchers of the former governmental enterprises 
free of charge. These vouchers could then be exchanged into shares at 
special auctions. The main advantages of this method appear from that 
the process of privatization gains speed by simplifying the task of 
divesting a large number of SOEs. In Sudan this method of privatization 
hasn’t been used that the mentality of the Sudanese government is a 
collective one. The Sudanese government wants all the proceeds of the 
privatization entre in its treasury without tendency to investigate the 
feasibility of the different legal methods of privatization. 
 Joint-venture reflects the need for a strong investor to contribute in 
the shares of the governmental enterprises. The outside investor brings 
new capital and technology, while the SOE provides existing physical 
assets. In many countries, such method have been exercised as a 
transitional step towards complete privatization that he sudden transfer of 
the public enterprise to private body may create many of bad reflections. 
In Sudan, Joint-venture method was exercised as a transitional step in the 
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privatization operation of the former Public Telecommunications 
Corporation. The Sudanese Government attracted some local and foreign 
investors to establish a joint-venture company. After establishing such 
company, the Sudanese Government began gradual withdrawal from the 
company by listing the governmental shares in the internal and 
international stock markets.  
 In a lease agreement, a private investor rents an asset or enterprise 
from the government for a specified period of time and retains the 
enterprise’s profits for its management services. A concession agreement 
is similar in that the concessionaire pays either a fixed fee or a percentage 
of profits for the right to operate a facility or to provide a service, keeping 
the rest of the proceeds. Lease and concessions all over the world are 
used for large-scale enterprises such as infrastructure sectors. In Sudan, 
lease operation was exercised in privatizing hotel activities; the Grand 
Hotel.  
Under a management contract, a private operator takes over the 
management of the enterprise in exchange for a fee, while the 
government remains the enterprise’s owner.  However, the new investor 
will not risk his own capital for any restructuring or future investments. 
In Africa, management contracts are mostly used in infrastructure areas 
such as the water supply in Abidjan (Cote d’ Ivories) and Guinea. In 
Sudan we have not illustrated any use for such type of privatization 
contracts. 
In many cases, governments, especially in the small-scale 
enterprises, give the management and employees the right to make an 
offer for their enterprise before the privatization. In Sudan we have 
illustrated two uses for this method; the White Nile Agricultural 
Corporation and the Blue Nile Agricultural Corporation. An agreement 
was concluded between HCDPE and Al-Janien for Agricultural and 
 324
Animal Production to lease the lands and machineries of former White 
and Blue Nile agricultural corporations. This contract resulted in a 
dispute between the Sudanese government and the farmer of the two 
corporations. The government decided to transfer the ownership of the 
two corporations to their farmers. 
 BOOT (build-own-operate, and transfer) agreements are used 
mainly for large energy and infrastructure projects. The investors provide 
the finance and build and operate the facility for a fixed period of time. 
They recover their initial capital outlay plus a reasonable return by 
charging user fees. At the end of the contract, ownership reverts to the 
government. BOT system, save in narrow scope, is used for privatization 
of governmental activities not existing enterprises. Nowadays, in Sudan 
the railways sector has contracted with some private companies according 
to some formulas of BOT system, namely RLT (rehabilitate, lease, and 
transfer) formula. 
Liquidation and asset sale can be considered as one of the 
privatization methods. In the case that public enterprise is in a particularly 
bad financial condition with high liabilities, a direct sale and other types 
of privatization might prove impossible. In such a case, the government 
might opt to liquidate the enterprise and sell its assets. The Sudanese 
government used this method in privatizing the highest loss-making 
corporations like the Mechanical Transportation Corporation; many of the 
fuel stations owned by this corporation, with their assets, were sold to 
private bidders. (See chapter3). 
After performing the different privatization methods we 
recommend that negotiated and direct sales should be limited or, at least, 
exercised in narrow scope. Absence of transparency in exercising these 
contracts, especially in the large-scale enterprises has bad reflections on 
the credibility of the privatization program as a whole.  
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Abstractly, tenders and auctions privatization provides high level of 
transparency in the execution of privatization processes. In addition, 
many of the most successful privatization operations in Sudan were 
executed through tenders and auctions suck like Elnilein Industrial Group 
Bank privatization, Bank of Khartoum, and Real Estate Bank. Therefore; 
notwithstanding the other legal methods of privatization, we invite the 
Sudanese government to widen the use of this legal method.   
 Privatization and Constitution and International Law: 
Despite the fact that, during the period from the beginnings of the 
ninetieth of the past century until the beginnings of the current century, 
economies of most of the former socialist and Marxist-Liniest countries 
were liberalized, many constitutional barriers on the face of privatization 
remained. Some of these constitutional provisions limit the scope of 
privatization for example, Portugal’s 1976 constitution declared 
irreversible the nationalizations that followed the April 1974 revolution. 
Therefore the constitution had to be amended to authorize the 
privatization of these SOEs. In Sudan, the Permanent Constitution of 
1974 did not include any strict provision for prohibition of privatization. 
On other hand, some Articles of such constitution included signs for the 
nature of the Sudanese economy that minimize the role of the private 
sector in the national economy: 
Article 30: The socialist system shall be the foundation of the economy of the 
Sudanese society so as to realize sufficiency in production and fairness in 
distribution, and to introduce decent living for all citizens and prevent any form of 
exploitation and injustice. 
Article 31: The Sudanese economy shall be directed to realize the objectives of the 
development plans in order to achieve the society of sufficiency and justice and the 
state shall own and manage the fundamental means of production in the economy. 
Article 32: The Sudanese economy shall consist of the activities of the following 
sectors: 
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The public sector, which shall be pioneer sector and shall lead progress in the fields 
of the purpose of the development, shall based on public ownership and be subject to 
people’s control. 
The Co-operative sector, which shall be based on the collective ownership by all 
members participating in co-operative societies. The state shall care for the co-
operative and the law shall regulate their formation and   management. 
The private sector, which shall be based on non-exploiting private ownership. The 
state shall protect and encourage it and organize its formation to play a positive and 
active role in the national economy. 
From the above provision, we can note that Article 31 directly 
provides for socialism as the economic policy in Sudan. Article 32 ranked 
the private sector at the end of the list of the productive sectors; after the 
public and the cooperative sectors. 
In some countries, the constitution may provide that any 
privatization operation must be approved by parliament. This is the case 
with Article 34 of the French constitution of 1958. With regard to that 
privatization is in need for smooth applications without tension between 
the executive and the legislative authority, such provisions create barriers 
for privatization. 
Constitutional provisions may also limit the extent of the 
government’s discretionary power. For example, while valuation of the 
enterprise to be privatized in England is a government’s discretion, in 
France the Constitutional Council which is responsible for verifying the 
constitutionality of laws, ruled that the constitutional principles of 
equality among all citizens and Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights which mandate the payment of just compensation when 
property is confiscated, prohibit the transfer of public assets at less than 
the real value. Also the control of constitutionality of privatization 
legislation may also delay the execution of the privatization operations. In 
many countries such like France; the constitutional court may review 
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legislation before it comes into force. Therefore, the frequent suits by 
labour unions usually delay the execution of the privatization program. 
  The conduct of privatization transactions in a given country can 
also be affected by the international treaties and agreements to which 
such a country is a party. Most of the international treaties and 
conventions, although they do not frankly provide privatization, they do 
not provide for any preferential treatment for the public or the 
governmental sector. For example, EU treaty is very significant, even 
though the treaty itself is neutral regarding type of ownership. The 
abolition of customs barriers, the liberalization of former monopolistic 
markets, and the imposition of common competition rules on private as 
well as public enterprises all foster the entry of private operators.  
Sudan is a member of many international commercial conventions 
and treaties like COMESA which includes countries of east, central, and 
southern Africa. Provisions of such a treaty eliminate custom barriers 
between the member countries regardless of the sector of producer 
(public or private). In addition, many of the member countries of 
COMESA are also member in WTO. Accordingly, they comply with 
WTO’s provisions which include liberalization of economies. Also, 
Sudan is a member of Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). In the light of 
that many of the member countries of GAFTA are, at the same time, 
members of WTO, wherein the private sector has great portion in the 
national economy; the private sector in Sudan should be given 
considerable contribution in the national economy activities.  
Bilateral agreement also has important affection on the 
privatization, especially in the events of privatization of airlines. Before 
privatization, routes of airlines are often governed by bilateral agreements 
between governments as owners of the airlines companies. After 
privatization, the ownership of airlines will become private ownership; 
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therefore, for protection purposes, governments often put some 
safeguards in the privatization contracts to maintain their rights in these 
routes.  
Current conventions, bilateral agreements, and treaties on trade, 
although most of them do not frankly provide for the liberalization of 
national economies, they are implicitly concerned with creation of 
economic climate favourable for liberalization and wide contribution of 
the private sector in the economy. The Government of Sudan has 
involved some bilateral agreements which created monopolistic climate 
(like the Exclusive Agency for Sudanese live-stock and Meats between 
Sudan and Saudi Arabia), a thing which make investors, especially the 
foreigners, fear to invest in Sudan.  
For the above we can say, that since that the current constitution in 
Sudan is an interim or transitional one; we recommend that the provisions 
of the permanent constitution should not include any provisions for 
economical ideology. Furthermore, we recommend that any legislation or 
governmental order should not provide for any monopolistic treatment for 
the sake of governmental or private body. Lastly, the Sudanese 
government is required not to implement any commercial convention, 
treaty, or bilateral agreement if it creates monopolistic or preferred 
treatment for the sake of any private or governmental body. 
Privatization and Competition: 
 Many privatization writers consider the level of competition in a 
country a measure of the success of the privatization program in such a 
country. Furthermore, part of international economists considers 
competition as determinant element in achieving not only successful 
privatization program, but rather a measurement for the performance of 
the economy as a whole. Professor George Yarrow stated (see chapter 5): 
“Competition is likely to be more important determinant of economic performance 
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than the ownership”. In other words, if public productive enterprise had 
initially been established on competitive bases, they would have never 
presented disappointed performance.  
  The importance of the adoption of fair competition appears from 
that in a country launching privatization program, a considerable number 
of potential investor are foreigners and part of them come from liberal 
economies where public enterprises are not granted preferred treatment 
over the private ones. Therefore, any preferential treatment for the sake of 
the public enterprises will narrow the participation of the foreign 
investment in privatization program. 
 In many countries (Sudan among them), legislations protecting 
competition exist, but the main challenge to achieve successful 
privatization program is to prohibit anticompetitive treatment between the 
different actors in the market before, during, and after the execution of 
the privatization operations. To achieve successful privatization program, 
non-discrimination between the private and public sectors in the market is 
a declared policy in many countries.  In Brazil, for example, guarantees 
of non-discrimination are, even, found in the constitution. Article 173 of 
the 1988 of Brazilian constitution provides that public corporations, joint 
venture companies, and other public entities that engage in economic 
activity are subject to the same legal system as private companies.  
  It is irrational to use the privatization itself as a device to create 
monopolies. The Sudanese government committed this mistake by 
granting long-term monopoly for the new owners of the former National 
Telecommunications Corporation. Again, in the privatization contract of 
Atbara Cement Factory, the Sudanese government agreed some 
uncompetitive provisions. A letter from the Secretary General of Taxation 
Chamber to President of Higher Committee for Disposition of Public 
Enterprises on 15/10/2002, mentioned these provisions: 
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Terms 5/11 to 5/14: are not constitutional and against the international agreements, 
they prejudice the rights of the states and the other similar factories such like Rabak 
Cement Factory. In addition they are monopolistic and contradict the economy 
liberalization policy. 
SS. 13, 20, 22, 37 contradict the Additive Value Tax Act in concern the imported 
commodities, and permission of sale without issuing sale invoices. The exemption 
from the additive value tax is only issued by legislative order from the Minister of 
Finance and National Economy after the recommendation of the General Secretary of 
Taxation Chamber. 
For the above, the Sudanese legislative authority and government 
are required not to issue any legislation or order which creates sort of 
preferential treatment for the sake of one investor over the others. In 
addition, Sudanese government or the Higher and the Technical 
committees are required not to consent to any term of contract provides 
for any uncompetitive treatment. 
Privatization and Public-sector Management: 
 Public-sector management has important role in the privatization, 
especially in countries with French influence in their legal system. In 
France, privatization hasn’t been exercised by a special governmental 
body (committee or agency). Absence of such body means absence of a 
special authority facilitates overriding laws which stand as barriers on the 
face of the privatization. 
In Sudan, although there are federal governmental bodies to 
execute the privatization program (the Higher and the Technical 
committees), some difficulties have faced the execution of the 
privatization program. Identifying legal owner is standing as strong 
barrier in the face of TCDPE that some of assets of the public enterprise 
to be privatized may be owned by other public entity. In addition, the 
privatization program was launched in the period where the governance is 
central.  After application of the federal governance, TCDPE (federal 
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committee) faced many problems in transferring ownership and 
concessions of the privatized enterprise to the new investor.   
The ambiguity in determining the boundaries of authorities 
between the different governmental units also has big affection in 
smoothing execution of privatization program. For example, the 
privatized cement factories like Atbara Cement Factory have suffered a 
lot to renew their concessions of quarries of lime stone. For example, a 
dispute was launched between the Geological Research Authority of the 
Sudan (GRAS) and the new owners of Atbara Cement Factory. GRAS 
refused to renew the concessions of lime stone quarries to the new 
owners. The new owners of the factory claimed that the authority for 
renewing the concessions is for the Ministry of Investment of River Nile 
State. However, the dispute was amicably solved.  
For solving property problems, we repeat what Mr. Hassan 
Alkhier, Head of Department of Investment Promotion in the Ministry of 
Investment (mentioned in Chapter 6) said: 
“1- Most of the investment lands which were formerly granted to the governmental 
productive units in the fortieth, fiftieth, and, seventieth of the past century, specially 
those were granted outside Khartoum, have no records in the lands authorities. 
Therefore, after their privatization in the past and the current century; governmental 
bodies of these productive units failed to determine boundaries of these lands, a thing 
which resulted in many problems for the government and the new investors. 
2- The former governmental management bodies of units which were granted these 
lands are presumed to be responsible for such negligence. They are the persons who 
were responsible to pursue surveying and registering these lands under the names of 
these units. 
3- The governmental management bodies have to inform TCDPE that these lands 
have not yet been registered under the name of the targeted SOE. Informing TCDPE 
enables it to solve problems of surveying and registration before privatizing the 
targeted SOE. 
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4- TCDPE, now, is required to register all lands of the targeted SOES, (listed in the 
schedule of the Disposition of Public enterprises Act 1990), under its name. Such 
registration will enable TCDPE to exercise the privatization operations as the owner 
not as a representative; a thing which will emanate its negotiating position.   
The Privatization Law: 
While most countries legally implement their privatization 
programs by passing law on privatization which specify the scope of the 
program, establishes the institutional authority to conduct the 
privatization program, and define the most important elements of the 
process; other countries consider  existing legislations as sufficient to 
conduct the privatization program. However, if privatization law is 
required, it must define what is to be privatized, list governmental 
enterprises that will be sold, and specify the entities responsible for the 
execution of the privatization program. 
 Many countries launched their privatization programs without 
specific law that such countries were in bad need for implementing argent 
privatization programs. On the other hand, there is also the danger of 
major delays through the long-time political debates in the parliament of 
prior to passing a privatization law. In addition, enacting privatization 
legislation may require major changes bigger than the ordinary 
parliament debates; it may require amendment in the constitution of the 
country. 
In the absence of a specific legislation to privatization, and where 
the government does not want to be involved in the complicated 
procedure of enacting a specific privatization law; using some sorts of 
creativity, lawyer can circumvent the amendment of number of 
legislations that stand as barriers for privatization. For example, In 
Vietnam (former communist state), the ownership of SOE’s land can not 
be transferred to private enterprise. The problem has been solved by 
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establishing joint-venture companies whose public sector partner held the 
rights to land use granted long leases. Another example, in Nicaragua, the 
state’s ownership titles to certain assets are imprecise or disputed. This 
made the sale of these assets to private enterprise very difficult. The 
problem was solved by that the state concluded leas-sale contracts 
allowed assets to be transferred without immediate sale; lessee was given 
an option to purchase these assets at the end of the contract. 
Privatization law may be a general one which places all the 
required powers for privatization in the hand of certain committees. On 
the other hand, in many countries despite that privatization is exercised 
depending on a specific law; such law may be restrictive in some 
authorities, followings are examples:  
- The law may list SOEs to be wholly or partially privatized; 
therefore, government’s authority is limited to these listed SOEs. 
- All too often that privatization laws and regulations prescribe the 
authorized privatization methods.  
- Some privatization laws put restrictions on entity of the buyer 
such as prohibition of public entities to involve as buyers in the privatized 
enterprises. The Sudanese privatization law doesn’t include such 
restriction and the government sold many of the privatized enterprises to 
other public entities. Box no.6 in this dissertation appears that among 25 
transfers of public enterprise to other public entities, 12 transfers are 
considered as failed operations.  
- Some privatization laws put restrictions on foreign participation 
in the privatization operations, for example, in Burkina Faso, Article 10 
of Ordinance no. 91-0040/PRES of July 1991 empowers the minister 
responsible for SOE supervision to reserve in priority a share of each 
privatization for Burkinabe nationals. In Brazil, Article 13 of Law No. 
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8031 of April 1991 limited holding by foreigners to 40 percent of voting 
shares. 
- Privatization law in many countries provides for the golden share 
in privatization contracts.  The golden share enables the government to 
veto some decisions or share transfers; this technique remains a state’s 
control beyond privatization. In Sudan many privatization contracts 
included golden share for the government. For example, the privatization 
contract of Atbara Cement Factory includes that the new owner cannot 
amend the objectives of the company of the factory. In addition, the 
purchaser agrees to transform the Company of the factory from private to 
public five years after privatization. Moreover, the purchaser is obliged 
not to sell the Factory at any time, but has the right to involve any co-
ownership in a sense not affecting the terms of the agreement. 
For the above, the public enterprise should not be transferred to 
other public entities. Also, there must be rational balance between the 
portion of local and foreign investors in the privatization operations. 
The Institutional Framework of Privatization: 
Determination of the institutional framework of privatization 
requires the definition of the roles, responsibilities and authorities of the 
various actors in the privatization operations such like the legislature, 
government, individual ministries, and the transactions body.   
The role of the parliament is fundamental in the institutional 
framework of privatization. International experience of privatization 
shows that relations between parliament and government can be strained 
at any stage of privatization process even where the government is in a 
bad need for enacting the privatization legislation. The bad face of the 
intervention of the parliament appears from that it may constrain the 
privatization from the first step (enacting the required legislation). Delays 
attributable to intervention by parliament may be more detrimental in 
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smoothing the privatization program. On the other hand, consent of 
parliament in any privatization operation gives many advantages for such 
operation and the privatization program as a whole. 
Countries adopt different institutional frameworks characterized by 
varying degrees of independence of the privatization body (committee or 
agency) from the political apparatus. The common institutionalization of 
privatization bodies is by the appointment of two agencies or committees. 
One is a supervisory committee which sets the main policy of 
privatization and sign final privatization contracts. The second is an 
executor committee that operates under the supervision of the first 
committee; its missions are to make all the preparative steps before the 
privatization like rehabilitation, valuation, and termination of service of 
employees of state-owned enterprise. Strict separation of authorities of 
the two committees provides smooth application of privatization 
program. In Sudan we have illustrated some contraction of powers 
between the two committees, the Higher and Technical committees (see 
Table No.10 in chapter 8). 
 Part of privatization writers mention that some principles of law in 
a country are better determinant for the institutional framework of 
privatization than the sections of laws do. Guarantee of rule of law and 
delegation of powers principles come first in these determinant principles.  
It is a common notion that “capital is coward”, therefore, without 
guarantee of the rule of the law in a country both foreign and local 
investors will not join any privatization operation. Guarantee of the rule 
of the law includes, among other things; 
 - The publicity of the rule of the law; which enables all parties to 
have access to the laws and regulations that affect their activities. 
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- Predictability in the application of the rule of the law reduces the 
risks linked to changing interpretation, implementation, and enforcements 
of laws. 
- Systematic stability provides assurance that the government will 
not unilaterally and unfavourably change the legal and regulatory 
conditions that underlie investment. 
- Fairness, possibility of legal resource, and due process provide 
access to independent recourse and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
There are clouds of doubts about the real application of this 
principle in almost all countries that are dictatorially governed.  
Assurance of the principle of delegation of powers is also required 
to achieve successful privatization program in a country. Proper 
application of such principle creates good impression on the investors that 
privatization operations are smoothly applied without unnecessary delays 
in completing sales and handovers procedures. Delegation of powers also 
requires the members of privatization agencies or committees to be 
excluded from investing in the privatized firms. 
 
For the above,  the followings are advisable: 
-In the application of the privatization program, there must be strict 
application for the principles of the guarantee of the rule of the law and 
the delegation of powers. 
-Sine the current law of privatization in Sudan was enacted in a 
period of moratorium of the constitution and the parliament, the 
government is now required to request passing of privatization law by the 
parliament. Beyond the doubt the consent of the parliament will reflect 
high level of credibility on the privatization program as a whole. 
-The Minister of Finance and National Economy (President of the 
Higher Committee of Disposition of Public Enterprises) should monitor 
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and prohibit the contradiction of authorities between the two privatization 
bodies. 
Privatization of Infrastructure: 
   Infrastructure sectors are, or were, usually thought to exhibit 
monopoly characteristics; that is, one operator should be able to provide 
these services more efficiently than could several operators acting 
separately. Infrastructure sectors are intensive capital activities; therefore, 
one may think that all the activities of the infrastructure sectors had 
initially been practised by the governments. By vestigial research in the 
history of the public sectors it appears that, save in rare countries, most of 
infrastructure activities were initially started as private sector activities. 
Thereafter,  because of war-related circumstances, governments 
nationalized these activities. In addition, because of the same war-relate 
circumstances, former private owners bankrupted, a thing which 
compelled governments to undertake the responsibility of producing and 
presenting services of infrastructure sectors.  
   According to the big size of the infrastructure sectors, a 
fundamental step before privatizing the infrastructure sector is required. 
Unbundling the sector is the required step; it implies that the internal 
components or segments of the infrastructure sector should be divided 
into separate units so as to simplify the privatization operations.  Enabling 
the individual investor whether local or foreign to contribute in the 
privatization operations stands as the first justification for unbundling the 
sector.  Another justification appears from that unbundling eases the 
regulators’ control over the privatized units and facilitates their mission in 
benchmarking the competition of the new operators. Any of the divided 
segments can carry a legal entity to facilitate the privatization, or it may 
be privatized without carrying legal entity. 
 338
Methods of the privatization of infrastructure resemble the methods 
of privatization of state-owned enterprises. Privatization by BOT system 
(Build, Own, and Transfer) implies that privatization by this method is a 
privatization for activities which were formerly reserved for the public 
sector. But, some formulas of BOT system can even be used for 
privatization of existing infrastructures, for example, RLT (Rehabilitate, 
Lease, and Transfer) which is widely used in the contracts of the 
Sudanese Railways Corporation.  
Because of its feasibility, BOT system should widely be used that it 
provides good source for financing infrastructure schemes without 
burdening the public budget by huge amounts of money.  
 Privatization and Labour: 
Labour rights have great importance before, during, and after the 
execution of privatization operations in a country. Despite its importance, 
labour is one of the least addressed issues in privatization. It is true that 
the former practice of government resulted in excessive number of labour 
in the governmental enterprises.   
The past bad experience should not underestimate the necessity of 
efficient guarantees of laid-off labour’s rights. The first guarantee of 
labour can be achieved by dealing with them before privatization, and the 
government should explain the rationale, costs and benefits of 
privatization, and the costs of non-privatizing. Experience of some 
countries like Argentina and Uganda appears that workers supported 
privatization when they understood the advantages and necessities of 
privatization through government communications. In Sudan, the labour 
union frequently declares that it was actively consulted during the first 
Conference for Economic Reform 1990 (where privatization policy was 
recommended). But, the frequent grievances and protestations of labour 
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syndicates denote that they have not been well informed with regard to 
privatization feasibility.   
In countries where the pensions and insurance systems are weak, 
the problem is that the early retirements enlarge liabilities of pension 
funds and the social security system, a thing which results in delaying 
payment of laid off labour rights and, consequently, the credibility of the 
state.  
With regard to the above, we recommend that the communication 
with employees through the Labour Union is a fundamental device to win 
their support for the privatization program. Also, assuring that Pensions 
and Social Insurance Funds are ready to pay the rights of laid-off 
workforce before implementing privatization is a good guarantee for 
smoothing the privatization. Pensions and social insurance funds should 
be subsidized to fulfil the laid-off employees’ rights without waiting for 
the payment of instalments of sales. Lastly, generous severance payment 
for the laid-off workforce is advisable as it guards them against 
complicated procedures of the Pensions and Social Insurance Funds. 
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Appendixes 
 
Chapter 3: 
 
(1) Memorandum of Understanding of Bank of Khartoum Privatization Operation.  
 
“This agreement is made the.............407 day of July 2005 between: 
(1) The Bank of Sudan whose registered office is at Khartoum –Sudan (the ‘Vendor’) 
and 
(2)Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC whose registered office is at Dubai- United Arab 
Emirates and which shall include all assigns and transfers of Dubai Islamic Bank 
PJSC, including without limitation any third party to whom Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC 
transfers any shares acquired by Dubai Islamic Bank PJSC pursuant to the terms of 
this agreement as ( the ‘Purchaser’). 
WEREAS, the Vendor has agreed with the Purchaser for the sale of 7,086,000 fully 
paid shares in the Bank of Khartoum Public Limited Company (the ‘Company’) being 
a company registered in the Republic of the Sudan. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY AGREED AS FOLLOWS:  
1 . Definitions 
For the purposes of this agreement: 
‘Balance Sheet’ means the balance sheet and profits and loss statements for the 
company or 12 months period ending on the balance sheet date; 
‘Balance Sheet Date’ means December 31 2004; 
‘Business Day’ means any day on which banks are open for business in the 
Republic of the Sudan; 
‘Business hours’ means 9-am-5pm inclusive on any business day; 
‘Completion’ means the process of completing the sale and purchase of shares in 
accordance with cl 7; 
‘Completion Date’ means the date specified in writing by the Purchaser as being 
the date on which the purchaser wishes to complete the purchase contemplated by this 
agreement; 
‘Due Diligence End Date’ means the date falling 60 days from the date hereof; 
‘Existing Commitments’ means all contracts of the Company on the Completion 
Date and bids by the Company outstanding on the Completion which subsequently 
become binding contracts upon the terms contained in those bids; 
‘Loss’ or ‘Losses’ any and all liabilities, losses, costs, damage (including special, 
indirect and consequential damage), penalties and expenses (included reasonable legal 
fees and expenses and reasonable costs of investigation and litigation). In the event of 
any foregoing are indemnifiable pursuant to schedule Three, the terms ‘Losses’ shall 
also include any and all reasonable legal fees and expenses and reasonable costs of 
investigation and litigation incurred by the Purchaser in enforcing such indemnity; 
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‘Person’ means an individual, corporation, government or governmental subdivision 
or agency, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, or association, two or more of any 
of the foregoing having a joint or common interest, or any other legal or commercial 
entity or undertaking; and ‘Persons’ shall be construed accordingly; 
‘Purchase Price’ is US$ 57,000,000 (fifty seven million); 
‘Requisite Consent’ is defined in cl 3.4; 
‘Share’ means the 7,086,000 ordinary shares of 1000 Sudanese Dinars each of the 
Company 
‘Sub-Contracts’ means the sub-contracts entered into in order to enable the 
performance of, or otherwise in connection with, the Existing Commitments; 
‘Tax’ includes (but is not limited to) income tax, corporation tax, advance 
corporation tax, capital gains tax, development land tax, development gains tax, social 
security and earnings related contributions, income tax payable by way of pay-as-you-
earn deductions, estate duty, inheritance tax, capital transfer tax, stamp duty and value 
added tax, and all costs, charges, interest, penalties, surcharges and expenses related 
to any disallowance of relief or claim for taxation; 
‘Warranties’ means the warranties set fourth in schedule 1; and ‘Warranty’ shall be 
construed accordingly; 
in this agreement reference to a ‘day’ means a period of twenty-four hours ending at 
twelve midnight, reference to a ‘month’ means a calendar month, and reference to a 
‘Year’ means any period of twelve months;  
 All references to a statutory provision shall be construed as including 
references to; 
(a) Any statutory modification, consolidation or re-enactment (whether before or after 
the date of this agreement) for the time being in force; 
(b) Any statutory provisions of which a statutory provision is a consolidation, re-
enactment or modification; 
 Unless otherwise stated, a reference to a clause or schedule is a reference to a 
clause of or a schedule of this agreement; the schedule and appendixes to this 
agreement constitute an integral part thereof. 
 The headings in this agreement are for convenience only and shall not 
constrain or affect its construction or interpretation in any way whatsoever; 
References to days or dates (including without limitation the completion date) which 
do not fall on a Business day shall be construed as references to the day or date falling 
in the immediately subsequent Business Day; 
 Whatever in this agreement a period of time is referred to, the day upon which 
that period commences shall be the day after the day from which the period is 
expressed to run, or the day after the day upon which the event occurs  which causes 
the period to start running; 
 Where the context so admits, any reference to the singular includes the plural, 
any reference to the plural includes the singular, and any reference to one gender 
includes all genders; and 
 Any reference to a ‘Party’ means the Vendor or the Purchase and references to 
the ‘Parties’ shall be construed accordingly. 
2. Sale and Purchase of Sales 
 The Vendor has agreed in principle and subject to contract to sell with full title 
guarantee and the Purchaser has agreed in principle and subject to contract to 
purchase the shares for the sum of US$ 57,000,000 (fifty seven millions), completion 
to take place on the Completion Date. 
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3.Completion is subject to:     
  A legal report (including but not limited to those matters set out in schedule 3 
(legal due diligences) on the affairs and business of the company satisfactory to 
Purchaser being received by the Purchaser not later than the Due Diligence End Date, 
which investigation shall be commenced forthwith upon the signature hereof and in 
respect of which the Vendor shall extend all necessary co-operation to the Purchaser 
and the Purchaser’s legal advisors; 
  A audit report (including but not limited to detailed analysis of all non-
performing loans) stating the financial condition of the Company as at June 30 2005, 
(addressed to the Purchaser and jointly signed by the Companies auditors and auditors 
selected by the Purchaser) being received by the Purchaser not less than the Due 
Diligence End Date, which investigation shall be commenced forthwith upon the 
signature hereof and in respect of which the Vendor shall extend all necessary co-
operation to the Purchaser and Purchaser’s auditors 
 A technical report (including but not limited to internal banking compliance 
ant IT issues) satisfactory to Purchaser being receipt by the purchaser not later than 
the Due Diligence and End Date, which investigation shall be commenced forthwith 
upon the signature hereto and respect of which the Vendor shall extend all necessary 
c0-operation to the Purchaser and the Purchaser’s technical banking team; and 
 Granting of all necessary governmental and other consents including without 
limitation (i) a determination of Finance and National Economy approving the 
acquisition and (ii) evidence satisfactory to the Purchaser that the proposed share 
transfer is in accordance with the Khartoum Exchange Act 1994. 
 Save as required by law each party shall keep confidential and shall not make 
a public announcement or other disclosure in respect of this agreement or the 
transaction contemplated herein without consent of the other party. 
 The parties shall agree upon the most efficient and cost-effective method 
auditors of structuring the transaction detailed above, and the parties further undertake 
to review and, if necessary, to negotiate any materially affected terms and conditions 
of this agreement if for valid and substantial the transactions are structured so as to 
cause serious deviations from the original intent. 
 In consideration of the Purchaser (a) agreeing to enter into this agreement and 
to negotiate in good faith with the Vendor concerning the transaction detailed herein, 
and (b) putting in hand the investigation and audit reports referred to in cl 3, the 
Vendor hereby agrees with and undertakes to the Purchaser the following obligations, 
each of which shall be a separate obligation, legally binding upon the Vendor and 
separately enforceable by the Purchaser as follows:, 
     The Vendor will ensure that the directors, officers, representatives, and the 
agents of the Company (including the Company’s auditors) afford the purchaser and 
its representatives, including its lawyers and auditors, such access to the Company’s 
records, premises, accounts and management personnel, during business hours, as the 
Purchaser and its representatives may reasonably require so that the Purchaser may 
perform a purchase investigation of the Company’s business, financial and legal 
condition; and 
 If Completion does not occur within six months from the date hereof the 
Vendor shall pay to the Purchaser an amount equal to all costs incurred by the 
Purchaser in connection with this agreement, including but not limited to all costs 
associated with the legal investigation and financial audit. 
3. Completion 
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1- Completion shall take place on the Completion Date at 10 am at the registered 
office of the Company if in the opinion of the Purchaser the conditions specified in cl 
3 have been satisfied. 
2- At Completion, The Vendor deliver to the Purchaser duly executed transfers in 
favour of the purchaser, or if the Purchaser so directs, in favour of nominee of the 
Purchaser, in respect of the shares together with the current shares certificates 
relaying to the shares; 
3- The Vendor shall deliver to the Purchaser or any person whom the Purchaser may 
nominate such of the following as the Purchaser may require: 
4- The statutory books of the Company (which shall be written up to but not including 
the Completion Date), its certificate of incorporation and any certificates of 
incorporation on change of name, and its common seal (if any); all books of accounts, 
cheques books, paying in books and unused cheques of the Company; 
5- Resignation of the Directors or the Secretary from their respective offices in the 
Company confirming that they have no outstanding claims of any kind against the 
Company; 
6- Resignation of the existing auditors of the Company confirming that they have no 
outstanding claims of any kind against the Company; appropriate to amend the 
mandates given by the Company to its bankers; 
7- The Vendor shall procure that a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Company 
shall be at which: Such persons as Purchaser may nominate shall be appointed as 
additional Directors of the Company with immediate effect; 
 The existing directors of the company shall be appointed as additional 
directors of the Company and such negotiations shall be accepted; 
 The secretary of the Company shall resign and acknowledge that they have no 
claims against the Company, such resignation shall be accepted, and a person 
nominated by the Purchaser shall be appointed as secretary, with immediate effect; 
 The registered company  shall be changed to a new location; 
 The share transfer referred to in cl 7.2.1 shall be approved for registration 
(subject to stamping); 
 All existing mandates to bank shall be revoked and new instruction shall be 
given to such banks in such form as the Purchaser may direct; and 
 The registration of Company’s auditors shall be accepted in favour of the 
persons who shall thereupon be appointed as auditors of the company with immediate 
effect; 
 The Purchaser shall procure that the additional directors to be appointed 
pursuant to cl 7.2.3.1 attend the said meeting of the board of directors and accepted 
office; 
 Should any person whose resignation from the office the Vendor is obliged to 
procure bring a claim against the Company by reasons of that Person’s resignation 
from office the Vendor shall indemnify the Company against such claim and against 
all Losses incurred by the Company in connection with such claim. 
 To the extent that they shall not already have done so on Completion, and to 
the extent that the same is within the possession and/or the control of the Vendor, the 
Vendor shall (for a period of 24 months after the Completion Date) make available to 
the Company copies of such information, records and data as are necessary for the 
operations of the Company as are requested by the Purchaser by notice in writing to 
the Vendor. 
 The first instalment of the purchase price shall be paid to the Vendor in 
immediately available funds on the Completion Date. 
 348
 Subject to the occurrence of Completion: 
 on the first anniversary of the date hereof the Purchaser shall pay to the 
Vendor US$ 19,000,000 (nineteen millions) and; 
 on the second anniversary of the date hereof the Purchaser shall pay to the 
Vendor US$ 19,000,000 (nineteen millions). 
4.Warranties  
The Vendor hereby warrants to the Purchaser, in terms of warranties, as of the date of 
this agreement and as of the Completion date ( as if the warranties were remade on the 
Completion Date), and acknowledgments that the Purchaser has entered into this 
agreement in reliance upon the warranties and the undertaking contained in this 
agreement. Each of the warranties shall be separate and independent and claims may 
be made whether or not the Purchaser knew or could have discovered (whether by any 
investigation by it or in its behalf into the affairs of the Company or otherwise) that 
any of the warranties has not been complied with or carried out or is otherwise untrue 
or misleading. 
The Vendor undertakes to disclose to the purchaser promptly any thing which comes 
to its notice which is materially inconsistent with any of the warranties. 
The Vendor undertakes not to make any claim against the Company or its employees 
in respect of the matter giving rise to such claim. 
In the event of any warranty given by the Vendor herein is shown to incorrect or 
inaccurate, the Vendor shall indemnify the Purchaser in respect thereof in accordance 
with schedule 2 (Indemnification). 
9. Assignment  
This agreement shall not be assignable by either of the parties hereto without the prior 
written consent of the other party hereto. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 
Purchaser shall have the right to transfer any or all of the shares it owns now or in the 
future to third parties of the Purchaser’s choosing. Any third party who becomes an 
owner of any shares following such a transfer by the Purchaser shall be entitled to rely 
upon and enforce any terms of this agreement against the Vendor as if that third party 
had been a signatory to this agreement. 
10. No press release, notice or other public announcement concerning the transaction 
set out herein shall be made or issued (other than to the extent required by the law) by 
one party hereto without the prior written approval of the other. 
11. Costs and expenses 
       Other than specified 
in cl 6.2 and cl 8.4, each 
party shall pay its own 
costs in relation to the 
negotiations leading up to 
the sale of the shares and 
to the preparation, 
execution and carrying 
into effect of this 
agreement and of all other 
documents referred to in 
it. 
       Without prejudice to the generality of cl 11.1 the Vendor 
shall be responsible for the stamping of the transfers of the 
shares delivered by the Vendor pursuant to cl 7.2.1 and for the 
payment of the relevant stamp duty. 
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12. Survival of warranties  
The warranties, and all undertakings or representations contained in, or obligations 
imposed by, this agreement, shall survive Completion and continue in full force and 
effect notwithstanding Completion, except for those obligations to be performed on or 
prior to Completion but only to the extend that they have been so performed. 
13.Arbitration 
         Any dispute to any provision of this agreement shall be referred to a single 
arbitrator in London to be agreed between the parties. Failing such agreement within 
seven days of the request by one party to the other that such a question or difference 
be referred to arbitration in accordance with this clause such reference shall be to an 
arbitrator appointed by the President for the time being of the Law Society of England 
and Wales. The decision of such arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties. 
Any reference under this clause shall be deemed to a reference to arbitration within 
the meaning of the Arbitration Act 1996. 
14. Service of notice  
14.1 Any notice and certificate permission consent license approval or other 
communication or authorisation to be served upon or delivered or given or 
communicated to one party hereto by the other (in this clause called a 
‘communication’) shall be in the form of a document in writing including without 
limitation a telex or telegram but not a facsimile or an electronic mail massage. 
14.2 All communications shall be made to the Vendor at its location addresses or 
its telex number, and shall be (for the attention of: ‘the Company Secretary’). And to 
the Purchaser at the location addresses or to its telex number and shall be (for the 
attention of: ‘the Company Secretary’). 
14.3 A communication shall be delivered by hand during business hours or sent by 
telegram or telex or registered post (where possible by airmail). 
14.4 A communication shall have effect for purposes of this agreement and shall be 
deemed to have been delivered to and received by the party to whom it was 
addressed: 
14.4.1 If delivered by hand upon receipt by relevant person for whose attention it 
should be addressed as provided above, or upon receipt by any other person then upon 
the premises at the relevant address who reasonably appears to authorised to receive 
post or other massages on behalf of the relevant party; 
14.4.2 if sent by telex upon the transmission of the communication to the relevant 
telex number and receipt by the transmitting telex machine of an answer-back code 
showing that the telex massage has been received properly by the telex machine to 
which it was transmitted; and 
14.4.3  if sent by telegram twenty four hours after the text of the cable has been given 
to the relevant telegraph company or other authority for transmission unless before the 
expiry of that period an advice of inability to deliver is received by the party make the 
communication; 
14.4.4  if sent by registered post seven days from the date upon the registration receipt 
provided by the relevant post authority. 
14.5 Each party shall be obliged to send a communication to the other in 
accordance with this clause notifying any changes in the relevant details set out in the 
second paragraph of this clause, which details shall then be deemed to have been 
amended accordingly. 
15. Termination 
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15.1 if the requisite contents are not obtained within a period of six months from 
the date hereof, then (unless the parties otherwise agree and subject to cl 15.2) neither 
the Vendor nor the Purchaser shall be obliged to complete the purchase and sale of the 
shares, this agreement shall automatically terminate upon the expiry of the said period 
and neither party shall be under any liability to the other by reason of such 
termination, other than obligation on the Vendor contained in cl 6.2. 
15.2 If Completion has not taken place within a period of six months from the date 
hereof neither the Vendor nor the Purchaser shall be obliged to complete purchase and 
sale of the shares, this agreement shall automatically terminate upon the expiry of the 
said period and neither party shall be under any liability to the other by reason of such 
termination, other than obligations on the Vendor contained in cl 6.2 and 8.4. 
16 Set-off 
 Whenever under this agreement or any other agreement or contract binding upon the 
parties any some of money shall be recoverable from or payable by one party hereto 
(the ‘paying party’) to the other party (the ‘receiving party’), the same may be 
deducted from any some then due or which at thereafter may become due to the 
paying party from the receiving party under this agreement or any other agreement or 
contract between the paying party and the receiving party. 
17 Governing law 
The construction, validity and performance of this agreement shall be governed by the 
laws of England. The parties submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of English 
courts.” 
 
(2)Privatization contract of the Grand Hotel – Khartoum: 
 
Contract for the Lease, Renovation, and Rehabilitation of the Grand Hotel – Khartoum 
 “1-This agreement is made and entered into by and between the Government 
of the Sudan represented by the Minister of Finance and National Economy, 
hereinafter referred to as the “Land Lord” and Lanka-Suka Hotels and Resorts SDN 
BHD, a company registered in Malaysia, or its duly nominated subsidiary as the 
second duly authorized, (power of attorney, Annex A), hereinafter referred to as the 
“Tenant”. 
 2- Whereas the Land Lord is offered to lease, renovate and rehabilitate the 
mentioned hotel. 
 3- And whereas the tenant is interesting to lease, renovate and rehabilitate the 
mentioned hotel. 
 4- The Tenant has agreed to lease and renovate and rehabilitate the mentioned 
hotel according to the following conditions: 
 5- The tenant has no right to change the purpose of the hotel unless by a 
written consent of the Land Lord. 
 6- Payments shall be as follow: 
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 a- The first year, after the rehabilitation; the Tenant shall pay US$180,000 to 
the Land Lord. 
 b- For the second year the Tenant shall pay a sum of US$180,000. 
 c- From the third to the fifth years the Tenant shall pay US$ 220,000 in 
addition to 2,5% from the revenue to the Land Lord, for every year. 
 d- From the sixth to the tenth years the Tenant shall pay US$220,000 in 
addition to 2,5 from the revenue for every year. 
 e- From the eleventh to the twentieth years the Tenant shall pay US$308,000, 
in addition to 3% from the revenue and 5% from the net profits for every year. 
 f- From the twenty first to the twenty five years the Tenant shall pay US$350 
in addition to 3% from the revenue and 5% from the net profits. 
 g- The payment for every year shall not exceed two months from the 
beginning of the accounting year. 
 h- The Tenant shall pay 50% from the agreed-upon amount of the first year at 
the time of signing this agreement, and the other 50% shall be immediately after the 
handling over of the Hotel.  
7- The Land Lord has agreed to deliver all the related concessions, facilities 
and all the exemptions granted by the Encourage of the Investment Act 1996. 
8- The lease period will be 25 years commencing twelve (12) months from the 
date of taking over the Hotel from the actual completion of the rehabilitation which 
ever is the earlier, with an option to the Tenant to renew the lease period for a further 
15 years upon a written request made by the Tenant not less than twelve (12) months 
before the expiry of the initial Twenty five (25) years period subject to the consent of 
the Land Lord. 
9- The tenant should bear all the costs of the rehabilitation. 
10- The Tenant has the right add any facilities or extra buildings in the Hotel 
premises in order to increase its capacity subject to the consent of the Land Lord. 
11- The Land Lord agrees to hand over the Hotel to the Tenant free from any 
liabilities to any other party and with its present condition and contents as mentioned 
in the list of contents. The Tenant has to hand over back the Hotel in good condition 
at the termination of the contract without responsibilities or liabilities, which may 
accrue during the contract period. 
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12- Any extensions, rehabilitation or maintenance or renewal in the Hotel will 
be the property of the Land Lord at the time of termination of the contract period for 
any reason whatsoever or at the end of the lease period. 
13- The Tenant should be responsible for any damage or loss in the Hotel or 
its contents during the contract period and he has to compensate the Land Lord for 
such damage or loss. 
14- The Tenant shall be responsible for any damage or loss or negligence 
caused by his sub contractors. 
15- The Tenant shall not transfer any of his rights or liabilities in the contract 
wholly or partly to any third party without prior written consent of the Land Lord. 
16- The Tenant has the right to dispose of any tool, material or movable 
property which he has placed, provided that the replacement shall be of a better 
quality and shall be the property of the Land Lord. 
17- In the event of the Tenant’s fails to pay the annual rent agreed in the 
contract in the time specified in this contract, or in the event of the breach of any of 
his responsibilities and liabilities, the Land Lord shall issue a notice in writing 
specifying the default and requiring the Tenant to remedy the default within 30 days 
and if after 30 days without the breach complained being remedied, the Land Lord 
shall have the option to terminate his contract without referring the matter to the court 
and to restore the Hotel without prejudice to all other legal rights, provided all ways 
such breach of contract default are not caused by any of the followings: 
i- War or civil commotions. 
ii- Political or labour unrest. 
iii- Force majeure 
18- In the case of any dispute between the two parties regarding this contract, 
they agreed to settle it amicably, and in the case of their failure, the dispute shall be 
referred to arbitration according to the civil and binding and the venue of arbitration 
shall be the city of Khartoum. Procedures Acts 1983 and the award of arbitration shall 
be final. 
19-This contract shall be subject to the laws of the Republic of the Sudan. 
          Signatures: 
Abd-Elwahhab Osman                                Dato Ahmed Sebi 
Minister of Finance and                           General Manager of Lanka- 
 National Economy.                                Suka Hotels Company. 
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(3) Privatization contract of Atbara Cement Factory (Translated by the researcher) 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
“This agreement is made and entered into force on August 27th 2002 by and between:      
*The Government of the Republic of the Sudan, represented by Mr. Alzobier Ahmed 
Alhassan, Minister of Finance and National Economy. 
* Sudanese African Company for Trading and Investment, thereinafter referred to as ‘the 
second party’ 
* Where as the Sudanese Government is debited for the Sudanese African Company for Trade 
and Investment by $41,000,000, and whereas Atbara Cement Factory Company “registered 
under the provisions of the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925, under registration no. C 
2785” is, with all its shares and portable assets, fixed assets, goodwill, trademarks and 
intellectual property rights, owned by the first party; the first party offered the sale of 
company’s shares to the second party.  
* The second party accepted to sell the offered shares of Atbara Cement Factory Company.  
Therefore, the two parties agree to the following: 
(1)The introduction and schedules of this agreement are inherent parts of the agreement, and 
the agreement shall be concluded accompanied with the followings:  
a-The presidential decree of consent. 
b-Decision of HCDPE No. 113, dated November 18th 2001.  
c-The memorandum of association of Atbara Cement Factory Company.   
d-Memorandum of the second party.  
e-Plan for rehabilitation of the Factory; prepared by the second party and approved by the first 
party.  
f-Power of attorney from the Bank of Khartoum to HCDPE for selling its share in Atbara 
Cement Factory Company (only one share). 
g-Power of Attorney from the second party to his representative. 
 h-Copy of the agreement which signed in May 9th 1990 between the Sudanese Government 
and the second party. 
SALES: 
(2) Sales are: 
a- Atbara Cement Factory Company, free of any former obligations, legally and financially, 
and this includes 10,000 fully-paid shares. 
 b-Brick Factory in Atbara. 
 c-All assets and lands owned by Atbara Cement Factory Company ltd. 
 e-All lands and estates owned by Atbara Cement Factory Company ltd., as mentioned in the 
fourth schedule of  this agreement.    
g- Fixed and portable assets as mentioned in the balance sheet in 30-6-2002.  
h- All the intellectual property rights of Atbara Cement Factory Company ltd, and this 
includes; goodwill, business names, patents and any other evaluated property owned by the 
sold company at the day of this agreement. 
 PRICE AND PAYMENTS: 
(3) The two parties agree that the purchase price shall be an aggregate amount of 
$41,000,000., and the second party shall pay the purchase price in the following manner:    
a-By a deposit of $20,500,000, upon the execution of this agreement, half of the deposited 
sum shall be paid in cash, the another half shall be considered as a repayment for the debts of 
the first party to the second party (see the introduction). 
b-$20,500,000 shall be paid as five instalments of $4,100,000 each. The period of the 
payment of the instalments shall be as follow: 
First, the first instalment shall be paid one year after the handover of the factory, $2,050,000 
shall be considered as a repayment of first party’s debts (mentioned in the introduction).  
Second, the second instalment, ($4,100,000); shall be paid two years after; $2,050,000 shall 
be paid as a repayment of the first party’s debts (mentioned in the introduction). Third, the 
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third instalment ($4,100,000) shall be paid three years after, 4,050,000 shall be paid as 
repayment of the first party’s former debts (mentioned in the introduction). Fourth, the fourth 
instalment, ($4,100,000) shall be paid three years after; $2,050,000 shall be paid as repayment 
of the first party’s debts (mentioned in the introduction). Fifth, the fifth instalment of 
$4,100,000 shall be paid after five years; $2,050,000 shall be paid as a repayment for the first 
party’s debts (mentioned in the introduction). 
FIRST PARTY OBLIGATIONS:                                                                                   
(4-1)-The first party agrees that he has presented all the required information which motivated 
the second party to join this agreement, and assure the following: 
a- All information which is presented to the second party is true. 
b-The first party is authorized and took all the required procedures to satisfy his obligations. 
c- The first party is the sole owner of the transferred shares. 
d-The first party has been allotted the shares in a proper way. 
(4-2)-The first party agrees that he shall not acquire any of the shares which may be issued by 
the second party in the future, with or without consideration. 
(4-3)-The first party agrees to declare anything that constitutes a breach of any of his 
obligations related to this agreement, or any other thing which may constitute cause the 
second party to terminate this agreement. 
(4-4)-In the case of the first party’s non-fulfilment of any of the mentioned guarantees; the 
second party will have the right to claim any of the followings: 
a-He has the right to claim an amount of money to the extent that puts him in a neutral 
position, as if the first part did not commit such breach. 
 b-He has the right to claim an amount of money to the extent that covers any liability or 
obligation resulting from the first party’s non-fulfilment. 
(5-1)-The first party agrees to hand over the sales to the second party free of any legal 
obligations; this includes termination of employees and labours service contracts, or and any 
other acquired rights. 
(5-2)-The first party agrees to transfer the ownership of Atbara Cement Factory Company and 
its properties into the name of the second party; therefore, the first party agrees to pay all the 
fees of the transfer of lands, and taxations (VAT, and sales tax or any other type of taxations). 
(5-3)-The first party agrees to issue extraordinary decision from extraordinary meeting of the 
company to increase the nominal capital (which is registered in the registrar office) to become 
$41,000,000, divided into 10,000 shares, and to present a document whereby such increase of 
capital is exempted from any fees.  
(5-4)-The first party agrees to renew all leases, concessions and licences for a period not less 
than fifty years; this includes machineries, lands, quarries and any other type of ownership. 
(5-5)-The first party agrees to transform all the agricultural lands owned by the Factory to 
become industrial lands. 
(5-6)-The first party agrees to register El-Tina Quarry (800,000 SQ.M), located in the east of 
the Factory, under the name of the Factory. 
(5-7)-The first party agrees to guarantee that any conflict about the ownership of Factory’s 
lands will not occur in the future. 
(5-8)-The first party agrees to register EL-Akad Quarry (11,904,760 SQ.M) under the name of 
the Factory. 
(5-9)-The first party agrees to register the Plaster Quarries in Port Sudan, which are owned by 
the company, under the name of the second party. 
(5-10)-The first party agrees to grant an agricultural land to the second party, to contribute in 
the development of the area around the Factory.  
(5-11)-The first party agrees to grant the price-level protection for the local cement instead of 
imported cement for five years. 
(5-12)-The first party agrees to grant a preferential treatment over the imported cement after 
the expiry of the above five years price-level protection. 
(5-13)-The first party agrees, for purposes of the price-level protection, to pay all the 
regionalist fees. 
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(5-14)-The first party agrees to grant the second party the right to import 120,000 tons from 
the Clinker (an assistant row-material of cement production) with 50% exemption from all 
taxations and other fees. 
(5-15)-The first party agrees that the Company, until completing the transaction, shall: 
a-Continue to commence its commercial activity to keep its goodwill.          
b- Not involve any new contract, amend or terminate any contract for bringing any subjects to 
the Company, or any other contract.    
c- Not terminate any part of its commercial activities. 
d- Execute all contracts to which the company is a party. 
 e- Not involve in any new assets whether by lease, leasing-sale or otherwise method. 
(5-16)- The first party agrees that the Company shall remain enjoying the position of “New 
Strategic Investment Project” which is provided by the Investment Encouragement Act 1999, 
for a period not less than fifteen years, and shall remain enjoying all the recent merits, in 
addition to any other merits which may be granted to any other investor in the same field in 
the future. 
(5-17)-The first party agrees not to use the name “Atbara Cement Factory Company”, or any 
other similar name, which may result in misleading on the minds of the current, or expected 
customers of the Company. 
(5-18)-The first party agrees not to use or disclose any secret information, and not to enable 
any other person to use such information. 
(5-19)-The first party agrees to inform the second party by any secret information. 
(5-20)- The first party agrees to pay all stamp-duties required for this agreement. 
 SECOND PARTY OBLIGATIONS: 
(6-1)-The second party agrees to start production processes operating within period not 
exceed six months after the handover. 
(6-2)-The second party shall comply with the environmental laws or any other relative 
legislations. 
(6-3)-The second party shall not change the objects of the Factory. 
(6-4)-The second party agrees to transform the Factory Company into public company five 
years after the beginning of production. 
(6-5)- The second party agrees not to sell the Factory at any time; but, has the right to 
participate with a partner in a manner not affects the terms of this agreement. 
HANDOVER: 
(7)-The handover shall be after six weeks from signing this agreement and the first party shall 
give the second party the following documents: 
First: The documents of the transfer of the ownership. 
Second: Documents of the ownership of the first party. 
Third: Documents of renewing all the concessions, licences and leases of Atbara Cement 
Factory Company. 
Fourth: The Company’s accounts documents until 30.6.2002. 
Fifth: A list contains all the assets; and the first party shall be responsible to pay any deficit in 
the listed assets, between the time of signing of the contract and the time of the handover. 
 (8)-The second party shall, in the case of non-satisfying his obligations, be responsible to 
return all the assets, document, and any other thing delivered to him by the first party. 
(9)-A breach of any term in this agreement may lead to the termination of all its terms. 
GOVERNING LAW:  
(10)- This agreement shall be governed by, and construed in accordance with, the laws of the 
Republic of the Sudan. 
 
4- Privatization Contract of Elnilein Development Group. (Translated by the researcher) 
 
Shares Sale Agreement 
This agreement is made on November 11th 2006 and entered into by and between 
Sudan Central Bank (thereinafter referred to as “the Vendor”), represented in this agreement 
by Mr. Bader-Alden Mahmud Abbas, Vice-Governor of Sudan Central Bank, and Al-salaam 
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Bank group (thereinafter referred to as the “Purchaser”), represented in this agreement Mr. 
Hussein Mohammed Salem Al-miza, and on the address of the Vendor and the Purchaser 
referred to in S. 13 of this agreement. 
Section (1): Introduction 
Whereas Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group is a bank established under the 
provisions of Elnilein Industrial Development Group Act 1994 and its main office in 
Khartoum- Republic of the Sudan, to exercise the purposes detailed in s.5 of mentioned Act, 
and whereas the nominal capital of the Bank is SD. 5,000,000,000 (five billions Sudanese 
dinar). The Purchaser owns 99%, and the Ministry of Finance and National Economy owns 
%1 of its shares. And whereas the Vendor offered to sell %60 of its shares in the mentioned 
Bank, and whereas the Purchaser offered and accepted to buy these shares with absolute 
knowledge for the financial situation of the mentioned Bank in 31.12.2005, and thereafter the 
Vendor has agreed the Purchaser’s offer. Both parties have agreed the following: 
Section (2): 
In this agreement, unless the context otherwise requires; following words and expressions 
means: 
“Vendor”: thereinafter means the Central Bank of Sudan. 
“Purchaser”: thereinafter means Al-salaam Bank Group. 
“Bank”: thereinafter means Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group 
“Agreement”: thereinafter means this agreement. 
“Closing”: thereinafter means the date of Purchaser’s fulfilling purchase of shares according 
to S.(6) of this agreement. 
“Main accounts”: thereinafter means audited account lists in 31.12.2005. 
“Closing Accounts”: thereinafter means final accounting lists of the Bank in 15.11.2006. 
“Act”: thereinafter means Elnilein Industrial Development Bank Group 1994. 
Section (3): Documents of the Agreement 
The following documents  agreement are inherent part of it: 
1-Publication in the news papers and TCDPE, for qualification of candidates. 
2-The offer presented by the Purchaser for buying shares. 
3-The main accounts of the Bank. 
4-Closing Accounts in 15 November 2006. 
5-Guarantee for Vendor’s ownership of the shares. 
6-Decision of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy and the HCDPE, delegates Mr. 
Bader-Eldeen Mahmud Abbas, Vie-Governor of the Central Bank of Sudan to sign in this 
agreement. 
7-Decision of the Minister of Finance and National Economy and HCDPE, for the consen of 
the sale. 
8-The Frame-work plan presented by the Purchaser. 
9-Power of Attorney whereby, the Purchaser delegates Mr. Mohammed Salem Al-miza to 
sign this agreement on behalf of him. 
10-An approval from Mr. Hussein Mohammad Salem Al-miza whereby; Iemaar Estates Co 
delegated him to sign this agreement on behalf of the Co. 
Section (4): Agreement of Sale and Purchase 
1-According to the law and conditions of this agreement; the Vendor shall sell %60 (sixty 
percent) of his shares of the capital of the Bank, which were legally registered under his name 
with all rights and liabilities on these shares according to the financial lists audited in 15.11. 
2006., the sale shall come into force in the date of closing these lists. 
2-Subject to this agreement; the Vendor shall make surrender to the Purchaser for any other 
rights related to the shares subject to this agreement. 
3-The Purchaser has agreed the continuousness of the Bank according to the same provisions 
of the law as developmental commercial bank until these provisions are repealed or amended 
to transform the Bank into company works under the provision of the Sudanese Companies 
Ordinance 1925. 
4-The Purchaser has agreed the full compliment of frame-work plan presented by him as it 
mentioned in the appendix no. (3) of this agreement. 
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Section (5): Shares price 
The full price of the purchased shares shall be $80, 000,000 (eighty millions American 
Dollars). 
Section (6): Payments 
The Purchaser shall pay the price of the purchased shares in this agreement as follow: 
1- %50 (fifty percent) of the total amount; in the time of signing this agreement. 
2- %50 (fifty percent) of the total amount after the Vendor completed the transference and 
receipt a registration certificate, within a period not exceed six months after signing this 
agreement. 
Section (7): Purchase Preparations 
(1) The two parties have agreed that the Vendor shall present the audited accounts of the 
financial year which ended on 31.12.2005, and any other information to audit the closing 
accounts, and the certificates related to the property of the different assets. This shall be 
within a period not exceeding 30 days from preparing these accounts on 15.11.2005. 
(2) The two parties have agreed that the purchase in this agreement is concluded depending 
on that all decisions, consents and other procedures required to conclude this agreement were 
in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Sudan. 
(3) The two parties have agreed that, all the rights in the Bank’s administration shall be 
transferred to the Purchaser according to the same percentage of shares owned by him 
according to this agreement. The Bank shall be work under the provisions of the Sudanese 
Companies Act 1925. 
Section (8): Termination 
1-The Vendor is entitled to terminate this agreement in the event of Purchaser’s failed to fulfil 
his obligations of payment or, in representing frame-work plan. 
2-The Purchaser shall be entitled to terminate this agreement, by written warning if, within six 
months of closing; the Purchaser is of opinion that any of the guarantees, information 
mentioned in this agreement are not correct. 
Section (9): Disclosure of information 
The two parties have agreed to keep the secrecy of all information and documents related to 
this agreement in all periods of negotiations, after negotiations and signing and, not to 
disclose them to any third party. 
Section (10): Transactions 
Any party of this agreement is not entitled to transfer any of his rights or obligations to any 
third party, unless by written consent by the other party, until the Bank is transformed into a 
company under the provisions of the Sudanese Companies Ordinance 1925. 
Section (11): Governing Law 
The governing Laws of this agreement shall be the Sudanese laws. 
Section (12): Arbitration 
In the event of any conflict between the two parties of this agreement about the application or 
interpretation of the provisions of this agreement; solving such conflict shall be amicably by 
direct negotiations between the two parties. In case of failure; the solution shall be in reliance 
to arbitration. The applicable law in such a case shall be The Sudanese Arbitration Law 2005. 
Section (13): Notifications 
All notifications and correspondences between the two parties shall be to the addresses of the 
parties as follows: 
1-Vendor’s address: 
Khartoum-Sudan 
P.O. Office: 313. 
Fax: 00249-183-780273. 
E-Mail: sabir@bankofsudan.org. 
1- Purchasers address: 
United Arab Emirates-Dubai  
P.O. Office: 120180- Dubai 
Fax: 009714-3193114 /or/ 009714-3673156. 
E-mail: djabr@amlakfinance.com. /or/ Djab@leadercapital.com  
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Parties:  
* Vendor: Central Bank of Sudan, represented by Bader El-din Mahmud Abbas  
Vice-Governor of Central Bank of Sudan. 
* Purchaser: Al- salaam Bank Group, represented by Hussein Mohammad Salem Al-miza 
Witnesses: 
1- Abd-Elrahman Nooreddeen, The president of TCDPE. 
2- Abdu Mahmud Mohammad Khalil, General Manager of Al-salaam Bank. 
 
5- Privatization contract of the Real Estates Bank. 
“This contract is made in Khartoum in December 4th 2002 between: 
(a)  The Government of the Sudan; thereinafter referred to as (First Party), represented by the 
Minister of Finance and National Economy (The President of HCDPE). 
(b) Eljumaa Company for Trade and Investment Company; (registered under the Sudanese 
companies Ordinance 1925, by registration certificate No. (C.17153) on 27.8.2001., the 
company’s head office is in; Elfaihaa Building, Fifth Floor, Khartoum-Sudan, and Elshiekh 
Jumaa Bin-Fahd Bin-Mubarak Eljumaa. Thereinafter referred to as the (the Second Party), 
represented by the President of the Board of Directors of Jumaa Eljumaa for Trade and 
Investment by the Power of Attorney No (12) – 15.10.2002.  
(1) Whereas the First Party offered to sell the Sudanese Real Estates Bank including all its 
branches and the Sudanese Real Estates for Investment & Trade co. ltd, and all the Bank’s 
shares in all other companies, and all its registered fixed assets (according to the accompanied 
lists), and its portable assets (according to the accompanied lists), for a price of USA $ 
15,500,000 (fifteen millions and five hundreds thousand USA Dollars), according to his 
authorities by S.(4-A) of Disposition of Public Enterprises Law 1990. And;    
(2) Whereas the Second Party accepted to purchase the described above Bank, by the 
determined price; the two Parties have agreed the follow: 
(3) The introduction, lists of fixed and portable assets, the certificate of registration of the 
Sudanese Real Estates Company, Shares certificate (determined in the accompanied lists), and 
the following documents; shall be considered as inherent part of this agreement: 
(a) The consent of Council of Ministers for the sale of the Real Estates Bank. 
(b) The decision of the HCDPE No (123) – 8.11.2002. 
(c) Registration Certificate, issued by the Registrar of Lands, approves the property of the real 
estates of the bank (accompanied on the list of fixed assets). 
(d) The list of portable assets. 
(e) A power of attorney from the Governor of the Bank of Sudan to  the representative of the 
First Party, to transfer his 1% shares, to the Second Party. 
(f) A consent document of the Ministry of Finance and National Economy for the transfer of 
its 99% shares. 
(g) A consent document from the Sudanese Company for Building and Construing for the 
transfer of its 1% shares. 
(h) A power of attorney delegates the Second Party’s representative to sign on behalf of him. 
(i) A plan for Development and modernization of the sold Bank. 
(j) The Memorandum of Eljumaa Company for Trade and Investment. 
(4) The First Party has agreed to sell to the Second Part; the Real Estates Bank, the Sudanese 
Real Estates Company for Trade and Investment, all the fixed and portable assets (mentioned 
in the accompanied list), and all the shares owned by the Bank in the other companies 
(mentioned in the accompanied list). 
(5) The Second Party accepted the purchase of such Bank and the price amounted USA $ 
15,500,000 (fifteen millions and five hundreds thousands American Dollars). 
(6) The First Party is obliged by the follow; 
First: To deliver the Second Party the sold Bank within not more than on 31.12.2002.  
Second: Providing all the required documents to conclude the contract. 
Third: Providing the consents of the Bank of Sudan and the Council of Ministers to enable the 
private company which shall be established by the first party to exercises banking activities. 
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Fourth: Termination of service of the Bank’s employees, and also termination of the service 
of the employees of the Sudanese Company for Investment and Trade, and pay all their post 
service rights, and any other financial or legal rights according to the Labours Law or any 
other relevant laws, this shall be within the time agreed-upon by both parties. The Second 
Party shall have the right to keep on service any employee/or employees according to new 
services contracts. 
Fifth: The First Party shall deliver the Real Estates Bank, free of any financial or legal 
liabilities 
(7) The Second Party is obliged by the followings; 
First: Payment of USA $ 15,500,000 (fifty millions and five hundreds thousands American 
Dollars) in cash, at the time of signing this contract. 
Second: Transformation of the Real Estates Bank into private shares company, and then into 
public shares company five years after the transformation into private one.    
Third: Presentation of frame-work plan for development and modernization the Bank. The 
Second party shall be obliged to apply such plan in the performance of the new private shares’ 
company which will be established at the time of signing this contract, and the other public 
one which shall be established after five years from the date of signing this contract, 
according to the provisions of this contract. 
Fourth: The second Party shall increase the capital of the bank to fulfil the Central Bank’s 
decisions about the specialized banks, and to work with compliance to the laws, regulations 
and policies which organize banking activities in the Sudan. 
Fifth: The activities of the company shall be as follow: 
(a) Transactions in the real estates and building and constructing. 
(b) Encourage of using advanced technologies for development of construction of buildings, 
and reduction of costs and time. 
(c) Contribution in financing house complexes and gathering the required financial sources 
from the savings of the beneficiaries and the other financers (banks, corporations, 
organizations and companies). 
(d) Exercising all banking activities and commercial investment banks. 
(e) Exercising business on commercial bases. 
(f) Contribution in increasing the national income by increase the production and promotion 
of productivity. 
(g) Contribution in increase the exports by creation new channels for exportation. 
 (8) Any party has the right to terminate this contract in the case of other party’s non-
compliance or non-execution of his obligations mentioned in this contract. In the event of 
termination this contract; the First Party is obliged to repay the delivered amount, and he is 
entitled to reduce 10% from the delivered amount.  The Second Party is entitled to terminate 
this contract in the case of non-fulfil of the First Party for any of obligation mentioned in this 
contract. 
(9) This contract shall be subject to the Sudanese laws, and shall be executed and interpreted 
according to the Sudanese law. 
(10) Any conflict between the Parties of this contract shall be solved through direct 
negotiations between the two parties. In case of failure; the governing law shall be the Civil 
Procedures Act 1983. 
Signatures: 
* First Party: Dr. Hassan Ahmed Taha: representative of the Minister of Finance 
*Second Party: Osama Mirgani Haj-Elnoor: Executive manager for Jumaa El-Jumaa. 
 
Chapter 4: 
Article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: 
(1) Every one has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. 
 
Chapter 10: 
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    Privatization and labour force reduction in Argentina (source: Sunita Kikeri, 
Privatization and Labour, 1998. World Bank Publications) 
Enterprise Employment before 
privatization 
Employment after 
privatization 
%change 
Entel Telecom 
OSN 
GDE 
SEGBA 
YPF (oil) 
FAA (railways) 
SOMISA (steel) 
 
Total 
44,399 
10,273 
  7,500 
20,271 
37,400 
92,500 
12,000 
 
224,283 
42,908 
10,273 
   7500 
15,806 
10,600 
18,000 
  6,000 
 
111,087 
      -3 
       0 
       0 
    -22 
    -27 
    -81 
    -50 
 
    -50 
 
    Severance payments in selected developing countries (source: Sunita Kikeri, 
Privatization and Labour,1998. World Bank Publications). 
Country Sector/enterprise Average length 
of severance 
payment 
Average 
amount per 
workers 
Financing 
Argentina Railways (FA) 
Telecoms(Entel) 
Steel (Somissa) 
 
2 year’s salary $ 12,000 
$ 25,000 
$ 15,000 
Government,donors 
Government 
Government, 
Commercial Banks, 
donors 
Bangladesh  Jute (BJMC) 3 year’s salary $ 5000 Government,donors 
Brazil Railways 18 month’s 
salary 
$ 15000 Government,donors 
Ghanna 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General 
 
Food processing 
(TFCC) 
 
Textiles (GTP) 
52 month’s 
salary 
14 months 
salary 
 
6 moth’s salary 
 
$1423-2486 
 
$2,2258 
 
 
$744 
Government 
 
Government 
 
 
Government 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
